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Chapter I 
Personal Background to the Research 
 
 
 
1.1.  Escape from Violence:  Blessing or Disaster? 
 
A few days after violence broke out in the North Moluccas, some people thought 
it meant the end of my research.  Apparently, the village where I conducted my 
fieldwork was gone, burned to the ground.  I had just left Ngidiho for a few days 
to celebrate Christmas with our family in Yogyakarta.  On 27 December 1999, my 
husband and I were on the way back to Ngidiho, as we had promised to celebrate 
Idul Fitri with uncle Din (Oom Din) and his family. However, in North Sulawesi, 
we heard the news of the recent burning of the village during the explosion of 
violence.  We experienced shock and grief. 
 
The process of writing this book is like two sides of a coin.  It brings back many 
traumatic memories but it is also a healing therapy. In my original plans I 
expected to stay in Ngidiho until late January 2000, before taking a brief trip out.  
However I changed my schedule because of several factors.  First, I discovered 
that January and February 2000 would be key months that year, in the religious 
activities of the village, while December 1999 would be relatively quiet. 
Secondly, my laptop computer broke down, therefore it needed to be fixed.  
Thirdly, my research had proceeded very quickly and December was a good 
month to stop and evaluate my data.  Therefore, providentially, I left Halmahera 
in December 1999, before the violence spread to Galela.   
 
The tensions were spreading and rumours flew like wildfire after war in Central 
Halmahera led to the eviction of the Makians from Kao, followed by the slaughter 
of Christians in Tidore and Ternate in early November 1999.  Nevertheless, I felt 
safe in Ngidiho.  I was surrounded with loving people who condemned the 
increasing tensions between Muslims and Christians.  Oom Din sent a touching 
message to my husband to the effect that he should not worry about my safety.  
He said he would die himself, before he would allow anything bad to happen to 
me.  Fortunately, I left the village before his extravagant promise could be put to 
the test!  
 
However, Oom Din accompanied me as far as Ternate at the end of November 
1999, before my departure to Java.  Besides him, there were more than twenty of 
the Village Heads of the Galela District who were all Muslims. They went to 
attend a meeting for all the village Heads of the Galela District, organised by the 
governmental elites in Ternate.  None of the Christian village Heads made the trip 
due to the fears of fresh violence in Tidore and Ternate. It was very dangerous for 
“If nobody reads our studies – virtually in their entirety – our 
efforts are doomed to obscurity.  We need not apologize for 
efforts to make our work interesting” (Wolcott: 1995, 209). 
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Christians to travel to Ternate, but it was difficult to leave the area without going 
through Ternate.  
 
The village officials were going to attend a meeting, planned by the government, 
to discuss the offer of land from the state to those Galela peasants who had 
already sold their land to the Perusahaan Terbatas  Global Agronusa Indonesia 
(PT GAI), a Banana Company since it started operation in 1991 (see Chapter III).1    
In Ternate I stayed with a trusted Muslim friend (a Makian), who showed me 
around the damaged city.  I was probably the only Christian in Ternate at the time.  
I introduced my friend to Oom Din.  This was fortunate since later on, after the 
violence engulfed Galela, my friend was able to locate Oom Din and his family 
among the crowded Muslim refugees in Ternate who had fled from their burnt out 
villages (see Chapter VI).  Through my friend I was able to communicate with 
Oom Din after it became clear that I could not go back to Ngidiho. 
 
Violence and destruction engulfed almost the whole of Halmahera.  The village of 
Ngidiho was burned to the ground.  All of my belongings that I had left behind, 
including my motorcycle, were burned along with Oom Din’s house.  Over the 
telephone, he told the story of how he had tried to defend his house.  Many arrows 
were shot at him but he said he was invulnerable (kabal), and not one arrow 
entered his body.  He said he is invulnerable because he practices Sou-Sou.   
Sadly, in the end, his house was burned anyway while he and his family escaped.  
Christians had fled to Tobelo (the neighbouring district south of Galela) and 
Manado (North Sulawesi), while Muslim fled to Ternate and Tidore (see Chapter 
VI). 
                      
This tragedy was not the end of my research.  The more I wrote down my 
thoughts, the more I became conscious that my research is now even more 
valuable. My providential escape from the violence, not only may have saved my 
life.  It also helped protect me from the tragic bias that inevitably occurs when you 
have to identify with one of the warring sides in order to preserve your safety.  
While no one can claim perfect objectivity, at least I was free to continue my 
research without being drawn into the extreme emotions that accompany war.  It 
is a kind of miracle that I am able to continue this project while retaining love for 
people on both sides.   
 
Facing up to the unfolding reality of this tragedy, is like meeting the essence of 
truth that only expresses itself through a process of becoming that is never quite 
finished.  Perhaps only when finished reading the story that follows, will the 
reader understand the flaming sorrow that erupted from this human tragedy that  
recently occurred in the life of the people in Halmahera.  How could conflict erupt 
in a peaceful agrarian society to the point that thousands were killed and human 
life seemed to lose all value?  That is a question that lurks behind the extended 
series of questions that are waiting at the final stage of humanity’s own journey. 
This is also a question that I can share with the people the Moluccas by comparing 
                                                 
1 The interview was conducted with one of the Village Head of Galela District who was at the trip. 
Ternate, November  25, 1999. 
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different interpretations of the socio-political circumstances before and after the 
conflict in the North Moluccas (see Chapter VII). 
 
There are several goals of this research.  First, the aim is to understand the conflict 
and violence in Halmahera that peaked in 1999-2000.  Secondly, in order to do so 
we have to see how power relations have changed in the years/decades before 
1999. Thirdly, I want to show how conflict was fought through ritual.  Ritual is 
part of a socio-cultural history that functions in the making and solving of 
conflict.  Many rituals are created through a long historical process of social 
change.  These symbolic actions serve multiple purposes and are liable to be used 
as political tools that can drive people to violence. The participants are drawn into 
rival, all-pervasive perspectives on the events.  These perspectives almost 
perfectly reflect the picture of their convictions that stem from various symbols 
from their ethnic or religious commitments.  In all rituals there are elements of 
preparation, expression, meaning and fulfilment in the symbolic action that is 
carried out.  The tragedy of violence in the Moluccas followed a pattern like a 
customary ritual ceremony that focuses the power of the people.  In the centre of 
this ritual lies the quest for identity. 
 
Understanding this question and trying to answer it helps me to map the conflict 
and observe how the people managed to stop the violence.  In the process of 
writing, the question developed into two questions that provide a more analytic 
framework to guide my  research. These two question are: 
 
1).  What is the meaning of ritual and how does it function to create both 
solidarity and conflict in the community, thus influencing the formation of the 
people’s identities in North Moluccas? 
 
2).  How did political practices during the colonial period and Indonesian state 
rituals, shape regional political identities in North Moluccas?  
 
1.2.  A Researcher without Boundaries? 
 
While writing this dissertation, I experienced again my sorrow at the broken 
contact with the people with whom I used to live. Generally I could feel the 
barriers that still stand between people, families and neighbours after the conflict. 
However, I am inspired by their innocence and seriousness, their ignorance and 
their knowledge, and their anger and joy.  Their various moods of heart and mind 
inspire me to endure in the process of scientific research as a focal point of my 
own intellectual journey.  Even though, some of the people of Galela didn’t allow 
me to share in their inner thoughts, most of the people showed me honour and 
invited me to know them better, both during my first four-month stay in Ngidiho 
in 1999, and later when I returned to the area in February 2002 and March 2004.  
Through these people, I also learned about the others who didn’t want to have 
contact with me.  I observed their lives through their practices.  In their 
interactions with others I could see how they coped with the challenges of life 
they had to face.   
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As a researcher, I face certain boundaries that limit the areas in which I can 
explore the mysterious movements of the Galela people.  At the first Friday prayer 
time, I asked Oom Din whether I could attend the sholat 2 at the mosque, and he 
said no.  He said this is the rule that he has to follow, as he is not allowed to go to 
the church for a Christian service.  Oom Din imposed this boundary because I am 
a Christian, even though my religion does not itself require such boundaries.  
There are borders imposed, which condition a people’s experience of “the other”.  
This particular boundary of religion did not abolish other kinds of tolerance that 
people can give and receive.  For example, I was invited to attend a thanksgiving 
prayer (tahlilan) at their new unfinished mosque, before they poured the cement 
foundation for its roof.  This was an uncommon invitation since, according to 
local custom, only men are allowed to attend the prayers at a family gathering.  
Women cook but the men eat after the prayers are finished. 
 
A barrier is erected when people start to distinguish their living practices from 
others.  Divisions are strengthened through religious rituals that express a political 
identity. The borders that separated me from certain activities created a feeling of 
secrecy.  For example, when I was taught not to visit people at dinnertime, 
because of their belief in taboos (boboso), I conformed to their practices and I 
didn’t go. Although going to the mosque during the sholat is not permitted for 
those who are non-Muslims, visiting the mosque at other times and for other 
purposes is freely permitted.  Later I discovered that among the Ngidiho Muslims, 
a distinction is made between the secrecy surrounding traditional taboos (boboso) 
and (saali), which were considered a human production and Muslim taboos, 
which ruled their religious practices (fardu, Arabic for “the law of God”). 
 
So, what were my boundaries?  This question became urgent when I had to decide 
whether or not to return to Galela after the violence broke out.  I did not want to 
go to the Christian community in Tobelo, where I would be accepted, because that 
would identify me with the enemies of the Muslims of Galela.  Nor could I return 
to Galela where there was no possibility for me to be among Muslim villagers 
who were at war with Christians.  With this last realization, I began to see clearly 
the border that had been vague during my stay in Galela, before the conflict in 
December 1999.  When a taboo no longer strengthens the relationships within 
families and between friends in a small village, the taboo, which marks a border, 
looses power to regulate boundaries of behaviours and can unleash violence. 
 
Nevertheless, taboos, including the sharply drawn boundary between Muslims and 
Christians during the explosion of violence, must be respected.  With respect for 
their borders, which had now been drawn in blood, I decided to just portray 
Halmahera from a distance.  When we heard of the bloodshed, my husband who 
had deep concern for the people of Halmahera, both Christians and Muslims, 
wanted to visit them.  We were in Manado at the time, not far away, and he 
managed to arrange passage on a private ship.  However it was clear to me that I 
                                                 
2 Sholat is usually translated prayer, but in fact is closer to our understanding of the word 
“worship.” 
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could not go.  Fortunately, his plan to enter the dangerous area was prevented by 
an unusual illness.  Before the ship left, mysterious lumps began growing on his 
neck.  We left Manado in search of medical help and eventually the lumps were 
removed through an operation in Singapore.  Until now, we still do not know 
what was the cause of his sickness. 
 
When I first became deeply involved in the human tragedy of the Moluccas, I felt 
that it would be impossible to write an academic study about it.  Besides being 
unprepared to deal with this kind of disaster, I also doubted where I stood in it all, 
and felt that I must be very careful in writing about such a violent tragedy.  Even 
though I gathered mountains of valuable data on the Moluccan conflict that was 
no guarantee that I could finish such a demanding task.  Conflicts in Indonesia are 
complex and sensitive phenomena.  It is very easy to be carried away in a river of 
emotions in the direction of prejudices that can subvert the possibility of an 
appropriate and balanced view of the problem.  Perhaps it is easier to write about 
‘violence’ in a distant, conceptual manner without having to experience the 
anguish of its practice.  For me, it required a long period of reflection before I 
could arrive at a responsible perspective that integrated my own thoughts, anxiety 
and feelings of ignorance.  
 
The complexity of violence in Indonesia cannot be explained through a simplistic 
model of provocation that results in religious conflict.  Currently, everywhere in 
Indonesia, tension between human groups is very high.  The tension breaks out in 
village level violence, where people are mobilised for attacking another village.   
Indonesia is justly famous for its gentle, hospitable, tolerant people, who generally 
live in peace together in spite of remarkable cultural diversity.  But during the 
period of my research, even small tensions could erupt into bloodshed.   
 
In the Moluccan conflict, and various other open conflicts that are chronic in 
Indonesia, tensions are manipulated through the use of symbols of race, ethnicity 
and religion. Sophisticated methods are used to socialize emotional symbols 
capable of mobilizing large numbers of people.  Public opinion is formed such 
that false rumours are transformed into facts that are based on fears. 
Simultaneously, people believe the promises of material benefits such as land and 
wealth after they achieve victory over their “enemy”.  Each group ties itself 
together through charges against their enemies and attack based on the conviction 
that these charges are true.  Convictions transform rumours into reality, and leave 
us guessing about what really happened in the region. 
 
Among the victims of this human disaster are simple people who know the history 
of their sharing every day in a rural community but are not in  a positon to 
critically evaluate a discourse that mixes their local quarrels with transcendent 
beliefs.  When an adversarial ideology is created by important and powerful 
people, the villagers are forced to choose and agree with the dominant discourse. 
As time goes by they become more and more sure of the truth of a discourse 
which at first they may have doubted or denied. 
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This dissertation is not just an academic report, but nor is it a novel.  It is a modest 
attempt to express one aspect of the truth about what happened in North Moluccas 
as experienced by the ordinary people.  Therefore it is both a narration and an 
academic work of research.  As an academic analysis this dissertation strives for 
accuracy, honesty and impartiality.  But it is also a work that springs from the 
stories that I heard and experienced together with the communities of Halmahera.  
The questions and reflections of the Halmaheran people over the past 13 years, 
since I began working with them in a community development project in 1990, 
are a part of this dissertation.   
 
1.3.  Becoming a Scientific Analysis 
 
Writing this dissertation on this topic is my fate as an Indonesian and a  
Moluccan-Javanese social scientist, who happened to be doing research in the area 
when the conflict broke out. I have tried to avoid polemics intended to justify or 
condemn any particular party. Listening, witnessing and reflecting on national 
discourses, local opinion and ordinary practices, has driven me to think about 
creative, appropriate and united approaches to map the problem in the North 
Moluccas, and the Moluccas at large. This study provides a microanalysis of 
social change at the village level in relation to macro changes in the regional, 
national and international spheres. It is intended for those concerned about social 
conflict and conflict resolution in general.  More specifically it is about how the 
local people of Halmahera cope with violence. It is hoped that the study will 
prove useful to those who have been involved in the conflict, in their own efforts 
to solve their own problems. The information contained in this study is intended 
for humanitarian purposes to improve our knowledge and understanding and to 
aid the people in their efforts to rebuild their lives after a terrible loss. 
 
The causes of violence in Ngidiho lie in the history and geo-political conditions of 
the region.  People, who are the subjects of the violence, are also the subjects of 
reconciliation. This study does not focus on violence, as if it were the main 
concern for explaining the destruction in the Ngidiho society.  Locating the study 
in a bigger picture of the political transformation of Indonesian society, provides 
me with sources for understanding how identities have been shaped through the 
long, historical struggles of the people in the area.  This approach is consistent 
with my moral commitments as a researcher who portrays the people as agents of 
transformation.  Local practices and the history of ordinary people have to be 
respected. 
 
I was privileged to experience the struggles of the people just before and after the 
violence.  This made it possible to analyse this case study comprehensively based 
on direct observation.  This study shows that power distinguishes and identifies 
the people according to their interests, belief and history.  Their relationships 
include elements of trust, competition, agreement, modes of exchange, hierarchy, 
domination and subjugation.  This creates the potential both for conflict and 
reconciliation. Conflict in inter-personal affairs can become large scale when its 
nature is structured and mobilized by each group involved in the dispute. 
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Solidarity is negotiated through common symbols, history and material interests 
of each group.  
 
The New Order regime (the popular name for the government of President 
Suharto who ruled Indonesia from 1966 - 1998), homogenized differences and 
created a myth of a single national identity at the expense of democratisation.  The 
collapse of the New Order in 1998 also threatened the national unity of Indonesia. 
Indonesia is searching for a new political format that respects regional, ethnic and 
religious differences.  The homogenizing method is still practiced in the process 
of uniting each group according to their ethnic or religious affiliation.  The New 
Order regime asserted its power in sharp contrast with the former authorities of 
the Old Order and the Colonialists.  The Reformation government uses the same 
tactics and in the process obscures the richness of ethno-religious values as they 
appear in the ethnographic account of the Ngidiho people.  Homogenisation of 
groups benefits the politicians in terms of short-term material support but 
undermines the long tradition of democratisation and justice in Indonesian society 
(see Chapters III, V, VIII). 
 
Identity politics as a means of homogenizing and regimenting people can be 
traced to the early colonial period.  Dutch colonialism followed a policy of 
“divide and rule”, while nationalism stressed “unity”.  My research examines how 
identity formation has impacted the Indonesian people, especially those who are 
in the region of the North Moluccas.  Primary and secondary resources of 
historical accounts are employed in this research to articulate the shaping process 
of identity politics of the local people.  I examine the historical origins of ancient 
symbols and ritual practices that appeared during the process of the recent 
conflict.  My interpretation of the historical accounts is based on what different 
groups in Halmaheran society perceive about their own history (see Chapters IV, 
VII and VIII).  
 
In their fascinating discussion of the invention of tradition, Hobsbawm and 
Ranger were unable to show how old material is used in new traditions and how 
new languages are needed for extending the meaning of old symbols (Hobsbawm: 
1984 [1983], 7). This is because they work from archival or documentary sources 
and do not observe the process.  In my research I watched new traditions come 
into being.  This dissertation elaborates how Indonesian politics employs ritual, 
drawing from the practices that are available in Indonesian society.  If ritual is 
viewed only as a kind of spiritual practice it will result in a misinterpreting of the 
social history of the people.  The Halmaheran people establish and re-establish 
their practices in order to form their identities in relation to their memories of the 
past. 
 
The violence of the recent years worsens the relationships of not only the Ngidiho 
people but also the entire society of the North Moluccas. There might be sceptical 
feelings among Indonesians as well as other readers towards the efforts of 
reconciliation after the trouble and violence.  In this study, I give an empirical 
account on how the people and their history have changed after the conflict.  In 
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order to create a conflict, a universal symbol can be used to mobilize the people.  
During the process of reconciliation, such symbols tend to be localized in the 
context of kinship and village so that the people can develop their trust in a 
natural way (see Chapter VII).  In order to understand the Moluccan conflict, we 
need not only to focus upon its history and the violence, but also on the way 
people try to settle it afterwards by negotiation and the creation of new meanings.  
 
Drawing this analysis from the everyday practices of the people provides lots of 
material sources to reconstruct the socio-political history of the people.  I use my 
own ethnographic accounts as the main instrument for examining the present 
practices of the people.  Older sources of ethnographic accounts can be found in 
the travelling reports that were written by Dutch missionaries who worked at the 
region.  I carefully examine both primary and secondary resources in order to 
understand the interpretations and assumptions that coloured their work (see 
Chapters III and IV).  I trace the oral history of the people by observing their 
present practices together with their own explanations. With this approach,  I hope 
the world of Galela can be seen through the eyes of the people.  
 
A multidisciplinary approach is required to come up with a viable interpretation 
about the real experiences of the people (see Chapter II).  As an ethnographer I 
have to admit my limitations, both in the mastery of all the social scientific 
disciplines (including anthropology, history, economics, sociology, political 
science and study of religion), and in access to all the perspectives available.  
Every researcher has a limited “horizon of meaning”.  I cannot claim access to all 
of the narrations from the people that would be required to understand all of the 
dynamics of these complex events. However, with a careful study, I have tried to 
locate this case study of the transformation of the Ngidiho people in chronological 
and thematic order starting from the period before the conflict and ending with the 
stage of reconciliation after the violence had ended.  
 
As a part of an academic community, I have to explain theoretical approaches, 
assumptions, hypotheses, the core questions and methodologies that are employed 
in this study.  In the second chapter, I will discuss broadly the theory of ritual as 
an entrance to portray this case study.  Social science theory is determined by a 
dominant worldview and discourse (Gouldner: 1970; Marcus and Fischer: 1995).  
In this study I don’t have any intention of building a universal theory.  Rather, I 
concentrate on local actors, such as the people in Ngidiho, who cope with an 
extreme situation of change in their social life.  The people who survive violence 
are radically transformed.  
 
In anthropological research, ritual is a debatable subject that gives rise to many 
polemics.  This study concentrates on the analysis of ritua l in North Moluccas.  In 
North Moluccas, rituals are dynamic. They are reciprocal acts of negotiation and 
exchange, which unite and distinguish people by symbolic actions that express 
political, social, cultural and economic power differences. Some readers might not 
appreciate my long discussion of the theory of the ritual and politics (see Chapter 
II).  However I need social theory as an analytical tool to examine the unique 
phenomena of the field research.  This theoretical approach leads me to focus on 
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the dominant discourses used in the political and academic debates about the 
ongoing conflict in the Moluccas at large. Admitting the possibility that a case 
study based on the experience of one village or one area oversimplifies the 
conflict, I invite other scholars and lay readers to interact with the process of 
interpretation in this empirical study.  I would like to see this study as an opening 
dialogue between Indonesians and international scholars to enrich our 
understanding of how to cope with violence in the context of social change. 
 
1.4.  From the Field:  a New Province 
 
When I wrote my research proposal in 1999, Halmahera was still a part of the 
Province of the Moluccas. The North Moluccas was a Regency in the Province.  
On October 12, 1999, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs in Jakarta officially 
announced the establishment of the Province of the North Moluccas. The need for 
a separate province of the North Moluccas was first stated about fifty years ago, 
and again during the Permesta period (1959-61) before it was fulfilled.3  On 
October 20, 1999, people celebrated the delivery of the Legal Documents (pataka 
Propinsi), brought by the Caretaker of the new province, Surasmin, into the land 
of the North Moluccas, which people called Bumi Maluku- Kie-Raha. They saw 
this event as a sign of the freedom of which they had been dreaming.  The 
opening ritual called Joko Kaha, which means, “step on the land” was conducted 
in Ternate. The people were dressed up in traditional costumes and rode in their 
kora-kora (Ternatenese traditional war boats).  The articulation of old memories 
of the pride of the Northern Muslim kingdoms, as it appeared in the celebrations, 
felt like a miracle had occurred and there was now no going back.  According to 
many newspapers the welcoming ceremony for the new province was more 
festive than the welcome given to the Indonesian president.4   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 (Djahir, M.S :1964).   See also Radar Ternate ( October  23, 1999). 
4 See,  Radar Ternate  (October  23, 1999). 
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Map 1:  Province of the North Moluccas 
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The changing of the status of the North Moluccas was not a new idea.  Rather it 
reflected an effort to revitalize the idea of the realm of Maluku-Kie-Raha that is 
portrayed in Moluccan political myths.  Maluku-Kie-Raha refers to the four 
vulcanic islands of Ternate, Tidore, Moti, and Makian. These were associated 
with four “sultanates”, namely Jailolo and Bacan besides the Sultanates of Tidore 
and Ternate. The Sultan of Ternate appeared to be the most successful  in dealing 
with the colonial powers (see Chapter IV). 
 
Maintaining a degree of independence in directing his government, the Sultan of 
Ternate was involved in all trade agreements managed by colonial powers (van 
Fraassen:1999). The colonial powers implemented a policy of destroying the 
production of spices in the Northern part of the Moluccan archipelago in order to 
break down the power of the Sultanates. The colonial government which 
controlled central and Southern Moluccas set up a new centre for the production 
of spices in Ambon and its neighbouring island where were easier to dominate 
than the areas controlled by the Sultan. 
 
This colonial policy influenced the Indonesian government policy during both the 
Old Order and the New Order regimes to locate Ambon as the centre of the 
Province of the Moluccas.  It did so because of the availability of developed 
infrastructures in Ambon with the effect that the Muslim majority area in the 
North was second to the Christian areas around Ambon in development efforts. 
The present distinction between the peoples of the North Moluccas, the Central 
Moluccas and the South Moluccas is not only based on cultural differences but  
also on their inherited traditions of government.  
 
After Independence, the Old and New Order governments minimized the role of 
the Sultans in the North Moluccas.  The end of the Sultan’s power to run his 
territory came in 1956 when D.M.M. Usman Syah stepped down from his position 
as the “Resident” of Ternate.5  The term “Resident” was used by the Dutch to 
name a governmental officer who served as a bridge between a Governor and a 
Regent.  The Indonesian government practiced a politics of centralisation among 
the official bureaucracy by appointing members of the Javanese middle class to 
strategic positions throughout the whole country.  As a result, the North Moluccan 
Sultans disappeared into largely symbolic roles during most of the first fifty years  
of Indonesian independence.   
 
The collapse of Suharto’s New Order government in May  21, 1998, opened the 
way for minority groups to struggle for their regional autonomy (see Chapter V). 
It also revived the ancient enmity between the neighbouring “brothers”:: the 
Sultan of Ternate and the Sultan of Tidore.  The Sultan of Ternate (a Muslim) was 
allied with disenfranchised traditional groups such as the indigenous  tribes of 
Kao, Halmahera, who are predominantly Christian (or “animist”); although about 
10% are Muslim.  In her study, Leontine Visser noted that the Sultan of Ternate 
traditionally received support from the districts of Sahu, Jailolo and Dodinga, in 
the form of manpower for wars and tributes of rice (Visser:1989, 19).  Some 
                                                 
5 See, Informasi Kecamatan (1993, 2)   
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traditional North Moluccans saw him as a natural choice for Governor of the new 
province.   
 
However, the Sultan of Ternate was strongly opposed by a group of professional 
people who were members of the government bureaucracy.  A well-educated 
group from the island of Makian had dominated the channels of political and 
economic power in Ternate for the past twenty years or more.  They were anxious 
not to lose their power to a resurgent Sultanate, whom they also viewed as an 
apostate Muslim.  In the struggle to re-establish their power in the new Province 
of the North Moluccas, the Makian professionals allied with the Sultan of Tidore 
against the Sultan of Ternate.  The tension, between the Sultan of Ternate and 
Tidore included controversy over the location of the capital of the North Moluccas 
(Ternate or Tidore), and over who should become the new governor (see Chapter 
V). 
 
The island of Halmahera resembles a letter ‘K’ and was divided into two 
territories, or Regencies before it became a Province.  The two wings, upper and 
below were included in the Regency of the North Moluccas with its capital city on 
the island and city of Ternate.  The Centre belonged to the Special Regency of 
Central Halmahera.  Its capital was located in the town of Soa Sio, on the island of 
Tidore.  Ternate and Tidore are two small islands, close to each other and not far 
from the Western side of Halmahera.   After the North Moluccas was upgraded to 
a Province in 2002, Galela was divided into several Districts.  Tobelo became the 
capital of the Regency of Northern Halmahera.  The plans to increase the number 
of official Regencies in the province of the North Moluccas was realized through 
regulation number 1, 2003 or UU Pemekaran Propinsi Maluku Utara No. 1, 2003 
(see Chapter VII). 
 
Since 1971, the Sultan of Ternate has been involved with the ruling Golkar party 
which appointed him as one of the representatives in the delegation of the North 
Moluccan Regency to the DPR (Parliament), in Jakarta (see van Fraassen:1999, 
60).  Golkar is the party of the former New Order government.  The elite 
competition between the Sultan of Ternate, and his rivals became obvious during 
the era of reform in Indonesia, which started in 1998.  When I was in Ngidiho, I 
listened, through the radio, to the ordination ceremony for the Sultan of Ternate, 
H. Mudaffar Syah, to become the Head of the Legislative Assembly of the North 
Moluccas Province (DPRD).  His appointment as the head of DPRD stemmed 
from his leadership of the Golkar party. On October 18, 1999, after the 
announcement of the new province, H. Djafar Syah, a distant relative of the Sultan 
of Ternate, was ordained as the Sultan of Tidore.  These two Sultans were not 
destined to become friends, but rather bitter rivals.  Later, after the clash between 
them could not be hidden any longer, the rival faction in the DPRD fired the 
Sultan of Ternate as the Head of the DPRD. 6  Even Akbar Tanjung the Head of 
Golkar in Jakarta, became involved.  He pressured the Head of the Indonesian 
                                                 
6 See  Bernas  (January 28, 2000).  According to some accounts, the faction of his opponents fired 
him after his supporters in the DPRD had been forced to flee.  This additional information is from 
a member of the DPRD, whom I interviewed in Manado, in August 2000. 
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Police to condemn the Sultan of Ternate.7  The Sultan of Ternate was accused of 
being a “provocateur” who sharpened the conflict between Christians and 
Muslims because of his own political ambitions (see Chapters V and VI). 
 
When I arrived in August 1999, I heard five versions of the story about why 
fighting had broken out between the Kao and the Makian peoples.  Although this 
conflict was the embryo of the violence that eventually engulfed the whole of the 
North Moluccas, it is interesting to note that none of the five stories I heard at this 
stage mentioned religion as a dominant factor in the violence. 
 
Firstly, the government of the North Moluccas saw the tension as a territorial 
problem.  In 1975, the Makians were moved from the island of Makian by the 
local government, to settle in the district of Kao.  Kao is located in the interior, on 
the Southern portion of the upper wing of Halmahera.  The Makians came from an 
island located close to the island of Tidore to the West of Halmahera. They 
resettled in the village of Malifut, in the region of Kao because the volcano on 
their island was threatening to erupt.8  In July 1988, the volcano erupted and more 
people from Makian came to live in Malifut. The area controlled by the Makians 
had gradually expanded, and they were slated to take over another part of Kao, 
including five villages of the indigenous Kao people. The five villages of Kao are 
Gayok, Wangeotak, Malifut/Sosol, Balisosang and Tabobo. The Kao people felt 
very threatened when the provincial elite (dominated by Makians), issued Rules 
for Regional Government, PP 42, 1999, concerning the establishment of the 
District of the Makian in Malifut, including the five villages from the district of 
Kao. The Kao people felt this was illegitimate and counter to their historical rights 
and would further divide their land and their people. Therefore, not only the five 
villages, but also the whole of Kao rejected the government’s approval of this 
decision (see Chapters V and VII).9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7  Bernas, (October  9, 2000).  
8 See,   Ternate Post, ( November  2-8, 1999). 
9 See the letter, which was signed by sixty-four Kao leaders including religious leaders, traditional 
leaders, societal leaders and youth representatives on August 27, 1999.  This letter was sent to the 
Head of the Regency of the North Moluccas in Ternate. 
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Map 2:  The Location of Kao and Malifut Makian Daratan Districts 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, according to people in Ternate with whom I met before going to 
Halmahera, the tension between Kao and Malifut (Makian) resulted from a 
struggle between political elites over who should be the preferred candidate for 
Governor in the anticipated new Province of the North Moluccas.  The riots in 
Kao and Malifut were expected to affect the nomination of the Sultan of Ternate 
as one of the candidates for governor because the Kao people supported him while 
the Makian had their own candidate.  The expansion of Malifut Makian Daratan 
challenged the authority and prestige of the Sultan of Ternate, who was 
traditionally viewed as the protector of Kao. 
 
Thirdly, the Kao people considered the tension between the Makian people and 
themselves as a traditional tribal war, to be fought according to the traditions of 
their ancestors.  Tribal warfare has a long tradition in Halmahera.  They believed 
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that Kao was a federation of tribal groups that formed a single ethnic unity.10  
Another ethnic group now threatened this unity.  When the violence first broke 
out, they fought by traditional rules, consistently attacked the people of Makian, 
but not their possessions, buildings or mosques.  In the early part of the war, the 
Kao people didn’t burn or loot the belongings of the Makian people because that 
would violate the traditional rules of tribal warfare.  Since 10% of the Kao people 
were Muslim, they were careful to avoid any attacks of religious property or 
officials.  In contrast, the Makian people played by different rules.  From the first 
outbreak of violence, they burned the churches, schools and the houses of the two 
closest villages of the Kao people.  By defining the conflict as religious in nature, 
they were able to appeal for help from outside (see Chapter VI). However the 
Muslims of Kao (10%), even today, remain united with the Christians of Kao 
(90%)11, in opposing the Makian people (see Chapter VII). 
 
Fourthly, as some people in Tobelo observed, there are deep cultural differences 
between the Kao and the Makian.  Even a Christian resident of Tobelo who was 
sympathetic to the Kao people, acknowledged that the Makians were hard 
working, successful and intelligent people, who far outstripped the Kao in their 
ability to gain access to education, wealth and power.  Their ethnic network 
organisation has been designed to give easy access to Makian people to compete 
well for positions within the modern institutions of the bureaucracy, military, 
government, business and education. The Makians are also strict Muslims. In 
contrast, the majority of Kao people still follow a very traditional lifestyle of 
hunting, gathering and simple agriculture, and are proud of their tradition of being 
warriors.  Those who attempt to modernize their lifestyle find it difficult to 
compete in institutions dominated by the Makian.  Many of the Kao who are 
officially Christian or Muslim, in fact still follow the religious practices of their 
traditional religion.  The vacuum of power created in the transition period led to 
the outbreak of long-festering grievances between the two cultural groups. 
 
Lastly, some people, including Muslims in Ngidiho, argued that the tension 
between the Kao and the Makian people was primarily an economic conflict over 
control of a gold mine. In 1998, an Australian company, named Nusa Halmahera 
Minerals coorporation with Indonesian Mining Enterprises (PT Aneka Tambang) 
which is a State Owned Enterprise (BUMN), made a sizable investment to 
develop a gold mining operation in Gosowong near the disputed area of the five 
Kao villages.12  These five, Kao villages, including the mine, were designated to 
join the district of Malifut Makian Daratan at the instigation of a Makian 
controlled bureaucracy.  The Kao people responded by saying if the decision were 
not reversed, they would drive all the Makian into the sea.  My Muslim 
                                                 
10 My interview with one of the Christian Kao leaders in Tobelo. Interview was conducted in 
August 1999. The confirmation of this point of view with the Kao people will be explained in 
Chapter VII.  
11 The Christians are divided into Protestant with the affiliation of GMIH (75%), Catholic (10%) 
and Pentecost (5%). GMIH is an acronym for Gereja Masehi Injili di Halmahera  (The Christian 
Evangelical Church in Halmahera). See the report about the riot in Kao-Malifut Makian Daratan 
written by the Synod of GMIH, Tobelo: September 6, 1999. 
12 See Manado Post (January 5,2000). 
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informants in Ngidiho expressed some sympathy for the Kao people.  They had 
also experienced the loss of control over their own land through the presence of 
the Banana Company, PT GAI in 1991. Some said that they would do the same 
thing as the people of Kao to protect their rights.  However, by December 1999, 
Ngidiho and the whole of Galela were caught up the violence. 
 
Complex factors influenced the rise of the conflict in 1999-2000.  If the Sultans in 
the North Moluccas were part of an ancient kin-network, how did the conflict 
erupt among them and how did it suck the common people into the maelstrom of 
violence? In order to understand the potential conflicts latent in the Moluccan 
leadership requires a historical study of their relationships in the competition for 
power in the region since the colonial period.  This book examines the history of 
religious conversions in the Moluccas and how they were used to create allies in 
the struggles for dignity and justice (see Chapter IV). 
 
Kinship relationships are important in the changing society of Galela.  Kinship 
and households are usually seen as categories of social group formation through 
biological reproduction, which perform the functions of cultural production, and 
actualise the daily needs of their members.  However, kinship may also be 
understood in the larger sense of how the geographical range of an ego’s social 
field is extended (Harris: 1990, 79).  In this research I want to show how the 
inhabitants of an area are interconnected and what this mean for the exchange of 
loyalty, services and materials among them.   
 
The extent of a person’s social network is adjusted to fit the symbol system to 
which he or she refers.  My research investigates the meaning inherent in 
relationships within or between the symbolic units of a culture.  In practice, 
kinship is better understood as a type of normative commitment than as a 
subcategory of genealogical relations.  Genealogical relations are not enough to 
bind people together. They need relationships based on familial idioms such as are 
found in sharing the same adat (traditional laws and customs), or the same 
religious practices. The formation of ethnic and religious institutions facilitates 
imaginative networks that are structured from the village level all the way up to 
regional and national institutions.  The people find identity by allying with kin or 
religious networks, which are often structured by political and material interests 
that shape the loyalty of the people. 
 
The above concepts help clarify why mounting tensions in Galela led to alienation 
between members of the same language, ethnic and  village group.  Even members 
of the same family who adhered to different religions were caught up in rival 
warring groups.  Kinship relationships are facing a severe challenge in the society 
of the North Moluccas.  People ask how the facts of biological relatedness, as we 
understand them, are significant in the new cultural realities, which they have to 
face.  In the current crisis, religious affiliation usually supersedes kinship ties.  
Surprisingly, the case of the genealogical relationship between the Sultan of 
Ternate and the Sultan of Tidore, who share common blood as believed in the 
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myth of Maluku-Kie-Raha, and even adhere to the same religion, does not fit this 
explanation. The realities of a power struggle and political motivation for the 
creation of the idiom of Maluku-Kie-Raha may overthrow all kinds of ties (see 
Chapter IV). 
 
1.5.  Returning to Galela.13 
 
Travelling to Galela, for me was like going home.  During 1990-1993, I worked in 
this area at a community developmental project based in Tobelo.  Carrying lots of 
questions concerning the nature of social change among the people of Galela, I 
went to Central Java to do further study.  This brought me to conduct research in 
Galela on how the impact of developmental policies in the region affected 
changes in people’s values and lifestyles (Risakotta: 1995a). With the opportunity 
for wider study, I have developed these issues into a PhD research project at 
ASSR-UVA that brought me back to the area in August 1999.  However, this 
time, I didn’t go to Galela by myself.  My husband shared this returning home 
with me.  There were plans to bring my supervisors to see the people and the land 
that had such a profound effect on my own personal growth.  Unfortunately, only 
Ibu (or mother) Leontine Visser could witness the fieldwork I was doing in the 
early stages of my stay.  The violence that broke out put an end to our plans. 
 
                          
 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Picture 1:  Mount Tarakani, the Symbol of Galela.  It is viewed he re from the 
Nothern part of the island. 
 
                                                 
13 The name “Galela” according to local myth, comes from the word “lela” which means a flower 
“lilla”. This was a favourite flower of Sultan Batjan. Therefore it was called “Gamlela”.  Gam 
means village and lela is the flower of lilla (de Jongh: 1909, 753). 
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Inhabited by 31,227 people14 at the end of November 1999, Galela with a 
landmass of 587.5 km2 is located on the North East of the left upper wing of the 
large island of Halmahera.  This island faces the Pacific Ocean and is a gateway 
for world trade, providing an alternative to the trade link from Singapore to the 
countries of the world. This area is a part of the Pacific Belt Economic 
Development, which localises Menado-Bitung as the centre of integrated 
economic development in Eastern Indonesia (see  Manajemen Stratejik,1999, 5).15  
Among the 353 islands in the Northern part of the Moluccas, Halmahera is the 
biggest. The old name for Halmahera was Almaeira, a word that is said to come 
from the language of Ternate “Alu Ma Eira”, which means ‘a base for boats’ 
(Magany:1984:8).   
 
Map 3: Galela and the Pacific Trade Lane 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14  See, The Religion Office (November, 1999). 
15 See also Kompas (October 17, 2000) 
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On our trip to the site of my field research, we found that the normal land route 
across Halmahera was blocked by conflict between the indigenous people of Kao, 
and the immigrant settlers who live in the Kao territory.  The immigrants were the 
Makian people from the island of Makian   Therefore my husband and I took a 
boat trip from Ternate to Tobelo, by way of Morotai, rounding the top of the 
Western tip of Halmahera.  Taking a boat trip, gives a different feeling for the 
islands.  We paid double to obtain a simple sleeping berth, because of the 
overwhelming number of passengers who were unable to use the road.  The trip 
took about 24 hours, including a few hours stop in the sleepy town of Daruba on 
the island of Morotai.  During World War II it was chosen as a launching point for 
the U.S. allied forces Pacific strategy, along with Pearl Harbour and the 
Philippines (cf Green: 1996).  In Daruba, a huge old airbase, left over from World 
War II is still operated by the Indonesian Air Force.  The roof of our sleeping 
place on the boat was too low to sit or stand up, so we spent many hours sitting on 
the front deck, watching the dancing performances of a school of dolphins, as 
islands slid by and the sky displayed many dramatic changes of weather, colour 
and light.   
                              
Map 4:  Sea Routes from Ternate to Tobelo and  The Trans-Halmahera Route 
 
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After a few days in Tobelo and Ngidiho, my husband returned to Java and I 
accompanied him as far as Ternate.  By this time the trans-North Halmahera 
highway had just been opened by the military, but we had to rent a car to take us, 
as public transportation still did not dare make the trip. We were in the first 
vehicle to pass through the area, accompanied by an armed soldier in the more 
dangerous areas.  Travelling from Ngidiho in Northeastern Galela to the Southern 
part of the North Moluccas in Ternate, we passed several districts such as Galela, 
Tobelo, Kao, and Jailolo. Entering the regions of district Kao and Malifut, we saw 
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many burned buildings and groups of people armed with spears and long knives.  
In the area of Kao, there were also magic amulets hanging by the road, evidence 
that this war was not just fought with physical weapons. Going through the 
Malifut district, several times we were stopped by local armed groups who 
searched our car for passengers who were native to Kao. Our soldier carried a big 
gun, which he poked at anyone who questioned our right to pass. Fortunately, the 
car made it through the area safely.   
 
                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2:  The road in the Kao – Malifut area, which was blocked with 
drums and stones, along with flags and bottles containing magic spells. 
 
While writing about my experiences, I remember how I enjoyed my time in 
Ngidiho where the people were proud of their uniqueness as a village where 
Muslims and Christians lived peacefully together and a visitor could be drawn to 
love and to be loved during her or his stay with them.  Oom Din welcomed me 
into his home with the explanation that a house is blessed if there are people 
staying in it. I still feel the truth of what Oom Din said about the blessing of his 
house. I lived as a member of his family, which included about 13 people living 
under one roof. This family was a starting point for me to understand the 
characteristics of households in Ngidiho during a period of a rapid agricultural 
modernisation, social turmoil and political tension (see Chapters III, VI and VII).  
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Map 5:  Galela and its Neighbouring Districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staying with the family of Oom Din provided many opportunities for me to know 
lots of people.  I made friends both inside and outside of the house.   Besides his 
position as a member of Local Islamic Court (Badan Sara) at the Mosque, Oom 
Din is also a healer or tukang obat  that in Galela is called a Sou-Sou.  Because of 
this role, many people who were sick would come to his house to receive help. 
This also was a great opportunity for me to know them.  Actually, I began to 
recognize the importance of rituals in the people’s lives while staying at 
 his house.  At night, Oom Din frequently attended religious ceremonies 
conducted at the houses of other people.  Surprisingly, he allowed me to come 
with him.   
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Picture 3:  Oom Din, who is on the right, plays an important role in leading 
religious rituals for the village. 
 
The organization of social life in Ngidiho is closely related to agricultural 
activities. Even though the primary occupation of some villagers may not be 
farming, their spare time is used for agricultural activities. Often people have 
mutiple jobs. They may be a traditional farmer as well as a laborer at the Banana 
Company or harbour.  Or their main work is as a teacher or a mechanic, but they 
also farm their own land.  Retired farmers who are too old to work often receive 
half the income from their children’s labour on the family raki (plantation). Some 
villagers consider themselves pure, traditional farmers who only own their raki 
and doro (gardens).  Raki is a traditional name for plantations, of perennial crops 
such as coconut, which provide security for their future.  Doro or garden is the 
place where people plant annual subsistence crops such as rice and vegetables to 
live on as long as the coconut plants are not ready to harvest.  Raki and doro may 
be used for the same field, depending on how they are planted for different 
purposes with different crops.   
 
The people of Ngidiho have developed different ways to supplement their income 
since the Banana Company set up in the area.  One day my motorcycle had a flat 
tire just before I went out of the house.  There were some young men sitting on 
the bamboo bench under the tree in the front of Oom Din’s house.  I didn’t know  
how to find somebody in the village to fix the tire.  They said to me that I need not 
worry.  Behind Oom Din’s house there is the house of a mechanic who can lend a 
tire pump.  They went to see him but came back with nothing because the owner 
said that the pump was broken.  Oom Din was there too. He said to me, “Ibu, it is 
his work which he needs to make a living.  Thus it is better for you to pay”.  His 
statement made me aware that present-day Ngidiho is not like a village ten years 
ago where money was not the centre of people’s economic life.  Quickly, I said 
that surely, I would pay.  The young men returned to the neighbour’s house again 
and soon came back with a miraculously fixed pump.  The people in Ngidiho 
know how to make money to survive in their lives.16  
                                                 
16 Tragically, the man who fixed my tire was killed in the violence in December 1999.  
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At different levels and time periods, over many centuries, the Galela people have 
been influenced by various agencies that introduced new crops and new divisions 
of labour.  However, only in the recent past has there been developmental change, 
which depends on sophisticated technology like that used by PT GAI, the Banana 
Company.  Even though the people have a complex classification system 
describing the stages of banana cultivation (see Yoshida:1980, 25),17 in the past 
people didn’t grow bananas for the local market.  However, when the joint 
venture, PT GAI, an export-oriented multinational corporation (MNC) set up 
production in the area, it brought many new workers who came from far and wide.  
The total number of labourers at the end of November 1999 was 4,635 people. 
Half of labours registered themselves as villagers of Ngidiho although they were 
not indigenous and didn’t even stay at the village.  Most labourers stayed in 
simple houses, about 21 square meters, provided by the Banana Company. There 
were 1,365 houses available in November 1999.18   Half of the labours originated 
from Galela, about 170 people were contract labourers from Java, and the 
remainder were from other parts of Indonesia, including the North Moluccas, 
(Tobelo, Makian, Kao, Sahu, Jailolo, Ternate, Tidore, Gebe, Morotai, Loloda, 
Buli, etc.), Manado (North Sulawesi), Toraja, East Timor, North Sumatra (Batak), 
West Papua and Ambon. 19   
 
The opportunity to sell bananas was bigger than before. Smallholder cultivation of 
bananas became one of the pillars of the household’s economy since the middle of 
1990’s.  Mother Iana (mama Iana), the wife of Oom Din, always brought their 
bananas to the market three times a week.  If the family had an oversupply of 
bananas, Oom Din would ride his ox-cart to the housing complex of the banana 
labourers to sell the bananas.  Usually the labourers would buy the bananas on 
credit, which is paid after they get their salary.  Or they would barter for bananas 
with rice, which was taken from their supply given by the factory.  In another 
chapter I discuss how people were involved within new systems of exchange, 
including food, money, coconut plantations, labour, etc., governed by market rules  
(see Chapter III). 
 
1.6.  Ngidiho:  An Old Village  
 
Ngidiho is an old village in a new province. The people narrated the history of the 
village to me in the following story.  Long ago, a sister and a brother lived in 
Igobula, which is a village along the lake.  When the sister got married and had to 
stay separately from her brother they agreed to build the house of the sister with a 
high roof so that her brother could see her from far away.  Thus pona natitiho 
means a high roof where her brother could see the room of the sister from the 
other side of the lake.  Ngidiho as a name, is said to come from this word titiho.  
The name of the village Ngidiho was changed to become Pattinama, which refers 
to the name of the head of Galela district who led the region before 1936.  In the 
                                                 
17 The stages of banana cultivation in the practices of the Galela people can be found in Yoshida  
(1980). 
18 My interview with the Personal Manager of PT GAI in Ngidiho, November 12, 1999. 
19 My interview with the Personal Manager of PT GAI in Ngidiho, November 12, 1999. 
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report of a Dutch administrator, the name of Ngidiho was still used until 1909 (de 
Jongh:1909, 758).  After the year of 1936 when flooding damaged the old village 
location and the people moved to the current location, they still called their 
village, ‘Ngidiho’. 
 
People in Ngidiho are traditionally told this story.  However, the location of the 
village has moved several times.  The sister went to a village across the lake that 
was called “Longa.”  This was believed to be the place from where the Galela 
people first came.20  At this village, the people lived in one long house called a 
tahu lamo.  This house, or bangsaha, had eight corners (pupuku tupangi) in the 
shape of  sosaleta, which means the construction was built from the centre out to 
the eight corners.  But there was shameful accident that brought about a split in 
the village.  In the process of constructing the building for worship a father- in-law 
fondled the breast of his modoka (his daughter- in- law), who was carrying 
traditional food on her head.  This caused a clash in the village.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Another source says that the people of Ga lela, Tobelo, and Kao came from the same area in the 
lake of Lina that lies in the hinterland between the border of the district of Tobelo and Kao (see 
Mangunwijaya:1987). 
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Pictures 4–6:  Oom Din works in his banana planatation;  
Bananas are stored in the house before being delivered to the market;  
Mother Iana moves them to the side of the road to be ready to be taken to the 
market. 
 
The family and people who sided with the accused man were asked to leave the 
village. They moved to another location in the North East coast of Galela that is 
now called Limau.  Eventually the people who stayed at Longa also moved further 
along, down river to a place called Pattinama.   Finally, as the result of river 
flooding, they moved to the current area and gave it the name Ngidiho.  
According to Naomichi Ishige, people from the village of Limau told the story 
differently (Ishige: 1980, 420).  In Ishige’s version, there were four brothers living 
together in Limau, a village located to the North East of the hinterland of Galela, 
along the coast.  When one of the brothers went to the forest to make a canoe, 
another of them fondled the breasts of his brother’s wife. Perhaps there was 
intercourse between them. As a result, a fight occurred between the brothers. The 
one who discovered his brother’s adultery left Limau with a third brother and  
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moved to Ngidiho.  Ishige tells this story to explain other practices among the 
people in Limau who still keep the statues of worship: the kodoba.  
 
Map 6:  Ngidiho and its Neighbouring Villages 
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Before the conflict that brought about the burning of the villages in Galela in 
December 1999, the people of Limau carved the form of a women’s breast on the 
poles used in the construction of their seri.  The seri is the sacred shrine where 
people place the statues of the fish hawk family (kodoba), which contain a couple 
of parents and their children.  People believe that kodoba represents their 
ancestors.  Kodoba was their totem.  Ishige says that people now localise the seri 
in the back garden of a particular house because they feel ashamed to be seen still 
honouring the practices of the old, local religion. The sacred place is used as a 
timber storeroom but in its attic are two kadobas.  Without protective walls, the 
3.5 meter high structure of the shrine is placed on four posts that support a saddle 
back roof made of sago palm leaves (Ishige: 1980, 418). The seri is now just 
considered a memorial to their ancestors.21  Once a year, the whole village does a 
ceremony to clean the kodoba.  It is a big party where they perform a traditional 
dance (ronggeng).  People line up in rows where all of their hands are tied 
together to form a tunnel for a virgin girl to walk through. 
 
After only a few years living at the new location, in 1942, the Ngidiho villagers, 
like all of the people in Galela, fled from their village because of the Japanese 
occupation.  Villages were burned to the ground.  The only time when the Ngidiho 
people could stay for a longer period in their village was the period from the 
Second World War until December 27, 1999, when conflict led to terrible 
violence.  According to official figures, the total number of people who lived in 
Ngidiho in December 1999, including those who worked at PT GAI, was 4,576 
people.  During my stay, the number of households who were living in the village 
was 230 households that included about 188 Muslim households and 42 Christian 
households. This is the number of households who own their own house in 
Ngidiho.  This implies that the number of permanent residents in the main village 
was around 1,500 people.22  
 
One night I visited the Head of Ngidiho (Kepala Desa) to discuss with him the 
total number of the people in his village.  Instead of giving the number, he 
complained to me about the dual role of the village, which seemed unclear to him.  
Apparently, the territory of PT GAI is under the administration of three villages:  
Ngidiho in South, Simau to the East and Limau to the North East.  However, the 
function of the villages was just to provide various recommendation letters or 
documents for the people who wanted to work at the factory.  “The relationship 
between the village and the company is only a paper relationship”, said  the 
Kepala Desa with a resigned voice.  Depending on the location of the labourers’s 
housing, the village heads also help to issue personal documents such as birth 
certificates to keep track of the increase in the number of the people.  
 
However, the three villages don’t have a representative official to carry out the 
villages’ responsibilities in the area of the banana plantation. The drawback is that 
when a labourer resigns, gets fired or otherwise loses his job, nobody comes to the 
village head to report the decrease of people in his village.  Jurisdiction is 
                                                 
21 cf. Ishige: 1980, 420. 
22 I was still working out the population census before I left the village at the end of November 
1999.   
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sometimes controversial. Young people from Ngidiho occasionally made trouble 
by fighting with, or threatening the labourers.  According to the company, the 
head of the village should be able to cope with these conflicts because he receives 
a monthly salary from the company from the banana plantation.  23  In one case the 
company called the head of the village to solve the problem. 
 
Map 7: The Territorial Location of PT GAI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reaching Ngidiho in the hinterland of Galela can be done in three ways.  One is 
just to follow the business road, taking public transportation starting from the bus 
station in Soa Sio, the capital of the District  (Kecamatan), that is located along 
the South coast. It only costs five hundred rupiah ($0.05), and within twenty 
minutes to half an hour, one will arrive in Ngidiho.  During the drive, one will see 
                                                 
23 My interview with the executive manager of PT GAI, Ngidiho, November 1999. 
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villages and people carrying out traditional agricultural activities, occasionally 
interrupted by the jarring sight of a fancy parabola antenna along side a simple 
thatched hut.  The driver must be careful to watch for domestic animals, which 
suddenly cross the road.   
 
Another possibility is to rent a motorbike, called an ojek, from the bus station.  It 
costs five thousand rupiah ($0.50).  Or one can rent a car, which is expensive, to 
take an alternative road along the lake of Galela cutting around the bottom of 
Mount Tarakani. Trucks, which deliver boxes of bananas to the harbour in Soa 
Sio where the exporting ships await their cargo, take this road.  The views of 
nature, the lake, the coconut plantations and different kind of plants reward 
travellers who take this road.  There is only one house located half way up the 
road.  In less than fifteen minutes you arrive in Ngidiho.  But the road is not as 
nice as the other one.   
 
Thirdly, a rental car or ojek can bring one around past three villages along the 
South to the East coast namely Soa Sio, Toweka, Simau, to come to the hinterland 
of Ngidiho entering from Simau.  Before the economic crisis in 1997 in Indonesia, 
one could fly from Jakarta to Ngidiho with connecting flights that included 
stopping over in Ternate for a day. Near Ngidiho there is an airfield inherited 
from the Japanese occupation.  However, simple accommodations can only be 
found in Tobelo, a town and District to the West of Galela, about an hour’s drive 
from the airport.  
 
Ngidiho is located between Makete, a village inhabited by the Sangir people from 
North Sulawesi since the 1950s, and the big river called “Tiabo” that divides 
Ngidiho in the West from Limau in the North East.  This river was the source of 
flooding in the past, which forced the relocation of the village.  To the East of 
Ngidiho there is one close village, named Simau with its extended village called 
Toweka.  Along the river to the East and the Southeast, the banana plantations are 
cultivated professionally by labours from PT GAI.   
 
One day, when I was interviewing the manager of the company, I was invited to 
go up to the housing area of the executives of the company in Kokopola Estate.  
From there I could view the whole Southeast and Eastern area of Galela.  The 
fertile landscape spread out before me.  This, along with other prosperous 
industries in the North Moluccan area, is one of the most promising places in 
Eastern Indonesia. Only a few security buildings show up among the great sea of 
green.  Up there, I began to relate what I was seeing to the stories people had told 
me about the great changes in their system of agriculture and how they tried to 
cope with the great challenges to their style of life. 
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Pictures 7–8: View of the Banana Plantation from the Kokopola Estate; 
The view of Mount Tarakani which is covered with coconut palms. 
 
 
Only those who work for the company and the elites, who set up the project for 
the multinational agro industry in Ngidiho, know how important this area is.  
Even though Ngidiho or Galela were involved in large-scale banana cultivation, 
the area remained largely unknown, even to Indonesians, and far from the fame of 
a place like Bali, the most visited tourist spot in Indonesia. Only the recent bloody 
conflict has brought this lovely area into the spotlight of national and international 
news. Because of the violence that exploded in December 27,1999, Galela has 
become a household term, known to people all over Indonesia.  I sometimes feel 
scared to let people in Java know that I used to live there. Families, my 
supervisors and close friends from all over the world were concerned and tried to 
reach us when they watched on television the horrifying stories of this great 
human tragedy.   
 
In the beginning of August 1999, when I was in Ternate to arrange research 
permits from the government of the North Moluccas, before my departure to 
Ngidiho, an official said that I had come to the right place to observe the progress 
of development.  The pride of the government official made sense because the 
crowd of workers at the time required increased transportation from Ngidiho 
directly to Ternate.   For only Rp 35.000,- one could take a public bus, which goes 
back and forth between Ngidiho - Sidangoli. The bus taking the smooth road of 
the trans-North Halmahera Highway left Ngidiho at 3 AM to reach Sidangoli 
before the arrival of the first ferry at 9 AM from Ternate. Before the conflict 
occurred, crossing with a ferry from Sidangoli to Ternate back and forth can be 
conducted twice a day, in the morning and in the afternoon. It takes only an hour 
from Sidangoli to Ternate.  For a little extra, one can take one of the frequent 
speedboats, which are more accessible than the ferries.  Ternate is the capital of 
the new Province of North Moluccas.  It is located on a small island to the West of 
the main island, Halmahera. 
 
Even though Ngidiho is a relatively remote village, every morning before the 
sunrise prayer, the noise of buses, the voices of people and the passing of trucks, 
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which deliver workers or export products, awakened me.  Because I used the front 
bedroom of Oom Din’ house, which lies close to the noisy road, I felt like I was 
staying in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia.  It seemed like this village never 
sleeps.  
 
1.7.   Conclusion  
 
This chapter locates my position as a researcher whose points of view are 
determined by my commitments to human rights and respect for religious beliefs 
and local practices in a particular culture.  Ngidiho cannot be isolated from 
outside influences, including, developmental projects conducted by the Indonesian 
government, political changes in Jakarta and Ternate, economic competition and 
religious ideology. Economic and political changes create potential problems that 
can grow bigger when ethno-religious sentiments are used for a political means. 
The geo-political condition of the village of Ngidiho, with its links to regional, 
national and international networks helps explain the transformation of the people 
in the area since the colonial era up to the present.  Multiple symbols, created 
through a long historical process of change, serve multiple purposes.  Ritual 
practices are political tools that drive people, both to participate in violence, and 
to strive together for reconciliation. 
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Chapter II 
Theories on Ritual and Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
This dissertation is about the politics of ritual and its role in making and resolving 
conflict.  Ritual can lead to violence or peaceful negotiations.  When one wants to 
say something about a problem, then the process of the analysis should consider 
multiple perspectives to understand the object of study.  The case study in this 
research is used to illuminate how the transformation of social practices in the 
everyday lives of people relates to the power struggles within and outside their 
community during the period before and after the 1999-2000 violence.  Changes 
in the politics of ritual at a local level, such as a village, can be located within the 
larger scale of political struggles in Indonesia, during and after the Colonial 
Period.  
 
This chapter discusses the basic design of my research on the politics of conflict 
in which ritual appears both  to distinguish and to unite people. This chapter 
begins with a deconstruction of the epistemology that lies behind some of the 
contemporary theoretical debates in Moluccan studies. Then I will map several 
theoretical approaches that lie behind my selection of the particular perspectives 
in this study. This analysis sketches a picture of the whole discussion on ritual and 
politics in Indonesia. Analysis of ritual is based on the stories told by the people 
in Ngidiho. This chapter ends with an explanation of how I interpreted and 
theorized the data and how I used the methodologies that are employed in this 
research. 
 
2. 1.  Theoretical Approach to Research 
 
It is impossible to conduct research in the Moluccas today without examining the 
role of religion in the present social conflict.  However, it is too simple to reduce 
the situation to just a matter of religious conflict. This research searches for a 
different perspective and a comprehensive discourse that can map the continuities 
in the social transformation of the Moluccan society. 
 
People articulate the meaning of their lives and transform their reality as part of a 
large-scale civilising process that gradually alters their practices.  Structural 
changes in society alter both its appearance and its essence.  This can be seen in 
“An anthropologist told me that his inhibition against exercising 
authority was so strong that his first fieldwork had to be made 
extremely difficult by his refusal to employ a servant.  These 
very people, who prefer unstructured intimacy in their social 
relations, defeat their wish for communication without words.  
For only a ritual structure makes possible a wordless channel of 
communication that is not entirely incoherent” (Douglas: 1996, 
51). 
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the different stages of change, which affect societal institutions such as 
households, kinship relations, trade links within and outside villages and relations 
with larger structures such as the state.  In the following section I will discuss 
three foundations for my research:  Epistemology, Analytical Tools, and 
Theoretical Perspective. 
 
2.1.1.  Epistemology    
  
In relation to Galela as a field of study, there are several resources available.24  
Since the violence began in 1999 in the Moluccas at large, there is an increasing 
need for comparative study of the region.  The field of study should link local and 
global contexts in order to understand the dynamics of conjunctural change that 
the people face (Appadurai:1996, 185). The Moluccas are a rich resource for this 
kind of study. 
  
In Moluccan studies, several approaches are employed. Early missionaries who 
were ethnographic anthropologists used functionalist and structuralist approaches 
to the study of Northern Halmahera.  In contrast, recent studies focussing on the 
South Moluccas are more post-modern (see for example Mearns and Healy: 
1996).25  Linda Sun Crowder and Patricia Horvatich criticize the anthology, 
Rituals and Socio-Cosmic Order in Eastern Indonesian Societies edited by 
C.Barraud and J.D.M.Platenkamp for not considering the political and social 
context that gave rise to the rituals (Crowder and Horvatich:1992, 23-136). 
Structuralism tends to focus on effectively “isolated” social units or symbolic 
forms and not pay attention to political or economic aspects of contemporary 
experience in Moluccan communities, such as the impact of developmental 
projects on the society (Mearns and Healey:1996, 2).  In my study, rituals are 
analysed at different political layers that are located within a historical narrative 
that influences both their meaning and presentation. 
 
Rituals “make and unmake” a society, but their meaning can only be understood 
in relation to the political economy of the society. Similarly, an approach that 
studies the role of the state in changing the people’s lives without discussing the 
process of social change within a long historical context is also problematic. 
People weave together new meanings in coping with the long history of change in 
their everyday political practices and institutions as the result of outsider 
intervention. 
 
Some studies are critized because they build upon the concept of ‘development’ 
and reflect a modernist hegemony about the way people think and act (Mearns 
and Healey:1996). However, the post-modern critique used in some contemporary 
                                                 
24 From historical, anthropological studies and developmental studies, the names include van 
Baarda (1908, 1917), de Jongh (1909), Ishige (1980), Lapian (1981),  Chauvel (1986), van 
Fraassen (1987),  Mangunwijaya (1987), Platenkamp (1988), Baker (1988), Visser (1989), (1994); 
Andaya (1993a), Kiem (1993),  Masinambow (1994), Risakotta (1995a), Schuurman (1995),  
Ajawaila (1996), Djurubasa (2000), Prabojo (2000) and etc. 
25 Ortner criticizes a political economy approach as problematic due to its construction of history, 
which is not about “the history of that society but the impact of (our) history on that society” 
(Ortner:1994, 387). 
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studies usually comes out in the form of critiquing and deconstructing fictions 
(Barth:1993, 7), rather than focusing on the shaping process of the social 
organisation and knowledge of the people.  A neo-Marxist political economic 
paradigm in ethnographic studies is problematic because of the lack of attention to 
the process of research, in which “etic” and “emic” perspectives are kept in 
appropriate proportions.26  With awareness of the limitations of each theoretical 
approach, I choose an ecclectic method that draws insights from both 
structuralism and post-modernism, but focuses primarily upon the long history,27 
knowledge, discourses and practices of the local people. 
Structuralism is helpful for understanding how cultural meanings are constructed 
into practices. However, to understand how people cope with change, we must 
elaborate both their legacies from the past and how they respond to new 
developments in their lives.28 People’s acts and practices can be interpreted with 
the help of an understanding of the structures of their inherited knowledge (see 
Barth:1993, 319). On the other hand, structuralism in some of the ethnographic 
reports written by missionaries, colonial politicians and scholars, often portrays 
the local people based on the imagination of the authors and not on what the 
people understand about themselves.29 The ethnographic constructions of the past 
that are recognised as histories, were built according to the fashions of scholarship 
of their time and place (Fernea:2000, ix). Post-modernist critiques deconstruct 
                                                 
26 Carol M.Eastman discusses the terms etic and emic as either an approach proposed by Marvin 
Harris or as an interpretation proposed by Kenneth Pike (Eastman: 1984, 17-19).  Emic is an 
approach for articulating the world of the natives “as the natives see it” (Harris: 1968, 316).  This 
is based on the assumption that the actor is able to know his own inner state (Harris: 1968, 576).  
The knowledge about the actor’s inner state helps the observer to understand the presentation of 
the actor’s behaviour and to describe the behaviour in the stream of events in which the actor 
participates (Harris: 1968, 574).  It is an epistemological formulation about the actor’s notion of 
what is significant, real, meaningful, or appropriate (Harris: 1968, 575).  According to Pike, emic  
represents to us the view of one familiar with the system and who knows how to function within it 
himself, while an etic system may be set up by external criteria or a ‘logical’ plan whose relevance 
is external to the system being studied (Pike: 1967,38-39).    
27 Actually within structuralism, there is a developed study in which attention to cultural or social 
change is taken into account. Material conditions affect the rearticulating of new meanings in their 
formulation of the same basic structural ideology (MacCannell and MacCannell: 1982).      
28I would like to express thanks for the interesting lecture given by Prof. S.Sanjay Subrahmanyam 
from Centre d’Etudes de l’Inde et de’Asie du Sud, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
in Paris. Titled “Forcing the doors of Heathendom: Ethnography, Violence, and the Dutch East 
India Company”, the lecture was delivered at the 13th Wertheim Lecture of the Centre for Asian 
Studies Amsterdam/Amsterdam School for Social science Research (ASSR) in Amsterdam, June 
25, 2002.  Another lecture organised by ASiA, Platform for Asia Studies in Amsterdam in June 
24, 2002, with the title “Celebrating or Commemorating the VOC,” prompted a valuable 
discussion with Prof. Subrahmanyam about some important resources that I use in Chapter IV, 
regarding the presence of Portuguese expeditions in Asia. 
28 Theoretically, a Gramscian understanding of hegemony helps explain the turning point of each 
movement in the society as it is observed through discourse and ritual practices. To some extent, a 
ritual action can be categorised as part of a discourse. As a definition, discourse is a way of 
constituting knowledge; together with the social practices that forms subjectivity and power 
relations among different agents (Weedon: 1987, 108).  Hegemony theory combined with 
observations of practices and discourses helps to deconstruct the use of power within ritual 
politics. A dynamic analysis is used for understanding how new symbols are created based on 
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imaginative narratives of ritual that conceal the power relations invested in 
various actors in the society including the power discourse made up by the 
colonizers and post independence elite governments.30 My dissertation will argue 
that ritual is a potent tool for negotiating political and economic conflicts.  In 
brief, this research analyses rituals within their historical and political contexts, 
starting from the level of practices within families and villages, up to the level the 
Indonesian state as an imagined community conceived of as one great family. 
 
2.1.2.  Tools of Analysis 
This dissertation takes a concrete approach in discussing ritual. Instead of 
beginning with the complex theoretical debate on the definition and meaning of 
ritual, I begin with a living narrative of ritual practices in the village of Ngidiho, 
District of Galela, Island of Halmahera, Province of North Moluccas, Indonesia.  
Of course I do not claim that this narrative encompasses all the meanings of ritual 
that occur in Ngidiho. But a concrete narrative helps me to construct a working 
definition of ritual and to compare it later with the results of other theoretical 
discussions of ritual that are examined in this chapter. This approach also helps us 
to listen to and imagine the real context of the people who are engaged in ritual.   
 
Narration is a tool of analysis that shows the different stages in a dynamic ritual 
practice.  In all seven chapters, I begin the analysis with a narration that shows the 
power relations among the actors.  I locate the analysis of ritual action in a bigger 
frame, which shows the interweaving of elements in the ritual performance. The 
stories of ritual performances are followed with a thick description of the 
conditions and reasons behind the event. This description doesn’t mean to 
separate ritual action as a political event from ritual as a cultural creation 
produced by a person, collective or institution. The narration is only a tool for 
understanding that the total meaning of a ritual action includes both the ideology 
it expresses and the material conditions which it negotiates.  These two aspects 
cannot be separated. 
 
This interpretation is strengthened by showing the dynamic process by which the 
people (and the researcher) build up their knowledge through participating in 
ritual practices. A narration helps show that in the real actions of human beings, 
historical time functions normally even though ‘total meaning’ may be created 
simultaneously for the people who experience a sacred moment during the ritual. 
A ritual event is a cultural production that the people use to cope with crises in 
their life.  
 
                                                 
material condition and how a hegemonic condition is transformed into practical action.  The same 
analysis can be use to understand the political legitimacy created by the Indonesian leadership 
through imposing Pancasila as a state ritual. However, the collapse of the Indonesian economy 
revealed the bankruptcy of the state hegemony (see Chapter V). 
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My interpretations of rituals are grounded in a basic assumption of my research 
that my purpose is to understand the people’s own story of their lives.  My 
understanding, whether drawn from empirical fieldwork or secondary accounts, is 
always part of a larger framework of understanding that I bring to the work.31 
Considering the process of interpretation, I have to admit that my description of 
reality is influenced by my particular values, the boundaries of my research and 
the limitations of my capability to locate the subject of analysis in a 
comprehensive point of view (see Chapter I).  
In the following description, I narrate the story of a wedding party as I observed it 
in 1999 during my fieldwork in Ngidiho, continued by an account of the events 
that led up to the rituals within the wedding party.  The drama of the wedding 
rituals in Ngidiho is one of the elements that inspired me to study the politics of 
ritual among the Ngidiho people before and after the religious conflict in the 
North Moluccas. 
 
2.1.2.1.  The Wedding Party 
 
The party takes place under a roof constructed of iron sheets which lies over the 
road at the side of the family’s house.  It is full with villagers from Ngidiho as 
well as outsiders.  Crowded with hand clapping women and men, the dance plays 
out a fascinating ritual.  The bride and the groom are carried around the circle of 
the dancers.  No rejection, no complaint, and no expression are seen on the bride 
and groom’s faces that might betray the tensions that have gone before.  Dancers 
are still rotating while cheering them on.  The bride and groom keep very still, 
because on the top of their hair there is lots of money that was placed by all the 
dancers involved in the game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 9: Dancers at the wedding party place money in the hair bun of 
women in the circle of dancing (tombo-tombo). 
 
                                                 
31 cf. Appadurai:1996, 182. 
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The father of the groom shares in the play.  He is dancing with two  50,000 rupiah 
bills.32 Rhythmically, he slides from the newlyweds to the mother of the bride.  
He is dancing with two hands holding the money.  Like a soft handkerchief, he 
carefully places the money on the hair bun of the woman (tombo-tombo).  The 
music becomes faster and more dynamic.  People are laughing and shouting to see 
the scene.  Then the woman dances out of the circle.  Suddenly, she disappears.  
Where has she gone?  I wonder.   “Let’s dance, bow, and stretch out our hands!” 
the leader of the dance calls out loudly.  With their eager faces, people are waiting 
for a surprising moment that is about to happen.  
 
Somebody is directing me to look towards the road.   The mother of the bride is 
gently entering the circle of dancers. With a lively, gentle smile, the happiness is 
bright on her face.  She is carrying a rolled up colourful mat, almost as tall as she 
is.  Her body moves beautifully with the mat while holding it under her armpit.  
The spirit of the dance seems to return. The men’s clapping hands welcomes her 
to join the stream of the dance.  Now she seems to enjoy the play and becomes the 
centre of attention for the whole community.  She is dancing towards the father of 
the groom.  Adroitly, she opens the mat and wraps it around the man’s body  
(mikoloro).  Then this mat man is dancing agilely, following the flow of the circle 
of dancers.   
 
People look up at him with understanding.   An informant told me that it is 
“always wiser to solve the tensions when they are hot”, as in the Galelan saying,  
sahu-sahu sidoloho damala kada gasi, which means, “When it is hot, is better 
than after it becomes cool.  Music is still playing and new faces join the dance.  
The mat wrapped man is dancing out of the circle to reach his wife somewhere 
among the audience.  They are smiling together.  This moment is called in Galela 
terms toposero, which is an interlude in the dance (ronggeng denge).  The bride’s 
family holds the mat and wraps it around the whole family of the groom who is in 
the circle of the dance.  The mat can be moved out if the groom’s family give 
some money to their opponent in the play.  
 
2.1.2.2.  An Interlude 
 
As the story tells us, the father of the groom put some money first on the hair of 
the bride’s mother.  After the party was over I wondered about the meaning of the 
scene. An elder in the community explained to me that it was not a common 
practice in Galela. How could it be?  However, I only started to understand the 
meaning of the play when I reflected back on the moment of tension33 between the 
two families just before the party was held.   
 
This wedding story tells about the power relations among the people.  The 
wedding party is an imaginative ritual in which each family gives meaning to its 
roles in the community.  The people themselves know that a shift in the common 
                                                 
32 Rp. 50,000 are currently equal to less than 6 Dollars, however in the context of the Halmaheran 
economy it is considered quite a lot of money, perhaps similar to 100 Dollars or more in the 
Netherlands.  In Halmahera Rp. 50,000 is almost equal to a week’s wages for a labourer. 
33 See the larger context of the story under 2.1.2.3. 
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practices of the dance relates to a political bargain between the two families. The 
common practice is that the family of the bride and the family of groom dance 
together. The bride’s family first takes several colourful mats, wrapping them in a 
circle around the family of the groom. The groom’s family will be freed after they 
give some money to the bride’s family.  
 
This wedding party symbolizes and realizes the political negotiations in the daily 
life of the common people.  Power and compromise is expressed by the 
sublimation of each individual of the community in reaching reconciliation 
between the families as they had different expectations before the party.  The 
symbols and models of bargaining about power amaze me as an ethnographer.  
The story behind the scenes is deeper than I thought, before I had time to reflect 
on my field journal.  The following account is adapted from my field notes. 
  
2.1.2.3.  Before the Party 
 
Emang, a fifteen-year boy who dropped out of junior high school, and Maila, a 
fourteen-year girl who had not finished elementary school, were thought by the 
families to be too young to get married.  The families worried about their close 
relationship.  Both families agreed to watch out so that the two children didn’t 
meet each other too often.  If they were ever caught together by the people, they 
would be forced to marry under the Badan Sara, which is the local Islamic Court.  
To convince the two young people that they must be married within one year, 
after coming of age, the two families made their vows to each other and arranged 
the marriage.  The plan was set for March 2000 when the groom’s second uncle 
returned from his hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.  At the meeting, it was agreed that the 
groom’s family would pay a bride price of one million rupiah34, fifty-kilos of rice, 
twenty kilos of sugar, fifty kilos of flour and twenty kilos of oil. 
 
Only two weeks before the wedding party actually took place, the two families 
met again and re-discussed the plan of their children’s marriage.  The girl’s family 
felt forced to speed up the marriage ceremony.  The mother of the girl told me that 
she worried constantly, because her daughter returned home almost every night in 
the early morning.  She wondered why nobody caught them and brought them to 
Badan Sara to be married as in traditional practice.  It seemed to me that she was 
very frightened that her daughter would be caught with her boy friend and 
delivered to the Badan Sara.  I wondered why?   At a second meeting, the date of 
the wedding was rescheduled for the end of October 1999, giving a little time for 
the boy’s family to collect money from their copra harvest.  The bride wealth was 
reduced to five hundred thousand rupiah, twenty-kilos of rice, twenty-five kilos of 
flour and ten kilos of cooking oil and no sugar. 
 
However, two days after the second meeting between the families, the mother of 
the girl reached the end of her rope regarding the couple’s sexual activity.  In the 
early morning before the sunrise prayers (subuh), when her daughter had once 
again just returned home from a night with her boyfriend, the mother forced her 
                                                 
34 One million rupiah equals less than 120 Dollars, but is a very large amount of money for the 
poor people of Halmahera. 
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daughter to go with her and dropped her off at the boy’s house.  When the family 
woke up, they were surprised to see her there.  Without any explanation from the 
girl’s mother, the boy’s father assumed that her delivery to their house meant that 
her parents wanted their daughter to be married that same day.  Nurman, the father 
of the boy, directly came with the girl to his elder sister’s house where I was 
staying.  She would stay there until her status became clear while they discussed 
this new problem. He asked his brother- in- law, Oom Din who is one of the 
spiritual and social leaders of the village, to visit the girl’s family and ask them 
what was their plan regarding this new phenomenal complication among them.  
 
The involvement of Oom Din, the husband of Nurman’s elder sister (Iana), made 
this story even more complex.  Three times, Oom Din went back and forth to 
negotiate with the girl’s parents.  At around eight in the morning of September 25, 
1999, Oom Din came first to the girl’s father who apparently didn’t object to 
having his daughter married that evening in the house of Oom Din.  The girl’s 
mother, after bringing her daughter to the boy’s house, had left for work at the 
banana plantation.  In the early afternoon, Oom Din went back to the girl’s house.  
Someone from the boy’s family had heard that the girl’s family interpreted the 
involvement of Oom Din, as related to his status as a member of Badan Sara 
rather than as an uncle of the boy.  This story was taken seriously not only by 
Oom Din, but also by the whole extended family of the Budimans who were the 
largest extended family in Ngidiho.  
 
There were two interpretations that came out of the ensuing discussion in he 
living room of Oom’s Din’s house.  They led him to return to the girl’ s house for 
further negotiations.  Firstly, if the girl’s family blamed the boy’s family for 
hiding his relationship with the girl, then the girl’s family could prosecute the 
boy’s family at the Badan Sara.  That meant that the Badan Sara could decide 
that the boy’s family had to pay a fine to the girl’s family, and renegotiate the 
marriage agreement.  In that case, the control of the young couple would become 
very strict.   
 
Secondly, if the Badan Sara decided that the fault came from both families, then 
the cost of a rush wedding ceremony would have to be shared together.  The girl’s 
family would not accept this because they would lose the bride wealth and have to 
spend it all for the wedding party of their daughter, without reaping the benefits of 
the help that was owed them.   
 
According to tradition, the bride's family should have held a party for their 
daughter before she was taken to the house of the groom's family.  The 
elimination of this party was a significant loss for the family of the bride, because 
they had already stored up obligations from the village to pay for the party.  By 
their donations and help at other community weddings, they had a right to expect 
the same help in return at their daughters wedding.  
 
Only later did I understand why the girl's family was so careful in dealing with the 
tension over Oom Din's involvement.  If the Badan Sara were involved it would 
affect significant economic interests, as well as family status.  
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The result of their discussion was that both families agreed Oom Din’s presence in 
this process was not to be seen as involvement of a member of the Badan Sara but 
rather as an uncle of the boy.  Therefore, they agree that the wedding 
arrangements should not bring them to the formal authorities of the village.  Oom 
Din managed to persuade the father of the bride to accede to the need of the 
Budiman family to avoid the shame and potential economic loss of dealing with 
the Badan Sara.   
 
While Oom Din was working to fix the wedding process, the boy’s family from 
all over the village were coming to Iana’s house, the sister of Nurman, to prepare 
food for the wedding ceremony that night.  Nurman was walking around the house 
carrying a jojobo book, which is used to write down all the people’s names, that 
came to help and who brought donations for the wedding party.  The kind and 
amount of “work” or support (jojobo) contributed are strictly recorded to  be 
weighed against future ritual and material exchanges. 
 
Quickly, I saw that there was a tremendous amount of cooking ingredients 
necessary for preparing the food.  However, while making a joke, a woman who 
was cooking said that this was just a pesta roti goreng (fried bread party) because 
of its simplicity.  Into this crowded, festive and joyful atmosphere that surrounded 
the anticipation of a big wedding ceremony later that night, came some shocking 
news.  In the late afternoon, the mother of the bride returned from her work at the 
banana agro-business and announced that a formal marriage event could not be 
conducted so soon.  She said that she wanted her daughter to be married 
immediately but that in line with Muslim customs, the wedding had to be held at 
the bride’s house.  She was angry with her husband who seemed to support the 
plans for a rushed marriage. 
 
Palpable anxiety floated to the surface and seared the emotions of the people 
gathered from the groom’s family.  They were disturbed by the personal reaction 
of the girl’s mother.  According to Galelan Muslim traditions, the marriage could 
not be held if the bride’s father or his official representative (wali) did not conduct 
the wedding ceremony.  The groom has to be approved by the girl’s father or his 
“wali”.   
 
A ritual in which the bride’s father or wali must approve of a prayer recited by the 
groom symbolizes this.  The marriage ceremony is only valid after the groom is 
able to reproduce the wedding prayer, exactly as it has been prayed by the father 
of the bride (or the wali).  The groom must carefully duplicate the rhythm of the 
prayer, as well as the back and forth movements of his hands that are tied opposite 
to the hands of his father- in- law (or wali) in a crossed position.  Sometimes, at 
other weddings I witnessed, this process had to be repeated many times before it 
was legally approved.  Therefore, the worry of the boy’s family made sense in the 
context of the whole drama of this rush wedding.   The mother of the girl could 
use this trump card to cancel the ceremony.   
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Picture 10: The hands of the groom are tied with the hands of his 
wali or father in law. 
 
Once again, Oom Din visited the girl’s house with a new proposal from the boy’s 
family, i.e., that the wedding ceremony could be moved to the house of the girl’s 
parents.  The mother of the bride rejected this vague suggestion from Oom Din.  
“I am unprepared to hold a wedding party!”  Oom Din related her reply to the 
groom’s family.  They were all gathered at his house to listen to the story of his 
efforts to convince the girl’s family that they must hold the ceremony that day.  
“But the feast that is being prepared at my house can be moved here, to your 
house,” Oom Din told her.  Now there was a smile on the weathered face of Oom 
Din, as he told the story.  People laughed.  They felt that Oom Din was winning 
the political ritual of negotiation.  
 
Of course the mother of the girl could not accept this new suggestion from Oom 
Din, because it violated her traditional responsibility to put on the party.  But 
apparently agreement was near.  With a proud voice, Oom Din related that the 
mother of the girl only asked for the bride wealth, as it had already been 
promised, but with one additional item, namely a roll of cotton cloth, to be 
delivered soon.  Implicitly this constituted an agreement to hold the wedding 
ceremony and initial celebration that night, at Oom Din's house.  In fact, the 
bride's family not only experienced shame that the ceremony and initial party 
were not held at their house, but also lost their chance to receive the favours 
“owed” to them by the community. 
 
The marriage ceremony was held simply and well.  The bride looked beautiful, 
wearing a traditional set of clothes including one of my sarongs.35 I dressed her up 
and applied make-up to her face.  Because she was cast away from her family to 
the boy’s house in the early morning, I felt deep sympathy for her.  I allowed her 
to stay in my room and I decorated it nicely, as is the custom for a bridal room.  
Surely, she looked happy, but, in the evening, I could see the sadness on her face, 
                                                 
35 “ Sarong” is a traditional cloth that is worn as a long skirt.  
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because of the conflict with her parents and their absence at this very important 
moment in her life.  A wali of the family was sent by the bride’s parents to bless 
the couple’s marriage. 
 
While the preliminary  “fried bread party” continued that evening, the father of 
the boy led a discussion among the guests who were all men.  Guests came from 
Ngidiho and some extended family members came from neighbouring villages.  
The majority of the family is Muslim, but some of them are Christians.  The 
Muslim and Christian immediate family members all lived in Ngidiho.  They were 
all now at the hurried party, talking, laughing and planning for the great wedding 
celebration that would take place in a few days time.  Besides the bride, I was the 
only woman who sat around with the men. I was permitted because of my special 
status as a researcher.  There were some women who stood watching from the 
back door and many more women were in the kitchen.  All of the people agree to 
have a great, traditional party to welcome their modoka (daughter- in- law) into the 
extended family of the Budimans. 
 
There was another reason for the groom’s family to plan a remarkable party.  The 
community of Ngidiho felt empathy for the bride’s family.  The wedding party 
was planned as a healing process to address their own guilt for not having the 
bride’s family attend the ceremony.  At the same time, it would be the moment 
when they could announce their presence as an influential family in the village.  
In the discussion that night, one of the family members said,  “Because this 
marriage has reformulated the nature of betrothal gifts from our family, we have 
to make a lively party to entertain the entire village.”   
 
Oom Din assured me that this would be the biggest party that I had ever attended, 
and it was true.  I was asked by the people from the wedding committee to make 
the invitations for the party.  Later, Oom Din and I created an inexpensive, 
interesting invitation, which was duplicated through a mimeograph machine I 
used at the Synod office of the GMIH church in Tobelo.  The meeting ended with 
the conclusion that each household who had a family tie to the groom should 
contribute twenty-five thousand rupiah for the party. 
 
It took five days and the work of many people to prepare for the party.  The 
bride’s parents wanted the parents of the groom to visit them to talk about 
betrothal gifts.  The bride’s family could not accept the presumption that was 
discussed among the groom’s family, that the bridal gifts should be deleted 
because it was a rushed marriage.   However, until the last day before the wedding 
party, the groom’s family had still not made the customary visit to the house of 
the bride’s parents to bring gifts.  Early in the morning on the day of the great 
party, mother Iana whispered to me the scandalous news that the bride had left the 
house of her parents- in- law to go back to the house of her parents.  “She threatens 
that she will refuse to be picked up by her husband’s family for the traditional 
ceremony of cleaning her feet (tiodo).”  This was the only explanation I was 
given.   While shrugging her shoulders, mother Iana left me alone, puzzled.   
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The foot washing ritual is an important event.  The modoka can only be accepted 
formally into the groom’s family after this ceremony is complete.  Eventually I 
learned the meaning of the bride’s refusal.  She felt that the betrothal gifts had 
already been promised to her family.  She was willing to change her mind and 
attend the tiodo if her husband’s family would deliver the betrothal gifts to her 
parents, before the traditional foot washing ritual was started.  Once again the 
whole process was in crisis. 
 
I suggested to the groom's family that they should just fulfil the request of the 
bride's family.  However they did not respond.  In the afternoon before the 
wedding party the bride became meek and agreed to attend the foot washing 
ceremony (tiodo).  Nevertheless, I was quite sad to see that the groom's family 
had not yet made the customary visit to their new “family- in- law’s” house.  If 
they did not visit their new in- laws, it seemed unlikely that the bride's family 
would attend the party.  I felt like the party would lose its excitement and interest 
for me if the bride's family members did not attend. 
 
The ritual of tiodo was done one hour before the party was scheduled to begin.  
After the ceremony, I went home to rest because I felt tired and sad.  I knew I 
would be expected to dance all evening long with them.  I slept for two hours and 
came to the party a little bit late.  The music floated out like wind, calling people 
to come to the source of the sound.  I quickly dressed in the traditional costume 
that the bride had worn for the religious marriage vow ceremony a few days 
before, and half ran through the darkness to the party.  To my great surprise, the 
two parents of Maila, the bride, were there.  They were smiling to welcome me.  I 
wondered, what had happened to change the situation? 
 
Soon it dawned on me that my suggestion to the groom’s family was 
inappropriate and could not be accepted by the family.  Apparently, they had the ir 
own way to solve the problem.  They picked their own time to visit the parents of 
the bride.  After the ceremony of tiodo, the groom’s families brought three parcels 
of beautifully plaited, dry fish that are traditionally called damaha, to the parents 
of the bride.  Two ‘second grandmothers’ (grand aunts), of the groom were sent to 
deliver the gifts.  Along with delivering the parcels, they invited the parents of the 
bride to attend the wedding party of their granddaughter.  The bride’s family 
answered that they would accept the invitation if the parents of the groom came in 
person to invite them.  The two delegates went home to deliver the message.   
 
Not long after that, the groom’s parents finally visited the bride’s family.  As 
gifts, they brought a roll of white cotton cloth, a dozen plates and a little money.  
They spent some time enjoying each other’s company and engaged in polite 
conversation.  When the groom’s parents left the house, they carried reciprocal 
gifts of food, given by the bride’s parents, such as daroko and sosirigu.  The 
groom’s presents had been accepted.  Their visit opened the way for the bride’s 
family to attend the party.  A few weeks later, the groom’s family paid the balance 
owed of the bride price. 
 
 
 55 
2.1.2.4.  Interpreting the  Ritual 
 
A social scientist is limited by her/his own experience of the conditions of those 
who are the main focus of the research.  Briefly stated, the perspective of this 
research project is that scientific capability to understand social reality requires 
giving context to the observable phenomena. It depends on deep experience and 
thick description of the reality experienced by the people in a certain society 
(Geertz: 1993 [1973], 6-7).  I came to Ngidiho with several assumptions that 
underlay my thinking. First, I started with the assumption that what I knew about 
the Galela people through my former work or my initial studies might be mistaken 
and require revision after I arrived on the field (see Chapter I).  Secondly, neither 
the people in the target group nor I, could fully understand each other’s 
background, to the point where our different methods and experiences would 
make complete sense to each other.36  Thirdly, my understanding of them should 
not be limited to what they said or formulated verbally, but should also include 
how they used their words to structure their actions. 
 
Carrying these assumptions to the fieldwork helped me to locate a particular 
cultural hermeneutic as an approach to map the people in Ngidiho.  I elaborated a 
simple suggestion by Guy A. M. Widdershoven that the purpose of my fieldwork 
was to understand the life story of human beings (Widdershoven: 1993, 3-6).  
Widdershoven distinguishes between ‘life’ and ‘story’ when he explains the role 
of hermeneutic perspectives in revealing the life story of people.  He builds his 
analysis on discussions from MacIntyre, Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty.  The word 
‘life’ is bigger than just, say, ‘action’ or ‘practice’.  ‘Action’ or ‘practice’, 
involves free decisions guided by motivations that are rooted in a social 
network.37   Thus understanding the life story of people is to create a personal 
context for myself within whatever broader climate of social attitudes may exist at 
the time (Kroger: 1993, 143).  As you can see in the story of the wedding party in 
Ngidiho, it took time for me to understand what was happening among the people 
with whom I interacted.  The larger picture that showed what was happening 
among them only had meaning for me later, after the whole drama of their new, 
ritual performance gradually showed how they coped with a unique crisis in their 
relationships. This crisis took shape long before the wedding party.  A new form 
of the ritual was shaped to deal with an unprecedented situation. 
 
                                                 
36 I received much help by reading the experience of the MacCannells (MacCannell and 
MacCannell:1982, 73-74). They explain the experience of Jean-Paul Dumont who was accepted 
into the community of the Panare people, not as an American but as a Frenchman.  
37 cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer: “The free decision takes its bearings by the order of preference 
guiding one’s life conduct, whether it be pleasure, or power and honour, or knowledge.  Beside 
these, we encounter in the political make-up of human life together, other differences in life 
conduct, such as those between husband and wife, the elderly and the child, dependents and those 
who are independent, in former times chiefly the distinction between slave and free” (Gadamer: 
1983, 91). 
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The wedding Party38 is a narration that shows the dynamics of power in which the 
people created a unique ritual in a time of crisis. The narration is a case study. A 
narration reveals nuances that clothe ritual and show more clearly the essence of 
power.  Through this short narration, we are shown the complexity of networks in 
the village of Ngidiho. We have a picture of a developing village in which a 
modern industrial system of banana agro business is interweaved with the 
traditional life style of the people.  This narration stimulated me to know more 
about the real practices of the people and how they create ritual as a part of their 
knowledge and mental production. A narration explains how productive 
resources, affection and services are distributed among people in households, 
kinship networks, and neighbourhoods.  
 
What does this narration tell us? First of all we can see the story as the description 
of conflict and its solution between two families that involved the whole kin-
network of both sides in the village. Unbalanced power has to be overcome. Each 
person plays a part that fits with his/her position, to calm down the disturbing 
crisis. Conflict is articulated through words, gestures and expression. To shift to a 
new stage in their relationships, a new form of the ritual has to be established that 
functions like a sacred power to witness the new birth of the agreement in the 
community. 
 
2.1.2.5.  A Preliminary  Definition 
 
Before I arrive at a definition, we need to turn to some characteristic of ritual.   
 
1.  Ritual includes reciprocal actions that have two characteristics. Firstly, ritual is 
a powerful form of reciprocal negotiation by which several parties try to reach an 
agreement, which represents all their interests. The legitimacy of the ritual action 
sometimes involves a sacred meaning.  For example, the ritual practice within the 
dance and the ritual action of the Muslim marriage ceremony both include sacred 
meanings although only one is explicitly religion. This shows that ritual action is 
part of ordinary life.  Secondly, ritual involves reciprocal transactions of 
exchange. This characteristic is part of the process of making a new network 
among families. The line of the “outside-female” (daughter in law) is required to 
bring ritual goods on special occasions such as marriages and funerals. The line of 
the “outside male” (son in law) is required to bring different ritual goods. For 
those who have no relative ties, people apply common exchange, which is called 
jojobo (litt. It means work or labour).   
      
2.  Ritual is based on inequalities/differences that have two characteristics.  
Firstly, it relates to power relations that affect the negotiations.  This characteristic 
can be seen in the bargaining between the groom’s family and the bride’s family 
on how much bride wealth and fongu (the cost for wedding party) the groom’s 
                                                 
38 I use this narration of the Wedding Party with a deep appreciation that the bride’s family was 
remarkably flexible in their willingness to rearrange the marriage agreements. In the following 
chapter I will show how the principles of exchange in marriage negotiations are often described as 
unjust to women in Western ethnographies. I argue that sometime analysis using feminist theory to 
examine another tradition leads to oversimplification. See Adeney-Risakotta (2001d). 
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family should provide.  In fact, both parties do bargaining on how much has to be 
paid by each side, but it is not always bargaining between equals.  Secondly, it 
includes acts of mutual recognition that are determined by gender and social class. 
This is shown by gender distinctions in the exchange of ritual goods.  The male 
line is required to bring sago, local liquor and fish. Whereas the female line has to 
carry raw rice, cooked rice, sugar and vegetables. The question emerges: why are 
there gender distinctions in the goods that are exchanged?  The dance of the 
wedding party shows us an imaginative ritual in which each person of the family 
or society strengthens their roles in the community. The bride’s family brings 
goods that are the normal everyday product of the bride’s work.  The groom’s 
family brings the products of male labour. Therefore the exchange of goods 
reinforces the division of labour in society based on gender. 
 
3. Ritual is not ancient and static, but constantly redefined along political and 
economic lines.  The narration of the wedding party shows two characteristics.  
Firstly, the rituals are obviously reinterpreted and revised. Sometimes in the 
process of reinterpretation and revision, rituals  are manipulated for the purpose of 
creating a conflict. On the other hand, rituals also function as an integrative 
solution to bring social cohesion.  Interestingly, we have seen how the father of 
the groom tried to soften the tension by revising the content of the dance. By 
doing so, he gave new meaning to the play, which was seen by the whole 
audience at the party, as a way to bring reconciliation with the parents of his 
daughter in law.  Secondly, changes in rituals are often freighted with economic, 
as well as social values. The mat, which the bride’s mother gave to the father of 
her son in law, had the same value as the Rp. 100,000  the father of the groom put 
on her hair bun. If the mother appreciated the innovative action of reconciliation 
in the dance by only giving an inferior mat of lesser value she would lose the 
respect of the people at the party.  
 
These characteristics help me construct a preliminary  working definition of ritual 
with which to analyze other theories that relate to the definition of ritual.  Rituals 
are dynamic, reciprocal acts of negotiation and exchange, which unite and 
distinguish people by symbolic actions that express political, social, cultural and 
economic power differences.  It functions to make and unmake community.   
 
2.1.3.  Searching for A Perspective  
 
The narration above shows how a marriage involves the whole families from both 
sides. These families have their own way to build an in- laws-network to extend 
their relationship through the marriage network of their children. Conflict that 
occurs during the process of marriage needs to be negotiated. They used their own 
symbolic practices in the wedding party and modified them in order to solve the 
problem. This intentional action made sense to bring back the two families. If they 
want to live together and agree to support their children’s choice to marry, they 
have to negotiate their bargaining position. In  a larger context, a country is like a 
family. Families, whether in a kinship network, or symbolically as a nation, create 
rituals to integrate their members.  However, sometimes counter, or opposing 
rituals are created to challenge the authority of the families. 
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In her study of the Halmaheran people of Sahu, Visser (1989), argues that the 
ritual practices of the people should be differentiated from what people in West 
think of as ‘ritual’. Visser shows that the Sahu people do not consider their 
agricultural rituals as separated or distinct from their material actions in their 
agricultural activities. She says: 
  
The Sahu themselves do not consider the agricultural 
rituals as distinguishable from the more practical farming 
activities involved in rice cultivation..” (Visser: 1989, 74). 
 
In my description of the wedding party it is very difficult to distinguish between 
“ritual” and “non-ritual” actions without artificially creating two different 
narratives. In Ngidiho, there is no particular or general name used to cover all the 
activities that make up a wedding. In Ngidiho and Galela at large, kinship 
networks will know about the marriage plan when somebody comes to their house 
to invite them to contribute to the wedding feast. This invitation is called 
“gogoro”.  But there is no word to say directly “wedding party”.  However, they 
name every step of the marriage process (see Chapter III).  Henk Schulte Nordholt 
says that in Bali what is labeled anthropologically as “ritual”, actually is called 
“work” (see also Goody: 1997, 102; Firth: 1967).39  In Javanese culture, the word 
nduwé gawé means work in preparation for a ritual performance, during which 
relatives, neighbors and friends come together to help the family who will be 
sponsoring the life cycle ritual. The Javanese use the term rewang to indicate 
those who participate in the preparation for the ritual.  The word rewang means 
servant or friend (Keeler: 1987, 142-143).  
 
Visser shows that the Sahu attach great significance to ritual performances even 
though detailed knowledge of the proper texts may have withered, and despite the 
fact that they have embraced Christianity (Visser: 1989, 74-75).  Visser’s research 
focuses on an exposition of particular stages in the life cycle.  However she 
implicitly shows the dynamic adjustments that the people make in their own ritual 
processes.  My research in Ngidiho confirms Visser’s observations. Building from 
this work, I will clarify and define the practices which anthropologists label 
“ritual”, not just as discrete symbolic actions, but as part of a larger political 
struggle which derives its meaning from a long historical process.  To understand 
a ritual we must understand its history. 
 
2.1.3.1.  Redefining Ritual 
 
None of the definitions of ritual in the anthropological literature seems to capture 
all the practices of ritual described in my narratives about rituals in Halmahera.  
The word ritual comes from Latin, ritualis that is linked to the word ritus (rite) 
                                                 
39 I would like to thank Prof. Henk Schulte Nordholt for this reference. Prof. Schulte Nordholt was 
the chairman of the Amsterdam School Staff seminar on May 7, 2000 that discussed this chapter. 
The seminar helped to sharpen this chapter. 
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that means “practice” especially in religion. 40  Maureen Henry analyses the use of 
ritual kinship by the Roman Empire as a political ideology to unite various 
practices from other ethnic groups who were subjugated by the Romans (Henry: 
1979 [1947]).  In 312 CE a new empire, Byzantium arose, ruled by Constantine. 
He established Christian rituals as a political tool to oppose the Roman Empire.41  
Ritual politics were also adopted by the Holy Roman Emperor to homogenize 
practices of all the nations that were subjugated under him.  
 
The Reformation movement stressed the inspiration of the Bible and the validity 
of its interpretation by the individual conscience.  This provided a moral grounds 
for the separation of church and state and a theological rationale for opposing the 
imperialist politics of the Holy Roman Emperor in the name of religion.  42 The 
Reformation stimulated the birth of the “nation,” defined as groups which are 
bigger than families but smaller than clans and which have a strong unified 
identity (Wilkinson: 1971, 88). However early nationalism still maintained the 
practices of feudalism and the politics of empire. The nationalist movement soon 
extended the idea of nation beyond ethno-religious categories.  After the 
American and French revolutions, nationalism promoted universal principles of 
citizenship, solidarity and equal rights (Wilkinson: 1971, 89-90). In this process 
new rituals were created by the French Revolution to subjugate the authority of 
the feudal-clerical system that used religious language to legitimise their power 
(Hunt: 1984, 21). 
 
Since the French Revolution, processes of rationalisation, secularisation and  
bureaucratisation have diminished the power of religion, especially Christianity, 
as a single comprehensive system of meaning (Weber: 1974).43  Western 
discourse is very cautious about political rituals that use religious symbols 
because of their similarity to medieval politics where imperial power was clothed 
                                                 
40 cf Onions: 1964, 768-769.  Ritual is the adjective form of the word ‘rite’ (Partridge: 1990 
[1958], 566-567).  
41 One example of the creation of a new ritual was the Jerusalem pilgrimage. This ritual was 
created more for political purposes than for religious ones.  The conversion of Jerusalem from a 
Roman into a Christian city was important for Constantine who was converted later, after his 
mother Helena. To do that, he created the pilgrimage to Jesus’ burial place, which had never been 
practiced by the earlier Christian themselves. The Emperor issued sacred edicts and began to build 
a route for the pilgrimage between Jerusalem and Constantinople (Peters: 1985, 131-150).  
42 According to Geoffrey Benjamin, the sixteen-century Reformation movement in Germany was 
the source of inspiration for the creation of modern-nation states in Europe (Benjamin:1988, 9).  
The Reformation was not only a religious movement but was also a struggle for local power that 
opposed the homogeneous politics that tried to enforce a united Christendom through Christian 
rituals and the common language of the Catholic Church (Fisher-Galati:1959, 190-196; 
Stadwald:1996). 
43There was a movement of anti-ritualism in the Western scientific tradition due to the criticism of 
using ritual to gain power (Patton and Doniger: 1996, 63-64). Many Western critics view ritual or 
rites as formalized repetitive acts whose symbolic meaning is either lost or irrelevant.  In this 
context, Talal Asad rightly concludes that the word ritual lost its original meaning as it appeared in 
monasteries of the ninth century, meaning practice or discipline (Asad: 1993, 62).  In the 18th 
century, according to Asad, ritual was understood as a book, which directs people in religious 
worship. The idea of the book relates to the holy book, which provides instructions on how 
different people must behave. A text or a script becomes a source of rules for guiding the way 
people behave (Asad: 1993, 58).  
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with religious ritual to justify territorial expansion and religious exclusivism. 
However Robert N. Bellah, David Kertzer and others have shown that in 
advanced democratic states such as the United States, political rhetoric is often 
clothed with ritual (Bellah: 1975; Ketzer: 1988). Civil religion, 44 complete with its 
own rituals, is created by civil society to integrate members of society, without 
homogenizing them under a unified state ideology. Within this context, the state 
guarantees all citizens the right to follow their own practices under a social 
contract in which all agree to obey a common law. Not only democracies, but also 
Communist governments used rituals to strengthen social order in society (Lane: 
1981).45  The use of ritual in Indonesian politics is also well attested (N. Schulte 
Nordholt: 1980; H. Schulte Nordholt: 1981,1991; Sekimoto: 1990). 
 
Talal Asad explains the historical contexts at the time when ritual was formulated. 
He begins showing the general definition of ritual as a book that directs the way 
rites should be performed and moving to the modern conception of ritual as 
enacted symbols of particular behavior.  Asad suggests that definitions of ritual 
that are embedded in many anthropological formulations, such as the influential 
writings of Clifford Geertz, 46 are the result of a conception of ritual inspired by 
the practice of Christianity. He questions whether such a formulation can be used 
to understand different phenomena outside the church (Asad: 1993, 61). How can 
a definition of ritual grounded in Western Christianity explain non-Christian 
traditions, which have different books or only have oral traditions? Asad questions 
definitions of ritual as a religious symbol system and rightly observes that they are 
influenced by a secularized Western anthropological tradition that assumes the 
demystification of religious practices in the post-Christian West. 47  
                                                 
44 Bellah is credited with reviving Rousseau’s idea of a civil religion, however he has himself 
abandoned the term since it gave rise to so much misunderstanding (Bellah, et. al., 1985, 1991). 
45 cf. Henry:1979 [1947]. In this book Henry shows that conceptions of Christian ritual as 
portrayed by John Winthrop in his sermons to early Puritan settlers in 1630, in America, 
influenced the C.P.S.U constitution in which the claim of blessing is strongly applied to the 
communist society (cf. Henry: 1979, ix-xi).  
46 Many scholars use Geertzian definitions of ritual and religion.  Ketzer questions the assumption 
that ritual only remains politically significant in “less advanced” societies, however his definition 
of ritual is limited to the definition provided by Clifford Geertz (Ketzer: 1988,2-3). Schulte 
Nordholt says that Kertzer’s definition does not include material aspects of cultural production (H. 
Schulte-Nordholt: 1991,5). 
47 I agree with Asad that the Western tradition is trapped in a conceptual dichotomy between the 
sacred and profane that arose in Enlightment discourse.  However, I think Asad does not  account 
for the new ritual practices that are always reappearing in Western politics.  Western democratic 
and liberal ideology uses many ‘non-religious’ rituals to strengthen its hold on the hearts of the 
people. Religious practices cannot easily be used as a political identity for citizens due to the 
irreducible multicultural and multireligious nature of most modern societies. Sometimes particular 
groups claim divine authority for their own purposes, but most modern states do not validate their 
claims. This does not mean that the role of religion is weak.  Many human beings find inspiration 
through the divine spirit whose presence is experienced through religious practices. In many 
modern states, the relation between human beings and God is considered a private, not a political 
relationship. However, even if Church and State are separated, the influence of religion on politics 
remains very strong.  Religious practices are still strong in most societies but with different rituals 
according to the community of believers. There is no single Christian practice in worldwide 
Christianity comparable to the rituals of Islam.  However Western politics has long been 
influenced by Christian culture. The Evangelical and Charismatic movements in Christianity 
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Keeping the observation of Asad in my mind, I should move now to discuss 
several definitions of ritual formulated by anthropologists.  First is the 
formulation provided by Geertz.  In his explanation about the discordant relation 
between religion and human secular experiences, Geertz discusses the role of 
ritual. He says that     
 
In a ritual, the world as lived and the world as imagined, 
fused under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, 
turn out to be the same world, producing thus that 
idiosyncratic transformation in one’s sense of reality to 
which Santayana refers in my epigraph (Geertz: 1993 
[1973], 112).   
 
In this definition, Geertz sees a ritual as a condition where the reality of everyday 
life and the ideal reality of people are melted into a unique reality. In many pages 
of his explanation of religion, rituals are only described as significant symbols for 
interpreting meaning (Geertz: 1998, 48, 82, 112, 127-143). A melded reality is an 
emotional reality where people may even enter into a trance (Geertz: 1993, 117).  
Geertz interprets ritual as a way of producing feelings, not as a dynamic 
relationship between human beings (Geertz: 1993, 82).  Geertz says, 
 
But the point is that in man neither regnant fields nor 
mental sets can be formed with sufficient precision in the 
absence of guidance from symbolic models of emotion. In 
order to make up our minds we must know how we feel 
about things and to know how we feel about things we 
need the public images of sentiment that only ritual, myth, 
and art can provide (Geertz: 1993, 82). 
 
Geertz’s analysis can be understood in relation to the demystification of sacred 
meanings in ritual in the Western Christian tradition as discussed above.  Geertz 
views ritual as a tool of sentiment and meaning rather than as a means of political 
and economic negotiation. Geertz and others forget that even in the West, ritual 
appears in many different guises.48  The view of ritual as mainly symbol becomes 
problematic when a study of ritual is located in the discourse about social 
movements, class analysis and political history.  If a ritual or religion is only a 
psychological phenomena or a symbolic fact how can one explain the 
development of social movements based only on symbolic meanings without 
elaborating on how rituals are used by a community (Asad: 1983, 252; van der 
Veer: 1989, 46) and how the use of rituals relate to material conditions and 
                                                                                                                                     
effectively project their unique religious rituals using modern media technology 
(Aldridge:2000,130).   
48 See (van der Veer:1989,46).  Sean Wilentz acknowledges that there has been a shift in the 
perspective of historians. They now interpret authority, power and social perception as 
fundamental elements in the use of rituals within political movements, rather than seeing rituals as 
just irrational elements in an otherwise rational system (Wilentz: 1985, 13-16); cf. Kelly and 
Kaplan:1990,120. However there is still no definition what is ritual. 
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interests (Hefner: 1985,46; Russell and Cunningham: 1989, 2; Schulte Nordholt: 
1991, 5)?  Scholars who examine traditions outside the Western world have 
criticized Geertz’s definition of ritual and religion as a cultural system.49  
 
The problem of Geertz’s theory of religion is not in the formulation of religion as 
a cultural system, which functions both as “a model for,” and “a model of” a 
human being’s mentality.  It is true that culture and religion are models for and 
models of, people’s mentality in the society that produces them (Geertz: 1993, 
118).  However, the definition formulated by Geertz limits his consideration of the 
cultural and social forces that produce a society. Peter van der Veer says that the 
intention of Geertz is to look for the meaning of a symbol within itself (van der 
Veer: 1989, 45, 47, 51).   
 
Geertz’s definition influences his misinterpretation of a dispute over the funeral of 
a young Javanese man. Geertz relates the case study of a young Javanese man 
who died and whose funeral became a symbol of identity. Geertz reduces the 
practical meaning of ritual in Javanese Muslim society by formulating the usage 
of religious ritual as a sign of conservatism in opposition to modernity (Geerzt: 
1993, 150).  Geertz suggests that a general social phenomenon such as social 
differentiation because of modernity is a source of conflict in society.  Geertz 
doesn’t explain explicitly the linkage between the capability of adjustment within 
the ritualizing process and power (van der Veer: 1989, 47).  Using the perspective 
given by van der Veer above, I would like to see Geertz develop his analysis on 
the change in a ritual slametan (thanksgiving ritual) in the context of the funeral, 
from a religious meaning to a political means. Why does ritual become more 
important than just as a means for social interaction? (Geertz: 1993, 168).  When 
the Modin, who is the Muslim ritual leader does not quickly bury the young leader 
of the Javanese Muslim abangan (peasant), it not only becomes a source of 
conflict regarding Islamic practice, but it also relates to political distinctions in the 
society especially if we consider the political turmoil in the Indonesian politics of 
the fifties. 50    
                                                 
49 See for example, Asad’s research in the Middle East (1993), Veer’s research in India (van der 
Veer: 1989, 1994) and H. Schulte Nordholt’s research in Bali, Indonesia (Schulte Nordholt: 1991; 
1993).  
50 Geert z’s work shows the significant role of social forces in the shaping of Javanese ritual. His 
explanation is important for understanding the function of power in the process of making rituals 
in a religious community. As far as I can see there are three elements in Javanese society that 
relate to power as Geertz demonstrates in his book (Geertz: 1976). The three social categories are 
peasants, traders, and administrators. Geertz tries to show that these three classes represent three 
Islamic ritual orientations.  The peasants relate to what were called abangan , the traders are 
labelled santri, and the administrators are recognized as priyaji . The abangan are those who 
practice Islam along with local Javanese rituals. Santri practice Islam as written in the Qur’an. 
Priyayi practice Islam in a way similar to the abangan’s but with a greater emphasis on esoteric 
mysticism. Andree Feillard suggests that the categories formulised by Geertz have changed. 
According to her explanation, 79.1% of Indonesian Muslims are now santri and 20.9% are not. 
However, she divides the santri into two categories, firstly, those who practice strict Islamic rituals 
and those who still practice the abangan  rituals. She concludes that the shift in the category of 
abangan to santri is related to changes in Indonesian politics in which the political participation of 
Islam became larger than during the period under the regime of Suharto. Moreover, she says if a 
traditional santri gets sick, she/he will go to a kiai  (a Muslim leader) to ask for water from Mecca 
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The second definition suggests that rituals are ways of overcoming dis tinctions. In 
his research in the 1950’s, Geertz showed how funeral rituals distinguished 
political identity for the Javanese community.  In Javanese community where 
Andrew Beatty did his research during the 1990’s, it appears that the ritual 
slamatan functions to unite the three types of Muslim orientation in Javanese 
society.  Thus ritual may prevent social disintegration such as occurred during the 
1965-1966 massacre of alledged Communists led by the Indonesian armies 
involving Islamic Organisations in East Java (Beatty: 1999, 25-49).  According to 
Beatty, in the slametan ritual, those who hold different religious orientations must 
negotiate their power for interpreting Islamic cosmology within the context of the 
Javanese ethic of social harmony (rukun) (Beatty: 1999, 38-40, 49-50).  In the 
context of a pluralistic society, multivocal rituals have great integrative power 
(Beatty: 1999, 49). The same conclusion can be found in the study of Victor 
Turner who sees ritual as a social mechanism that functions to restore the 
equilibrium and solidarity of the group (Turner: 1967). 
 
Mark R. Woodward (1989) and Robert Hefner (1985) object to Islamic 
stereotypes such as abangan, santri, and priyayi as formulised by Geertz and used 
by Beatty, especially if the stereotypes are used to measure the depth of the 
Javanese’s Muslim faith. Woodward shows that Geertz failed to account for the 
transformation of Islamic rituals from the Arab Islamic tradition into the Javanese 
Islamic tradition. The people in Ngidiho, Galela distinguish their religious 
practices from other villages in Galela because they claim the right practices were 
brought first by the Muslim ´ulamâs, whereas the practices that came later were 
considered makrúh.51 The interesting part of the analysis of ritual in the North 
Moluccas is to see how they adjust ideologies that come through religion, trade 
and development into unique practices of the people in Ngidiho. Despite the 
complexity and uniqueness of their rituals, the Galelans see themselves as true 
Muslims.52 
                                                                                                                                     
whereas if an abangan gets sick, she/he will go to a dukun (shaman) or seek medical care 
(Feillard:2001, 3). 
51 ‘Makrúh is a principle of Islamic law. This Arabic word means an obligation that has to be 
fulfilled. Following the law leads to ‘pahala’ (reward), but if it is not followed, it is not sinful.  
52 In addition to the debate on the ritual distinctions of Islamic communities in Javanese society 
produced by Geertz and discussed by Woodward and Hefner it would be interesting to see a 
comparative analysis of the distinction of Islamic practices between Shi’ ism and Sunnis that relate 
to the formation of identity, class and power in each community.  Shireen T. Hunter analyses 
various Islamic practices that relate to ethnicities and political power in each community (Hunter: 
1998, 38-39; Lambton: 1985 [1981] cf. (Choueiri: 1989, 45).  According to her explanation, 
Sunnis relate to the practices of northern Arab tribes who accepted a form of elective process to 
solve the succession issues. Whereas in Shi’ ism, which was based on lineage, a dynastic system 
advocated a hereditary system of successor-ship. Obviously, these two different Islamic practices 
are not normative institutions but they had a historical landscape that shaped their differences. The 
rise of Islam in 622 AD ( A.H.1) was during the period of the two large world Empires of 
Byzantium and Persia. Islam follows the Islamic calendar that sets the exodus (hijra) of Prophet 
Mohammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 as the starting point of Islamic history (Crone and 
Cook: 1977,9).  Persia was influenced by Zoroastrianism practices, whereas Byzantium was 
identified with Christianity (Lewis: 1995). By identifying with the new religious movement of 
Islam, Persia was enabled to overcome its rival, because it extended its territories.  However, the 
superiority of Persia could not be asserted by accepting only the ritual practices introduced by the 
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The third definition relates to Talal Asad who sees ritual as a part of organised 
practices of power.  According to Asad, ritual is a medium where power is 
exercised (Asad: 1993).53  Catherine Bell describes Asad’s analysis of ritual as 
moving from “reading symbols” to “analyzing practices” (Bell: 1999, 79).54  Van 
der Veer discusses ritual in the discourse of social movements especially 
considering how power and its change of constellation is enforced within ritual 
(van der Veer: 1989, 47).  However, it is very important to notice that a ritual 
functions not only for mobilizing the power of people to differentiate between 
each other but also plays a role in the negotiation of power for the purpose of 
integration. My data shows that ritual is used for both purposes, to distinguish and 
to unite people. 
 
The fourth definition is ritual as a means for social change. Ritual is a powerful 
tool for mediating ideologies, both to unite or divide the people from one another 
(Wolf: 1993, 57).  In this general polemic about ritual theorists often ignore the 
question of where does the power come from. We need an explanation of how 
power can be masked by ritual so that it is seen as perfectly natural (Mouffe: 
1979).55  Eric R. Wolf asserts that power is the product of a relationship (Wolf: 
1993: 4-5).  Norbert Elias says that power is like a game in which each party 
searches for their turn to become the winner (Quoted in Wolf: 1993, 4).  People 
create different kinds of ideas to dominate others and appear as the winner. In the 
broad political arena, ideology becomes the instrument to preserve power and 
interests that are based on material conditions. In the body politic, material 
conditions influence the articulation of new meanings that are formulated as part 
of a larger ideology (MacCannel and MacCannel: 1982).56  Ideology has to be 
                                                                                                                                     
Arabs. Persia wanted to have her own style of practices that were localised. This schism is known 
in Islam as fitnah (see Lambton: 1985). However according to Choueiri the schism was not 
connected with theological differences but related to the ethnic distinctions and ritual practices 
(Choueiri: 1989). A similar dynamic may be used to explain the different practices of rituals 
between Christian traditions in Western countries. 
53 Asad shows how in histories of Western criminal law, judicial torture was linked to the power of 
Christian ritual which was rooted in primitive forms of accusatorial procedure (Asad:1993, 84 ff).  
54 The main question of practice theories in regard to ritual is how to explain it as a means by 
which a construed relationship of authority and submission is revealed.  As a practice, ritual has to 
be examined in the context of power and unequal relationships. With this focus of study, an 
analysis of ritual is situated in its historical process in which a ritual pattern is not only reproduced, 
but also reinterpreted and transformed (Bell:1999, 83). According to practice theory, power is 
clothed with ritual for a justification. Influenced by the change of political trajectories after 
colonialism when colonial domination and its universalizing discourse were questioned by what 
people practiced in their everyday lives, the theory of practice comes up with a new analysis on 
how rituals should be studied (Bell:1999, 76-83). Bell mentions several names of people who 
discuss how to understanding ritual as everyday practice, including: Pierre Bourdieu, Marshall 
Sahlins and Talal Asad (Bell:1999, 76-83). 
55 This question is inspired from the discussion of power as it is explained in the political thought 
of Antonio Gramsci (Mouffe:1979).  
56 The word ideology can be given a positive sense as discussed by Wolf (Wolf:1993, 23-35). 
“Ideology” appeared as a critical word during the Enlightenment, meaning “the science of ideas”. 
Ideas were understood as sensations and knowledge. This positive meaning created by Antoine 
Destutt de Tracy from France was opposed by counter-enlightenment Germans such as Karl Marx 
and Engels who see the notion of ideology as a negative conception referring to dominant ruling 
truth.  
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communicated in ways that make sense to its followers. Ideological representation 
can be seen in various hegemonic realities, in formal-conscious beliefs and in 
world views (William: 1981, 26). 
 
The fifth definition shows ritual as a tool for mobilization. In a study of collective 
action and social movements, Charles Tilly discusses Max Weber’s conception of 
the role of charismatic leaders who use ritual to solve the problem of succession. 
Weber apparently shows that charismatic leaders develop their power by using 
ritual as an irrational tool (Tilly: 1978, 38).  In contrast, my research suggests that 
ritual is rarely just an irrational tool.  Sometimes continuity of ritual allows a new 
ideology or religion to replace the old one.  Leaders invest new meanings in old 
rituals in order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Ritual exchanges 
are also a common means of minimizing the use of unilateral power.  Exchange 
rituals negotiate power.  The stagnation of a power structure can stimulate a 
counter attack, which is ritually legitimated.  Rituals require a symbolic enactment 
that can mobilise the people who favour the interests behind the ritual. Rituals can 
manipulate people by masking the powerful material conflicts that motivate the 
ritual (Jarman: 1997). Ritual clothes power with sacred meaning. Religious and 
ethnic justifications of identity can be seen as rational.  The elite is often clothed 
with ritual in order to manipulate popular values and strengthen a hierarchical 
structure that favors the dominant group over the common people. At the same 
time, power that is colored by ritual can be used as a means for resistant action 
from the weakest to challenge the ritual practices of the dominant group (Dirks: 
1994, 483-503).  Ritual as a means of resistance is often used by the weak to 
balance and equalize the power of the strong. 
 
Historical accounts show that rituals mobilize people, especially in the process of 
the succession of institutional power.  The history of rituals in the Moluccas, from 
the colonial period up to the 1999-2000 violence suggests that a ritual is like a 
coin with two faces. These two faces relate to the possibility of demystification 
and loss of sacredness in one set of rituals at the same time as other rituals are 
imbued with new sacredness (Taussig: 1980, 230-231).  The politics of memory 
and recognition are structured within the command line of their social networks to 
create a political identity.  The identity tha t comes through politics sometimes 
occurs in a violent act when a powerful agent imposes a particular identity on an 
individual or group (Laclau and Zac: 1994,23).   
 
The sixth definition relates to Bell’s definition of a ritual as a practice that is 
constructed socially to regulate people’s behavior.  Bell labels this process as 
“redemptive hegemony”.  She says ritual is 
 
a construal of reality as ordered in such a way as to allow 
the actor some advantageous ways of acting (Bell: 1999, 
81).  
 
There are complex realities of power enshrined in entities such as gods, traditions, 
myths and values that are non-human.  Within these entities rituals are shaped by 
and for the purpose of a social relationship (Bell:1999, 82). Bell’s emphasis on 
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rituals as acts that should be separated from other actions raises some interesting 
problems.  She says that if we consider ritual, 
 
…as practice, the most we can say is that it involves 
ritualization, that is, a way of acting that distinguishes 
itself from other ways of acting in the very way it does 
what it does; moreover, it makes this distinction for a 
specific purpose (Bell: 1999, 81).   
 
This statement of Bell is hard to apply as a general phenomenon to all cases.  My 
assumption is that thought is manifested in action tha t invokes a socially 
constructed reality. This reality determines the form of people ’s practices (Berger 
and Luckmann: 1967). Social values, cultural sentiments and power struggles play 
an important role to shape the way people perceive and approach their lives.  To 
express a ritual act one does not have to isolate ritual practice from non-ritual if 
the boundaries between the sacred and profane are unclear in her/his system of 
knowledge.57 My research shows that ritual is a dynamic medium of 
communication, which can be adjusted for different kinds of purposes. Ritual 
unites people in spite of their differences. My objection is that the understanding 
of a ritual cannot be separated from the former process that produces a ritual 
performance. The action of ritua l is not independent or separated from other 
factors whether material or spiritual. Within the body politic, ritual action cannot 
be divided from non-ritual action. But old rituals can be reshaped by material 
interests to become new rituals within the same structure of body politics. 
 
The seventh definition shows that ritual relates to a notion of power relations. It 
inspires one to distinguish their identity from the identity of others and their 
former identities. Ritual mediates a process of separation from one’s previous 
status (van Gennep: 1960).58  Arnold van Gennep concludes that in the phase of 
transition, the ritual subjects are in a “liminal period” which shows the ambiguity 
of the person’s status.  Mary Douglas says that in the transition period of a ritual 
the situation appears very dangerous and can lead to an act of violence (Douglas: 
1988 [1966]).  It is primarily performative. Ritual changes social relationships. It 
establishes new identities and new sacredness.  The process of constructing 
identity can be achieved through the categories of spirituality and rationality. 
Rationality provides a space in which sacred meaning in a ritual is demystified 
and demythologised in relation to the politics of the subjectivity of human beings 
(Carrette: 2000, 136-137) and the creation of a new ritual. However, at the same 
time, rationality itself becomes a means for creating inequality and domination. 
Edward W. Said demonstrates that the British Empire justified their domination 
over Egypt by claiming its intellectual superiority over the local people (Said: 
1978, 32).   
                                                 
57The distinction between sacred and profane practice is not the best starting point for 
understanding ritual.  Analysing a ritual performance should be conducted, as a narration in which 
the understanding of the meaning the people make is located in the whole system of their cultural 
production.  
58 Van Gennep discusses the meaning of ritual as a rite of passage associated with periodic events 
or crisis in people life such as initiation, marriage, illness or death (van Gennep:1960).  
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My data suggests that the demystification of ritual in the old Moluccan structures 
during the colonial period was part of a systematic effort to delegitimize and 
replace the powerful, traditional leadership in the society.  Spirituality can also be 
used to bolster and establish the power that determines social orders and 
structures.  Sacred meaning is used to lift the spirits of human beings so that they 
dare challenge the institutional powers of society (Carrette: 2000, 137).  Of course 
it can also stimulate the creation of injustice. 
 
A new question appears. Is it possible to demystify ritual so as to reveal the 
dynamics of hidden power, without stripping its sacred meaning? Many 
movements in society derive their inspiration from awareness of inequality, 
insecure conditions or just power struggles that are legitimized through religious 
teachings and cultural, moral or formal beliefs?59  Asad questions the indicators 
used to determine how other traditions outside Christianity define ritual (Asad: 
1993, 61).  What are the implications of his argument for examining other 
traditions that are not part of a great tradition? To what extent are the global 
religions different from other traditions such as local ones? First of all, Asad 
shows the reality of different traditions, which influence the practice of ritual, but 
he doesn’t answer the question of how to understand other traditions, which are 
not included in world-wide traditions such as Christianity and Islam.  
 
The historical context that invokes the distinction between whether an action has a 
sacred meaning or not is determined by the notion of power. In his study on 
pilgrimage to Ayodhya, van der Veer concludes that the sacred meaning of the 
place changed after the state used the idea of the Agamas (religions) as a tool for 
penetration into temple affairs (van der Veer: 1989, 51). According to van der 
Veer, the earlier sacred meaning of the Ayodhya practices relates to the ritualistic 
pilgrimage of purity and the ancestor rituals (van der Veer: 1989, 51,59-60).  In 
this case, sacred meaning is used because of the power struggle between the 
Muslim and Hindu communities over control of the place. It is interesting to see 
the transformation of belief conceptions among Hindus who were influenced by 
Muslim discourse about legitimacy. The earlier thought of the Hindus about the 
place was already linked with the idea of sacred meaning, but they needed the 
same legitimacy as the Muslims in order to claim their land. The shift to assert a 
higher sacred meaning is demonstrated by ritual actions. These rituals already 
existed in their ordinary practice, but the conceptualisation of the rituals was 
reformulated in the same symbolic categories as used by the Muslims. The more 
people have to legitimise their actions, the more sacred meaning is created.60  
                                                 
59 cf  (Wilkinson:1971,  55-79) and  (van der Veer: 1994).    
60 A similar case can be observed in Robert Hefner’s research on the Tengger mountain people in 
Eastern Java, Indonesia. He says that the ritual forms of Tengger tradition (adat) had to be 
perfected by introducing true religion (agama) into its rituals (Hefner:1985, 259-260).  Religious 
reform in the community was related to developmental projects that focused on education. 
However, the local people hesitated to adjust their rites in conformity with new reforms. Instead of 
showing the influence of religious reforms as a means of state intervention, as discussed by van 
der Veer,  Hefner focuses on the advantage an individual would receive by converting to a world 
religion. This brings him to the same conclusion made by van der Veer, that the cause of 
conversion is not mainly faith. Conversion is socialized in political worlds where an individual’s 
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Prior to the arrival of the universal religions in North Moluccas the society’s 
belief in divinity focused on respect for the ancestors.  It can still be categorized 
as holding sacred meanings. The “special logic’’ of the knowledge system for this 
group requires that they honour their people who died before them. For them, this 
is rational action with a sacred meaning. 61 
 
The eighth definition relates with the assumption that ritual can be formulated 
according to the capabilities of people to respond dynamically to environmental 
changes.  There is a dialogue between the change of material conditions and the 
re-conceptualisation of their symbol systems.  Changes in labour relations within 
family and kinship groups, or in the larger society, pressure the people to create 
ritual acts to cope with the changes they face.  As an example, the practice of the 
Cakalele dance by the people of Galela portrays several different layers of the 
historical landscape including the changing material contexts. The Cakalele dance 
shows the continuity of ritual over hundreds of years. The people adapt their 
memories with different motivations according to a changing historical context. 
The Cakalele dance shows traces of different meaningful practices since the 
period of colonisation down to the 1999-2000 violence in the North Moluccas.  
Each practice provided a different historical discourse for the people. 
 
Ritual is not always formed with the explicit content of a religious meaning. 
Ritual exchange that we see in the narration, the wedding party was not created 
for religious purposes, but it has a sacred power that unites the two families. A 
failure to fulfil the exchange obligations that formalize the connection of the two 
kin-networks will directly affect their social, political and economic relationships. 
The people in Ngidiho extend their non-genealogical networks by mutual support 
or “work” (jojobo). These practices are the unwritten law that the people follow.  
Ritual practices are adat and an action that violates tradition is seen as betrayal. 62  
 
The introduction of new ideology into the people’s practices can only be accepted 
if the old practices still have meaning for them.  One of the tactics that both 
Muslim and Christian missionaries used to convert the people in Halmahera was 
to claim that their ancestors would be saved if they converted to the religion of the 
missionary. This suggests an intriguing answer to why in Ngidiho a single family 
often includes both Christians and Muslims. By converting to both the major 
religions, a family ensured the salvation, not only of themselves, but also 
guaranteed their ancestors’ salvation, no matter which religion was right.  A more 
recent movement of conversions began in the 1950s just before the first 
                                                                                                                                     
consciousness is formed (Hefner:1985, 263). His analysis has to be located in the political history 
of Indonesia after the massacre at the time of the communist dissolution in 1965-1966 when the 
state made atheism illegal (Hefner:1985,7). Local religious practices had to be modified by 
identification with one of the recognized religions in Indonesia such as Islam, Christianity, 
Hinduism, or Buddhism. In this context, most of the Tengger communities converted to Hinduism. 
Moreover, Indonesian Hindus created a monotheistic concept of God to allow them to live 
together with other universal religions such as Islam and Christianity ( Sastra:1994).  
61 I agree with the analysis of John Plamenatz who says that the distinction between the sacred 
from the profane started in mediaeval philosophies. In contrast, Greek philosophies did not 
distinguish the divine form the human (Plamenatz: 1977, 8). 
62 cf. Koesnoe:1973, 6-8. 
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Indonesian election.  Once again the legitimacy of the ancestor’s position was 
maintained in ritual by linking the whole ancestry network to the salvation offered 
by the monotheistic religions. This is why after the 1999-2000 violence, ancestral 
rituals were used again by Muslims and Christians to tie together the relationships 
between families and their larger networks. The people combined and modified 
ancestral and religious rituals as part of a politics of remembering and forgetting 
in the process of reconciliation. Those who combined both ancestral and religious 
rituals to maintain their village unity did not participate in the violence. 
 
Considering these eight definitions of ritual along with the narration of a Galelan 
wedding party and the working definition, I would like to propose a new 
definition that will guide my research in this dissertation.  Ritual mediates 
transitions, not only in the human lifecycle but also in the crisis transitions of a 
particular society. As a dynamic practice, ritual is guided by ideology, memories 
and practices from the past that are reshaped as needed to meet the needs of the 
present. These practices are usually highly symbolic to give weight and strength 
to the present action. This action often includes an element of negotiation related 
to power, wealth and identity. Sometimes the process of negotiation is 
strengthened by reference to sacred values that are acknowledged by all the 
parties involved.  The ritual performance of sacred values can be seen in words, 
actions, gestures, myths, symbols etc. When the negotiation does not work out, 
ritual can be used to differentiate people and sharpen conflict.  
 
In summary, three aspects of Galelan ritual may be emphasized.  First, ritual 
clarifies the meaning of power in the ordinary practices of the people.  For 
example, the people sometimes voluntarily adopt their ruler’s religion or rituals 
but incorporate their own meanings without submitting to domination.  Secondly, 
rituals are the primary means to provide legitimacy for power.  Rulers who do not 
follow the people’s religion and/or ritual system are not legitimate in the eyes of 
the people.  The same applies to the people. In the eyes of the ruler, the people are 
illegitimate if they do not follow the “true” religion and perform the proper rituals. 
The requirement of conformity in the practice of ritual can create a frontal conflict 
between people and their ruler.  A unifying ideology that is inserted into a ritual 
action can only work well when this action is followed with exchanges that 
benefit both parties.  Sometimes, of course, the nature of the exchange does not 
meet one party’s expectations.  Outside forces may determine whether or not a 
particular ‘ritual’ will become integrative or differential. Thirdly, if all parties are 
represented in the practice of rituals then they build solidarity across religious and 
ethnic lines.   Shared rituals bind people together whether within the same religion 
or not. On the other hand, when ritual is used for political purposes to strengthen 
the dominance of an exclusive ideology, it creates sharp divisions that can lead to 
violence. 
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The figure below shows how ritual mediates transitions, not only in the human 
lifecycle but also in crisis transitions of a particular society.  Ritual links the 
past with the present life of the people. Ritual practices give meaning to 
solidarity, starting at the family level and moving up to associations, 
neighbourhoods, villages, districts, provinces and countries. Ritual practices 
consolidate and restore a sense of belonging to a community, but if this 
community falls apart through conflict, the same practices can be used to create 
solidarity between opposing factions, just as they were used to create 
antagonism between the different parties. Ritual can rally the people against 
real or perceived outsiders and also can help them achieve agreement after 
confrontation. When used in conflict, ritual is a means to mobilize people to 
oppose existing power structures which are seen as a threat or to fight other 
groups seen as pursuing opposite interests. It formulates ideology and material 
conditions into concrete actions and uses sacred meanings to legitimize the 
decisions they reach together. These practices are usually highly symbolic and 
embody sacred values to give weight and strength to the present actions. These 
values are expressed through words, actions, gestures, myths, symbols etc..  
 
 
Chart 1:  Theory of Ritual 
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2.1.3.2.  The Use of Ritual in Indonesian Politics  
 
The use of the concept of ritual in the creation of conflict at the village level can 
help explain how conflict develops at the state level. The period of succession, 
after the fall of Suharto, is a critical time when many political agencies create 
competitive discourses that sometimes lead to violence. The danger is heightened 
when there is a great gap between different interests and the process of political 
negotiation is blocked. Patrons of political identities strive for hegemony and try 
to enforce a single identity from the centre to the periphery. As a result of power 
struggles between the centre and the periphery, there is a shift in the ritual actors 
who provide safety and security to the people. These dynamics influence the 
manifestation of violence in the process of political transition. 63 
 
In a society where mediating social institutions are weak there is a greater need to 
formulate policies and political rhetoric that utilize ritual.  In this context, political 
action can be manipulated into becoming a kind of sacred ritual by which people 
are ready to die for their sake of their ideology. Terence Ball emphasizes how 
metaphorical discourse stabilizes political identities.  In ritual participants 
recognise their identity and becomes committed to it (Ball: 1988, 86). Political 
identities are articulated in a language whose meaning can be seen at practical 
level.  People distinguish each other through their social constructions in which a 
sacred meaning goes hand in hand with more mundane categories (Anderson: 
1999 [1983], 12-18).  For example, military force and economic power are also 
tools of subjugation that work together with new sacred myths created by a new 
political actor (Bauman: 1978, 202-203). New coalitions, formed on the basis of 
power and interests, create new “primordial” identities as a means to gain political 
position.  
 
In the North Moluccas after the collapse of Suharto, elite competition and ethno-
religious leadership became involved in the making and unmaking of their 
society.  Power that treats ritual as a game reveals the world of the people who are 
involved. To understand the structure of society, we should analyse ritual 
according to the categories of the actors who each play a role (Wolf: 1993, 66-67). 
Conflict in the relations between families and kin-networks are often solved 
through ritual. However when riots involve both local and non- local groups, it 
becomes more difficult.  The accumulation of fears and tension boils over into 
violence.  I define violence as a deliberate action, which can be distinguished into 
physical violence, psychological violence and threats of violence. Competition for 
resources can lead to violence. People create meanings to justify their violence.  
Opposing groups use threats of physical violence to defend themselves and 
express their power, thus increasing fear and tension.  The negative turning point 
for the violence in the Halmahera was the moment when a land-dispute between 
the people of Kao and the Makians was changed from a local, material-ethnic 
conflict into a transcendent religious war that invited outside intervention.   
 
                                                 
63  cf.  Robinson:1995. 
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In the context of the North Moluccas, the collapse of the Suharto regime improved 
the position of some local competitors over their rivals in the struggle for 
leadership positions and control of natural resources.  The people reconstruct the 
story of their past to legitimate their current interests. The Makians, who now 
occupied the centre of governmental power in Ternate, built a coalition with the 
Sultan of Tidore in their ancient rivalry with the Sultan of Ternate. Meanwhile the 
Sultan of Ternate embraced the middle classes from other ethnic groups in the 
island of Halmahera.  Using a politics of ritual that appealed to ancient loyalties, 
the Sultan of Ternate built a coalition with the Halmaheran elite to enhance his 
reputation and overcome a dispute between the Kao people and the Makians.  
 
According to the old boundaries, a person was primarily tied to traditions within 
the limited territory of their village, with loser ties to a regional and national 
identity. Religious rituals, including the Hajj, reinforced a transcendent, non-
territorial, non-ethnic identity. Religious ideology became more significant than 
ethnicity and was used to promote the cause of material interests connected with 
power struggles at regional, national and international levels. The weakest in the 
society immediately experienced the effects. The divided elites sought support by 
dividing society as well. 
 
The story of how the Ngidiho people in Galela became involved includes the 
narration of how they lost their land during the globalisation process under 
Suharto’s regime. Beginning in 1990 they were forced by the government to sell 
their land at a price even lower than the very low price paid by the multinational 
corporation that set up the banana agro business in 1991. Chinese investors from 
Jakarta brought the global agro industry to Galela, attracted by ethnographic 
accounts of Galelan ‘banana culture’ written by a team of Japanese 
anthropologists.  Chinese were believed to control the Indonesian economy under 
Suharto and the majority of Chinese are Christians (Hefner: 1998a). Therefore, it 
was easy for the Muslims in Galela to believe that the global industry that took 
their land was a Christian industry. 
 
During the political turmoil following Suharto’s resignation, a competition took 
place between regional elites in Halmahera about how to address the injustices of 
the agro business.  In the debate, competing parties made frequent use of ritual 
words like ‘anti Suharto,’ ‘anti Orde Baru’ ( anti New Order), ‘anti globalisation’ 
and ‘anti Christianity’ to win legitimacy and distinguish their movement from the 
old regime.64  In the context of the North Moluccas, the Sultan of Ternate was 
considered part of the old regime. New slogans with ritual overtones were created 
by the Sultan’s political rivals.  Although the Sultan of Ternate is Muslim, his 
alliance with traditionally Christian ethnic groups and appeal to adat tradition, 
rather than religion made him a target of religiously nuanced attacks.   
 
People responded to the anti-globalisation discourse because there were material 
promises that they would receive back their land. When anonymous sources 
appealed to religious identity in the struggle against agro business, it divided the 
                                                 
64 cf. Hunt:1984, 21. 
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Christians and Muslims of Galela who had sold their land. Anonymous 
accusations by “provocateurs” underline the ritual- like manipulation of religious 
sentiment in favour of material interests. Competing powers and interests were 
clothed in religious symbols of legitimacy. In the language of rumour, physical 
threats against life and property occurred almost daily. As tensions  increased, 
false rumours were transformed into facts.  Each group built solidarity through 
charges against their “enemies”. The image of an enemy was clothed with 
religious discourse.65  These others were then attacked based on the conviction 
that these charges were true. Gradually, subjective convictions transformed 
rumours into reality. As a result of apocalyptic, mob rumours, people embraced 
violence as their fate. A forged letter, allegedly from religious authorities, 
articulated the desire for unilateral religious control of the Moluccas. This was 
used to rationalise the use of violence in the religious defence of the land. 
Religious rituals involved their participants in a totalising perspective on the 
events that demonised their enemies and transformed resistance into holy war. 
Violence exploded as unknown rioters began to attack.  
 
2.1.3.3.  The Politics of Negotiation in Ritual 
 
Territory is important for anybody.  It was the cause of the burning violence in the 
North Moluccas’s religious war. The use of religious territorial concepts as a war 
liturgy to commit people to violence shows the development of political 
constellations in the landscape of Indonesian politics when Suharto was in power 
up to now. In the North Moluccas the territory of an ethnic group is a genealogical 
territory. An act of territorial change is done through a physical action called “tola 
gumi”, which indicates the line of a new border by cutting down (tola) hanging 
vines (gumi). This practice is a part of the ritual marking of a boundary or border, 
for example where the boundaries of cultivated land are indicated in the forest 
(Visser: 1989).  On a larger scale, a dynastic empire such as the Sultan of Ternate 
used to claim his borders by sending his family members and official servants to 
set up a formal network of district overseers called, soa  (van Fraassen: 1999). 
After the end of colonialism, neither genealogical nor religious territory could be 
used to unite the territory of a united Indonesia. However the State established the 
ideology of Pancasila as a sacred border that encompassed and united the “family” 
of Indonesia.  Declarations of allegiance to Pancasila became a collective ritual 
for uniting and preserving the nation-state of Indonesia. Pancasila also became a 
sacred mantra for legitimising the power of the New Order.   
 
After the violence in Halmahera subsided, the people realised that they needed a 
ritual negotiation, similar to the one portrayed in the story of the wedding party, if 
they want to return to their homeland. Therefore, they invented a territory ritual, 
called tona ma langi, the boundary setting of territory or land, to establish a new 
agreement of peace among the people.  They strengthened the ethnic borders and 
de-emphasised religious divisions. Rituals were performed to strengthen 
interreligious and ethnic family ties and help people recover from the trauma of 
violence.66 
                                                 
65 cf. Bathust:1993 and Dudley:1991. 
66 cf. Sturken:1997,73. 
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The state can play a positive role in promoting rituals that encourage different 
ethnic and religious groups to live together in peace.  Unfortunately the state often 
exacerbates conflict by linking local problems with regional, national or 
international interests. On the other hand, there is a tendency in the national 
discourse to blame all conflicts on the central government and assume that ethnic 
and religious conflicts cannot be stopped with negotiations but require a total 
revolution in which the ideology of the state is changed. 
 
For Indonesia, in the context of multiculturalism, local rituals can contribute to 
nation building if political pressures from the dominant discourse are used in a 
moderate way.  The principles of exchange practiced in the North Moluccas 
discourage the tendency to take action that only benefits the stronger party. Rather 
than stimulating healthy exchange, state elites often use conflict as an opportunity 
to build their own empires. The Indonesian elites use the symbol of the great 
national family67 to resolve local conflicts in a way that benefits the national 
leadership, without paying attention to the principles of exchange that are 
practiced in common society. Local rebellions are often a protest against the 
stagnation of the exchange system and the growing gap between social classes. 
 
Some Indonesians believe we need a new ritual structure to break out of the 
decadent structures of the past.68  Included in the “ritual repertoire” of current 
Indonesian discourse is the rise of interest in making Indonesia a religious state.  
This political desire is problematic for most Indonesian Muslims since the 
universal ideal of an Islamic state is also exclusive and threatens other universal 
values such as universal citizenships, equal rights to civic participant, equal 
treatment under the law and religious freedom. 69  My data suggests that positive 
Islamic practices in Ngidiho before the violence demonstrate the capacity of Islam 
to adjust with the local culture.70  In contrast, imported ideologies stimulated the 
violence.  Ritual practices among Muslims in Indonesia are very diverse and 
efforts to homogenize them will impoverish the nation.  
 
Power should be negotiated rather than centralized as in the Javanese idea of the 
integral state (Supomo in Feith and Castle: 1970 [1945]). Religious values enrich 
the reformation of Indonesian life by informing national rituals in a way that does 
not exclude freedom for regional and local practices as well. The exploration of 
social arrangements enshrined in the practices of exchange can minimize the 
tendency to centralize power in terms of majority and minority conceptions 
(Eisenstadt and Roniger: 1980, 42-77).  Competition between elites and ethnic 
groups can be channelled through the politics of exchange in which each region 
                                                 
67 cf. Sullivan: 1991.  
68 cf. Hunt: 1984, 12. 
69 cf.  An-Na’im: 1994b; Hidayat: 2001; Siddiqui:1997, 196-197. See Chapter VIII. 
70 For example, the capacity of the local people, both the Muslim and Christian to bargain with the 
global banana company, PT GAI to rearrange their policy regarding female labour. The people 
demanded that the company give rice to female labours along with their husbands who also work 
at the company.  
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shares its superior products. This dissertation tries to locate the practices of ritual 
that are useful in the struggle to create justice in the world.  
 
In conclusion, I would like to show why this study is of the politics of ritual and 
not a study of the politics of religion. To answer this question, I would like to 
concentrate on two facts.  Firstly, in gathering data, I conclude that political 
identity is not always legitimised with reference to religion. Legitimacy can be 
derived from local practices that are not structured by a religious institution. The 
decision of where the people look for legitimacy depends on the political support 
they can get to exercise their power to choose from the available options that are 
accessible within their local knowledge systems. Secondly, ritual transcends the 
categories of religion and the sacred by including the social, economic and 
cultural affairs. In Indonesia “religion” is limited by referring primarily to the 
institutions of the five recognized religions. However in the practices of the 
people ritual intrudes into all areas of life, including activities that are usua lly not 
considered sacred or religious but are based on conscious beliefs. The actual 
practice of ritual exchange as it appears in the common practices of Ngidiho 
shows how family ideology is taken into political practices.  
 
2.2. Genealogy of a Research Project 
 
In the following discussion, I would like to show how an ecclectic approach helps 
me to understand the field of study. My field of study is the people in Ngidiho 
who are interwoven with various networks and structures within and outside their 
community.  As a field of study, the people in Ngidiho are a whole world that is 
waiting to be discovered.  I try to use their voices and perspectives to portray their 
own world and its surroundings.  Geertz warns of the danger of arbitrary 
eclecticism that sometimes produces superficial and confusing results (Geertz: 
1993, 88). His suggestion to link fieldwork analysis a bigger dialog between thick 
description and thin theoretical conceptualisation encourages me to be self-critical 
and careful in minimizing the epistemological and methodological problems that 
may occur from this research (Geertz: 1993, 6-7). 
 
2.2.1.  How to Proceed  
My research changed direction because of the outbreak of violence in the village 
where I was doing fieldwork, starting in August, 1999. I decided to address how 
globalisation of resource management provoked competition for power, and how 
rituals were adapted as a means for mobilising different groups to violence. The 
issue of agricultural modernisation as a dominant factor in social change was a 
major theme of my research in Ngidiho in 1995-1996 and 1999.  Globalisation 
spread to this area through trade, colonialism, religion and modern, developmental 
ideologies. Since the colonial period globalisation has had a great impact on the 
lives of the people and led them to create rituals in order to mediate conflict and 
promote social integration. 
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After the revision of my research plan, I came out with two hypotheses as a 
guidance to begin this writing.  First, violence that occurs in a society as a result 
of resource competition can lead to the social construction of a ritualising process.  
Secondly, a society is able to create rituals, which combine different ideological 
agendas as a negotiation tool to reconcile with each other.  
 
The central questions of this research can be formulated as follows: 
1).  What is the meaning of ritual and how does it function to create both 
solidarity and conflict in the community, thus influencing the formation of the 
people’s identities in North Moluccas? 
 
2).  How did political practices during the colonial period and Indonesian state 
rituals, shape regional political identities in North Moluccas? 
 
Every chapter is located in the bigger picture of these central questions. However 
each chapter is guided by its own goals.  Chapter I explained the personal 
methodology that was shaped by the outbreak of violence during my fieldwork.  
Chapter II maps a theoretical framework for understanding the definition of ritual 
and its relation to politics. Chapter III focuses on the question of to what extent  
are the everyday practices of the Ngidiho people part of their production of 
political culture?  Chapter IV answers the question of to what extent did political 
practices during the colonial period influence the formation of the people’s 
identity, as shown in their rituals?  Chapter V shows how the Indonesian state 
uses rituals in its political practices.  Chapter VI explains how the people created 
rituals of conflict.  Chapter VII examines how rituals were shaped and 
reinterpreted by the people in order to cope with the massive trauma after the 
violence in 1999-2000.  Chapter VIII discusses the role of the state in facilitating 
collective rituals that minimize conflict and strengthen integration in Indonesia. 
The book  ends with a conclusion in Chapter IX. 
2.2.2.  Strategy in the Field 
 
When I came to Ngidiho in August 1999 I was fascinated by how the people 
created their world through practices and concepts, which had been passed down 
for generations. After the village was burned to the ground, I had a chance to 
reflect on a large amount of data that I had collected. I interpreted the data 
according to themes that gave me an understanding of identity formation, village 
livelihood and power structures in the society. Before I arrived in Ngidiho, when I 
was still taking classes in Amsterdam, I was planning to do a general survey in 
order to choose some households as my informants.  However, I came to realize 
that informal discussions with groups or individuals gave a more complex picture 
of the people in Ngidiho. This helped me to design my questions and to select 
informants.  My time at the village was filled with listening and asking as many as 
question I could. In the process of my research, I constantly reformulated  initial 
questions to reveal the reality of the people in Galela. The dynamic of making 
creative questions was built on the dialectic between the answers and actions 
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people presented in relating to my questions. The application of this method 
follows the hermeneutic principle used in my earlier explanation about 
interpreting ritual.  
 
Located in Galela, I chose Ngidiho as the focus of my research.  It was one of 
three villages included in the administrative district where the banana agro 
business was located.  Ngidiho was closest to the banana agro business complex, 
which begins about 100 meters to the North.  Ngidiho was the recipient of two 
different government projects for Family Planning (1997-1999) and Health 
(1999).  They used different characteristics or criteria to select the households, 
which would participate in these projects.  For the Family Planning project, they 
selected poor families based on the construction of their houses and amount of 
their belongings.  For example, houses that were constructed without a cement 
floor or a corrugated roof were considered unhealthy and poor. In reality these 
criteria were often misleading because people might have a nice house but have 
lost the land where they used to plant coconuts or other crops. These people used 
to own their own land but they sold it to the PT GAI, a multinational that exports 
bananas (Risakotta: 1995a). The Health Project emphasized criteria such as 
available ventilation, a clean toilet, and clean water from a well. 
 
I used my own criteria for selecting different categories of households as my 
informants. Firstly, I chose households that had three generations living under the 
same roof, owned their own land (raki and dori) and who pooled their income 
together for basic family needs. Their income came from agricultural work and 
they sold their own produce. The second category of respondents consisted of 
three-generation families who no longer owned any land (raki or doro), where 
they could do agricultural work.  However some of the household's income may 
come from family members who work for the banana company or do other petty 
business.  A third category of respondents was nuclear family households who 
don't own any land (raki and doro), and work at the banana plantation.  The fourth 
category includes nuclear families that still own their own plantations but also 
work at the banana agro business. 
 
With a total of 230 households, inhabited by 188 Muslim and 42 Christian 
families, my research included a selective sample of 20 households in the first 
category, 25 households in the second, 30 households in the third category and 15 
households in the last category. My informants included 80 Muslim households 
and 10 Christian households. Thus the total number of the respondents was 90 
households most of whom were indigenous to Ngidiho. Households inevitably 
included some members who had married into the family from other villages.  
Some of them stayed at the village and some stayed in barracks or apartments 
provided by the banana company.  My work was not finished yet when the riots in 
Halmahera exploded on December 27, 1999.  However, I had already interviewed 
75 households in the village from all four groups before I left in early December 
(about 83 % of my target).  
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The interviews I conducted with respondents at the village concerned issues of 
peasant livelihood, including their production levels, the distribution of resources 
among them, their system of economic exchange and survival, and the policies 
within their households.  Fortunately, I stayed with a Muslim household headed 
by Oom Din, a religious and community leader who loved to tell stories. He was 
my most valuable informant as he provided many clues that helped me dig out 
insights that revealed a picture of his personal life as well as of other people’s 
lives. He was my teacher on the customs, religion and rituals of the Galela. 
Another old, Christian man, who was originally from the neighbouring village of 
Limau, also helped explain things, which I didn’t understand.    
 
The Head of the village (Kepala Desa), whom I have known since I conducted my 
M.A. research in Halmahera, was surprised and pleased when I said that I would 
like to stay with a Muslim family. There were several basic requirements I asked 
of him.  For example, the household should have several generations of the same 
family staying together under a common roof.  The members of the family should 
not include an official government servant of the village. Even though, he didn’t 
understand my explanation of why this was important, he quickly found a family, 
which matched my criteria. In the morning of August 21, 1999, after my husband 
and I had spent the night at the house of the village Head, Oom Din informed me 
that I would stay with him. His house was located just across the road from the  
Kepala Desa. Oom Din’s family’s taught me how to behave according to 
Ngidiho’s customs.  I was not allowed to pay rent for my room. The culturally 
acceptable way to pay was for me to shop and pay for all the food of the 
household each week. Most of my field research was among Muslims. 
 
My contact with other villages was usually connected to village activities that 
included people from Ngidiho, for example, marriage parties, funerals and other 
festivals, economic activities and festive or just a common visit to family and 
friends.  In my first research proposal I was going to do a comparative study of a 
Muslim village (Ngidiho), and a Christian village (Duma), to see the impact of 
religion on their behaviour in dealing with the agricultural transformation of 
Galela.  Duma is located on the interior shore of Lake Galela to the East of 
Ngidiho.  However, I abandoned this plan because there were too many different, 
independent variables involved that would make it difficult to do a comparative 
study.  Nevertheless, I did conduct a few interviews in Duma before my departure 
to Java, although it was not enough for a useful comparison. There is data 
available on the local religious transformations that were brought about by contact 
with Christianity. 71  Some Christian practices and perceptions are recorded in my 
interviews with Christians from Ngidiho or Duma.  However most of my 
interviews with Christians from Galela and elsewhere in Halmahera were 
conducted outside of Halmahera after the violence engulfed the island.  I met 
many people from Duma or other villages from Halmahera when I conducted a 
month of interviews in August 2000 among the refugees in their camps and in 
hospitals in Bitung and Manado (North Sulawesi).  During the time when I could 
                                                 
71 For example in Naomichi (1980), Haire (1981), Platenkamp (1988), Ajaiwaila (1996). 
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not go to Ngidiho, my only contact with the Muslims of Ngidiho was through the 
telephone. 
 
My relations with the minority of Christians in Ngidiho included some 
participation in church activities and general socializing.  Some were included in 
interviews I arranged with the target informants. However, I refused repeated 
invitations to preach, teach or play an official role in the church.  Shortly before 
leaving for Java, the pastor of the church asked me to give one sermon to the 
people.  It was hard to reject because they, as a congregation, needed a fresh 
message to encourage them to guard their unity and integration with the Muslims 
of Ngidiho.  In addition to preaching once, I was also asked to give a speech to the 
whole village of Ngidiho at a village meeting in front of the Kepala Desa’s house.  
After the riots in Ternate and Tidore erupted, the leading men of the village had a 
meeting to discuss the possible consequences of the violence on the people of 
Ngidiho and what actions might be taken to prevent the expansion of the riots to 
Galela. We talked until 3 am. 
 
Two weeks before my departure to Java at the end of November 1999 I conducted 
interviews with banana company executives, managers and foremen. I also 
interviewed copra collectors in Galela and Tobelo who buy from the village 
cooperatives and bank officials who support the economic life of the people in 
Galela through loans.  The interviews with the provincial leaders in Ternate were 
conducted before and after the religious war occurred in the North Moluccas. In 
Tobelo and Galela, I held interviews with governmental, spiritual and social 
leaders before and after the 1999-2000 violence in Halmahera. Interviews with 
Christian leaders after the violence were conducted in Manado (North Sulawesi). 
However most interviews with Muslim leaders after the riots were conducted 
through telephone.  I did conduct interviews with some Muslim leaders in Ternate 
just right after the eviction of Christians from Ternate and Tidore in earlier 
November 1999. I reconfirmed the details of the Ngidiho villager’s account of the 
civil warfare, from both Muslim and Christian perspectives when I revisited them 
in February 2002. 
 
One interesting approach, carried out with some female teenagers and housewives 
in the dining room of Oom Din, was to draw a map of the village that showed 
where each family lived. Within two working days, I heard many stories about 
many of the people of Ngidiho. The women liked to gossip. Later, I used the 
information they shared as an entrance to get to know the people personally. 
When the map was made, I took a walk with about ten teenagers and some 
children, just to pass by the houses of the people.  The teenagers would add more 
information by explaining things like the condition of animals that the people 
owned.  Sometime they reflected on the belongings and economic status of their 
parents. My camera also presented itself as a helpful tool for me to make friends 
with people. They loved to see pictures of themselves and their friends. I heard 
many stories about the people who appeared in my photographs. Gossip, stories 
and rumours that are not “scientific data” actually provided an entrance into 
understanding how the people see each other.  People wondered why I paid 
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attention to their ordinary, normal, everyday lives.  At the beginning they were 
surprised by the simple questions I asked.  After they knew that I really want to 
study and to live with them, they would tell me everything.   
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 11 – 13: Drawing a village map with female teenagers and adults; 
Children were part of the action during our walk to draw the map; 
A mother cow and her baby during our journey through the village. 
 
Cooking provided another entrance to open a discussion with people about their 
lives. During my stay with my household, Wednesday was my cooking day. Of 
course, I helped mama Iana, and her two married daughters, Sahadiah and 
Sarnawiah in their kitchen every day, which gave me a chance to think about how 
to modify their practices when my turn came. On Wednesdays I made breakfast, 
lunch and dinner. I used local ingredients to cook my meals. Cooking is an art 
form.  My attempts to modify Galelan cooking always stimulated deep 
conversations during and after enjoying the meal. The people would share their 
own experiences on how they modified dishes that came to them from outside. 
Then we would continue to talk about the practices and social arrangement the 
family and neighbours in Ngidiho. The discussion was especially interesting 
because every Wednesday Oom Din’s large extended family visited our house to 
taste and to take home the dishes I cooked.  This day was also a writing day.  I 
didn’t go out except to welcome guests who came to taste my cooking.  After long 
conversations I would write down observations and reflections on my experiences 
with the Ngidiho people that week.  
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Some people were suspicious of my habit of writing down every single word in 
my little notebook each time I had a conversation with them.  In the middle of 
October 1999, war broke out again in Malifut-Kao and thousands of Makian 
people fled from Halmahera to Ternate and Tidore. In Tidore and Ternate, 
Christians were attacked and forced to flee. In the context of increasing tension, 
some men of Ngidiho became suspicious of my presence in their village. They 
wondered whether my presence was connected with the religious conflict in the 
Moluccas. Since I have Ambonese blood and one of the pastors who was killed in 
Tidore was named Risakotta (a distant relative), there were questions about my 
motives in living with them. In November 1999, before my departure to Ternate 
on the way to Java, I was talking with the Secretary of the District of Galela, when 
a young man entered the office and interrogated me for about an hour. However, 
an extensive explanation about the purpose of my study seemed to overcome most 
people’s doubts and restore their trust.   
 
After leaving Halmahera, I stayed in Yogyakarta for about a year from January 
2000 until February 2001.  During the month of August 2000 I stayed in Bitung 
and Manado in North Sulawesi to meet refugees from the North Moluccas. While 
in Yogyakarta, I collected information about the violence in the Moluccas, 
reflecting on my experience, and studying the discourse in the media about the 
role of religion in the conflict. I gathered extensive newspaper clippings of articles 
that show the discourse, especially among Indonesian Muslims, about the conflict 
in the Moluccas, religion and violence, Islam and the state, etc.  I was invited to 
several conferences, including a meeting of Muslim activists concerned about the 
increase in religiously related violence in Yogyakarta.  These experiences 
enriched my perspective, especially in understanding how Javanese Muslims 
portray the religious conflict in the Moluccas.    
 
In February 2002, I returned to the North Moluccas to study how the process of 
reconciliation has taken place in the region. In Tobelo I stayed with Oom Din’s 
relatives who are Christians. With them I visited my Muslim household in 
Ngidiho. Even though Christians were not yet permitted to stay in Ngidiho, it was 
a touching reunion. I felt so relieved that they are all still alive. I also visited the 
village of Kao in Halmahera and stayed for a few days with a close Muslim 
family in Ternate. This trip contributed to the special chapter on the politics of 
memory and forgetting recorded in Chapter VII. Later, in March 2004, I was 
nominated by the National Awaking Party (PKB) to run for the Indonesian 
National Parliament to represent the Province of the North Moluccas.  This 
brought me back to the North Moluccas to campaign among Muslims and 
Christians. My first campaign in North Halmahera was in Ngidiho where the 
Head of the village, Basarudin Ayub was also nominated by PKB to run for 
Regency office in Tobelo. I discuss the contribution of this trip in the Forword of 
this dissertation.  I understand my PhD dissertation research as part of a larger 
effort to bring reconciliation to the region. 72 
 
 
                                                 
72 Adeney-Risakotta, Farsijana. “Running for Office. A Christian candidate for a Muslim party in 
North Maluku” (16). In: Inside Indonesia. No.79, July - September 2004. Australia: Collingwood.  
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2.3.  Closing Remarks 
 
As an analytical lens, ritual helps to examine how the political changes in the 
national arena affect people at the village level.  Ritual mediates transitions, not 
only in the human lifecycle but also in crisis transitions of a particular society.  
Ritual links the past with the present lives of the people.  The need to create an 
integrated Indonesian state was confronted with the fact that there is a gap 
between middle class- intellectuals and common people.  Another gap lies between 
different ethnic and religious groups.  After colonialism, the Indonesian leadership 
created national rituals to bridge socio-cultural differences and serve the particular 
political agendas of local groups.  
 
As a means of integration, ritual unites and mobilises people to negotiate and 
achieve their political agreement in a representative way.  Sometimes the process 
of negotiation is strengthened by reference to sacred values that are legitimised by 
all parties involved.  In a context of conflict, ritual can mobilise people to oppose 
a power structure or to suppress another group’s interests.  Groups legitimise their 
violent action through powerful ritual symbols. In light of the above, this research 
is concerned with social change on a large scale, whose meaning is just as 
significant as the social change that takes place at a very local level. Ritual is 
given meaning and practiced, starting at the level of the family and moving up to 
associations, villages, districts, provinces and countries. 
 
Ever since the colonial period, when agricultural production in Halmahera was 
adjusted to the needs of Europe, Ngidiho has been influenced by large political 
changes within its global network of relations. Each new regime used ritual 
politics to mobilise its followers and to distinguish its repertoire from its 
competitors. In recent events, outside elites stimulated potential local conflicts and 
used internationally validated ideologies as ritual tools to drive the people to 
commit violence. However, this study also suggests that there is no absolute 
power that can completely dominate a society that has its own complex identity. 
The people of Galela are still creating life together with the help of local rituals 
that gather and negotiate their power.  
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Chapter III 
Everyday Life and Livehood in Ngidiho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section will discuss practices that are adjusted as the result of social change 
and the political realities in the village. Beginning with a discussion of family 
practices we will sketch a picture of life in Ngidiho and see how the society 
created the image  of the enemy. When people in Ngidiho connect with strangers 
from outside, for example through trade, they still regulate the relationships with 
ritual. In this chapter I will address the question of how the everyday practices of 
the Ngidiho people are a part of the political production of their culture.  
The answer to this question will help us understand the reconstruction of the 
1999-2000 violence that occurred in Ngidiho and its surrounding areas and the 
process of reconciliation that began to take place in October 2000. 
 
The dynamics between material changes and the everyday practices of the society 
in Ngidiho led to ideological changes in the politics of ritual. Modernization of 
agriculture created new structures within kin-networks and changed living 
patterns. Sometimes within the same material context, several different concepts 
are used to explain the same meanings. For example, the meaning of local 
religious practices are adapted to Muslim or Christian doctrine, but without losing 
their old meanings either.  The phenomena of remaking and unmaking practices 
also takes place with regard to modern rituals such as the everyday routines of the 
banana agrobusiness in Galela. 
 
3.1.  Kinship, Neighbourhoods, and Enemies 
 
How do the people of Galela understand their relationships within the categories 
of kinship, neighbourhood, and enemy? Beginning with a description of kin and 
affinity relationships, I will explain how the ritual system, as a medium of 
communication, functions to build relationships and avoid the conflicts that 
commonly appear among them. Rituals are also created to tie together people who 
do not have a genealogical connection. This chapter opens with an account of a 
ritual healing by Oom Din.  Healing is a moral practice in which people perceive 
powers of good and evil that can effect the whole community.  Community 
networks of healing show the moral commitment of its members to each other. 
This section ends with some observations about “trust” and “the enemy” 
according to the people of Ngidiho.  
 
“Better there should be no prayer than excessive offering; a gift 
always looks for recompense. Better there should be no sacrifice 
that an excessive slaughter”  (Poem from Edda, quoted by 
Mauss: 1954, xiv). 
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3.1.1.  Making People Aware  
 
In every day life, Oom Din dedicates himself to helping other people.  His house 
is often full of people who come for healing. Oom Din always says that people get 
sick because their actions are opposed to the traditional rhythms of their everyday 
life. Therefore the healing rituals conducted by Oom Din are intended to make 
people aware of their wrong action. Before the ritual healing begins, Oom Din 
will ask the patient about the history of their sickness. If the person is  too weak to 
tell their own story, the person who brought the patient is asked to explain the 
history of their problem. 
 
While paying attention to the stories carefully and without saying anything, Oom 
Din will prepare warm water to mix with cold water. He prepares a full washbasin 
of warm water to pour on the head of the patient. After he says a silent prayer 
while moving his lips, Oom Din will invite the patient to go out to the side of his 
house where Oom Din will bathe the patient. If the patient is a teenager girl or an 
adult woman, she covers her body with a sarong. A teenager boy or an adult man 
just wears shorts, while children are bathed naked. After that, the patient is 
covered with dry clothes and taken back into the house of Oom Din. 
 
Before the patient leaves the house, Oom Din will whisper in the ear of the patient 
how the sickness can be cured. If the patient is a child, Oom Din will tell his 
secret to the parent of the child. However Oom Din doesn’t tell directly how the 
patient got the sickness. Oom Din talks very quietly about this matter so that other 
people in his house will not hear what he says. In the process of healing, a 
member of the family where the patient lives will prepare yellow rice cooked with 
special ingredients (dada) and deliver it to Oom Din. That is a sign for Oom Din 
again to prepare warm water to bath the patient who is beginning to feel better. 
 
One morning, when we had just started our breakfast, a woman came with her 
one-year-old son to Oom Din’s house. Along with them came grandmother 
Nafisah, who had just recovered from her sickness, and another woman who was 
carrying dada. I had seen this process before and knew it indicated the patient was 
getting better. But this time I observed the relationship between dada and the 
healing process for the patient. That morning, after Oom Din prayed over the 
dada, the mother of the little boy fed him. The boy ate ravenously. 
 
I smiled to see the healing process happening in front of me. I began to understand 
that the dada was given to the child with two purposes. Firstly, the aroma of the 
delicious dada, stimulated the appetite of the person whose tongue felt bitter. 
Feeding dada to the boy also signified pushing out the germs of the sickness and 
refilling the patient with new strength. Life giving food replaces the germs in the 
boy’s body. The ritual offering of food includes a pattern of material exchange in 
the understanding of the people in Galela, which includes both spiritual (non-
material), and material meaning. 
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Pictures 14–15: Oom Din gives a bath to an old patient; 
The patient eats dada. 
 
After the patients left the house, I discussed these ideas with Oom Din.  Oom Din 
laughed out loud and said that the offering of food not only has “vertical 
meaning” (offering to the ancestors), but also a “horizontal meaning” of service to 
his neighbours. I was surprised.  This view contrasts with my experience when I 
stayed with the second cousin of my mother in Yogyakarta during my senior high 
school. Even though they were strict Javanese Muslims, the family also routinely 
practiced Javanese rituals.73  Every Monday and Thursday night, she made a 
special sajen (offering) to respect her ancestral spirits. However this “sajen” was 
never used to feed someone who was sick. 
 
Platenkamp quotes the report of Christian missionaries who lived in the late 19th 
century saying that the Galela people prepared their offerings in respect for their 
family members who had already died (Platenkamp: 1988, 186). However the 
offering was not fed to the living people. The purpose of feeding ancestors (o 
diliki) is to control the power of those ancestors who died an unnatural death, and 
could still bother the living.. At least once a year the people had to observe the 
ritual of offering food to their ancestors (Platenkamp: 1988, 104-105).74 In light of 
                                                 
73 Sajen is a special offering of food to the spirits. (Geertz: 1960, 41-44). Sajen are prepared on 
Thursday nights, which according to the Javanese are considered part of Friday. The Javanese 
include a sajen in most of their ceremonies. The leader of the ritual drinks the water of the sajen or 
he can sprinkle the water onto those who wait  for a blessing, which will guarantee safety and 
peace. In the annual ritual of cleaning the village (bersih desa), the people prepare sajen with a 
cooked meal or raw rice. The food is later given to the poor people (Geertz: 1960, 25). Teruo 
Sekimoto describes the process of similar ritual ceremonies within contemporary Javanese 
celebrations of Independence Day in Indonesia on August 17 (Sekimoto: 1990, 65). 
74 Geertz says that in Javanese tradition, the aroma of the yellow rice used in the sajen attracts the 
ancestral spirit to eat the offering (Geertz:1960, 9,11). The same explanation can be found in the 
ritual of eating together (ngorom lamo’o) in sabua (a tradition open pavilion) in Sahu (Visser: 
1989).  In Tobelo, before the presence of the universal religions, people carried out the gomanga 
yo hakai ritual, which offers food for the ancestral spirits (Djurubasa: 2000, 42). 
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this, I suspect that the healing practices carried out by Oom Din included an 
Islamic influence in which the meaning of an offering was reinterpreted logically 
to make it conform to Islamic doctrine. 
 
During my stay there was government-sponsored housing for nurses in Ngidiho.75 
However there were no medical workers occupying the house. Oom Din offered 
the only medical care in town.  He has been working as a healer (Sou-Sou)76 for 
many years.77  He doesn’t ask for payment from those who need his services 
although, like most dukuns, he does accept gifts whose amount depends on the 
success of his treatment and the economic ability of the patient.78  According to 
Oom Din, his treatments would not cure the patient if he didn’t do them with a 
sincere heart and without self- interest (tanpa pamrih). He learned his traditional 
healing powers as a response to combat the power of a rival in the village who had 
used his powers to oppose him. Oom Din was forced to leave Ngidiho and he 
stayed on the island of Morotai for about 10 years, from 1969 to 1979. During this 
period, he only came to Ngidiho to visit his parents and relatives. He moved to 
Morotai because his mother came from that island. After his parents divorced, his 
mother went back to Morotai.  There were two reasons that made Oom Din move 
to Morotai.  First, he was not strong enough to oppose the magic forces that were 
sent by his enemy against his family members. His wife and children always got 
sick when they first arrived in Ngidiho. Secondly, during his stay in Morotai, he 
used this opportunity to learn from a famous Sou-Sou. 
 
“I became a Sou-Sou to stand up to another Sou-Sou who always used his power 
to endanger people whom he saw as his rivals,” Oom Din explained to me when I 
asked why he was attracted to become a Sou-Sou. “The Sou-Sou hated me because 
I am the heir of the Kimalaha,79 who traditionally has the right to lead this village. 
Therefore the Sou-Sou was afraid that I might be chosen as the head of village, 
                                                 
75 The District government arranges to place nurses in remote regions, which are far from public 
health services. According to the Village Head in Ngidiho there use to be a nurse who already left 
and moved to Tobelo because of her marriage. However once a month, there was Posyandu group. 
Posyandu is an abbreviation for a centre for women and children’s health services, which is 
mainly concerned for the health of pregnant mothers and children below the age of 5 years. 
76 Literally Sou-Sou means medicine, or a person knowing medicine. 
77 Ishige concludes that sometimes a Sou-Sou (healer) is Gomahate (Indonesian: dukun; English: a 
shaman). In his research, he found that in Galela it is not easy to acknowledge that a person is a 
Sou-Sou because they might be accused of being part of a deviate sect (Ishige: 1989, 439). I didn’t 
observe this reluctance in the Muslim community in Ngidiho. Oom Din always called himself a  
Sou-sou. The mother of Mala, the bride I described in the narration of the wedding party, is also a 
Sou-Sou. Djurubasa says that the healing process before the period of the universal religions was 
carried out by a Gomahate (the Gale lan term) or a gomatere (the Tobelanese term) which means a 
shaman. Sou-Sou (the Galela term) or You Houhouru  (the Tobelo word) is a healer who also cures 
people from spirit possession (Djurubasa: 2000, 53). 
78 Ishige states that there was no standard payment. However the patient typically pays in 
accordance with the success of the treatment and their financial capability (Ishige: 1980, 440). 
Djurubasa says the gift that the patient gives to the healer is a sign of thanksgiving rather than a 
standardised fee, because the effectiveness of the treatment depends on the compatibility of the yo 
houhouru  (magic formula) with the sources of sickness in the patient. In the healing process, the 
patient first receives water that has been already blessed with a formula to ensure compatibility.  
79 An explanation about changes in the political structural of Ngidiho is found at the end of this 
chapter. 
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continuing the position of Kimalaha that was inherited by my father.”80 After 
Oom Din became strong, he returned to Ngidiho and there were no disturbing 
problems that came to his family. He could even overcome the Sou-Sou. From this 
experience, Oom Din chose to become a Sou-Sou and a Muslim religious leader 
rather than becoming the Village Head, even though he has talent as a leader. The 
Sou-Sou who was hostile to Oom Din became the Head of the village for about 15 
years, from 1970-1985. This former Village Head died about two years before I 
came to Ngidiho.  
 
3.1.2.  Relationships within Kin Networks 
 
The centre of life for the Galela people lies within their families. Amoung the 
Galelan people, all descendents of a founding ancestor, through any combination 
of male or female links, are related to each other.  Such a non-exclusive mode of 
tracing descent is called ‘congnatic descent ( cf. Keesing: 1981, 222-223).  The 
smallest social unit relates to the word “house” (o tahu, Platenkamp: 1988, 76). 
The relations between people within the same house are called ma-dutu relations 
(“true, or truely my own relations”). The members refer to each other as gia-dutu 
(“one owner”, Platenkamp: 1988, 70-71,76). The ma-dutu relations within a 
family are understood as relations within a single, life-giving “stem” which shows 
them their original place of origin. Blood relationships were conceived as 
including those who live in a single bangsaha (great house), which contained at 
least three generations (Matsuzawa: 1980, 373).81 Due to its function as a unified 
place for a family to stay, a bangsaha was also called, o tahu moi (one house, 
Ajawaila: 1996, 52ff) or o tahu ma dutu (my own house, Platenkamp: 1988, 10).82  
 
Unfortunately the last of the great houses in Soa Sio (a village lying on the 
southern coastal area of Galela), was destroyed in 1930.  Since then, people no 
longer use bangsaha as a model for their house construction, although it still 
retains its symbolic meaning (Matsuzawa: 1980, 373). The household of Oom 
Din, with 13 members of the family from three generations living together, 
illustrates how the change of the physical construction of the house did not change 
the essence of the family structure. Two families of two daughters, Sahadiah and 
Sarnawiah with their husbands and children, live together with Oom Din and his 
wife, mama Iana. Sahadiah has two children, and her youngest sister Sarnawiah 
                                                 
80 His grandfather from his father’s side was also the Kimalaha . 
81 Matsuzawa says that the terminology of genealogical relationships is complex because of the 
variety of terms that were formulated in connection with traditional practices in the structure of the 
bangsaha (Matsuzawa: 1980, 366). cf. (Ajawaila: 1996, 53).  
82 In his research on kinship, C.C. Harris distinguishes between kinship and family (see Harris: 
1990). However Matsuzawa shows that the Galelan concept of family is differs with 
anthropological terminology. As an example, Harris says that family in general is understood as a 
domestic group where reproduction takes place (Harris: 1990, 27). However, there are no separate 
words for family and household in the Galela language (Matsuzawa: 1980, 348). The words family 
(keluarga), and household (rumah tangga), in Indonesian have distinct meanings. Keluarga 
(family) is a term that was borrowed from the Dutch and shows the core unit of kinship, including 
two parents, children from their blood, adopted children and members of their kin-network who 
stay together in the house (Matsuzawa: 1980, 349). According to Matsuzawa, the term 
“household” characterizes people who stay together and share the same family resources 
(Matsuzawa: 1980, 349).   
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has a boy. Two sons of Oom Din and a distant relative from the village of Bobane 
Igo also stayed in the house. The simple construction of house had three 
generations of people who lived together.83 
 
In Galela, the Indonesian word family (keluarga) and its original term o bolu moi 
(one group) (Matsuzawa: 1980) and ‘bilaterally extended family’ (rio-dodoto)84, 
are used interchangeably (Platenkamp: 1988, 76). A family doesn’t have to stay in 
one house (o tahu moi) because family is defined in terms of kinship, not of 
residence. In general, the members of households in Ngidiho include members of 
the nuclear family household and relatives who are linked by the descent line. 
Social relationships within a kinship group in Galela encompass blood 
relationships (consanguines) and affinal relatives (Matsuzawa: 1980, 349). O bolu 
moi is a kindred relationship that is established through either the father or 
mother’s side (Matsuzawa: 1980, 367). 
 
Matsuzawa reports that the role of o bolu moi is very important, both 
economically and physically, for carrying out rituals in the Galela’s life cycle, 
especially in connection with marriage and death. Relatives from the o bolu moi 
are expected to help out, not only in everyday life but also on special occasions 
(Matsuzawa: 1980, 356-362). The children of Oom Din never go to help a family 
who has a party unless they clearly understand their kin ties with the family. 
When I just arrived in Ngidiho, during the first week, there was a wedding party 
for a family related to Oom Din. However his children and wife didn’t attend the 
party. We, Oom Din and myself, represented his family. Later, I found out from 
his daughter that the family holding the party only had a distant kin relationship 
with Oom Din. Therefore, Sahadiah did not feel close to them or obligated to 
attend. In contrast, she was involved in working for the success of her first 
cousin’s wedding party, as portrayed in my narration of the wedding party. 
 
The Galela are equally committed to both their cousins and their siblings. 
According to the people of Ngidiho, helping siblings should not be based on 
calculations of obligation. Support should be carried out according to capability of 
the person. Upahe pae etoka is a Ngidiho saying that means, calculating 
(obligations) between siblings fails to show true brother/sisterhood. Even if there 
is no material help, it is very important to just show up (teke si dohawa). In the 
relations of o bolu moi, a member of the family in the modoka or doroa lines 
attending a ritual performance by a relative, has to bring the determined gifts if 
they don’t want to be humiliated by other members of the family. Doroa means 
the son- in-law.  
 
In the household, a mother carries the status of the modoka line due to her 
marriage to her husband. When she attends the ritual ceremonies of her husband’s 
family she has to bring wajik (sticky rice cooked with brown sugar and coconut 
milk), halua (canari nuts mixed with peanuts and brown sugar), cucur (fried cake 
                                                 
83 The architecture of the house is simple and only has three bedrooms, one living room, and a 
dining room, located at the back of the house. 
84 Rio-dodoto means brothers and sisters who are not directly siblings of Ego.  It refers to sister or 
brother-in-laws who are siblings through marriage. 
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made of rice flour and brown sugar), white sugar and jomoto (plaited mats).  In 
the past, the modoka had to bring all of the gifts listed above. During my stay, 
they had to bring at least two of the dishes as gifts. Doroa is the functional title 
given to a man by his family- in law due to his marriage to his wife. When he 
participates in the ritual ceremonies of his wife’s family, as a doroa, a husband 
has to bring saguer (liquor), sago (from the sago tree) and ikan (fish) (Matsuzawa: 
1980, 356-362; see also Platenkamp: 1988, 191).85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 16-17:  The modoka line comes to the party bringing its own special 
obligatory gifts. 
 
If the gifts run out during a party, it affects the whole distributive system that is 
arranged in a pattern of giving and receiving in the marriage and death rituals of 
Ngidiho. When a guest from a family of the modoka line brings wajik, they return 
home carrying sago or fish. Similarly, a family of the doroa line brings fish and 
sago, and return home carrying wajik or sugar. Therefore, if a particular kind of 
gift runs out, there will be an inequality of distribution that will affect the 
exchange process in the kinship bonds. Othe r people who come to help with the 
party contribute rice or sugar according to the common agreements in the village. 
They receive meals but don’t take home special gifts.86  
 
In Galela, the “generation of ego” expresses the differences between siblings and 
cousins according to their  gender. Two terms are used to signify sibling brothers 
and sibling sisters. A sibling sister is addressed as bira by a male ego and the 
female ego addresses her sibling brother as hira. Cousins address one another as 
gia ma nongoru.  Gia nongoru means brothers and sisters (van Baarda: 
1895:148).  This term is also applied to young siblings and cousins from the same 
                                                 
85 See the diagram of exchange below. After the Ngidiho people converted to Islam in the 1950s, 
the tradition of bringing local liquor became less common. Now the family from the doroa  line 
only brings sago and fish.  
86 Guests, families and neighbours who come to help receive meals and drinks. If there is leftover 
food, neighbours may take some home to share with their household members. This practice also 
applies to the agricultural rituals at the time of planting and harvesting. 
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generation. From the eldest “ego” to the youngest of his or her siblings, all are 
members of one kin relationship (Ajawaila:1996, 55-56). 
 
The terms Oa and Epe (Ajawaila: 1996, 57), Owa and Epe (Matsuzawa: 1980, 
364) or Awa and Epe (van Baarda: 1908, 29) show the distinctions made for 
parents according to their gender. However all the siblings from the parents are 
called wota. This term does not differentiate the gender of  specific siblings of the 
parents. Baba ria and meme ria are the names for the elder sibling’s partner. 
Meme doka is the term used to refer to the FyBW (father’s younger brother’s 
wife) and the MyBW (mother’s younger brother’s wife). Wota refers to the FyZH 
(father’s younger sister’s husband) and the MyZH (mother’s younger sister’s 
husband) (Ajawaila: 1996, 57). The elder brother of the Ego’s father and the sister 
of the Ego’s mother are called dodo and jaru. The elder brother of the Ego’s 
father and the elder sister of the Ego’s mother take custody of the Ego if her/his 
parents die.87  
 
A daughter doesn’t have the right to inherit her family’s land, because she shares 
in the ownership of her husband’s land. However if she helps in the process of 
planting coconuts, she has rights to the trees that are planted.88 The principle that 
women get land from their husbands should not be understood as just receiving 
free land. Women play an equal role with men in building the family economy of 
Galela. If they get divorced the land is divided equally between the woman and 
the man. Men or women can expand their land if they work together opening up 
new land from the jungle. In November 1999, in Galela, there were many women 
who owned their own land. The men of Ngidiho call a mother, hajj Fatma Bakali, 
“a strong woman”, because she has divorced her husbands five times! The 
Ngidiho men say to this woman, ngopodeka koma gena nayahiwa, which means: 
“Another woman like you is not to be found in Galela!” However she believes 
that her husbands were lazy. She owns a little store where she sells household 
necessities to the villagers in Ngidiho. From her income from this store she 
bought more land for expanding her coconut plantation. She doesn’t plant by 
herself but rather hires other people to plant and take care of her plantation. 
Several forewomen at PT GAI, the Banana Company also own their own coconut 
plantations and hire others to do the physical work of caring for them.  
 
                                    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 In the society of Galela, the rights of an Ego are received from either the father-line or the 
mother-line. If an Ego is a single daughter including a single child, then the right to inherit the 
family property goes to her directly. However, the female Ego has an obligation to participate in 
the exchange rituals within her genealogical lines, such as the modoka line from her mother’s side 
and the doroa  line from her father’s side. Although the female Ego participates in two lines, her 
mother’s side and her father’s side, nevertheless surnames are given according to a patriarchal 
system (patrilineal descent) (See Matsuzawa: 1980, 364ff). 
88 Platenkamp reports that if a woman gets a divorce and returns to her parent’s house, her rights to 
the trees on her parent’s property are given back to her (Platenkamp: 1988, 82). 
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3.1.2.1.  Types of Households in Ngidiho 
 
There is no universal definition of the word “household”. The material context of 
a household determines its definition. Households are sometimes defined in 
relation to two main features that are connected with their social context. First, a 
household is defined as an institution whose members pool their resources 
because each of them has cash. Secondly, a household is also the community 
where its members consume their incomes (Wong: 1984, 57-61). 
  
These definitions apply to the households of Ngidiho. The two characteristics 
account for the importance of kinship and enduring family ties in the 
determination of who contributes what to the common income. A Household is 
not independent as a separated island, but it also relates to a broader family bond. 
For example, Sarnawiah, the daughter of Oom Din could not contribute money to 
her parent’s household because she doesn’t work and her husband refuses to give 
her money. He hopes that he and his family will be kicked out of his parent- in-
law’s house.  However, due to the fact that Sarnawiah’s husband didn’t pay the 
bride wealth, his family and himself have to stay at his parent- in-law’s house. He 
had to turn down the opportunity to stay in a house provided by PT GAI, the 
Banana Company, because of his obligation to work for his in- laws.  
 
‘Poor in cash’ is a common  phenomena in Ngidiho. People who own land may be 
rich in resources or in earning power from their family’s labour, but poor in cash.   
Many households in Ngidiho rely on the cooperative stores who provide 
everything they need, from fertilizer to toothpaste, on credit. When the coconuts 
or copra is harvested, or when payday comes at the banana plantation, they pay 
off their debts to the store.  Each member of a household contributes the products 
of their labour to meet the common needs of the household. 
 
Households in Ngidiho may be classified by the responsibilities of the members 
based on tradition (adat), as in the case of Oom Din’s daughter and her husband.  
But they may also be classified by their primary purposes and goals.  These goals 
are dependent on the changing economic system on which the household relies. 
Almost all of the respondents from households whom I interviewed said that the 
main purpose of their work was to have their own plantation. 89 With the income 
from their plantations they could build their own houses and pay for the school 
expenses of their children. 
 
My research suggests four types of households in Ngidiho. The first type includes 
three generations of family living together in which the parents own their own 
land and have sufficient income for the whole family. In one example of this type, 
the youngest son and his family provided leadership in the household, whose 
                                                 
89 I chose to interview 90 households which where picked to represent the different types.  From 
the total number of households chosen, 20 households were categorised as the first model, 25 
households representated the second model, 30 households belonged to the third model and the 
last model was represented by 15 households. However because of the violence, I only completed 
interviews with 75 households, including 65 Muslim households, and 10 Christian households. See 
Chapter II for more details. 
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primary task was to take care of the aging parents.90  In other examples, the 
parents are the head of the household. The second type is of a household family 
with three generations where the parents do not own their own land or have 
income so that they depend on the other members of the family who stay and take 
care of them. 91 The third type is of a nuclear family that lives independently, 
owning their own house and land. They inherited their property from their parents 
or added to it by their own work.92 The fourth type is of a nuclear family that lives 
by itself, but does not own its own land.  In this type the family depends on wage 
labour or various other sources of income. This fourth type includes several 
subtypes, for example, they may be young, middle aged or old. 93  They may have 
                                                 
90 This tradition comes from the practice that the youngest child is married last. If the youngest is a 
daughter, the last son before her has the right to stay at the parent’s house. However if the family 
has only a single daughter, the right of inheritance goes to her. This type of household model 
doesn’t consider owning the house as the target because the ownership of the house remains with 
the parents. The obligation to take care of the parents is not a free choice. The income from the 
management of the plantation is divided between the parents and the child who takes care of them. 
However, after the parents die, the property will be divided equally between the children. In this 
example, the family income doesn’t only depend on raki, but also on a labourer’s salary from PT 
GAI, the Banana Company. Copra from the raki is produced four times a year. Cash and credit are 
used to pay for everyday expenses of the family members. Family households that include 
inhabitants from three generations are not only found in the families of youngest sons who stays 
with the parents, but also are found among unmarried children and married daughters with their 
non-Ngidiho husbands. The three-generations of Oom Din’s family is an example of this case. 
During my stay Oom Din’s two sons are not yet married, so they are not expected to contribute to 
the everyday expenses of the family. 
91 In this type, housing is not a problem. The parents own their own house but have no income. In 
several cases, families renovated their homes after selling their plantations to the Banana 
Company. However neither the parents nor their children own any land besides their house. Aged 
parents stay at home and take care of the small grandchildren while other family members work as 
labourers at the Banana Company. The children of the landless parents have a variety of jobs to 
make a living, including fishing, cleaning other people’s plantations, labouring at the Banana 
Company or making snacks to sell in the village. With jobs at the Banana Company, they can still 
be trusted for credit from the cooperative store in the village. They share their incomes with their 
parents.  
92 This nuclear household has mature plans for their family life. They work hard to achieve their 
goals. Their first target is to get land for planting coconuts. Achieving this plan can be done 
through working as labourers at the Banana Company or making lump sugar. Their house is very 
simple, but when they have money from their work they gradually work on renovating their house. 
I didn’t find the model of a nuclear family, which included only parents who were old and still 
owned their own raki but lived alone. Old parents who own raki always invite one of their married 
sons to stay with them. If the son is sick and can’t work with their raki, the parents can hire other 
people to manage their plantation. They receive credit from the cooperative store to cover their 
basic needs if they don’t have cash. 
93 Housing is not a problem for them, but they are concerned about their lack of health services 
and the difficulties of old age. There were several old couples without raki, who got sick without 
having families to take care of them. After selling their raki, their help comes from their married 
children. However the stores in the village will not give them credit to buy their basic needs 
without cash because they have no regular income. I found that parents fear living alone as a 
nuclear family without having a son to take care of them. Several families didn’t ask for bride 
wealth but instead asked for a grandson to come and live with them. Even though they had a 
daughter but they could not ask their daughter to take care of them because she has responsibilities 
to the family of her husband. However if the daughter is a single child and gets married to a man 
who has several brothers, then there is a possibility that the daughter and her family would want to 
stay at her parent’s house because all the property of her parents would go to them. In contrast, the 
property of the husband’s family would have to be divided among all the children of the parents. 
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never owned land, or formerly owned land which they sold to PT GAI, the 
Banana Company. 94 These types suggest that changes in household characteristics 
in Ngidiho are not caused by changes in the physical building of houses but rather 
are stimulated by the development of a variety of work options available in the 
society. 
 
According to Matsuzawa, in the past each extended family stayed together in a 
“great house” (bangsaha) in which each nuclear family had separate rooms but 
shared a kitchen at the back of the house (Matsuzawa: 1980). Although the 
bangsaha are now extinct, during my research, families with three generations 
living together were still common. They pool their money together for buying the 
necessities of the family. Different members contribute what they can.  For 
example, for the first half of every month, when money is relatively abundant in 
the village from the monthly salaries of the Banana Company, the sisters 
Sarnawiah and Sahadiah made snacks to sell in front of Oom Din’s house. The 
snacks sell quickly during the first half of the month. The profit from the sale of 
snacks contributes to the necessities of the household including necessities of their 
nuclear families.  Each nuclear family pays for secondary needs like buying 
clothes, education and other things. 
 
The Galela people support their young people in several ways. If the son- in-law 
comes from inside the village, the daughter- in-law will move directly to her 
parent- in- law’s house. However, if the groom comes from outside the village and 
the bride is from inside the village, the groom is invited to stay at the bride’s 
parents’ house, assuming that the groom has already paid substantial marriage 
costs, including bride wealth and fongu. Then both the bride and groom’s family 
will help them build their house.  If not, the husband will have to help his father-
in- law. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Traditionally, a daughter after getting married becomes a part of her husband’s family and only 
owns the property that she and her husband can produce from their work together. A son can’t 
depend on the property of the parents because it has to be divided equally. The parents in Galela 
don’t often help their married sons because the son has already received lots of help from the 
family at the time of his marriage. The groom’s family has to pay a lot to the bride’s family. 
However the son always has a special position in Ngidiho society.  Besides inheriting his parent’s 
house, because he takes care of them, the elder son is also respected. He has the right to arrange 
the distribution of his parent’s property to his siblings. Sometimes, if the parents don’t arrange 
clearly for the equal division of their property, the sons will take more than the daughters. 
However the norm in the present life of Ngidiho is to distribute the parent’s property equally 
among all the children. 
94 They may work at a variety of jobs, for example working at the Banana Company, but also 
taking time off from working at the company to do other work like fishing or labouring on other 
people’s plantation. Sometimes they are invited to play traditional music at marriage parties. They 
are not tied to a particular job. They might work for a while as labourers at the Banana Company 
and then go off to Irian to search for eaglewood which is the main ingredient to make incense. 
Housing is not a problem for them as long as it is safe. Those who work at the Banana Company 
or in the harbour, have cash. However those who work in Irian don’t have a permanent income. 
Only husbands go to Irian. Sometimes, after staying six months to a year, they return home with 
no money.  Wives who don’t have raki bear a heavy load. Even if they work at several jobs, 
sometime they are not trusted for credit by the consumer store. 
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The background of Sahadiah’s contribution to Oom Din's household is directly 
connected with her marriage process. Oom Din as the father of the bride, didn’t 
request the customary bride wealth that would normally be used to put on a big 
party.  Instead the groom’s family only paid the fongu and the party was kept 
simple. Oom Din repaid the fongu with small gifts to the groom’s family, thus 
preserving the basic principle of equal exchange.  However since the bride wealth 
had not been paid, the groom was still indebted to Oom Din (the bride’s family). 
As a result, the bride and groom had to live with Oom Din and continue to 
contribute to the expenses and work of the bride’s family household.  The entire 
family ate meals cooked by mama Iana and the two daughters, Sarnawiah and 
Sahadiah.  
   
Categorization of the household types described above shows not only the 
material conditions that tie family members to each other, but also shows how 
they articulate the relationships and ensure that each member benefits from their 
position in the family. When I first stayed with Oom Din, both of his daughters 
and their families lived together in one household.  In October 1999, the elder 
daughter, Sahadiah with her family, moved to their own house right next to the 
house of Oom Din. They moved out from Oom Din’s house, after Sahadiah’s 
husband, who is a wood worker helped to build his parent in law’s house.  
However, almost everyday, her children came to their grandparent’s house. If 
mama Iana cooked a delicious meal she would send a portion of the meal to her 
daughter’s family next door. In return, Sahadiah gave some of the snacks from her 
business to her parents. The exchange of food is common among friends within 
the village. I was usually offered food when I wandered from house to house 
during my stay in the village. The Galela people call this practice hike de dota, 
which means exchange of cooked meals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 18:  As she prepares to move out from her parent’s house, Sahadiah 
shows her kitchen supplies to her father. 
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3.1.2.2.  Negotiation in the Galela’s Marriage.  
 
The Galela practice an exogamous marriage pattern that is marriage between 
people from different clan or kin-networks.95  This pattern means that a family 
who gives their daughter must be different from the family that receives a wife. 
This pattern does not require that if a man from family A gives his sister to family 
B he is then entitled in return to receive his wife from family B. Sometimes there 
is marriage between cousins, however if this marriage happens, especially from 
the same male line (doroa), an asal madola ritual to disconnect the genealogical 
relationship, has to be carried out. The ceremony is assumed to break the blood 
relationship between the future husband and wife. 
 
Marriage is carried out in several stages. First, the groom’s family approaches the 
bride’s family and gives them kabilano, the traditional little plaited box of betel 
nut. At this time, the two families serve each other betel and areca nut to chew. 
The groom’s family begins the negotiations concerning the amount of fongu that 
must be paid. Fongu must be paid to the bride’s family to reimburse them for their 
loss. When agreement is reached on the allocation of fongu, it signifies that there 
is now an agreement of marriage between the two families. In the Galela 
language, the word fongu is a technical marriage term that is only used in the 
formal process of negotiating marriage between two families. The full statement is 
o kea moi in fongu that means “how much is the loss of the bride worth”. After the 
fongu is determined, they discuss the date of the wedding ceremony.   
 
In this book I use the word fongu with two meanings, firstly, the loss of the value 
of the bride and secondly, the cost of the wedding party. This understanding 
concurs with the explanation of an adat leader in Galela, Oom David Tunepe.  
Due to its connection with many ritual practices in the marriage process fongu has 
deeper meanings than just the cost of the wedding party. The loss referred to by 
the term fongu may have many referents, including the loss of their daughter’s 
presence in the family, the loss of her labour, the loss of her virginity and the loss 
of all her offspring. Fongu is given in exchange for the bride’s reproductive 
capability and is understood as o tiwi ma ngango that means “the living money”.  
In contrast, the term “bride wealth” (mas kawin) was unknown in the past and 
shows the influence of Islam in the Galelan marriage rituals. The bride wealth is 
usually a fixed amount of money, for example Rp. 60,000, and is not subject to 
the same intense negotiations that surround the fongu. 96 
                                                 
95 People within the same group are not permitted to marry each other. Platenkamp categorizes the 
marriage process in Galela and Tobelo as between the families of the “Wife Giver”=WG and the 
“Wife Taker”=WT. While I am indebted to Platenkamp for his careful research, I prefer to modify 
his terminology and use the less offensive terms of  “Wife’s Family”=WF and “Husband’s 
Family”=HF. According to Roger M. Keesing this type is categorized as a symmetrical alliance 
(Keesing: 1981, 264). This means in the kinship terminology of Galela there is no unilineal 
principle, which describes only one line of descent from the father or mother’s line, but rather a 
bilateral principle on which extended partnerships between families are built (Matsuzawa: 1980, 
366). 
96 According to Platenkamp, there is no term for bride wealth in the traditional marriage rituals, 
either in Tobelo or Galela (Platenkamp: 1988, 202). The people of Tobelo use the word huba  for 
the term by which there is an amount of money from the HF to be paid to the WF (Platenkamp: 
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The agreement between the two families is called demo pomakosone (Galelan) or 
putus suara (Indonesian for “unified voice”).  At this stage, the bride’s kin (o bolu 
moi) will bring up any wrong actions, which they feel the groom’s kin (o bolu 
moi) has shown in the interaction with them. The groom’s family has to 
acknowledge their wrong attitude, apologize and pay a fine to cover any 
humiliation the bride’s kin-family may have ever suffered as a result. The 
payment of this fine is called biomomade. 
 
If the groom’s family cancels the marriage, he has to pay a fine to the bride’s 
family.  Conversely, if the bride’s family withdraws they will have to pay a fine. 
If the bride’s family initiates a divorce after the wedding they have to pay a fine 
that is double the cost of the fongu that they received from the groom’s family. 
However if the groom decides to get divorced, fongu is considered “burnt” and the 
groom’s family has to pay a biomomade fine to cover the humiliation to the 
bride’s family. 
 
There are several general fines that have to be paid by the groom’s family before 
the wedding happens.  These fines or penalties are connected with stories of the 
settlement of conflicts in the distant past.  The sahe ma bobangu fine must be paid 
if a marriage couple unites two villages. For example, the groom from another 
village who marries a bride from Ngidiho has to pay this fine to the village of 
Ngidiho. The ciko ma bobangu fine97 must be paid if the marriage occurs between 
                                                                                                                                     
1988, 202, 271). Ajawaila uses the word rugi (loss) to translate the Galela word suba, which 
parallels with the same meaning in Tobelo (Ajawaila: 1996, 202). However the word suba means 
the action of respecting and bowing presented by the groom line (doroa) to the parent of modoka 
(the daughter in law). Furthermore the word to explain the loss is taken from the Galela word 
fongu. In the practice of marriage rituals among the Christians, they use the term fongu and mas 
kawin (bride wealth). According to the early practice, before the influences of the universal 
religions, the word fongu referred to the loss that had to be paid by the groom’s family (HF) to the 
bride’s family (WF) in Galela. Actually, the payment of fongu doesn’t go for the bride cost but for 
the offspring (keturunan). Because of this, huba, suba or fongu is understood as “living 
money”(see Platenkamp: 1988, 202). HF pays this money to WF as an exchange for the bride’s 
reproductive capacity. However according to Platenkamp the payment of living money cannot be 
seen as the sign of a process of negotiation because the relationships between the WF and the HF 
is not one of seller and buyer (Platenkamp: 1988, 202). I don’t agree with this argument, which is 
disproved by my narration of the wedding party. I agree that the marriage rituals do not imply the 
sale of the bride, but that does not mean that it is not a process of negotiation, including the 
negotiation of fongu and the bride wealth. The process of negotiation doesn’t only occur in 
relationships between sellers and buyers but is a part of all political relationships.  
97 The background of this fine is historical. In the middle of the 16th century, the Sultan of Ternate, 
Sultan Baabullah had a war against Portugal. He received help from the people of Tobelo to drive 
out Portugal from the small local kingdom, Morotia in Mamuya, which was located between the 
border of Galela and Tobelo. As a reward, he gave the Tobeloans land that was taken from the 
territory of Galela. The Sultan had the authority to do so because he claimed the whole of 
Halmahera as his territory. However the people of Galela enshrined their grievance over the loss of 
their land, in their rules for the marriage ritual, which were subsequently legalised by both sides. 
Every groom or bride who is from Tobelo and wants to marry a Galelan has to pay a fine because 
of something that happened over 500 years ago! In those days, the territory of Galela stretched 
from Gorua to Luari on Halmahera Island and to the small island of Tolunua, whose people still 
speak Galela up to present time. 
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two people from different districts, especially from Galela and Tobelo.98 If the 
groom is from Tobelo, he has to pay a fine to the bride’s family from Galela. On 
the other hand, if the bride is from Tobelo, the bride’s family has to pay the 
cikomabobangu fine to the district of Galela. A merah putih (red white) fine has 
to be paid by either a groom or bride who is from Tobelo.99 
 
After the demo pomakosone (unified voice) ritual, the groom and bride’s families 
carry out an exchange ceremony. In the past the exchange ceremony was 
conducted separately. However when I was in Ngidiho, the ceremony was carried 
out at the same time as the ritual demo pomakosone. The groom’s family usually 
makes preparations beforehand at a house in the bride’s village that is owned by 
someone in their kin-network. The groom’s family stores their exchange gifts, 
such as sago 100 and dry fish, in this house. After the demo pomakosone ritual they 
fetch the gifts and return to the bride’s family house with their goods for 
exchange. Meanwhile the bride’s family has already prepared cooked food such as 
wajik and halua to be offered to the groom’s family. The grooms’ family must 
accept the gifts and return gifts of money of similar value to the gifts of cooked 
food.  Later, the bride’s family will also give return gifts to cover the value of the 
sago and dried fish that they received from the groom’s family.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 In Chapter VII, I will explain how the cikomabobangu fine was connected with the tona ma 
langi treaty. This ancient treaty was reformulated and used for making peace in the North 
Moluccas after the mass violence of 1999-2000. 
99 This fine was justified with reference to an historical event in 1949 when an Indonesian troop of 
soldiers was created in Galela. Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945, however 
the Netherlands continued to try to regain its colony that led to several years of revolutionary 
warfare. In the North Moluccas, Galela was chosen as the centre for defending Indonesian 
sovereignty. Former Japanese soldiers (Heiho) who had fled from Java, formed up with the Galela 
people as Indonesian troops in Ngidiho. This troop was named pasukan merah putih (the red and 
white troops), after the colour of the Indonesian flag. These troops carried the Indonesian flag 
from Galela into Tobelo, where they were humiliated by the townspeople who were Christians, 
still loyal to the Netherlands. Ever since that event the Galelans have been paying back the 
humiliation to the Tobeloans through their marriage rituals.  
100 In the past there was an obligation to give sago powder, but this tradition has now been 
adjusted so that the groom’s family only brings cooked sago. 
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Pictures 19-20:  The exchange gifts are set up on the table during the dinner 
at the groom’s house; 
 The night before the wedding party. 
 
They deliver these return gifts after the groom’s family prepares a dinner for the 
bride’s family when they come the groom’s house to receive the fongu and the 
bride wealth. About a week before the wedding party is scheduled to take place, 
the groom’s family prepare a lama that is a long table to serve dinner to the bride 
family. After the delivery of fongu from the groom’s family to the bride’s family, 
the bride’s family has to return with rice (o tamo), cooked rice (tamo oko), cooked 
vegetables (o gaahu), halua, wajik, household equipment and plaited mats 
(jomoto).101 Then the two families serve each other with food (dadana). The old 
                                                 
101 The requirement of rice as one of the items of exchange in marriage and death rituals aims to 
maintain balance. In the pre-rice era before the 16th century, the groom’s family had to pay the 
fongu without expecting anything in return. The groom’s family gave the bride sago, fish and local 
liquor (saguer) as the products of their everyday work. However after the introduction of rice 
agriculture, the men worked outside their village. In the process of marriage, the two parties 
exchanged the products that represent their respective work. The men came bringing money, white 
clothes for his  future mother-in-law, and a few Chinese, porcelain plates. In the tradition of 
Tobelo, as reported by Platenkamp, the groom family gives a set of swords to the bride’s family as 
gifts.  Platenkamp suggests that the deliverance of the weapons of war as gifts to the bride’s family 
was a sign of the pride and courage of the groom’s family (Platenkamp: 1988, 198). However 
Platenkamp’s further interpretation that the deliverance of the war weapons to the bride’s family 
by the groom’s mother is to redeem a death or insult that may have happened before in the 
woman’s family and be blamed on the grooms family seems rather convoluted and speculative. It 
seems simpler to just assume that the set of swords are gifts representing the groom’s manliness 
and his heritage as a sea pirate or warrior. In the same way the bride brings the tools and products 
of her work. Perhaps Platenkamp should consider the historical factors that influenced the 
formation of this ritual, such as the historical involvement of Galela and Tobelo men in sea-piracy 
during the 17th – 19th centuries. Perhaps the mother of the groom delivered the swords to the 
bride’s family, not to pay for an imagined death or insult to the bride’s family, but as an offering to 
free her son from the accusation of murder that adhered to their ancestor’s profession as the sea 
pirates. In any case, by giving the swords to the WF, the power of the weapons is now in their 
hands and the son cannot touch it. In the framework of power, the exchange between the bride and 
the groom’s families seems in a position of balance, especially given the high value of the rice 
which was offered by the WF.  However in reality, ritual exchanges are seldom in perfect balance. 
Imbalance is inevitable when the value of gifts for exchange experience inflation or deflation. 
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people from the both sides serve each other by feeding each other directly into 
their partner’s mouths. 
 
There are three ways in which a Galela family can pay off the fongu and bride 
wealth if the groom is unable to pay at the beginning of the marriage. First, a 
grandchild may be formally given to the bride’s family as an exchange for the 
inability of the child’s father to pay the fongu and bride wealth. Secondly, a son in 
law has to stay with the bride’s family while helping them with the household 
work to pay off the obligation of the exchange rituals. Thirdly, if the groom’s 
family cannot pay but the bride has already moved in to stay with them, the 
bride’s family can take their daughter back. This means that the new marriage 
couple will face divorce. 
 
There is one other way in which Galela families remove the fongu obligation. The 
bride’s family can negotiate the elimination of their obligation to provide a big 
marriage party in exchange for giving up their right to receive fongu. If this is the 
choice of the bride’s family it means that they don’t have to respond by giving 
gifts to the groom’s family to pay back the value of the party costs paid by the 
groom’s family. If the bride’s family requests the party costs (fongu), they are 
obligated to give traditional gifts in return, for example, intricately hand-woven 
mats (jomoto),102 cooked rice (tamo oko),103 cooked vegetable (o gaahu), the 
kitchen equipment and the place for betel nut (kabilano). These gifts should be of 
similar value to the fongu. The two daughters of Oom Din were married using this 
model of negotiation. They didn’t ask for fongu so they didn’t have to give  in 
return.  
 
The elimination of fongu doesn’t mean the removal of other requirements such as 
bride wealth (mas kawin). For Muslims in Ngidiho, the bride wealth is a 
validation for a Muslim marriage. Muslim families give the bride wealth directly 
to the bride at the time of wedding ceremony (akhad nikah). The elimination of 
bride wealth causes a heavy punishment. The husband of Sarnawiah, the daughter 
of Oom Din who is a Bugis from Southern Sulawesi, was not permitted to stay in 
this own house because he didn’t pay the bride wealth. 104 There are no exceptions 
made for a man, whether from outside or inside the village, for not paying bride 
wealth to the bride family, since this sum signifies the legitimacy of the marriage. 
                                                 
102 Hand woven mats take many months to make and were very valuable in the life of the Galela in 
1999. 
103 According to Platenkamp, the ritual language of the Galela and Tobelo people names rice as a 
sign of fertility that symbolizes the bride who gives birth (Platenkamp: 1988, 213). However rice 
is also a highly valuable commodity, which benefits the groom’s family. Giving raw rice as an 
exchange gift means the groom’s family can use it as new seeds for producing a new crop (Visser: 
1989). 
104 Oom Din says that his son in law is an orphan. Andi came to Ngidiho to work at the Banana 
Company and had nothing to offer when he decided to marry to Sarnawiah, the daughter of Oom 
Din. In February 2002, I revisited the village and found out that Andi and his family had already 
moved to a different house. They moved out of Oom Din’s house because the house was burned 
down in the violence and also because Oom Din’s other son, Kibu, was now married and lives 
with his wife in Oom Din’s new house. 
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The bride wealth is paid at the time of the Muslim marriage vow (akhad nikah). 
The cost of bride wealth in 1999 was Rp. 60,000.105  
 
The modification of traditional practices that were carried out by Oom Din were 
possible because of his capability to interpret a new meaning of the practices in a 
new situation. 106 Changes in material conditions contributed to the process of 
reinterpretation. Ecological and economic change influenced the practices. For 
example, the natural materials needed for making some of the traditional gifts are 
becoming more and more rare and expensive in Ngidiho and Galela in general. 
The bride’s family minimized their obligation to make labour intensive gifts by 
eliminating the obligation of the groom family to pay fongu.  
 
Platenkamp argues that the marriage exchange rituals of the Galela free them from 
debts and obligations by maintaining a balance (Platenkamp: 1988, 196). I feel 
that this understanding is overly individualistic. Why? When two families are tied 
together through the marriage of their children, the exchange practices are an 
obligation that they cannot avoid. The two parties are tied together, within the 
terms of kin and affinal relationships, as the modoka line and doroa line.107  This 
relationship has a deep meaning that includes obligations that will be carried 
down to further generations.  Gift exchange does not remove obligation but rather 
builds relationships of ongoing responsibility. Once a party refuses to give, they 
also refuse to receive the exchange gifts of the other party. As a result they refuse 
the obligations of brother and sisterhood that are created through the marriage 
rituals (cf. Mauss: 1954, 11ff).108 
 
Affinal exchange relationships can be diagrammed as follows: 
 
1. Patterns of exchange in the marriage process carried out by the wife’s family 
(WF) and the husband’s family (HF): 
                                                 
105 Malay and Arab culture that spread along with Islam influenced the tradition of bride wealth. In 
Galela, mas kawin (bride wealth) is practiced by both Muslims and Christians.  
106 The party cost depends on the request of the bride’s family. During my stay in Ngidiho there 
were several families who modified the marriage ritual practices. Sometimes the families simplify 
the marriage rituals based on the economic capabilities of both parties. Another reason was the 
respective statuses of the bride and the groom. In practice the Christian community tolerates 
engaged couples who live together before marriage, although it is forbidden by church teaching. 
Unmarried couples that live together are punished for violating Christian morality. Both the couple 
and their four parents are forbidden from attending Holy Communion at the church. However, 
after their formal marriage by the Church and state they are restored again to full participation in 
the church. In the Muslim community, there is no tolerance for couples living together before 
formal marriage because of their stricter understanding of law and sin.  
107 (Matsuzawa: 1980, 364-365; cf. Barraud: 1994, 104) 
108 I don’t agree with Platenkamp who says that the deliverance of huba and the swords from the 
HF to the WF shows the subordination and lower rank of the WF towards the position of HF 
(Platenkamp: 1988, 207). When discussing the exchange of rice, Platenkamp assumes that this 
practice shows the deliverance of gifts from a lower giver to a superior receiver that emphasizes 
the subordinate position of the WF (Platenkamp: 1988, 193). Platenkamp’s hypothesis cannot be 
proved because the WF is also careful to ask fongu that will be of similar value to the gifts that 
they will return to the HF. The same reciprocal obligations are also observed in marriage rituals 
between a bride from Ngidiho and a groom from outside the village. When fongu is requested, 
there is an obligation to return gifts of similar value.  
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The bride family (WF)                                               The groom family (HF) 
          
 
Chart 2:  Exchange Mechanisms in the affinity network 
 
 I and III = HF 
                                                                     
                                                                               
                                                 
 
 
                                                     
                                                                     
                                            
 
 II = WF 
I. HF gives bride wealth and fongu 
 
II. WF returns with Sosoka, which is a package of gifts to the groom family 
namely: 
     1. Yomuto (several plaited mats) 
     2.Tamo oko (cooked rice) and o gauhu (cooked vegetables) 
     3. Poroco or palaudi (a full basket filling with raw rice= o tamo) 
     4. Sosiru (a flat basket to winnow rice) 
     5. Tate, sesasa, sosolota (several kind for clamping wood to make fire) 
     6. Kabilano (the place for betel nut). 
 
III. HF returns with sago, damaha (dry plaited fish), and saguer (local liquor). 
   
2. The position of Ego (E) in the affinalship bond is tied by the groom’s line 
(doroa) and the bride line (modoka). For example, a female Ego is modoka from 
the husband family (HF). Thus if the father of her husband died, she has to give 
exchange gifts from the modoka line to the family of HF. However, if a child of 
the female Ego gets married, the exchange gifts that she receives coming from 
both the doroa and the modoka line. The doroa is added in the family tree of the 
female Ego because she receives a son in law into her affinalship. The modoka 
line is added in the family network of the female Ego because she receives a 
daughter in law as her family member. This same principle is applied to the male 
Ego (father) who accepts the doroa from his wife family (WF).  From the 
marriage of his son he receives a daughter- in- law who gives him the modoka line. 
Through the marriage of his daughter he receives a son- in- law who gives him the 
doroa line.  
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Chart 3:  Family Lines 
E=modoka                                       E=doroa 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   Daughter =D                 S = Son                           D                S    
                   doroa          modoka                           doroa      modoka        
 
                                                                                                   
3. Patterns of exchange for giving (bilangngu) and responding (mafanggali) in the 
marriage and death rituals of a family tree (shema) of doroa (male) and modoka 
(female) lines can be drawn as follows: 
 
           Groom’s party (doroa)                              Bride’s party (modoka) 
 
   Comes with sago, fish and local liquor     Comes with wajik, halua, sugar and     
                                                                        cucur      
   Returns home with wajik, halua, sugar, Returns home with sago, fish and  
cucur  local liquor                                    
                                                                
        
 
                                  Chart 4:  Pattern of Exchanges       
 
                                                              Doroa                   
    Mahira usowo                                    Mahira usowo      
                                                                    
 
                                    Doroa                                      Modoka                                                          
               
                                                                                                   
 
                                                                                        
                        Mahira usowo            Modoka           Mahira usowo 
 
 
Mahira usowo are people who don’t have an affinity relationship through 
marriage. A mahira usowo cannot bring the exchange gifts that are required for 
the line of modoka or doroa. If a mahira usowo brings gifts required by an affinity 
obligation, the family who receives the exchange gifts will laugh at him/her. 
However a mahira usowo is involved in the party by bringing rice or other food to 
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the family without expecting to bring anything home in exchange. A mahira 
usowo will be repaid when she/he has a party and the family he/she has helped 
will return the favour by bringing rice.       
 
          
3.1.2.2.1.  Supporting the Kin and Affinity Family through Exchange 
 
One morning in October 1999, Oom Din was involved in a serious discussion 
with his elder son, Kibu who was 16 years old. As I listened, Oom Din was asking 
Kibu to participate in the harvest process of their coconut trees. Actually he just 
asked Kibu to be at the location of his plantation during the harvest. “I have given 
my plantation to be used by Suab Budiman who is my second brother- in- law, who 
was going to Mecca for his Hajj,” Oom Din explained to me when I asked him 
why his plantation was lent to his second brother- in- law. 
 
Part of the ritual exchange practiced by the people of Ngidiho is to loan or borrow 
coconut plantations. If  members of a kin and affinity network have urgent needs, 
they can borrow a coconut plantation from one of their relatives for several 
harvests according to their agreement and needs.  Going to Mecca is an expensive 
project for a member of a social class like the farmers of Ngidiho. In 1999, the 
total cost for the trip from Ngidiho to Mecca was about Rp. 30 millions. People, 
who make a vow to go on the Hajj have to collect their money for many years. 
“Without a sacred vow, a plan would always be blocked and never reached,” Oom 
Din explained to me. He gave an example of a married couple who had already 
announced their sacred vow to go on the hajj but then experienced a major 
disaster. 
 
According to Oom Din, their disaster came when the money donated by members 
of their kin-network for them to go on the hajj, was invested as financial capital to 
run their business. At the beginning, the marriage couple invested their money in 
buying a fishing boat and nets to catch fish off the island of Morotai. The prospect 
of the business was good, but the boat sank and unknown people stole the nets. 
After that, several businesses they tried had failed. Perhaps they were punished 
because they did not reserve the money donated for the sacred purpose of their 
vow.  
 
Beside their personal money, a person who is going on the hajj, need supports 
from the members of the kin-network. The help they receive is not always in the 
form of money. A candidate for the hajj might get money from the village 
cooperative (Koperasi Unit Desa = KUD) or the store where they regularly sell 
their copra.  Members of the kin and affinal network help the person generously 
by allowing them to use their coconut plantations. This help is given with the 
belief that in the future the receiver of help will return the favour by doing the 
same thing for the people who helped them in their time of need.  
 
The community also builds mosques and churches using this same system. “As 
human beings we have a lot of obligations,” Parmenas Budiman told me when I 
asked him how they manage their resources. In November 1999 there were 
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several activities that required support from him. His brother, Suab Budiman has 
planned to go on the hajj in February 2000. This meant that he had to give part of 
his plantation to be used by his elder brother, Suab. In November 1999, the Synod 
of GMIH had declared the district of Galela would become the host for the annual 
meeting of the church. The congregation of GMIH in Ngidiho was appointed as 
the host for the Synod meeting on Christian women before the annual meeting 
began. As a respectful member of the congregation and one of the elders of the 
church, Permenas Budiman had to contribute funds for supporting church 
activities. They had to complete the church building and build a kitchen for the 
parish house, which was going to be used for the women’s meeting before the 
annual meeting. His main source of income to pay for all of these plans was from 
his coconut plantation (raki). His wife sold clothes on credit to the people, but 
most of their income came from their sale of copra. 
 
3.1.2.2.2.  Trust and Debt 
 
Trust is a major factor in the social life of the people in Galela. The people judge 
whether or not someone can be trusted based on their work or their ownership of a 
coconut plantation (raki). With guarantees from their raki or their wages from 
regular work, a person can receive all they need and pay it back on a weekly, 
monthly or quarterly basis to the cooperative store (KUD). People are free to 
choose to whom they will sell their copra. However, once they are committed to 
selling or exchanging their copra for necessities at the store, they cannot easily 
shift to another store or KUD.  The debt bond that occurs between a farmer and a 
store or KUD limits their freedom to build another trade network.109 
 
In Ngidiho there is a saying, a igo ma sopo gena tongohi uwa to KUD, which 
means roughly, “I owe my dough to the company store!” (Literally, “The coconut 
harvest is not mine but is owned by KUD.”) Not everyone is trusted with credit. 
Stores in Ngidiho, KUD or the individual stores at the district level in Tobelo only 
give new credit to an owner of a coconut plantation after the person has sold four 
                                                 
109 Copra is sold through a series of “middlemen”  First, the farmers bring their product to the 
village cooperative (KUD) or an individual stores. Secondly, the KUD or store sells the copra to 
the temporary collector at the district level (Pengumpul Sementara=PS).  Next, the PS sells the 
copra to the Inter-Island Buyer (Pedagang Antar Pulau=PAP). Fourthly, the PAP sells to an 
Exporter in Surabaya. Farmers only relate to the PS, KUD or individual store. Farmers who 
produce at least one-ton of copra production per quarter can sell it directly to the PS without going 
through the KUD or the individual stores. These farmers can get a better selling price. 
Additionally the farmers may request a commission from the selling price given to KUD, or the 
individual stores as an incentive for the farmers to sell to them. The selling price of copra during 
my stay in Ngidiho was determined by the fluctuations of the market. If, in the exchange rate of 
the Indonesian Rupiah against the American Dollar, the rupiah weakened, the farmers were happy 
because the selling price of copra would increase, for example to Rp.2,500. per kg.  Many farmers 
delayed sell their copra until the Rupiah went down against the Dollar. The KUD and the 
individual stores provided an incentive for the farmers to sell to them, by guaranteeing credit for 
their everyday necessities. In Ngidiho there was one KUD and three individual stores which 
provided credit to farmers. 
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harvests to the store, thus proving that they own a plantation that regularly 
produces copra.110  
 
However occasionally the owners of a coconut plantation don’t fulfil their 
promise to their permanent buyers. The people of Ngidiho say igo siloda which 
means the coconuts have fled with their owners. This happens when the owners of 
copra have debts, which they can’t repay. If they sold the new copra to their 
permanent buyer there is a chance that they won’t receive any cash since their 
profits are already eaten away by credit. Therefore they sell the copra to another 
buyer. If this happens, the two buyers have to solve the problem. The former 
buyer has to ask the new buyer to pay off the debts of the copra seller. The 
arrangement of a new trade network will come into effect later, after the new 
buyer pays off the loans of the former buyer. Then the seller starts a new 
obligation to sell his copra quarterly to the new buyer in order to pay of his 
transferring debts and any new debts that he makes after the first copra production 
is bought by the new buyer. If the three parties cannot reach an agreement, the 
case is taken to the police at the district level. 
 
Individual stores and the KUD support the copra sellers as long as they sell their 
copra to their permanent buyers on a quarterly basis. The cycle of harvest is three 
times a year: April, August and December. For example, a farmer will harvest his 
coconuts in December and pay off his debts.  He or she then makes new debts, 
which will be paid off at the next harvest. Debts given by the buyers to the sellers 
could be in the form of cash or of necessities such as sugar, rice, soap, cooking oil 
etc. If the sellers have other expenses like cement or credit for buying a 
motorcycle, the permanent buyers write a guaranteeing letter to the stores, which 
sell necessities to the sellers. The sellers take the letter to the stores and receive 
whatever they need. Usually, the permanent buyers agree to make an early 
payment to the store in question. The permanent buyers charge interest on the 
credit they extend to the farmers and deduct it from the price of the copra at the 
next harvest. The interest follows the market rate. Those who need funds for 
going on the hajj also use this system.  
 
Many farmers no longer own their own plantations because they sold their land to 
PT GAI, the Banana Company. Landless farmers have difficulty building 
economic relationships outside the circle of their own village. People outside their 
village do not trust them if they have no plantation. Labourers who work for the 
Banana Company are tied to the labour KUD, which set up their labour union. 
Labourers can get cash or credit through their KUD labour union even if they 
don’t own their own plantations. The labourer’s debts are deducted directly from 
their paychecks by the Banana Company. Payment of debts among the labours 
directly is cut off through the company mechanism.  
 
The economic mobilisation of those who work for the Banana Company is 
blocked at the village border. They don’t have any products to sell except their 
                                                 
110 Before they are approved for credit, a copra owner is referred to as a temporary client (seller). 
If they pass this phase it means there is a trust relationship between the buyer and seller and the 
owner of copra is called a permanent client. 
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labour, which is difficult to export. In the middle of the month, when their money 
runs out, people take on new debts at the stores of their village. The owners of the 
stores can refuse to give new credit when it has reason to doubt that person can 
pay back their debts. However if the villagers have a source of cash for their 
labour the stores make a good profit by charging interest. Some Ngidiho people 
who wanted to work in the sugar cane fields in Magiloi111 needed money to pay 
for transportation. They asked for loans from the permanent stores in the village. 
The loans were granted but had to be repaid with interest everyday.  Similarly, 
loans were granted to women who wanted to make and sell snacks in the 
afternoon and evening. After their snacks were sold, they went directly to the 
permanent stores to pay off their loans each day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 21:  The owner of the store, wearing a sarong, stands at the front 
door, while many people gather on the terrace of his house and store. 
 
Those who work as civil servants, such as teachers at the elementary school or 
officers in the district government offices of Galela, have a permanent salary and 
prefer to borrow money from the bank in the district of Tobelo. After taking out a 
loan, they invest it back in the same bank. Their loans are paid off automatically 
through governmental channels through deductions from their monthly salaries. 
This social class can also easily obtain credit from the stores in their village if 
they need it. 
 
In my evaluation, the model of a modern village cooperative that developed the 
principles of KUD without paying attention to the cultural aspect of the exchange 
pattern among the people in Ngidiho, has enjoyed very limited success.112 The 
members of the KUD are eligible to receive a subsidy from the local government 
District Office (Kecamatan), which supports the KUD with financial capital. The 
purpose of the subsidies is to stimulate the entrepreneurial capability of the 
members of the KUD. The members are expected to multiple their capital by 
developing a particular business. However, the village cooperative (KUD) 
                                                 
111 Magiloi is a new agricultural field located on the Northern side of the River Tiabo. From 
Ngidiho to Magiloi it takes about an hour by public transportation to the last stop where people 
have to get off and continue walking on foot for about another hour and a half to Magiloa. 
112 See my interview with Poli Tolori in Ngidiho during October, 1999. 
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members do not build any bonds between the members or with the institution 
itself because there are no mechanisms of exchange to build obligation or 
commitment. The group is formed because of the availability of project funds 
relating to the empowering of small industries. Therefore members of the group 
don’t see any need to extend their capital through an exchange process between 
them beyond their kinship and trust network. Most of the cash subsidies fail to 
help the villagers multiple their energy or income. 
 
3.1.3.  Neighbourhood Ties 
  
It is easy to see how relationships in Ngidiho are built by observing the events of 
marriage and death.  Besides the system of genealogical relationships, the Galela 
people also have ways to develop their relationships with their neighbours. In 
daily life, people often exchange vegetables and cook meals. For example, Oom 
Din’s family and their neighbours, such as pak Hajj Tari frequently shared food. 
The daughter of pak Hajj Tari, a young widow sometime came to Oom Din house 
to ask for an ingredient she needed. As long as the ingredient was available in the 
house or garden, a neighbour was free to take it. However, the neighbours don’t 
only ask, but also give when they are asked. 
 
The sound of a beating drum (bedug) announces the death of someone in the 
village. Unlike in the case of a wedding party, the people do not need a verbal 
announcement in order to know that they are required to visit the grieving family. 
The grieving family has the right to receive voluntary help from people without 
any obligation to return the help. However, in reality, how much help the grieving 
family receives is dependent on the quality of their participation in the process of 
exchanging gifts and services within the village for their whole lives long and 
perhaps even longer.113 
 
Before a wedding party takes place, someone will come from door to door to 
deliver an oral wedding invitation (gogoro). The official messenger speaks very 
quickly and brie fly, announcing who are going to get married in the village. The 
announcement is usually delivered three days prior to the party. 
 
In these two moments of life, without being asked by the family from the death 
event or the marriage event, people who hear the announcement will come and 
help to prepare for the activity. As a neighbour, the most important contribution is 
to offer labour (leleani) and rice (o tamo). Each person brings about one liter114 of 
uncooked rice to two occasions of the family: the death rituals and the marriage 
rituals. A mother or a father can represent the family in providing donated labour. 
If the parents cannot make it, the children have to replace them. If the children 
cannot attend, then one of the members of the kin-network could represent them.  
 
Someone who comes as a representative must mention to the head of the 
household receiving the help, whom he is representing. This information will be 
written down to determine future exchanges. Helping neighbours with labour, 
                                                 
113 Exchange relationships in some cases are passed down from generation to generation. 
114 One litre is about one and half kg. 
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cash or material things is called jojobo. In the case of a big event like a wedding, 
the support of donated labour is insufficient to ensure the success of the activity. 
Long before the neighbours come to help, the extended kin-family and close 
family are already hard at work in preparation for the event. 
 
The relationships between neighbours who work on each other’s plantations are 
based on the assumption that work has economic value. Before the people of 
Galela accepted money as the medium of economic exchange, they already knew 
the meaning of an economic contract. Work in a plantation was valued according 
to the agreement of the two parties, the labour and the owner of the plantation. An 
informant who is known as the leader of adat for the village of Duma told me that 
in the 1970s the salary of a labourer who cleaned a coconut plantation at a rate of 
one hectare per day, was a plate of ketupat, which included twenty rice cakes and 
10 dry fish. Ketupat is a rice cake cooked in coconut milk and baked in plaited 
coconut leaves in the shape of a cone. During the 1970s there were not many 
people who planted coconut trees in Galela. Several men would work together to 
clean a plantation.  They worked, not according to a space-time wage, but 
depending on the entire contract for their labour. Usually, this labour could be 
finished within two or three days. This type of salary is called ma ngatori sima.115 
Besides receiving ma ngotori sima, they would also receive their lunch every day 
(ma ngaino yaho oda). In 1999, when I stayed in the village, the salary of a 
labourer who picked coconuts from the trees was Rp. 500 ($ 0,06 cents) per 
coconut palm tree. In a single day a man could harvest 15-20 trees for a total of 
about Rp. 10,000 per day. Along with the salary a labourer also received ma 
ngaino yaho oda (the major midday meal).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Ma ngatori sima means to arrange a counter payment (sima). 
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Pictures 22-24:  Cooking voluntarily for the wedding; 
Dancing to support the groom who goes to pick up his bride; 
Cooking for the funeral. 
 
One day a Javanese man who was about 40 years old, complained to me because 
he knew I came from Java. He was married to a native of Ngidiho, the daughter of 
the former Village Head who had already died. He complained about his 
frustration with the Ngidiho people. He said that they were lazy. He had given 
many packages of cigarettes to several young men with the understanding that 
they would clean his coconut plantation. However he was disappointed that they 
didn’t do it. I was surprised to hear his complaint and realized that he did not 
understand how the Ngidiho people build relationships of exchange. I suggested 
that he should tell them openly about what he wants them to do for him. 116 He 
should explain clearly how much he is willing to pay them. Perhaps the young 
men didn’t understand that he intended the cigarettes as payment for them to clear 
his plantation, because he didn’t explain it to them. Moreover, if the young men 
knew that the cigarettes would be their salary, they might not want to accept the 
                                                 
116 One of the characteristics of a Javanese is to speak indirectly rather than directly (see Niels 
Mulder: 1983). 
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job because they could get more money with the standard public payment for 
labour in the village or at the Banana Company. 
 
3.1.4.  Taboos and Enemies 
 
Each mature person in Ngidiho has to know their genealogy and the basic network 
of their kin and affinity group. Status awareness in kinship relates to the practices 
of taboos. Saali means rule that use other words to evade use of words that 
resemble in- law’s name (cf. Visser: 1989, 106). An adult woman who has an 
affinal bond through marriage, must pay respect towards her father- in- law who 
paid the bride wealth (Matsuzawa: 1980, 365). Respectful attitudes and practices 
are required from both the daughter- in- law and the son- in- law. In their status as a 
daughter or son- in- law, they must show respect by never uttering the name of 
their parents- in- law. In return, the father-in- law is obligated to protect his 
daughter- in- law and maintain the purity of the woman’s fertility as the right of his 
son. He is required to punish any other men who don’t show respect for his 
modoka.117 Modoka not only means daughter-in- law but also refers to the 
protection that she receives from the members of her husband’s family. Before the 
Galela people converted to Islam and Christianity they believed that a modoka 
was directly protected by the ancestors of her husband’s family (Platenkamp: 
1988, 183). 
 
When I stayed in Ngidiho, I was surprised to meet a Ngidiho man named 
Muhammad. Traditionally, it is forbidden to speak the name of your father- in-law.  
If so, how could this man’s son or daughter- in- law perform the sholat (daily 
Muslim worship)? In Islamic prayer, the name of the prophet Muhammad SAW 
must be stated in the praying liturgy. With the tension of this question I asked the 
man how his daughter- in- law dealt with this dilemma. He replied that his daughter 
was permitted to utter the name of the Prophet during prayers. He explained that 
God’s law regulates the use of the name of the prophet Muhammad SAW. This 
name is more important than the traditional Galelan taboo. However this example 
differed from the practice of Christians in Ngidiho. When a man whose father- in-
law is named Luke comes to the name “Luke” while reading the Bible, he is not 
permitted to speak out the name because it would be disrespectful to his father- in-
law. Therefore he has to find some circumlocution to avoid saying Luke when he 
reads the Bible. (cf. Visser: 1989, 106). A woman is also required to do the same 
thing.118  
                                                 
117 Respectful attitudes are expected from both the modoka and the doroa. The father-in-law has 
the right to receive respect from his son-in-law because he gave gifts in exchange for the fongu 
and bride wealth that were paid by the HF to the WF (cf. Matsuzawa: 1980, 357). Therefore a son-
in-law is not permitted to speak the names of his Father or Mother-in-laws (Matsuzawa: 1980, 
394). 
118 There are two meanings in the avoidance of names in Halmaheran culture that, according to 
Visser, are linked with the practices in Hawaiian cultures (Visser: 1989, 105). Visser reports that 
the taboo is applied in several layers of relationships. First is in the relationship between sisters 
and children. Second is in the relations between a family member (o dowara) of the opposite sex 
in relation to a man or a woman who are categorised as a husband of an elder sister of the Ego’s 
husband (HZH) or an elder brother of Ego’s wife (BWB) (mu’duor). For example, a male Ego has 
to relate in an indirect manner with the wife of the elder brother of his wife (WBW). He has to 
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People who don’t show respect for the bonds and taboos of their kinship relations 
are ostracised and portrayed as the enemy of the entire community. In Ngidiho 
there is a law that forbids a marriage between partners who follow different 
religions. The marriage can be accepted by the Muslim community, only if the 
husband or wife who is a Christian converts to Islam. Conversely the marriage can 
only be accepted in the Christian community if the Muslim partner converts to 
Christianity. It is said that a fight will erupt in the village if a marriage between a 
Christian and a Muslim takes place. One of my informants was a Christian woman 
who became a single mother because her family could not approve of her 
marriage to a Muslim man from Ngidiho. 
 
However occasionally a couple from different religions will get married secretly 
with one of the partners converting to become either Muslim or Christian. There 
are no strict regulations about this model, however I can list several cases of inter-
religious marriage. One of the uncles of mama Iana, used to be a Muslim but 
became a Christian when he married a Christian woman from the same village in 
Ngidiho. That took place in 1957 before the marriage law of 1974 (UU number 1, 
1974) and the regulation of 1975 (9/1975) which prohibits interreligious marriage 
and sharpens religious identity.  In 1974, an elder son of the couples mentioned 
above, Suab Budiman married a Muslim woman from the same village and 
became a Muslim. Most of people in Ngidiho, including Oom Din, saw their 
marriage as fulfilling the model of exchange. While these marriages may be seen 
as aberrations influenced by the conditions of a particular context and time, mixed 
marriages are a continuing problem all over Indonesia. In Ngidiho most people 
avoid inter-religious marriages because of the risks they present to both of the 
religious communities in the village. 
 
A Christian leader based in Tobelo whose family lives in Ngidiho told me the 
story about the beginning of his sister’s marriage to a Muslim man from Ngidiho. 
Her family who is Christian did not approve of the marriage. The hostility 
between her and her family had continued for many years. However the hostility 
was not an open fight because the Muslim man was the head of village in 
Ngidiho. The woman was the fourth wife of the man. After her husband died, she 
remarried to a Muslim man from Ternate. The relationship between the women 
and her family improved. Her daughter from her first marriage often visits to eat 
at the house of her mother’s parents in Ngidiho. 
 
The level of hostility to a couple who come from different religious communities 
depends on the individual case. Some people who break the taboo may not be 
indigenous to Ngidiho. In that case it may be easier for them to recover their 
relationships within their families after the process of inter-marriage happens.  A 
woman from a Tobelo-Chinese family, who were living in Ngidiho, married a 
Muslim man from Ngidiho.  After she gave birth to her first son, the hostility 
between families was eased because the grandparents shared in the joy of their 
grandson’s birth.  The grandson was given to them in exchange for their daughter 
                                                                                                                                     
respect the wife of his brother (BW) because of the taboo connected with the concept of modoka, 
which protects married women from direct contact with men who are not their husbands.  
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who became a Muslim due to her marriage to a Muslim. In this case, it might be 
observed that the level of hostility was influenced by which party came from the 
dominant in-group in the community and what was their respective social status in 
the society.  
 
Two examples illustrate how hostility can develop towards a particular person or 
group in Ngidiho. In the first example hostility is connected with breakdowns in 
the system of exchange. One day I was surprised to hear a comment from Oom 
Din about Pak Namsa whom I had just visited. He was known as an enemy of the 
people in the village. “Oh…that person! He is a dangerous man. I will ask the 
Badan Sara (the local Islamic Court) to punish him,” Oom Din told me 
emotionally. He was in a hurry to finish his talk with me after he heard where I 
had been. I had just returned from the house of Pak Namsa, a forty-year-old man 
who was proud to tell me about how he built his own house and used his spare 
time to work as a labourer at the Banana Company. His main work was to take 
care of his coconut plantation. Namsa is the example of a head of household who 
has a nuclear family and knows how to reach his dreams with a careful 
calculation. “I want my elder daughter from my first wife to go to nursing school. 
I have worked very hard so that I can have extra money to give for her education. 
I am dedicated to supporting my children so that they can extend their knowledge 
at school. I also must pay for the expenses of my second wife and her children.” 
Namsa shared his dreams with me. His first had wife died about six years ago. 
 
My acquaintance with Namsa made me feel confused when I heard Oom Din’s 
accusations against him. Why did Oom Din look so angry with him? “I heard he 
sold his dead cow to the people in Makete!” Oom Din sprayed out his accusation 
of Namsa to me. It was clear that Namsa must have made a big mistake. Eating or 
receiving money from the result of selling a dead animal is haram (forbidden). 
Islamic teaching requires that when an animal is butchered for the consumption of 
human beings, the butcher or ulama has to begin by saying the words of the 
syahadat (confession) that start with the word, Bismillah rraham nirrahiim which 
means in the name of God who is the All-Merciful Lord.  Because of this, if there 
is a party in the village put on by someone from the Christian community, a 
Muslim leader is called to do the ritual killing of the cow. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Picture 25:  A Muslim elder always prays before killing a cow that is 
going to be served for a wedding party in the village. 
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A week later I was invited to have lunch with a Christian family in Ngidiho after 
attending the church. I was surprised because the meal was luxurious. My host 
explained, “We put this meat in the fridge. We got it a week ago as a free and 
equal distribution to all the members of the church. The meat was from the cow of 
Pak Namsa, our neighbour in Ngidiho.” This explanation surprised me. I was 
happy to get another clue to discuss with Oom Din. 
 
The people of Ngidiho did no t eat meat very often. Beef is an expensive item to 
be eaten only on special occasions like a wedding party or funeral. People 
consume more fish because it is easy to catch and it is cheap. Namsa who was 
accused by Oom Din didn’t actually sell his dead cow to Makete, but rather called 
an elder from the Christian community in Ngidiho to take the cow. An unknown 
person had stabbed the cow. The Christian community was often called to receive 
a dead cow from the Muslim community if it died suddenly. 
 
I had to wait for the right time to discuss this story with Oom Din. On Sunday 
night when we were circling the table for dinner, the situation was very good. I 
told the family about my Sunday afternoon activities with the Christian family. 
Oom Din and the entire family always go to their plantation on Sundays. It is the 
best time for the whole family to gather and help clean the plantation. Oom Din 
only works a half-day on Fridays. Mama Iana doesn’t go to her garden on Fridays 
because she prepares a nice weekly dinne r for the whole family to eat together 
after the Friday prayers (sholat Jumat). I often used Sundays to visit the people of 
Ngidiho at their plantations. “This afternoon, I had lunch at the Annu family’s 
house. They served meat that was distributed from the cow of Namsa,” I 
explained with a soft voice. I didn’t want to put any pressure on Oom Din so that 
he would not feel offended. However he looks surprised to hear my account and 
his face seemed confused. Then I told the story about how the Christians in 
Ngidiho got the meat. Oom Din acknowledged that perhaps he received wrong 
information. 
 
Later we had a serious discussion that made me think Oom Din’s hostility to 
Namsa related to their different attitudes towards rituals of exchange. According 
to Oom Din,  Namsa is a stingy person. He never appears in the social activities in 
Ngidiho. He’s stingy in his donations to the development of the mosque. “His life 
is just for himself. Ibu, you can see for yourself whether he was at the wedding 
party of the Nurman’s son. He wasn’t, was he? People came from everywhere, 
while he, who is a neighbour didn’t attend!” Oom Din asked me to remember 
whether Namsa was at the family party, which was the biggest party during my 
stay in Ngidiho. I couldn’t remember seeing him dur ing the three days of the 
wedding celebrations. “However perhaps he got sick or had other obstacles?” I 
tried to understand the problem from his side. “Oh… it’s not true, he never wants 
to attend!” Oom Din grumbled. He explained about the time when Namsa built his 
house and not many people came to help him. Instead of having neighbours to 
help, he hired other people to work on his house. 
 
Oom Din’s story about Namsa suggests that according to the Ngidiho, anyone 
who refuses to participate in the exchange practices is assumed to be an enemy of 
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the community.  Namsa’s behaviour might appear evil to someone like Oom Din, 
who still lived within a traditional ethic of ritual exchange.  However an alternate 
explanation may be that he was not evil, but rather was already operating within a 
different system of modern, economic rationality instead of the traditional ethic of 
exchange. Perhaps he neglected his exchange obligations, but Namsa exhibited a 
high degree of commitment to his own family, a concern for education and 
“progress” and a willingness to cross religious boundaries with his charity. 119 
 
The problem of giving is not only the problem of Namsa. Oom Din also 
complained to me about the carelessness of the Muslims in Ngidiho who did not 
want to participate in donations for building the mosque. Oom Din went so far as 
to conclude that perhaps this careless attitude was caused by the assumption that 
exchange between human beings and God would not bring visible results. After 
all, how could God repay the people for their donations to build the mosque? 
Perhaps their calculations mirrored the attitude in the Edda poem quoted by 
Marcel Mauss at the beginning of this chapter! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 26–27:  Building a mosque and a pastor’s house in Ngidiho. 
 
In spite of his cynicism, Oom Din always gave to others and also to the mosque. 
He believed God would repay his charity. Oom Din’s attitude was connected with 
his conviction that the fruit of his labours would come later, after the mosque was 
finished. Then he, and all those who always gave to the mosque, would be proud 
of its existence in Ngidiho. Everyone would acknowledge that Ngidiho had the 
biggest mosque in Galela. 
 
A second example of conflict between traditional and modern values occurred in 
1993, when the Banana Company began to operate in Galela and I was working in 
Tobelo. The agro business provided many trucks to carry labourers from their 
villages to the banana plantation to work. People came from villages in Tobelo, 
and all around Galela. Traditionally, in Galela and Tobelo no man, other than her 
husband, was allowed to touch a modoka. Adat law imposed a fine on anyone who 
                                                 
119 This story is not meant to suggest that there is a simple evolution from a traditional to a modern 
rational ethic as assumed by a Weberian theory of social evolution. In Galela there is a dynamic 
tension between traditional cultural values, religious values and rational secular values.  cf. 
Bernard Adeney-Risakotta’s typology of the conflict between modernity, religion and the culture 
of the ancestors in, Kekuasaan, Agama dan Kekerasan di Indonesia (forthcoming). 
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dared to break the taboo. The amount of the fine depended on the seriousness of 
the violation. When the company entered the area and began to transport many 
people, packed into open trucks over rough roads, the society could no longer 
enforce a taboo against touching the opposite sex. Many modoka worked as 
female labourers along with the men. The trucks were full of male and female 
labourers and the company could not provide special trucks just for women 
(Risakotta: 1995a). At that time the Galelans generally viewed the Banana 
Company positively. The violation of adat taboos seemed like the inevitable price 
of progress in transportation and agriculture rather than the attack of an enemy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pictures 28-29:  Labourers are taken to the factory with trucks. 
 
However in 1999, the people of Galela already had a far more critical perspective 
on the Banana agro business. In February 1999, the people held a demonstration 
against the company, demanding additional compensation for the land they had 
been pressured into selling in the early 1990’s. The demonstration was apparently 
successful because the company paid a substantial sum to the head of the farmers’ 
group. Unfortunately he apparently manipulated the funds and did not distribute 
the money to the farmers who were meant to receive it. 
 
Several elite workers of PT GAI, told me that since the reformation movement 
came to Galela in February 1999, several people who used to be farmers back in 
1991 had threatened the company. They asked for various kinds of payments from 
the company and threatened to burn down the buildings if the company did not 
accept their demands. The community of Galela was changing its perception of 
the Banana Company, who no longer seemed like the source of modernity, 
prosperity and progress, but rather as an oppressor of the people. The next section 
will take up in detail the evolution of the land crisis in Galela. 
 
3.2.  Land and the Evolution of Traditions  
 
This sub section will explain how material changes in society influenced changes 
in tradition. Land is the most important material factor that moulds the basic 
conceptions of the Galela people in articulating their knowledge and tradition. 
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Changes in land use led to the reformulation of tradition. I will focus especially on 
exchange practices in connection with the planting of rice and coconut palms. 
 
3.2.1.  Life begins from Land 
 
Land is connected with the meaning of life for the Galela people. O Galela ma 
tona ma dutu means, “O Galela, my own land” (Ishige: 1980, 4; Ajawaila: 1996; 
Risakotta: 1995a, 34). Land is conceptualised as the people’s home, the place 
where they belong. 120  Visser speaks of two kinds of kinship in Sahu, Halmahera, 
one through blood and the other through land (Visser: 1989). For the Galela and 
Tobelo people, the word for land (ma tona) is related to the word ma dutu that 
means “ownership, truely mine” (Hueting: 1908, 83). Their ownership of the land 
is their identity, that they received from their ancestors. Platenkamp records that 
the ancestors were the centre of the life of the Galela (Platenkamp: 1988, 21,79).  
To understand this concept, we have to consider the power expansion of the 
Ternate Sultanate.  The concept of land, as understood by the Galela people is 
connected the expression Jou ma dutu (“the supreme lord”). This expression 
originally referred to the Sultan of Ternate.121 The people believe they received 
their identity from the ancestors who gave them their inheritance of land that was 
granted to them by the Sultan of Ternate.122 
 
3.2.2.  Making Sacred Borders  
 
In the middle of October 1999, towards the end of the monsoon season for 
planting rice according to the Galela calendar,123 we went to the doro (garden) of 
Oom Din to plant rice. A great throng of people, including Oom Din’s kin-family, 
several close neighbours, the Javanese couple, other friends of Oom Din, his 
household, and myself, gathered with great enthusiasm, covering his hectare of 
land in the southern part of the village, not far from PT GAI. The Javanese couple 
came to Halmahera as participants in a transmigration project in the district of 
                                                 
120 Platenkamp uses the term House with a capital letter H to distinguish the inhabitants of a 
household, who belong to the land, from a house as a physical structure (Platenkamp: 1988). The 
same approach, which differentiates House and house, is carried out by Simone Pauwels in her 
research about the meaning and the definition of house in the Eastern Indonesian (See Pauwels: 
1994, 76-96). 
121 See (Schuurman: 1995). 
122 If someone dies, the people say, O tona iboroka that means ‘the land mourns’ because from the 
land appears life (Ajawaila: 1996, 236). The Galela people say goho that means “growth”, “rise” 
or that “something is growing”.  Goho comes from the word oho that means life (see van Baarda: 
1908, 89, 94; Ajawaila: 1996, 236; Risakotta: 1995a, 35). Therefore land is connected with life 
and also life comes from the land. All life that grows from the land may be used as gifts for the 
marriage and death rituals (Ajawaila: 1996, 3). It is a common phenomenon in Tobelo, Galela and 
Sahu to view the relations between human beings and land not only in terms of human ownership 
of the land, but also in terms of the land owning human beings (See Visser: 12, 123-140).  In this 
book, Visser discusses the conception of de Coppet. cf.  (Platenkamp: 1998). 
123 According to Yoshida the Galela people are influenced by several conceptions of time. The 
moon calendar shows the influence of Islam. The practice of making predictions according to the 
position of stars shows their influences from Austronesian cultures. They also inherited planting 
practices introduced by Dutch missionaries who introduced the Gregorian calendar to the Galela 
people (Platenkamp: 1988, 40-41). 
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West Gane.124 They had lived in Ngidiho for about two months as labourers to dig 
a drainage system for the Banana Company. “Our life in West Gane was very 
difficult so we left the area and looked for another life,” Pak Nardi explained to 
me the first time we met.  
 
The night before, mama Iana, her two daughters and I cooked lots of food. We 
brought the food to the fields, riding on a cart with all the children. In Sahu’s 
tradition, as reported by Visser, families who perform the rice ritual provide meals 
for those who participate in the first activities of planting and then again when 
they harvest the crops about four months after the rice is planted. Although the 
meals were simple, such as ketupat, lodeh vegetable sauce, and spicy fish sauce, 
the approximately twenty workers enjoyed the delicious food after planting rice 
for about two and a half hours. 
 
Before we began to plant, Oom Din started with a prayer. “There is a special 
prerequisite that I have to perform,” he explained to me. He held a tin plate full of 
raw rice in his left hand.125  He dug seven holes and planted several seeds of rice 
in each one, while blessing the location with the following prayer: 
 
Bismillah rraham nirrahiim. Allahuma solli ala sayidina 
Muhammad wa ala alie sayidina Muhammad. Ashadu 
Allah ila ha illa-la. Wa shadu ana Muhammad Rasul 
Allah. (“In the name of God who is the All-Merciful Lord.  
Please God, give protection to the prophet Muhammad 
                                                 
124 The district of West Gane is located in the Southern part of Halmahera Island. It is a part of the 
district of Central Halmahera. Rice planting in Halmahera is carried out on dry land. Usually the 
area for planting rice is cleared out from the forest or taken from around coconut plantations which 
do not yet have tall trees. The system depends on nature. This is why the Galela people are tied to 
an agricultural calendar. The planting system conducted by Javanese immigrants in West Kao and 
West Gane where Pak  Nardi used to live, employed a wet rice system like in Java. The rice field 
had to be covered with water and use a drainage system. When I stayed in Ngidiho in 1999, there 
were less and less people who planted rice.  According to Oom Din, in the past, the rice planting 
ceremony was the moment, when people gathered to celebrate the fertility of the land. I still 
remember in 1990, when I just arrived in Tobelo, there were several ministers from the GMIH 
church in Galela who complained that their society always celebrated long rice festivals after the 
harvest. However I didn’t hear any complaint during my stay in 1999 because many people had 
sold their land to the Banana Company. There were no more rice ritual parties, in which people 
celebrated day and night for more than three days, as they did in Sahu (cf. Visser: 1989).  
125 Galelan language uses the term o tamo  for rice. Indonesian language has three primary ways to 
refer to rice: raw rice (beras), cooked rice (nasi) and rice plants (padi). In Sahu, according to the 
research conducted by Visser, rice plants are called Fatima . Fatima is the name of the daughter of 
the prophet Muhammad. The society of Sahu who received rice plants with the name Fatima, 
portrayed the rice plants as revelation. Even though they embraced Christianity, the new crops 
introduced by the Sultan of Ternate and brought by Javanese traders, were viewed as a revelation 
by the local people. Perhaps the Sultan of Ternate considered the Sahu people as just a means of 
production because he needed rice. However the people knew how to adjust to a new agricultural 
technology without being subjected to the identity created by the Sultan. The people could 
distinguish between negotiating their own identity, creating their own practices, and coping with a 
dominant power from outside (see Visser: 1989). Before PT GAI bought lots of land from the 
people they planted four types of rice: o tamo  (rice), bobootene (foxtail millet), guwapo (sorghum) 
and rore (Job’s tears). See also (Sasaki: 1980, 66).  
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and his family. I witness that there is no God besides 
Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.”) 
 
His voice echoed loudly and filled the whole area of the field. Oom Din was 
blessing the land with his prayer. 
 
The star is called  o pariama bau (bintang tujuh or Pleiades) appears in the 
heavens during a particular season, twice a year.126 When the star begins moving 
towards the West, it is the best time for people to begin sowing the rice seeds.127  
However during their growth, if the time of planting is not correct, the stalks of 
the rice plants may bend and break before they are filled with new seeds. Because 
of this, Oom Din was careful to observe the arrival of o pariama. The best time to 
plant is when the star stands straight above the head of an upright human being.128 
 
Before Oom Din uttered his prayer, Pak Nardi, Oom Din’s Javanese friend also 
prayed according to Javanese Muslim tradition. 129  He said a prayer before he 
began to make the seven holes to plant the seeds (potudu). The Galela connect the 
                                                 
126 The stars appears firstly at the end of April towards the West and then again at the end of 
November on the East side (Platenkamp: 1988, 41). 
127 See van Fraassen: 1999, 86. For the Galela people, the most important stars are the Pleiades (o 
pariama) (see Yoshida: 1980, 101ff). The appearance of these stars relates with the presence of the 
ancestors in the village. Yoshida says that the understanding of o pariama  shows a connection 
between Northern Halmahera and the Austrones ian cultures (Yoshida: 1980). Platenkamp suggests 
that there is a scientific link between the presence of o pariama  (Pleiades) with the fish season that 
appears from December to January, which is the time when the Galela people experience 
abundance with the harvest of both rice and fish (Platenkamp: 1988, 34-46). He also reports about 
the change of planting schedule in Galela introduced by the first Christian missionary, H. van 
Dijken (Platenkamp: 1988, 37-41). In the report of van Dijken, in 1871 the Galela people still 
planted rice between the months of April to May. The preparation for clearing out the rice fields 
was done from January-February. However, in 1888 van Dijken reported that the Galelan had 
already changed their schedule of rice cultivation. He says that the Galela planted rice in January 
and harvested in June. Van Dijken explained that the reason behind the change in planting 
schedule was determined by the sparse rainfall in Galela combined with high humidity. According 
to Platenkamp, the change of planting schedule influenced the their religious and social practices. 
The universe provides power and spirits that participate in every stage of their ritual practices. 
(Platenkamp: 1988, 32).   
128 The first appearance of o pariama  is in April when the Galela people plant and the second 
presence is in November when the people harvest their crops. Therefore the change recorded by 
van Dijken suggests that the Galela people no longer planted rice at the time of o pariama  
(Platenkamp: 1988, 38). However the report of van Dijken may have been an aberration because 
the Muslims of Galela still considered the presence of o pariama  in the process of planting rice as 
shown by Oom Din. Both before and after the Galela engaged with Islam, o pariama  was still 
understood as the natural sign when people should plant rice. Practically, it is an easy sign for the 
Galela people to observe. The change of planting schedule introduced by the Christian 
missionaries, also influenced the practice of Muslims, who also planted twice a year. This practice 
was conducted widely among the Galela people especially before they sold their land to the 
Banana Company. Therefore the influence of agricultural innovation introduced by the Christian 
missionaries affected the agricultural practices of the Galela people, both Muslim and Christian.  
129 They met about a month after I came to stay with Oom Din and his family. Oom Din owns a 
small cabin at the doro  where we came to plant the rice. Oom Din rented this cabin to the Javanese 
couple who were working on the drainage system at the Banana Company. Oom Din hired Pak 
Nardi to help in the planting and watch the new rice fields, protecting them from the intrusions of 
birds who would eat the new seeds. 
 120 
star o pariama bau with the number seven since it appears in an area of the sky 
with seven stars.  When I asked Oom Din why Pak Nardi prayed, he replied, “The 
more many people pray, the better it is for the growth of the rice plants”. Similar 
to the Galela, the Javanese believe in choosing a right time to plant and offer a 
special prayer. Pak Nardi said the date Oom Din chose was correct, although the 
direction of spreading the rice seeds in the holes was different.  
 
According to the Javanese, the blessing comes from the East. Therefore the 
spreading of rice should start from the East. However according to the Ngidiho 
people, the spreading of rice seeds has to be done from the direction of water. 
Because of this, the spread of the seeds begins from the West.130  The river Tiabo 
lies close by, just to the West of Ngidiho and flows down to the ocean towards the 
East. The Galela believe that spreading the rice seeds from the West to the East 
will speed the growth and strength of the rice plant. This ritual logic makes sense 
because planting rice requires a lot of water. However unlike the irrigation system 
in Java, in Galela rice fields planted close to a river rely on absorbing enough 
water through the ground from the river. 
 
Pak Nardi’s prayer was as follows: 
 
Bismillahi rrarham nirrahim. Niat inson ngarep nyebar 
biji tapi ditoleh kanan kiri buri ngarap ora opo-opo. Apa 
mane jama manungsa sedang satu kewang lelembuts ora 
ngene. Jadi saiki sandenen tisnawati ngarep tersebar 
nang tegal pekarangan atau tegal arara. Sandene tirna 
wati saiki ditempat nah apa sukma ya suka sukma 
langgeng langgeng kersane ngalah. 
 
This prayer begins with an Arabic greeting but the rest of the prayer is in 
Javanese. This differs slightly from the prayer of Oom Din, which is all in Arabic. 
Pak Nardi’s Muslim prayer is influenced by indigenous Javanese religious 
                                                 
130 Perhaps the Christian missionary didn’t consider the closeness of the rice fields to the rivers 
and lakes so he proposed changing the planting season to the month of January when the volume 
of rainfall was usually  high. However the Galelans also chose to plant and harvest their rice at the 
appearance of o pariama  because they believed it signalled the arrival of their ancestors in their 
village. After the harvest of rice, the Galela people needed fish to accompany their meals. 
Harvesting in November was a good time because it was also the time when nature also provided 
abundant fish for them. When they harvested rice, they also harvested fish. We may conclude that 
the Galela changed their planting schedule so that it would conform to the Christian calendar.  
Before some of the Galela converted to Christianity, they planted rice once a year in April with the 
appearance of o pariama . Van Dijken changed the pattern, and ever since, the Galela plant twice a 
year. The first planting season is January with a harvest in May-June. They plant again in July, 
harvesting at the end of November and early December. These were important months for the new 
Christians at the end of the 19th century since December is the celebration of Christmas. This 
hypothesis is convincing, especially in light of Yoshida’s question about why the Galela shortened 
their period before the harvest in the 20th Century. Yoshida finds inconsistency between the names 
of the month that the Galela created and the numbers used to refer to the growth of the rice, 
starting from the planting up to the harvest. Yoshida answers his own question by suggesting the 
possibility that the planting followed the pattern of the o bobootene (foxtail millet), which he 
believes was first introduced to the Galela. However, as observed by Platenkamp, Yoshida failed  
to pay attention to the influence of the missionaries in the change of planting schedules. 
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practices.131  In contrast, Oom Din’s prayer is directly rooted in the Qur’an. Pak 
Nardi’s prayer is not taken from the Qur’an, but nevertheless locates the petitioner 
in the relation to Allah, his current activities and the protection he requests. The 
prayer may be translated:  
 
In the name of the All Merciful Lord, I intend to spread 
these rice seeds. Before doing so, I turn my head and look 
to the right and to the left in hopes that there is nothing 
harmful. If human beings believe in God, there are no bad 
spirits which can harm these plants. Now I will sow the 
rice seeds in the field. May these seeds, that I am placing 
in these holes, grow bigger, strong and resistant toward 
disaster. 
 
Beside the differences in their prayers and the direction of planting, there are 
differences in the ways they dig the holes where the seeds are sown. The Galela 
stab a bamboo stick into the ground to make the holes at an angle. Pak Nardi and 
his wife made their holes upright. The Galela believe that growth and strength in 
their rice plants will be ensured they fulfil the requirements of the planting 
process. Nevertheless, Oom Din did not seem disappointed with the slight 
differences of concept and practice introduced by the Javanese couple. Oom Din 
could not understand the Javanese prayer said by Pak Nardi, however the 
beginning of his prayer in Arabic connected him with Oom Din. Pak Nardi also 
prayed to the same Allah who is the Ruler of heaven and earth. Both requested 
fertility for the new plants. It didn’t matter whether or not Pak Nardi followed 
Kejawen (Javanese mysticism), since his religious beliefs were very close to Oom 
Din’s. 
 
A day later, rain poured down on Ngidiho. The field was covered with water. 
Oom Din saw the rain as a good omen. The pressure of the rainfall pushed the rice 
seeds into union with the soil. Secondly, birds could not eat the seeds because 
they had already melted into the earth. Oom Din hoped that we all, including my 
husband who was planning to come to Ngidiho, would enjoy the fresh rice at the 
Idul Fitri celebrations in January 2000. When I left Ngidiho the rice stalks were 
already 20 cm. high. Sadly the violence of 1999-2000 erupted before we could 
enjoy the rice harvest. 
 
3.2.3.  Rice: Reformulating Galelan Practices 
 
Ten year after PT GAI began operating, rice fields have become a rare sight in 
Galela. Visser in her research in Sahu also reports that changes in the agricultural 
practices of Halmahera led to the marginalisation of rice cultivation (Visser: 
1989).  Government projects that encouraged the cultivation of chocolate (cacao) 
                                                 
131 The Muslim abangan  (peasants) in Java believe in evil spirits. The Javanese use the term 
lelembuts to refer to an evil spirit that is very dangerous. This spirit  can take a form like Satan. It 
can cause human beings to become crazy and even bring death. The Javanese perform special 
rituals to guard against these spirits (Geertz: 1960, 19ff, 195). In the prayer of Pak  Nardi, he uses 
the term lelembuts. 
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and coffee, also reduced the availability land for rice cultivation. Van Baarda 
wrote that when the chocolate and coffee he introduced failed, the Christians of 
Galela returned to rice cultivation (van Baarda: 1918). Rice came to the Galela 
through the Sultan of Ternate’s connection with Arabic and Javanese traders (cf. 
Visser: 1989, 39).132 Rice came to Galela via the kingdom of Gamkonora (or 
Limau Konora), an important kingdom in Halmahera before the 16th century. At 
the time, there were relations between the kingdom in Galela and other bigger 
kingdoms such as Ternate, Tidore, Jailolo and Bacan. Later, in the 19th century 
under Dutch colonial influence, the son of the Sultan of Tidore was appointed 
Sangaji in Galela.133 
 
The rice harvesting ritual is the opportune moment to gather kinfolk from far and 
wide.  In the past, people live separately, spread along the borders of the sago 
forest. The distance from one house to another was far. The rice rituals 
strengthened solidarity among kinfolk who lived far apart due to their need to 
gather food from the forest.134  Each bangsaha lived separately within the 
territorial borders they claimed. But through the ritual of rice, they gathered once 
a year they strengthened their intimate kinship relations. The party after the 
harvest could last for about two months (Platenkamp: 1988). The head of the 
household was responsible for protecting kin ties that were threatened by 
geographical distance. However women, as symbolically connected with fertility 
and rice, did much to make the lively harvest festivals a success. Family 
differences were forgotten as the young people had a chance to meet each other.135 
 
Rice played an important role in the marriage and death rituals of Galela because 
of its precious economic value. For the Moluccan people, eating rice was a status 
symbol (Boelens, van Fraassen, Straver: 2001, 58). Because of its preciousness, it 
became a major means of exchange. Visser quotes the note of Bosscher and van 
der Lith who reported that the Sultan of Ternate bought rice from his people at 
very low prices and resold it at very expensive prices (Visser: 1989). Rice was 
viewed as a sign of civilization. Sago is the primary source of food in the 
Moluccas in general, because the plant is commonly found throughout the 
                                                 
132 Foreign traders also brought their plants. The people traded crops and plants (see Boelens: 
2001). Theoretically, it is unknown when exactly the people in the Moluccas began to consume 
rice. R. D. Hill states that in Java, rice cultivation already began since the colonialism of India, 
which began in the 2nd Century CE. Historical records show that rice and millet were already a 
major source of food in a kingdom in the valley of Berantas in East Java. By the end of the 13th 
Century, the Kingdom of Majapahit demanded that citizens present gifts of rice to the kingdom 
(see Hill: 1977, 21). 
133 See Chapter IV and also, Schuurman: 1995 and van Fraassen: 1999. 
134 The structure of a society dependent on sago consumption is characterised by their limited 
mobility outside the area of the sago forest. Each family builds its territory as large as the sago 
stocks they control.  The period of their stay in a particular area depends on the availability of sago 
trees. When the stock of sago is finished, they have to find a new location which has not yet been 
claimed by someone else. Often they return to the old location of their territory as the new sago 
grows to maturity again. Yoshida reports that there is individual ownership of the sago trees 
(Yoshida: 1980, 115). 
135 A missionary reported, as quoted by Platenkamp, that the ritual of rice was lively and was 
greatly anticipated by the young people (Platenkamp: 1988; Visser: 1989). 
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Moluccas.136 Since rice could be stored for a whole year in Galela, it was often 
used to pay the salary of labourers who worked in the coconut plantations (raki), 
or gardens (doro).  In Sahu, payment with money was valued lower than payment 
with rice (Visser: 1989, 59). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 30-32:  Bobootene (foxtail millet); 
A new rice field; 
Women pounding rice to separate it from its stalk. 
 
Compared to sago, rice is a soft and gentle food that became the symbol of 
women. The traditional sago system which requires the hard labour of strong men, 
changed with the introduction of rice in the society. Rice could be planted and 
harvested by women. Rice cultivation changed the division of labour in the family 
and enhanced the economic role of women. The acceptance of rice as a staple 
food freed men from hard work within their villages. In pre-rice era, men prepared 
the stock of sago flour for the consumption of their family members. The heavy, 
rough and thorny sago trees require a man’s strength to process them into flour. In 
contrast, the willowy, fragile rice plants seemed to invite a woman’s touch. 
Women took over the rice cultivation and became responsible for ensuring the 
                                                 
136 Barros, as quoted by Hill, reports that at the beginning of the 16th century rice had already 
spread to all parts of the ‘Indonesian’ archipelago. In the Moluccas, millet and rice were available 
in small quantities but the people still depended on sago as their staple food (Hill: 1977, 28-29). 
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stock of staple food for the family. This new role of women freed men from their 
obligation to work in the village. They then chose to work outside villages.137 
 
Rice cultivation also changed the marriage and death rituals. Rice became a 
primary medium of ritual exchange, reflecting the new material conditions and the 
high economic value of rice. In Sahu, the people (men and women), came to 
picture themselves as women who gave birth to rice for the Sultan of Ternate 
(Visser: 1989). The new division of labour was also a response to regional 
geopolitical pressures and influenced the decision of the men of Halmahera to 
become sea pirates. 
 
 3.3.  The  Impact of a Development Project 
 
In the following subsection I will discuss two issues:  the agricultural 
transformation from coconut plantation to bananas and the ritualised tradition as a 
means for defending labour rights. 
 
3.3.1.  From Coconuts to Bananas 
 
The importance of coconuts in the life of the Galela can hardly be exaggerated. 
The economic value of coconuts was already proved, long before the Indonesian 
government introduced the Small Coconut Development Project (SCDP). 
Missionaries from the Utrechtse Zendings Vereeniging (UZV) introduced 
coconuts as an economic commodity in the beginning of the 20th Century. 138 A. 
Hueting and Metz set up a coconut company called Wari Wosia Klapper 
Onderneming (WWKO) in 1915 (Magany: 1984, 120-121; see also Chapter IV). 
It took time to receive permission from the Sultan of Ternate over the land status 
of the plantation (see Magany: 1984, 287). However, before WWKO began 
operations in Tobelo they had already set up a private coconut plantation whose 
centre of production was on Morotai Island. This company was named Morotai 
Klapper Cultuur Maatschappij  (MKCM). The Director of this private company 
was a Roman Catholic from Holland. He brought many Catholic koeli’s from 
Timor to work on the plantation. 
 
The missionaries introduced principles of self-support through commercial 
farming.  At first, there were not many people who cultivated coconuts 
professionally.  At the end of the 19th century, the missionaries influenced 
                                                 
137 An early missionary quoted by Platenkamp reported that women worked in the rice fields, 
while her husband looked for income from the sea. Men brought back money that was needed for 
the traditional rituals (Platenkamp: 1988, 43). The men from Galela, Tobelo, and Kao worked as 
professional sea-pirates. Ritual warfare is enacted in the marriage rituals, which reflect the 
professional work of the men in the 17th –19th centuries (see Chapter IV). 
138 The dependence of UZV missionaries on funding from the mission centre in Holland was 
minimized through coconut cultivation as a commodity that could sell on the world market in the 
19th century. The economic crisis that attacked the Netherlands and other European countries was 
due to the wars in several parts of Europe such as France. The first Dutch missionary to Galela 
was H. van Dijken who arrived in 1866. He chose to cultivate coconuts out of financial necessity 
and because of the position of coconuts in the world market. See Christian Heersink on the role of 
coconuts in the trade politics of the 19th-20th Centuries in Eastern Indonesia (Heersink: 1999). 
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changes in the planting schedule of rice. The Sultan of Ternate approved the idea 
of coconut development because he hoped this activity would help overcome the 
serious problem of piracy on the Moluccan Sea. The professional sea pirates came 
from Galela, Tobelo, Kao and Loloda (see Chapter IV). He hoped that the 
missionaries could convince the local people to shift their profession from sea 
piracy to become self-sufficient farmers. Coconuts were introduced as a 
commodity, without regard to religious affiliation, in the 1980s. The Indonesian 
government developed a hybridisation project in partnership with the World Bank 
and the Asian Developmental Bank.  The SCDP project aimed to bring economic 
prosperity and self-sufficiency to the people of Galela. 
  
Oom Din was the head of the groups whose members agreed to cultivate coconuts 
as a commodity.  Oom Din donated some of his land to members of his SCDP 
group who owned no land because he had lots of land inherited from his father. 
The project combined two important methods. First, families were seen as the 
primary production unit at the village level. By giving hybrid coconut seeds and 
fertilizer to the farmers, the government hoped that the society would increase 
their income and contribute to the developmental activities on the village. 
Secondly, the project also gave farmers the opportunity to own their own land 
within a larger coconut plantation. 
 
Economic and social relations overlap with each other on many levels. Farmers 
need to work together to clear out the forests and plant coconut seeds. During the 
period of cultivation, the farmers also need to work together. Because farmers 
received coconut seeds and fertilizer, they had to be monitored regularly by 
officials from the Agricultural Department at the district level. The officials 
visited farmers to provide agricultural extension education and answered their 
questions. They maintained a relationship with the farmers until the production of 
coconuts showed that their efforts brought success and the farmer could return the 
initial credits they had provided. 
 
During the coconut harvest, the system of working together (makokirio), received 
a new meaning. Cooperative work is an ancient tradition, as displayed in the 
rituals of the rice harvest, in which the people rotate to work in each other’s fields. 
During the  coconut harvest, members of the groups are remunerated for their 
labour at a rate of Rp. 500 per tree plus their noon meal (ma ngaino yaho odo). 
After all the coconuts are on the ground, the owners gather together, open the 
coconuts and scrape out the white inner meat from their shells, and put them on 
drying racks (para-para). It takes about 24 hours of grilling for the white coconut 
meat to become copra. The process of grilling is called fufu. For a 1-hectare 
coconut plantation, it takes 10 working days to harvest the coconuts and make 
them into copra.139  
                                                 
139 It needs 3-5 people to carry out the process of making copra for 1-hectare coconut plantation. 
The details of the work are as follow: (1) Picking the coconuts takes 2 days. (2) Gathering the 
coconuts from the ground takes 2 days. (3) Scraping out the fresh white meat from the coconuts 
takes 2 days. (4). Grilling the fresh white meat of the coconuts takes 1 day. (5) Putting the copra 
into sacks takes 1 day. In the process of harvesting copra, the farmers need lots of money to pay 
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In spite of the modest success of the SCDP, in 1990 the government decided 
Galela should become the centre of a modern agribusiness, which concentrated on 
banana cultivation. PT GAI, a multinational agricultural corporation was 
appointed to carry out the development of  this project.140  During my research in 
1993 the people’s land was purchased by the Banana Company based on carefully 
controlled prices according to the following classification scheme 
(Risakotta:1995a): forest land was valued at Rp. 100,000. per ha; scrub or straw 
land was Rp. 500,000. per ha; uncultivated coconut land was Rp. 1,000,000. per 
ha; cultivated coconut land (non-SCDP) was Rp. 2,100,000. per ha; and finally, 
SCDP cultivated coconut land was Rp. 2,200,000. per ha. The selling of farmers 
land was still going on during my 1999 fieldwork. The Banana Company already 
owned a total of 3,500 ha. Among more than 200 households in Ngidiho, there 
were only a few families who still owned their own land around the village. In 
1994, the Banana Company had purchased 55.07% of all the land that had been 
owned by farmers in the area.141   
 
The Ngidiho people distinguish between the soil, what is planted in it, and the 
plants.  Symbolically, according to the Galela, the Sultan of Ternate owns the 
land. The Sultan owns the land but the people can use it.  People own whatever 
they plant.  When land was unlimited, anyone had the right to use land if they cut 
down the jungle and planted rice or a garden.  Jungle land was “free”.  This 
activity in Galela is called tolagumi, and means “to open a path”. After carrying 
out tolagumi, people don’t have to plant anything on the land in order to lay claim 
to its use. People could extend their land by just cutting down tree branches to 
mark the new borders. In Sahu, according to Visser, the action of dolagumi (Sahu; 
Galela: tolagumi) served to keep a balance in the environment (Visser: 1989, 50).  
 
                                                                                                                                     
the salary of the labourers. This is one reason why farmers need the supporting credit from the 
permanent stores or  the KUD for the continuity of their work. 
140 Early surveys of the Banana Company in Galela were based on the research of a Japanese 
ethnographic team that studied banana culture in Galela (See Ishige: 1980). This region was noted 
for its agricultural potential since the Second World War. The Banana Company chose Galela 
because of its stability of temperature for the entire year. Temperatures in Galela range between 30 
and 32 degree Celsius. Geographically, the location of Halmahera Island is strategic for shipping 
bananas to other countries such as Japan and China. Although PT GAI originally exported bananas 
to Japan during my 1999 fieldwork, the Director of the company told me that they had shifted their 
exports to China and Taiwan. It only takes 6 days for a ship to travel from Galela to Chinese land. 
141 Because of the outbreak of violence that limited my time for fieldwork, I could not find new 
data on this issue. In my 1994 research, there were 8 villages in which most of the villagers had 
sold their land to the Banana Company. The villages were: (1) Toweka (60,08%),  (2) Ngidiho 
(55,07%), (3) Lalonga  (47,2%), (4) Soa Sio (35,5%), (5) Limau (34,6%), (6) Duma (23,3%), 
Gotalamo (21,6%) and Makete (8,9%). The homogeneous Muslim villages were Toweka, Soa Sio, 
Lalonga and Gotalamo. Toweka is divided into two villages, Toweka and Simau. The 
homogeneous Christian village were Duma and Makete. The heterogeneous villages with a 
Muslim majority are Ngidiho and Limau (see Risakotta: 1995a, 14-15). The total of land sold to 
PT GAI in 1994 was 1.947,1 ha. The rest of the land (total 3,500 ha) was bought by the company 
between 1994 and 1999. In 1994, the number of farmers who had no land was: in Soa Sio (6.3 %), 
Toweka  (6.9%), Simau (23.4%), Ngidiho (25%), Makete (12.6%), Gotalamo (0.69%). In Duma, 
most people still owned land even though they had sold some to the Banana Company. I did not 
collect data for Lalonga and Limau (Risakotta: 1995a, 15). 
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Plants have owners, however there are plants that cannot be claimed as owned by 
someone in particular. I was surprised when teenagers, who walked with me 
through a coconut plantation, stopped and picked papayas from the land of other 
people whom I didn’t know and who were not there. They explained that tradition 
ensures their right to pick the fruit of trees or plants that were not planted by 
anyone. Papaya trees grow everywhere because birds spread their seeds. 
Therefore I had free fruit in Ngidiho. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Picture 33:  Children picking ripe papayas. 
 
With this way of thinking, I could understand why the Ngidiho people sold their 
land so easily to the Banana Company. The company persuaded the people to sell 
their land using traditional reasoning: the state owns the land, not the people; the 
people just use it. The people didn’t have any legal papers to prove their 
ownership of the land. Another argument, which was built upon the material 
conditions and historical memory of the people, was that sooner or later the 
government would take back the land. The people knew that they didn’t have the 
right to their land because they didn’t have legal papers to prove it. However the 
farmers of the SCDP were a major exception. As members of SCDP, they 
received land certification.  
 
Farmers who had SCDP land certification could sell their land at a much higher 
price if their coconut plantation was in good condition. Of course the credit they 
owed to SCDP was deducted from the price, so the actual money they received 
was often much less.  Farmers who had only enjoyed the SCDP project for 10 
years had to give up their land in exchange for money. They could survive, as 
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long as the cash held out. The company never paid them compensation for land, 
but only for plants. When PT GAI paid the people, the Sultan of Ternate also 
received compensation since he claimed ownership over the land in Northern 
Halmahera. 
 
During the reformation era, in February 1999, students from Galela who were 
studying in Ambon and Makassar, came home to Galela and brought the idea that 
the Banana Company ought to pay them the value of the land that had not been 
paid in the 1990s. Obviously, the Banana Company used the traditional concepts 
of land for their own benefit and was able to buy the land with very little money. 
In contrast, the students used the Indonesian legal system to prove that according 
to modern law the people owned both the land and the plants so that the Banana 
Company should be forced to pay the farmers a reasonable compensation for their 
land. 
 
The reformation movement influenced the farmers of Galela to participate in 
demonstrations demanding compensation from PT GAI for their land. The 
reformation movement to compensate the farmers reached the village of Ngidiho 
in February 1999.  The movement succeeded because the Banana Company 
granted Rp. 600 million to all the farmers who had sold their land to the company. 
A source close to the situation told me that Ngidiho was supposed to receive Rp. 
150 million but in fact the farmers only received Rp. 75 million. The head of the 
Reformation Movement paid this money directly to the farmers based on a list of 
farmers that was drawn up by the head of the village. However many farmers in 
Ngidiho complained because their names were not included on the list even 
though they too sold their land. 
 
Farmers who didn’t receive their money brought their case to the district court. 
They accused the head of the Reformation movement of manipulating the money. 
Among those accused were some Christian farmers. This scandal had a wide 
impact among the farmers. They used the scandal to reject the re-nomination of 
the current Village Head who allegedly knew about the balance of the money that 
should have been paid to the farmers. They also questioned the use of a subsidy 
granted to the village. The subsidy was used to help build the village mosque, but 
none was given to the church. A Muslim candidate for Village Head, who held the 
position of Village Secretary, used this issue to attract political supporter from the 
Christians of Ngidiho. 
 
Those farmers who still owned their land mocked the reformation movement. 
Oom Din felt that the movement was motivated by self- interest. He criticized 
students who studied outside Galela and returned to mobilise farmers against the 
Banana Company. He felt that they didn’t understand the process of land 
ownership. With strong emotions that revealed his inner feelings, Oom Din said 
sharply, 
 
“My family and I never lost our home and land because 
we were afraid to watch the Ngidiho people unloading all 
their fancy new things from the bus. They bought 
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everything in Tobelo after they sold their land to the 
Banana Company.  When we went to our fields, we 
always covered our eyes because we were afraid that if we 
saw all their nice stuff we too would be tempted to do the 
same and sell our property to the company. Those people 
have lost their fields, but they now have nice houses. They 
used the compensation to renovate their houses”. 
 
Oom Din’s story reminded me of the time when I was staying and working in 
Tobelo during the first years of the Banana Company, in 1992-1993. From our 
office, which was located on the main road from Tobelo to Galela, I observed the 
intense mobilisation of people between Galela-Tobelo-Galela. Buses and trucks 
moved up and down the road all day long, full of passengers and goods for 
transport to Galela. In 1999, Oom Din told me that during that period the Galela 
created a new term, gagasa that means someone who quickly changes their life 
style after receiving lots of money. Now the word was used by young women to 
tease the young men who come to court them. They ask, “What do you have that 
makes you dare think that I could be attracted to you?”  
 
In those years, Oom Din and several other farmers formed a society to resist the 
pressure and persuasion used by the company and government to force people to 
sell their land. However Oom Din acknowledged that their position was not easy. 
In the end he had to trade his land to the company because it was surrounded by 
land already owned by the Banana Company. Fortunately he  did not have to sell 
the land but rather traded it for another piece of land, which the Company had just 
bought from other people. This land is still close to the public plantation, located 
near to Ngidiho. The banana plantation is bordered by a drainage system, which is 
about 2 meters wide and 3 meters deep. 
 
In spite of the pressure, there are still people who kept their own coconut 
plantations even though their land became an enclave surrounded by the 
Company’s banana cultivation. Haler Sou is a prominent example of the farmer’s 
resistance. In 1995, when I began to study this community, Haler Sou was the 
Principal of the elementary school in Ngidiho and the head of a SCDP farmer’s 
group. He was determined to struggle for the defence of his group’s land. He was 
arrested by the police in 1993. His arrest created fear among the common people 
and induced some to sell their land. I met him in 1995 and later felt grief when I 
heard of his death from illness. He succeeded in retaining ownership of his 
coconut plantation, even though he was imprisoned and fired from his position as 
Principal of the school. Nevertheless, his family continues to live from the 
plantation and his wife even went on the hajj in 1998 with the income from selling 
their copra.  
 
I observed the sensitivity of the society in Galela at the beginning of my research 
in 1995. The government and the Banana Company used leaders of adat, religion 
and village government as channels of influence to ensure the success of their 
development project. Village Heads, as well as religious and adat leaders received 
cash incentives to support the program. Village Heads received a monthly salary 
 130 
(Risakotta:1995a). The government promoted this “top-down” project as an 
attempt to redress imbalances in development between Western Indonesia and 
Eastern Indonesia. Under the leadership of President Suharto, big investors from 
Java were invited to expand their businesses in the Eastern part of Indonesia. 
“Incidentally” the project wiped out one development project (SCDP), which 
primarily benefited small farmers, and replaced it with another development 
project that promised high profits for developers in Jakarta. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 34:  The coconut plantation of a resistant farmer in the midst of the 
banana plantation. 
 
Intense debates and doubt divided Galela society in the controversy over the 
Banana Company’s presence in Galela. The agro industry brought fundamental 
changes in the everyday practices of the people. Cash and consumer goods 
became much more common, including televisions, videos and mass media from 
around the world. Many men could not adjust to the regular, tedious work of the 
banana plant and became unemployed, while women took over much of the 
banana production. Gender roles changed as women controlled more of the 
families’ income. Many traditional adat rules became irrelevant. The tensions 
prompted by extremely rapid social and economic changes such as these, no doubt 
contributed to the later eruption of extreme violence. As time passed, the meaning 
of the changes becomes gradually clearer and the people themselves understood 
more about what was gained and lost in giving up their land to PT GAI. For better 
or worse, agro business is an ongoing part of their economic and social life. 
 
At the beginning, the people of Galela were confused about what they should do. 
The physical abuse experienced by Haler Sou, the strong support of the 
development project by government, adat and religious leaders, and the offer of 
more cash money than they had ever seen before, convinced many farmers to sell 
their land. In fact, adat, religion and modernity all seemed like a part of 
development. They were used to submitting to the dictates of adat, religion and 
government. They felt ashamed to appear as backward indigenous people who 
would reject a modern development project like the banana industry. However 
 
 131 
they were not stupid. Farmers often played double roles, both resisting the agro 
business and then selling their land. They negotiated compromises to gain 
multiple benefits from as many parties as possible, in order to survive the 
onslaught of modernity (Risakotta: 1995a, 115-177). 
 
Although the Banana Company took over ownership of the farmers’ means of 
production (their coconut plantations), most people didn’t feel it. The Company 
paid for the land and the government persuaded the people that it was in their own 
interest. The ideology and practices of the government and the Company, backed 
by religious and adat leaders, formed the consciousness of the people. The 
company promised to hire the local people at good wages, as labourers to work on 
the banana plantation.  
 
Unfortunately lack of education limited the capacity of most Galelans to compete 
for good positions in the labour market at PT GAI. Muslim Galelans were 
especially disadvantaged. Both Christians and Muslims from Galela worked at 
cultivating the fields or in the packinghouses. However, in order to be hired as a 
foreman, a person had to have received a modern education, including a basic 
knowledge of modern methods for cultivating, treating and shipping bananas to a 
global market. Management positions were open to labourers who had a strong 
educational tradition such as the people from Duma, Soatobaru and Togawa. All 
of these are Christian villages in Galela that have a tradition of mission schools. 
Young engineers also came from the Christian areas of North Sulawesi and 
Toraja. They were appointed Assistants below the Director. The main Director of 
the company was a Christian from the Philippines. Several Muslim labourers from 
the North Moluccas were also appointed Assistants, but the management of the 
company was weighted towards Christians.  
 
During my fieldwork, I heard reports of dissatisfaction among the labourers about 
the social differentiation that began to appear in Galela.  The activists in the 
Reformation Movement in Galela were from the village of Toweka a Muslim 
village where half of the inhabitants sold their land to PT GAI. They demanded 
additional compensation for land that they sold a few years before. Their demand 
was delivered to Assistant Managers who were not indigenous to Galela. Some of 
the protestors already associated the ownership of the company with “Christians 
from outside Galela.”  Even though the company paid off the demands of the 
Reformation Movement the tensions did not subside because half of the money 
seemed to disappear. 
 
The loss of land caused decreased the production of rice and other plants needed 
by the Galelans. For example, it became more and more difficult to find the 
particular plant whose leafs is used for plaiting mats. The Galelans grow these 
rattan plants around their plantations (raki) and gardens (doro) as fences. Mama 
Iana, who always plaits her own mats, takes the basic materials from her own 
garden. Oom Din is responsible for planting this plant. The enau trees (sugar 
palm) that grow widely in the area also became limited around the villages. 
However, sugar palm trees are still available in Magiloi, which is a new plantation 
area for the Ngidiho people. Changes in the availability of traditional materials 
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that are gathered from decreasing amounts of raki and doro upsets the traditional 
patterns of ritual exchange and solidarity in the villages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 35-36:  The material for making mats grows in Oom Din’s 
plantation; 
Mama Iana makes the mats in her living room. 
 
On the other hand, PT GAI stimulated the development of new businesses. For 
example, those who still owned their own land and grew the local species of 
banana could sell their bananas. The Banana Company grew a special banana 
called the Calvanish species (Risakotta: 1995a, 15). The presence of many labours 
at the company plantation increased the demand for local bananas as the main 
consumption of them. The decrease in rice production did not have as much 
impact as it might have elsewhere, since rice is not eaten at every meal as it is in 
Java. Although rice is one of the main crops for traditional exchange in Galela, it 
is not the staple food. As a “new comer” crop, rice is placed in a special position 
as a food with rich ritual meanings.142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 This is different from the role of rice in Java. In company with other dishes, people in Java eat 
rice for breakfast, lunch and dinner. When I stayed in Ngidiho, I felt like I was staying in the 
Netherlands or the US where it felt inappropriate for the local people to begin every meal with rice 
or soup. 
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Pictures 37–38:  A view of Magiloi 
behind the banana plantation; 
Sugar cane plants in Magiloi. 
 
 
 
 
 
Rustam Ayub, the younger brother of the Village Head in Ngidiho was inspired to 
professionally redesign his doro by copying the methods of banana cultivation 
used by the Banana Company. He took me to his garden to show me his new 
planting system for local bananas, that he applies in his doro. His bananas are 
exported to Ternate weekly. He plants banana trees to encircle his raki (coconut 
plantation). When he can buy a raki from someone, he rearranges the field, giving 
more space to planting bananas rather than coconuts. He believed in good 
prospects for the local bananas as household economic prosperity, and the 
village’s income in general, increased. Once a week he could make about Rp. 
150,000. But when the violence occurred in Ternate at the beginning of November 
1999 and the banana buyers from Ternate could not buy his bananas, it hit him 
badly. Many of his bananas just rotted. The riots and violence in Ternate and 
Tidore before my departure to Java caused the people to throw away their 
agricultural products.  
 
The decreasing land also led to the extinction of wild animals like pigs in the 
nearby Galelan forest. Now the people must travel far, to the borders between the 
Districts of Galela and Loloda, if they wish to hunt for wild pigs. As a result the 
Christians began to raise pigs in their back yards in the village. Before the arrival 
of the Banana Company, there was very little pig husbandry in the village. 
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Ecological transformation affected changes in hunting patterns and influenced the 
relations between Christians and Muslims in Galela at large. Pig husbandry in 
Christian or mixed villages increased fears.  Muslims became reluctant to visit 
Christians or even to just walk on foot among the villages.  In Ngidiho, the village 
authorities requested the Christians to move their pigpens away from public space 
or roads where Muslims frequently travel. If someone caught a pig wandering out 
of its pigpen or entering their garden they were given the right to attack and 
wound the pig.  
 
According to a Muslim informant, the tradition of exchanging visits between 
Christian and Muslim families, even in different villages, used to be very strong. 
However, this tradition was practiced less and less due to the spread of pigs in the 
public spaces of the Christian villages. In villages where the majority is Christian 
the Muslims cannot prevent the pigs from wandering around. The Galela raise 
animals such as goats, chickens, ducks, and cows without keeping them in pens. 
However in the majority Muslim villages Christians are required to keep their pigs 
penned.  
 
Two other sources of conflict between Christian and Muslim villages are not 
directly connected with ecological or economic change, i.e. football competitions 
and youth parties. Football games between villages often erupted into fights after 
the match. Two years before the 1999-2000 violence, there was also a big fight 
between the young people from Duma and Dukolamo over differences of opinion 
about youth parties and alcohol consumption. Duma is a Christian village and 
Dukolamo is a mixed village. However violence between young people over 
football matches or parties were solved directly by the local police.   
 
3.3.2.  Traditional Ritual as a Means to Achieve Labour Rights 
 
The idea that changes in patterns of commodity exchange in agricultural societies 
transforms solidarity relationships has been widely discussed. The introduction of 
rice to the life of Galela prompted the people to reorganize their division of 
labour. New adat (tradition) regulations helped them cope with the challenges for 
survival in the new situation. The people also worked out cultural adjustments in 
the period of agricultural transformation from rice to coconut plantations. Even 
more radical changes seem to be required by the transformation from coconuts to 
bananas. But changes are not always in the direction of “modernisation”. During 
my research in 1999, I heard that indigenous labours from Galela were re-
evaluating the terms of their work for the Banana Company. The labourers 
requested the company to provide them rice again, rather than money, as a labour 
supplement.   
 
During my earlier research in 1995, male labourers received a supplement of rice 
in addition to their main monthly salary. Rice was not given to the married female 
labours whose husbands were employees of the company. The assumption was 
that the husband was the head of the household and his wife was just a follower 
who could eat from her husband’s rice (Risakotta: 1995a). The people of Galela 
protested this regulation because it contradicted their traditional labour practices. 
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Both men and women in Galela traditionally receive a salary and a food 
supplement. The payment for women to pull the weeds from a plantation is 
Rp.10,000 per day (US$1.20), plus dinner. This salary is higher than the wages 
paid to labourers in the Banana Company. At the Banana company women 
labourers are also paid Rp.10,000 per day but the women have to bring their own 
lunch. If the Company does not provide a rice subsidy then the owners of the 
plantation should provide them with lunch. For the women of Galela, the rice 
supplement was considered a substitute for the lunch they would receive for 
cleaning (mangi yoohodo) a coconut plantation.  
 
The women workers in Galela used this cultural argument to persuade the 
company to revise its policy of only giving one rice subsidy per family. From 
1996-1997, the Company distributed a rice supplement to both men and women 
labourers equally.  However in 1997, labourers proposed a new model of 
payment, requesting cash instead of rice. Thenceforth the labourers’ salary 
included both their monthly wages and a cash equivalent for the rice supplement. 
Unfortunately the Indonesian economic crisis resulted in a sharp increase in the 
cost of rice, which in a short period rose from Rp. 900 per kg. to Rp. 3,000 per kg. 
The labourers felt that their salary was eaten up just for buying rice. After a year 
of negotiations, in August 1999 the labourers again began to receive their rice 
supplement instead of cash. During this period of crisis the traditional barter 
economy reappeared as labourers exchanged rice for bananas or other crops. 
Bartering became popular, not in order to make money but to reduce hunger. The 
labourers had rice from their subsidy but did not have their own gardens, while 
local villagers had vegetable gardens but no rice. Bartering benefited both. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Pictures 39-40:  Traditional farm labour in the village; 
Modern work methods banana plantation. 
 
In 1997 when the economic crisis in Indonesia began, those who still had their 
own plantations were far better off than labourers at the Banana Company, whose 
monthly salary was not enough to cover their basic cost of everyday living. The 
situation was especially difficult for labourers who lived in Banana Company 
barracks and had to buy all their daily necessities. Several Assistants of the 
Banana Company reported that outsider labourers from Java or elsewhere were 
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more diligent than the Galela labours. They worked more hours at the company or 
added overtime just in order to get enough to eat. People from Galela still had 
access to food from their families and neighbours. 
 
The Javanese labourers had permanent labour status (Syarat Kecakapan Umum = 
SKU ). However, half of Galela who worked at the Banana Company only 
received status as free day labourers (Buruh Harian Lepas = BHL). Indigenous 
Galelans who worked at the Banana Company preferred their status as free or 
non-permanent labourers. This permitted them to work in their gardens, planting 
crops which supplied their daily food. They used their back yards or empty land in 
the Company complex where they stayed. 
 
3.4.  Conclusion: A Political Conception of Culture  
 
Yoshida makes the observation that the Galela’s the culture is syncretic. Various 
different elements are formed into a mosaic (Yoshida: 1980, 106). Each element is 
from a different pattern but is reshaped and modified by its contact with the local 
ideology and practices of Galela. The Galelas’ contact with people from 
neighbouring cultures like Austronesia, before the arrival of universal religions 
like Islam and Christianity, showed their ability to resist outside efforts to 
dominate them. Sometimes dominant influences from without were too strong, so 
they adjusted their own knowledge and practices to the new reality. For example, 
in the marriage rituals we saw the combination of traditional practices with Islam.   
 
Sometimes efforts to overcome the inconsistency between old traditions and a 
new situation, works well; but sometimes not. Most communities in Galela, 
especially the Muslims whom I studied, are very creative in modifying their local 
practices to fit into the modern context. They are able to reformulate traditional 
knowledge and practices so that they are consistent with new knowledge and new 
practices. The Banana Company changed the agricultural system of the society, 
especially when the people sold their land. The Galela transformed their patterns 
of labour in response to new conceptions of banana cultivation which included 
new industrial rituals like time clocks.  In doing so they put aside or modified 
their own rich traditions of banana cultivation (Risakotta: 1995a). 
 
Talcott Parsons says that power is a variable that can be calculated, although it 
cannot be counted. Nevertheless it is accessible to all the members of a society 
(Parsons: 1997).  Power can be expanded or contracted depending on the 
capability of society to reach its goals through political achievements and the 
accumulation of economic forces. The expansion or contraction of power occurs 
in families, kinship networks, villages and on up to the level of the state or even 
the whole globe. In the context of society in Ngidiho, the centre of power at the 
level of the family used to be centralised in parental authority but has now 
changed. Women’s roles are still limited as religious or adat leaders. But their 
new-found power through economic achievement is seen in their ability to adjust 
to new working opportunities at the Banana Company. 
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The transformation of the economic and ecological context in Galela led to a 
reformulation of social and cultural customs. The change in the material base of 
society forced the people to re-write their basic concepts about what they do in 
their everyday life. This is not an easy task. The gap between the older generation 
and younger generation hinders the reformulation of ideology in the cultural 
practices of society. However the changes that have shaped the social history of 
the Ngidiho people raise both serious concerns and real hope that through this 
painful process whole society will become more consciousness of its own identity. 
The struggle to find an identity in the midst of change is one of the factors that lie 
behind the violence of 1999 – 2000.  
 
Power and identity are related to how the ritual traditions of society are carried 
out. For example, who makes the regulations of adat and determines the 
traditional fines? One of my informants in Ngidiho who used to be the Village 
Head (Kimalaha) says decisions were carried out by the dola moi, which was a 
gathering of leaders to reach a consensus.143 This meeting included Kapitan 
(Captains), Jouhukums (adat leaders) and Kimalaha (Village Heads). “Captain” 
was the term used to refer to a war leader. The title was inherited. The Sultan of 
Ternate gave this title to those who helped him suppress the frequent rebellions 
that occurred in his region. Jouhukum was a title given to elderly leaders who 
were wise in the knowledge of adat. The status of Kimalaha was like the position 
of the village head in the modern era of Indonesia. Kimalaha conveyed 
government decisions to the society on matters such as tax regulations.  
 
The decisions reached by consensus in the dola moi were delivered to the people 
(kawasa), as official pronouncements from their government. The people were 
expected to discuss the new decision. If the community did not agree, the dola 
moi would gather again to re-discuss the issues. The Sangaji, or representative of 
the Sultan of Ternate, legalised the announcement when it was the result of the 
agreement of both the dola moi and the kawasa. When the Indonesian government  
imposed its own system of village government the people of Galela the traditional 
positions disappeared and were replaced by Indonesian government institutions. 
The dola moi was replaced by the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (Village 
People’s Defence Institution or LKMD) and the Lembaga Masyarakat Desa 
(Village People’s Institution or LMD). The Kimalaha was renamed the Kepala 
Desa (Village Head). Positions such as the Kapitan and the Jouhukum 
disappeared, only to resurface during the violence of 1999-2000. 
 
Sometimes there are policies that show inequality between different groups in 
society. The Galela marriage rituals illustrate a model of ritualised exchange that 
is practiced by different parties, who negotiate their power by exchanging labour, 
services and various kinds of wealth. The system is designed to maintain trust and 
equality in the society. Ritualised exchange is a method for negotiating power. 
The Galela practice gift exchange primarily in relations with people from outside 
their nuclear family. The Ngidiho people believe that relationships between 
siblings should be unconditional. However relationships with other people are 
                                                 
143 See (van Baarda: 1908, 45). 
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conditional. Marriage is a way to extend family relationships but its regulation has 
to be created. The indigenous people of Ngidiho accept foreigners and strangers 
into their families through marriage because they believe that a change in blood 
relationship via marriage also strengthens their existence as spirits after death. The 
goal of their spiritual transformation after death is to become one of the ancestral 
spirits (o dilike). 
 
The Galelans practice ritual exchange with two primary purposes. The first is 
economic, while the second is for friendship and brother/sisterhood. After a 
marriage takes place, brother and sis ter relationships are established among the 
members of the two families. This differs from the common practice of marriage 
in the West, for example in the Netherlands, where only the bride and groom are 
considered related to each other’s respective families.  The bride and groom’s 
families still remain essentially unrelated to each other, except through the bride 
and groom. Therefore, it is a mistake to understand fongu and the exchange 
process as a payment of the wife’s family (WF) to the husband’s family (HF) to 
pay for her reproductive capacities. Platenkamp oversimplification of these issues 
is made worse by his use of the terms “wife giver” (WG) and “wife taker” (WT) 
to designate the two families (Platenkamp: 1988). The Dutch missionary, H. van 
Dijken, displayed a similar prejudice in prohibiting new Christians from 
practicing ritual exchange in the marriage process with the exception of the bride 
wealth (mas kawin).   
 
Reciprocity is a central ingredient of the Ngidiho people’s efforts to expand their 
family networks. The narration of the wedding party describes the practice of 
jojobo or the general exchange of material and immaterial help, including rituals. 
The exchange of “work” or jojobo includes the whole community (kawasa), 
regardless of blood ties or marriage bonds; it makes everyone a part of your 
family. 
 
The life practices of the Galela should be seen in their totality.144 The principles of 
exchange can strengthen solidarity or sharpen antagonisms. Exchange is a ritual 
practice that can be found in all aspects of the Galela people’s life, including 
economic, religious and political life. Ideally the practices of exchange promote 
honesty and respect within human relations and acknowledge both the economic 
and spiritual needs that are basic characteristics of the Ngidiho people’s identity. 
The violation of these principles can create chaos and imbalance in the society. 
 
Practices of exchange do not guarantee either justice or balance within a society. 
The Banana Company contributed some positive aspects for strengthening the 
economic capabilities of the Eastern part of Indonesia and bringing new 
technology and skills to Galela. However at the same time, it defrauded the people 
of their land by subtle means.  The Reformation Movement in Galela protested 
against perceived imbalances and injustices in the exchange process. The entire 
                                                 
144 See the analysis of E. E. Evans-Pritchard in his Introduction to the English version of The Gift 
by Marcel Mauss. He uses the word ‘total’ to explain the patterns of exchange in ancient societies. 
In the process of ritual exchange, various phenomena that are separated in the structure of modern 
knowledge, are unified within the totality of the context of a traditional society (Mauss: 1954, vii). 
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society in Galela participated in the struggle of the farmers to increase their 
compensation for the land. 
  
Galelan students who were studying in Ambon and Makassar brought home ideas 
about political and economic reformation that they heard at the national level. The 
radical structural changes in Galelan ecology and society introduced by the 
Banana Company were not anticipated by the national industrial engineering 
policy that approved the project. The project should have involved more of the 
local community as subjects in planning development. For example, a project like 
SCDP in which the people are integral to the development process (perusahan inti 
rakyat=PIR, nucleus estates) could have been used by the Banana Company. In 
that case, the people could be taught to cultivate bananas for the Company on 
their own land. Or they could contract their land to the Company for a set period, 
for example ten years. These models are alternatives to the Banana Company’s 
policy of taking over the people’s land for a pittance (Risakotta:1995a). The 
imbalance of the exchange was not immediately apparent to the people because 
their subsistence economy was on a totally different level from the international 
economy of multinational corporations. Their cultural traditions of land ownership 
were also different.  
 
Of course, from the Banana Company’s perspective, they had to calculate the 
risks and likelihood of profit. Things like export targets, discipline and working 
hours could be a problem if they relinquished total control over their labour and 
means of production. After all, you cannot fire a lazy worker if he or she owns the 
means of production (land)! However these alternatives should be discussed 
openly with the people. After all, it is their land and their labour. It is not 
unreasonable to imagine that they would work even harder if they shared in both 
the risks and the profits of the venture. Those who provide the capital, knowledge 
and technique might need to reduce their expectations of huge profits, but they 
might also have reduced their risks related to major social upheaval. Obviously, 
the change of social structure in the society after the establishment of the Banana 
Company could become a boomerang towards the company if it came to be seen 
as the enemy.  
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Chapter IV 
Ritual, Identity and Politics in the History of the 
North Moluccas 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter reveals a truth in Joseph Conrad’s quotation. We will see how 
governmental policies before and during the Colonial period affected the identity 
formation of the people in Ngidiho and the Moluccas at large.  The people 
maintain symbols and stories from the past as part of their historical 
understanding of the present. The chapter begins with a narration of the Cakalele 
dance performed at one of the wedding events in Ngidiho. This story is a starting 
point for revealing the complex social structure of the people and how they build 
loyalty in the community. 
 
The Moluccas became a capital resource that brought the West to Indonesia and 
changed the material context and historical meaning of the region. Colonial 
competition for trade monopolies employed competing ideologies, which aimed to 
format the identity of the society in order to control its population and exploit its 
resources. Two methods were employed in the politics of trade. First, the 
colonialists employed a method of rational subjectivity.  Secondly they tried to 
mould the people’s spiritua l subjectivity. Changes in global politics transformed 
small villages in the District of Galela, North Moluccas. 
 
4.1.  The Cakalele Dance 
 
The sound of barking and the beating of a drum sends shivers down my spine. The 
urging voices of the watchers stimulate the passions of the dancers. They jump 
and leap with energy and rhythm. Each dancer holds a sword and a wooden 
shield. The wooden shields are decorated with mother of pearl shells, formed into 
the shape of eyes. People refer to them as “the eyes of the ir ancestors”. Half 
hysterical, the watchers also begin jumping and leaping, following the rhythm of 
the music. The drums beat faster and faster. My hair is standing on end and I feel 
like I just want to leave the place. However the call of the Cakalele dance is just 
too strong for me to go and hide away. Showing his muscles, like a true man, the 
male dancer (o soda)145 wields his sword in his right hand and his shield in his 
left. Suddenly a female dancer (o sisi) comes forward screaming, he---he---he---
he--- and joins with the male dancer. The bravery of the male dancer enchants the 
woman who displays her gentleness and courage. Without holding anything in her 
hands, she rotates the palm of her hand beautifully as if she were protecting 
something within her hand. The sound of laughter swells up as the people feel 
                                                 
145 Platenkamp notes that the Dutch missionary, van Baarda, wrote the name of the war dance as 
soda.  See (Platenkamp: 1988, 174). 
“The mind of man is capable of anything because everything is in it, all 
the past as well as all the future” (Conrad: 1985 [1902], 52). 
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pride and joy to see the strong and brave man facing the lovely woman. As they 
dance, the watchers gradually fall into a trance.    
 
A male dancer, who was the former Village Head, jumps out of the dancing 
circle.146  He is searching for someone. He stops in front of a man his age, in his 
fortieth year. He bows to the man and gives him his sword and shield. The man in 
front of him is chosen to replace him in the dance. The falteringly voices and loud 
applause of the watchers welcome the new dancer.  
 
The same woman is still dancing. She approaches the new dancer, laughing and 
shouting “he---he---he---he--” as she passionately invites the man into the rhythm 
of the dance. People scream to each other the word “tokanali!”. This word means, 
“Joyful like the devil!” The extraordinary sound of the music seems to awaken a 
mystery within the hearts of those present. Each dances in turn until they pass the 
dance on to someone else. 
 
A familiar voice rings out from one of male dancers who is searching for someone 
to take his place. “Nardi! Nardi!”  It is the voice of Oom Din. Then the dancers 
chase Pak Nardi who is known in the village as the friend of Oom Din. With a 
respectful nod, Oom Din bows low and gracefully transfers the sword and shield 
to Pak Nardi. The people shout enthusiastically.  
   
Pak Nardi dances with style, holding sword and shield differently from the 
dancers from Ngidiho. His style of dance reminds me of the kuda kepang dance 
that is popular in Java.147  No one seems to care if his style of dancing is different. 
All eyes stare at him. The same female dancer is still shouting and rotating the 
palms of her hands.148  Pak Nardi dances as if he is riding a horse. He waves the 
sword and shield rhythmically with the beating of the drums. The deafening music 
races faster and faster. Pak Nardi whirls round and round, thrusting with his 
sword. Music speeds to a fever pitch. Suddenly we are shocked as a great noise 
rose from the centre of the arena holding the performance.  People shout!  The 
music comes to an abrupt halt. Pak Nardi sways and falls. He collapses, sprawling 
out on the asphalt road near the wide tent set up for the wedding party of Emang 
and Mala. 
                                                 
146 This former head of the village and the woman of Ngidiho always are chosen to represent 
Galela for the performance of the Cakalele dance to welcome regional government officers who 
come from outside Galela.  
147 In the Javanese language, it is called Jaran kepang  (horse braid). I remember the jatilan dance 
that was performed by an art group in Yogyakarta to celebrate the winner of PDI-P in the 1999 
general election. This dance is the people dance in Java in general. The faces of Jatilan dancers are 
covered with make-up and they dress up with batik. This dance aims at showing the magic forces 
of the dancers.  The leader of the dancer doesn’t dance, but he functions to give consciousnesses 
and invulnerability to dancers who are in trance. The more the dance is performed, the more 
dancers go into a trance. They dance more than two hours. When the dancers are in a trance they 
drink dirty water that is provided for washing their faces or they even eat shards of glass. The 
inspiration for this dance was taken from the story of horse troops gathered and trained by Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono I, who was the King of Yogyakarta, to attack the Dutch colonizers in Java. 
(See the broshure, “Anak Wayang Indonesia”, Yogyakarta: 2002.  cf. Peacock: 1968). 
148 cf. D. Nijland: 1994. 
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The people immediately call Oom Din. They all know Oom Din is needed at this 
critical moment. Then I see Oom Din comes close to the unconscious and rigid 
body of Pak Nardi whose empty eyes bulge out, looking up at nothing. The voice 
of Oom Din echoes, as he utters the word “toka” (“devil”), in the left ear of Pak 
Nardi.  Then he utters the word “bismillah rraham nirrahiim” in the right ear of 
Pak Nardi. But one minute later, nothing seems to change.  
 
Several men then carry Pak Nardi out of the arena, which is prepared for the 
wedding celebration the next day. They lay him out unconscious in the living 
room of Nurman Budiman’s house, the father of Emang, the groom of the new 
wedding couple. While unconsciousness, Pak Nardi sometimes seems to want to 
get up, as if he is fighting or attacking somebody. However Oom Din is still 
beside him, holding his hands and saying words that I can’t understand. He prays 
with a cup of water and opens Pak Nardi’s mouth to help him swallow a little.   
 
Outside the house, people gossip that Pak Nardi is possessed by a devil because 
he is not an indigenous Galela (O Galela madutu). However people also think that 
his devil is not as strong as the ones they have in Galela.  All the people believe 
that Pak Nardi will be all right because they think he must have supernatural 
powers to protect himself as a foreigner, a Javanese immigrant, in the land of 
Halmahera.149 All this time the music continues its incessant beat, pausing only 
briefly when Pak Nardi falls. Other dancers dance and the rhythm of the music fill 
the bodies of all who are present.  Mystery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 41-42:  Pak Nardi and a local man dance the Cakalele. 
                                                 
149 The centres of transmigration in the North Moluccas are localized in the district of Jailolo, 
Sahu, Bacan and Kao (see Chapter V). 
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4.1.1.  The Spirit of the Ancestors and Evil Spirits 
 
A few days after the party, I asked Oom Din about what happened on the night 
before the wedding party. Oom Din laughed and said nothing. “It was nothing,” 
Oom Din said, apparently wanting to avoid the subject. “Ibu had already gone 
home. About 3 AM Pak Nardi returned to consciousness and I took him home to 
Tiabo in my oxcart.” Oom Din quickly shifted our talk to another topic.150 
However I persisted and asked him whether they often had events during which 
someone collapses while dancing the Cakalele. Oom Din laughed and shook his 
head. “Never. The Galela are brave people who know how to dance their ancestral 
dances. We respect our ancestors in the way we live. Our ancestors were sea 
pirates and when we perform this dance, we honour our ancestors.” Oom Din 
explained with enthusiasm. 
 
 “Some one who dances the Cakalele has to understand truly that this dance is a 
victory dance. For many generations, we have heard the stories of how our 
ancestors would go for long sea journeys to hijack ships (o tohiki). Before 
departing they had to have a big party. They danced and drank the local liquor 
(saguer, o daluku) to stimulate their energy and stir up the company of the 
ancestral spirits (o dilike). These are the spirits of those who died long ago.” Oom 
Din explained that even now the people from Ngidiho are always chosen to 
perform the Cakalele dance to welcome important government officials who visit 
Galela.  
 
“Even though we already have agama (“religion,” which refers to Islam), we are 
still proud of this inheritance.” Oom Din went on to explain why Pak Nardi was 
possessed by an evil spirit whereas the Ngidiho dancers were not.151 He said that if 
someone from Galela was susceptible to a bad spirit (o toka) they would know in 
themselves that they could not touch the sword and shield during the Cakalele 
dance. It is taboo. Performing Cakalele gives honour to the ancestors. Therefore 
souls of the dancers must be empty and not influenced by evil spirits. Only then 
can they be refilled with o dilike, the good spirits, the spirits of the ancestors. 
 
When the ancestral spirits fill the dancers, all of the audience can feel the presence 
of the ancient spirits who protect the entire village.152 Evil spirits, o toka, cannot 
unite with the ancestors, o dilike. O toka are not the ancestral spirits, but rather 
destructive spirits that can destroy the lives of human beings. However the 
ancestral spirits (Galela: o dilike; Tobelo: o dilikine) protect human beings. “In 
olden times, before our ancestors departed on a long sea voyage, they called o 
dilike to accompany them,” said Oom Din. 
 
                                                 
150 Pak Nardi danced at 1 am after he led the procession of slaughtering the cow for the next day’s 
party. In the tradition of Galelan somebody who slaughters a cow has a right to take home its head. 
Oom Din gives Pak Nardi this task because he can take the head home for consumption by his 
family. This man, who lives with his wife and a grand son, eats simply everyday. 
151 I don’t see that Oom Din means that the spirit within Pak  Nardi is the bad spirit. However, he 
means that the spirit o dilike from the Galela is different from another spirit. 
152 Each family has its ancestral spirits. The spirits of ancestors appear in the form of clan as the 
reality of the kin-network the Galela have. 
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“Even now, in the modern world, if a Galelan wants to go on a long journey, they 
always ask for the protection of o dilike in advance,” Oom Din went on to explain 
the differences between the ancestral spirits and the bad spirits. “The Galela will 
only call for help from the spirits (o dilike) who are ancestors from their own 
family. They feel that only the spirits of their own ancestors will really help them 
in a critical moment especially when they are physically threatened.”  Oom Din 
then told a story that the youth of Galela who become soldiers are always helped 
by their own o dilike when they are in a dangerous situation and their lives are 
threatened.   
 
The ancestral spirits, o dilike, are different from the village spirits, o wonge. O 
wonge are the spirits who protect the village. According to local myths, each 
village believes that particular animals represent some of their ancestors that they 
are forbidden to kill (Ishige: 1980). The o wonge of Ngidiho is a crocodile (o 
gosoma). Each village has a special o wonge. Another village believes that their o 
wonge is an eagle (o kodoba) (Ishige: 1980, 420; cf. Chapter I). Using the 
categories explained by C. Levi-Strauss (Levi-Strauss: 1969) and other authors, 
the concept of o wonge can be classified as their totem animal.   
 
Unlike the Christians, the Muslims of Ngidiho believe that o dilike is a good spirit 
and not a demon or evil spirit. Protestant Christianity, as inherited from the Dutch 
missionaries, did not believe in good ancestral spirits, but only accepted the reality 
of Satan (Iblis) and evil spirits or demons. The missionaries taught that living 
people can not communicate with the dead because they are already transformed 
from the physical world into the spiritual world. This teaching separated the new 
Christian community from their kin-network. Celebrating the ancestors was a 
kinship ritual that created solidarity. Among the more Evangelical forms of 
Christianity the spirit world was affirmed and God was believed to save the 
ancestors of those who became Christians. Nevertheless, even if there was a belief 
in good spirits, the Christian teachers stressed that only God should be celebrated 
and worshiped, not the ancestors. Orthodox Islam also focuses on the celebration 
of God and forbids the worship of spirits, but Qur’an teaching about jinn 
accommodates local beliefs in spirits.153 
 
In light of this background it is easy to see why the Cakalele dance is seldom 
performed at Protestant Christian wedding parties in Galela.154 As a substitution, 
they prefer modern style music like disco for the youth and waltz music for the 
older generation. Dancing the waltz still persists as an inheritance from Dutch 
missionaries. The Cakalele is an indigenous dance created by the Galelans. The 
dance of Denge described in the narration of the wedding party is also indigenous, 
although it was influenced by Malay culture that was passed on from Islamic 
missionaries (see Chapter II). Sometimes the Muslims of Ngidiho complain that 
the Christians are not true Galelans because they have forgotten the traditions of 
their ancestors.  
 
                                                 
153 Catholic Christianity was (and still is), more tolerant of local religious rituals that involve the 
spirits.  
154 cf. Jouwe rsma: 1985. 
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According to the Galela, devils, satan, syaitan (Arabic), iblis, (Galela: ibilisi) are 
bad spirits that eat human beings. Genies (jinn) are good spirits that live near 
human beings.155 In the original language of the local religion, there was no word 
for devil or genie (jinn). However the idea of good spirits and bad spirits was 
prominent in the local religion. In the meeting between Muslim teachings and 
local practices, the concept of devils and jinn from the Qur’an were easily 
assimilated with local concepts. Now the people of Galela differentiate between 
different kinds of evil spirits in the category of o toka.  O meki, o baja-bito and o 
putiana are all bad spirits or demons o toka. There are also a variety of good 
spirits, including o goma, o dilike, o wonge, gurumi ma dorou, moro and honga, 
all of which are considered genies (Arabic: jinn; Galela: jinni), because they don’t 
threaten human beings (cf. Ishige: 1989, 429).156  
 
With these accommodations between Islam and indigenous beliefs, a month 
before Ramadhan (the month of fasting), the Muslims of Ngidiho go on a 
pilgrimage to their family graveyards. They clean them and put flowers on the 
tombs. If anyone plans to get married, their parents will also go to the ancestral 
graveyards to pray for secur ity and blessing for the wedding rituals that are being 
prepared. According to the tradition, if they don’t visit the graveyard something 
strange is bound to occur at the party. For example, perhaps the rice will not turn 
out well or there may be some kind of accident, etc. The anomaly is a sign that 
they have proceeded with their plans without involving their ancestors. It makes 
sense for the Galela to involve their ancestors since the gathering for a wedding 
party or death ceremony involves the entire village and kin-group, including those 
who have already passed away. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 43:  Villagers visit the family graveyard before they hold a big event, 
such as a wedding party. 
                                                 
155 The word jinn is Arabic. In Islamic teaching, jinn are considered God’s creations since the 
beginning. They were created along with angels (malaikat).  Jinn have offspring and can die. 
There are two kinds of jinn: good ones and bad ones (syaitan). cf. Baker: 1988. 
156 In Java there are makluk halus (fine or transparent creatures) who existed before human beings.  
They are called danjang .  They occupy particular places and are called “mbah” that means 
grandfather.  This shows that the makluk halus are conceptually close to their ancestors (leluhur).  
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During my research in Ngidiho I had the opportunity to attend a major funeral 
ceremony that was held for one of the community leaders in Ngidiho. When 
somebody dies, all the men in the village have to attend the ceremony and pray 
together. After the person is buried, the core family, including the wife/husband, 
sons and son-in- laws, sit around the bed where the person who died is lying at the 
time of his/her death. For seven days and nights, the men read the Yasin scripture 
from the Qur’an and follows with tahlilan.157 On the bed, they put all the personal 
belongings of the deceased, such as sarongs, shirts, clothes, peci (rimless cap), 
shoes, sandals, books etc. On the seventh day, all the Muslims in the village are 
invited to attend a tahlilan for the grieving family. After reading the book of 
Yasin and saying confession, all of the personal belongs that are on the bed are 
distributed to the kin-family. The Christians also come to help with the cooking 
preparations for the following party. The in- laws from the male line (doroa) bring 
sago and fish, while the female line (modoka) brings red sticky cake (wajik). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 44:  Some villagers are chanting from the Qur’an after a funeral in 
Ngidiho.  In the background you can see the clothes of the dead person lying 
on the bed. 
 
The practices of local religion are still apparent in the ceremony of tahlilan seven 
days after a death, even though the ritual has been Islamicized. According to 
indigenous beliefs, some one who dies has to be treated carefully so that her/his 
body can be transformed into an o goma or ancestral spirit. The transformation of 
a corpse into an o goma is determined by material conditions that must be 
provided by the living family who remain on earth. After reaching the stage of o 
goma, a dead person may be transformed again to become an o dilike. This 
transformation is very important to the Galela. According to them, only 
indigenous Galelans (o Galela ma dutu), can be transformed into o dilike. 
                                                 
157 In Indonesia, Muslims always read this letter at the time of a death. It is assumed that reading 
the passage from Yasin helps the human spirit to be separated easily from her/his body.  A second 
reason is to request the forgiveness from God for the death person. 
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Foreigners, such as Europeans, Sangerese, Arabs, Ambonese, or Javanese, cannot 
be transformed after death into o goma because they are not native (Ishige: 1980, 
419). Someone of mixed blood due to intermarriage can become o goma when 
they die, though they are unlikely to make the further transition to o dilike. 
 
In the past, the living family could help the transformation process by fulfilling 
certain duties. First, they should bury the coffin together with all the personal 
belongings of the person.  This would give the dead person a feeling of security 
for their journey to reach their transformation into o goma. Secondly, during the 
period of the journey, that lasts approximately seven days, the family should make 
ritual food offerings and invite the dead person to eat them. 158 The presence of the 
entire family at the death ritual will help the transformation from a body to 
become spirit. If the ceremonies are not carried out properly, then the o goma may 
be transformed into a bad spirit or o toka. 
 
In Ngidiho, the requirement that males be involved in the death ritual is 
influenced by Islam. Islamic teaching regards only men as wali or representatives 
of the Prophet Muhammad SAW in their families and in society at large. This has 
an impact on views of illegitimate children, since a baby born to a single mother, 
without having a legal father by Islamic marriage, cannot become a wali and is 
called proscribed (haram). If the baby is a boy, then he will not be allowed to 
function as an imam (religious leader) when he grows up. Islam also changed the 
practice of burying all a persons belongings with the coffin. Instead, the Galelans 
distribute the belongings to the family of the deceased after they have been laid 
out on the deathbed for seven days. This follows the Islamic teaching in the 
Qur’an that a dead person’s belongings should be distributed to his or her family.  
However Islamic practices in Ngidiho still follow the old traditions in which the 
family shows their appreciation for the dead person by holding seven days of 
prayer to help the transformation of the person’s spirit to become a good spirit (o 
dilike).   
 
According to Islam, only a man may become an imam. In contrast, in the old 
religion of Galela, both women and men served as religious leaders without being 
distinguished by gender. In olden times, healers, or shamans were also considered 
religious leaders. However in present day Ngidiho, healers such as Oom Din or 
the mother of the bride in the story of the wedding party, must be very careful not 
                                                 
158 This ritual practice is found also in the Javanese tradition (See Geertz: 1976). If people die then 
their families hold thanksgiving prayers after seven days, 100 days and 1000 days. This tradition is 
still practiced even by Muslims.  There is no evidence to prove why the memorial of the dead is 
conducted after 7 days, 100 days and 1000 days.  But my data suggests that the time periods may 
correlate with the time needed to prepare hospitality for those who attend the ritual gatherings.  
The stock of food supplies for a family gathering is availaible for up to seven days.   Then people 
need to wait for their chickens to grow for 100 days.  Their cows may be ready to slaughter within 
1000 days.  Economical reasons are formulated into spiritual meanings.  This tradition was also 
influenced by the former religion (Hinduism) before people embracing their new religion. Leonard 
Andaya quotes Peter Bellwood, a historian of  pre-historic Papua New Guinea, and states that the 
evidence of rice barn and rice pestle found around Papua New Guinea and also in the Moluccas 
were related to the expansion of Hinduism in the area through the spice trade (Andaya: 1993a, 50). 
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to appear as rivals to orthodox Islamic teachers (see Chapter III).159 Galelan 
Muslims still maintain their old traditions but they have modified their ideas and 
practices to adjust them to their new religion.  
 
4.1.2.  Our Ancestors were Pirates  
 
“Our ancestors were sea-pirates!” I was astonished to hear this statement made 
with obvious pride and without embarrassment or guilt. Not only the Galelans are 
proud of their ancestor’s piracy. The people of Kao and Tobelo also speak with 
pride of their heritage as the descendants of sea pirates. According to Djurubasa, 
the Tobelo do not have any taboo against speaking of their ancestors’ profession 
as sea-pirates (yo tohiki) (Djurubasa: 2000, 139). As an ethnographer, I wondered 
why everywhere in North Halmahera, on the Eastern side of Ternate and Tidore, 
people say proudly that their ancestors were sea-pirates. What are the connections 
between war dances, sea pirates and the feelings of pride that remain in the 
society of Northern Halmahera? 
 
I discussed this question with Oom Din. He laughed and said: “Ibu, this relates to 
our self-esteem. Our ancestors proved that they were not just little people whom 
the big people could push around!” Then he explained how the ancestors of 
Galela pirated as far away as Ceram and Timor.160 “Who were the big people?” I 
asked, still feeling surprised. “Oh, those who sailed on the ocean, they were 
traders.” I listened with amazement to Oom Din’s stories about his ancestors. 
 
However, I still didn’t fully understand Oom Din’s pride in his sea-pirate 
ancestors. How did piracy against the shipping trade on the high seas during the 
17th – 19th centuries influence the cultural heritage of the people on the Eastern 
side of Halmahera? Why did they still maintain the memory in their rituals and 
practices? Clearly, Oom Din could not explain in detail how or why his ancestors 
became pirates. However he was quite sure that becoming sea pirates was a sign 
that his ancestors were not small people. 
 
The Galelans’ pride in their ancestors is built from their substantial awareness that 
piracy requires great bravery. They believe it is a sign that they are not a defeated 
people. The Galelans are a great people because their ancestors dared to go far 
and returned in victory. They celebrated their victories with huge parties. The 
Cakalele dance was the centre of their welcoming party to celebrate the safe 
return home of their sons and husbands, who came in joy, bringing wealth and 
victory. 
 
In the current Cakalele dance, the people decorate their shields with mother of 
pearl shells that show how many heads of their enemies were cut off by their 
ancestors. According to A. Hueting as quoted by Platenkamp, among the Tobelo 
                                                 
159 Christian communities experience a similar tension.  Adat leaders and shamans in most of 
Indonesia must be careful not to offend the local Christian ministers and priests. Hibba Abugideiri 
writes an interesting article about how Muslim women in the USA reinterpret the Islamic tradition 
so that their role in religious leaderships also changes (Abugideiri: 2001). See also (Wadud: 1999). 
160 (Valeri: 2000, 28, 422: n76). 
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and Tobaru people of earlier times, the decorations on their shields, that appear 
like the eyes of human beings, were made from porcelain or mother-of-pearl 
(Platenkamp: 1988, 201).  Spears, shields and swords used to be given as gifts 
from the groom’s family to the bride’s family. These gifts had to be followed by a 
purifying ritual. The gifts showed the people’s pride in their past, but also their 
need to purify the past, so that the sins of their ancestors would not be carried on 
by the new generation. The purifying ritual was meant to remove the fears of the 
bride’s family who were giving their daughter in marriage to a man who was a 
descendent of sea-pirates. The mother of the groom played the primary role in 
purifying the gifts, which her son gave to his bride’s family. The mother covered 
the gifts with her old clothes. By doing so, she removed the fears of the bride’s 
family. 
 
Traditionally, before the groom’s family gave the shield, the father of the groom 
took the role of a soda and danced the Cakalele. A sister of the bride accompanied 
the man as a sisi in the dance. The rest of the bride’s family would dance the 
Cakalele after they received the gifts. The cloth covering of the gifts would then 
be removed and the father of the bride would dance with the cloth, continuing to 
dance as a soda with the bride’s sister as a sisi (Platenkamp: 1988).  
 
In the past, besides fongu, the groom’s family also had to give Chinese porcelain, 
batik clothes and white clothes to the mother of the bride. The batik clothes were 
to reward the bride’s mother for her breast-milk because she nursed and raised her 
daughter, the bride. The white clothes were given for later use as a shroud for the 
mother when she died.161  The antique porcelain plates were intended to reward 
the father of the bride for his protection of his daughter. Antique Chinese plates 
demonstrated the bravery of the groom’s family because these rare items were 
only available as the fruit of a successful pirating excursion against the maritime 
trade. 
 
These traditions were still practiced in Galela when I was doing fieldwork there in 
1999. When the Banana Company cleared out the tombs of the ancient graveyard 
in order to clear them for banana fields, they uncovered further confirmation of 
these death and exchange rituals. On the other hand, according to the records left 
by the Dutch missionaries, the new Christians were prohibited from following the 
death rituals of their former religion. 162 
                                                 
161 These white clothes show the influence of Islam because at the beginning, the Galelans only 
buried by covering the body with mats provided by the modoka (see Chapter III). In the current 
situation, although the Galelan corpses are covered with the white clothes, the community also 
puts a piece of board that is covered by a mat, which is a gift from the modoka. After that the 
corpses are covered again with mats before soil fills in the hole,  cf. Ishige: 1980, 385ff. 
162 cf. Peraturan adat orang Kristen dan peraturan Sipil di Halmahera 1906-1927  (The adat 
regulation of the Christian people and the civil regulation in Halmahera 1906-1927). If somebody 
died in their family, their house and the entire belongings had to be left behind so that the spirit of 
the dead would not be jealous. The family would just leave the corpse on the drying rack along 
with the entire possessions of the person. The Dutch missionaries changed this by putting the 
corpse in a coffin and burying it. However during the time of the preparation the tradition to fill 
the coffin with the belongings of the death person was still carried out.  The Islamic teachings 
modified the tradition of Galela and formed a new meaning that relates to their religion. 
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The explanations we have constructed so far, concerning the ritual connections 
between the ancestors’ profession as sea pirates and the current identity and 
practices of the Galela are too incomplete to be satisfying. How may we 
understand the symbolic meanings expressed by Oom Din, especially in relation 
to the original context when the Galelan ancestors became sea-pirates? Perhaps 
Oom Din’s explanation suggests an “anti-centre” or “anti-hegemonic” discourse. 
However who were the centres? In the following section I will describe how 
historical events gave rise to economic and ritual practices that are still influential 
in the society of Ngidiho. This is a history of the oppression of the weak. 
 
4.2.  Spice Islands and the Process of Modernization 
 
There are connections between social and historical changes that occurred 
hundreds or even thousands of years ago, and the transformations in social culture 
that happened in the North. Moluccas during and after the violence of 1999-2000. 
 
4.2.1.  The Rise and Fall of Maluku-Kie-Raha  
 
Cloves in the North and nutmeg and mace in the Centre (especially the islands of 
Banda) were both a blessing and a curse for the Moluccas.163 Ever since the 
Roman Empire, spices have been in great demand. In ancient times, spices were 
used for the preservation of food, as well as to make perfume and soap. According 
to I. Innes Miller, in the 6th Century BCE doctors such as Alexander of Thalles 
and Paul from the Aegean used cloves to cure rheumatism, stimulate the appetite 
and relieve seasickness (Miller: 1969, 49). In India, a surgeon in the 1st Century 
CE named Charaka used cloves as a medicine after operations. The name of 
cloves is already mentioned in the book of the Ramayana that was written in India 
around 200 BCE. Spices were part of an ancient trade network, linked by the Silk 
Route that was controlled by Chinese and Indian traders (Miller: 1969, 49). 
 
In about 500 CE, two powerful empires, namely the Persian and the Eastern 
Roman (Byzantium) Empires, competed to control the trade routes from East to 
West. The conflict became greater when religions were used as a means to extend 
the trade territories of each powerful party (Lewis: 1995, 37-39). Ideological 
conflict between the Zoroastrians from Persia and the Christians of the Eastern 
Roman Empire shut down the trade routes between East and West because traders 
could not pass through regions that were in conflict, or controlled by followers of 
their rival religion (Simon: 1989, 9). Because of that, the trade route moved to the 
Arabian Peninsula because the “incense-route” was already part of the trade 
through Mecca (Simon: 1989, 27; Lewis: 1995, 46).164 
                                                 
163 In the trade history there are two famous names for cloves. First chengkeh  (Sanskrit that 
perhaps comes fro m Chinese script) and the second was lawang that has the same meaning as 
lavanga (clove flowers) (Miller: 1964, 48). “The North” included Ternate, Tidore, Moti, Makian 
and Bacan (Miller: 1969, 48). The word pala  (nutmeg) comes from Sanskrit, jati-phala or pala, in 
Malay as ‘pala’ (Miller: 1969, 58).  In Latin mace is known as maccis  (Miller: 1969, 58). 
164 The removal of the trade lane was undertaken by Byzantium to avoid regions that were 
controlled by Persia (Iran). Persia controlled the Indian Ocean where the incense route was 
controlled by Himyarite Yemen (Simon: 1989, 33). 
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Before Islam arrived in the Moluccas, Indian and Chinese traders had already 
sailed to Java to buy spices from the Moluccas. The Moluccas were the original 
“spice islands”. The origin word of the name Maluku (English: the Moluccas) is 
still a subject of controversy. 165 Frans Watuseke argues that the word Maluku (the 
Moluccas) derives from the word for mountain (maloko) in the language of Galela 
and Tobelo. This explanation tallies well with my explanation of the historical 
background of Maluku-Kie-Raha.166  
 
The rise of Islam began in the middle of the 7th Century CE and quickly spread to 
the regions that were related to Arabic trade routes, such as Southern India in the 
8th Century CE (Crone: 1987, 9). At that time there were several Hindus 
kingdoms in Java and Sumatra, such as Sriwijaya, whose power spread to the 
Malay Peninsula. The Hindu Kingdoms in India had a close relationship with 
Hindu Kingdoms in Java and Sumatra. According to one theory, Sufis converted 
the Malay regions to Islam from Gujarat, India. They communicated a form of 
Islam that accommodated local beliefs and practices (Andaya and Andaya: 1982, 
53).  Arabic traders from Gujarat began to move directly into the Eastern spice 
trade during the 9th Century CE (Andaya and Andaya: 1982, 51). However 
traders from China, India and Java, who were subject to the Hindu Kingdoms of 
Java, already controlled the region. Chinese and Indian traders were brokers of 
spices from Javanese traders to the West. M.C. Ricklefs says that the trade 
relationships worked well among the early traders without differentiating their 
religious backgrounds (Ricklefs: 1993 [1981], 8). 
 
A new Malay kingdom was founded in 1402. In the middle of the 15th Century, 
the last Majapahit Hindu Kingdom in East Java collapsed because of an attack 
from the Malays, a new state that had a Muslim king. After the traders cut their 
relationship with the Majapahit Kingdom, many small traders converted to Islam 
with the hope that they could increase their trade links with the prosperous Islamic 
Kingdoms (Sardesai: 1989, 54). At the peak of its power in the 15th Century CE, 
the Malay culture spread to entire regions that had been under Sriwijaya and 
Majapahit. The spread of Malay language from Aceh to Ternate is vivid testimony 
to the success of the Malay Kingdom (Andaya and Andaya: 1982, 54). 
                                                 
165 Historians such as M. C. Ricklefs assume that the name Maluku is related to the Arabic word 
Jazirat al-Muluk , that is ‘the islands of Kings’ (Ricklefs: 1993 [1981], 24). Both Ricklefs and Hall 
used the definition made up by L. C. Damais  (see Watuseke: 1977, 307; Ricklefs: 1993 [1981], 
310). However Frans Watuseke follows the linguistic work of H. Blink who assumes that the word 
Maluku has its origin from a local word. The local “Maluku” is closer to the word “maloko” 
(Galela and Tobelo) that means ‘mountain’. Looking from the direction of Halmahera, Ternate, 
Tidore and other islands are like mountains springing out of the ocean.  The word Maloko was 
found in the book of Negarakertagama written by a Hindu author, Mpu Prapanca, in 1365 CE.  It 
shows the same word that appears in the Portuguese language, Malucco or Maluku. The change of 
‘o’ to become ‘u’ appears often in the linguistic group in the North Moluccas and Halmahera. 
Therefore the word “Maloko” became “Moloko”; Maluku shows the linguistic process, which is 
related to the context where the word is used (Watuseke: 1977, 308).  See also (van Fraassen: 
1990, 1), (Lapian: 1990, 1).  
166 See the further explanation below. 
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Since the spice trade was now controlled by Muslim kingdoms in Java, the kings 
in the Moluccas who were involved with the spice trade converted to Islam. 167  
Javanese, Muslim traders from Gresik and Tuban converted the kings in the 
Moluccas to Islam even earlier than the Javanese kingdom in the hinterland 
(Ricklefs: 1993 [1981]). By converting to Islam they ensured that they could sell 
cloves to the Sultan of Malay (cf. Meilink-Roelofsz: 1962, 154). They changed 
their traditional titles from kolano to Sultan as evidence of their conversion to 
Islam. The use of this title gave a sign to the world that they were part of the 
Ummah, the brotherhood of Muslims throughout the world, which included the 
Ottoman Sultan and the Mughul Sultan (India) (Andaya and Andaya: 1982, 53). 
The Malay preachers of Islam used the idea of kinship to attract the kings to 
convert to Islam (Andaya and Andaya: 1982). Conversion to Islam brought many 
trade benefits. In the 16th Century traders and kings sought trade links with 
people from the same religion. 
 
When someone converts to Islam, it is sometimes referred to as “entering Malay” 
(masuk Melayu) (Andaya and Andaya: 1982, 55). The Malay Sultanate had 
economic and military power. Those who wanted to benefit from a relationship 
with it had to accept Malay religion and culture, even though they could continue 
with their traditional rituals and practices. In 1486, Djainal Abidin, the Sultan of 
Ternate began to use the title of Sultan in order to demonstrate the reality of his 
conversion (Haire: 1981, 91). 
 
According to Naidah in 1322 the islands near Halmahera were divided into four 
kingdoms. These kingdoms were Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo (Naidah 
quoted from Balwin: 1993, 46; Andili: 1980). Baab Mansur Malamo founded his 
kingdom in 1257. At that time, the title of kolano was adopted from the Javanese 
language as a term of address to a nobleman. Raja (which now means King) was a 
title from India that was used to address a noblewoman (Jacobs: 1971, 103).  It is 
interesting to see how the change of title from Kolano to Sultan fits into the bigger 
political context. Why did Djainal Abidin begin to use the title Sultan in 1486? 
According to Ricklefs, Muslim traders were already operating in the territory of 
“Indonesia” hundreds of years before the arrival of Western traders. If so, why did 
it take so long before conversions in the local kingdoms began happening in the 
15th Century, especially since the rise of Islam in the Malay Kingdom began in 
1402 (Ricklefs: 1993 [1981], 8). The answer to this question is directly related to 
control of the world trade routes after the victory of the Ottoman Empire over the 
East Roman Empire (Byzantine) in 1453.168 
 
In 1511, Portugal conquered the strategic port town of Malacca on the Malay 
Peninsula. This brought her directly to the Moluccas in 1512 (Andaya: 1993a, 
116). Portugal could subjugate Malacca because in 1510 Afonso de Albuquerque 
had captured Goa (Scammel: 1981, 238). This transformed the trade networks. 
                                                 
167 M. Jacobs notes that before the European arrived in the Moluccas, in the Maluku Sea the 
Persian and Arabic traders already sailed (Jacobs: 1971, 83). 
168 cf. Ricklefs: 1993  [1981], 22. 
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The kingdoms in the region welcomed the arrival of Portugal in the North 
Moluccas because they offered higher prices for buying spices than the Javanese 
traders (Meilink-Roelofsz: 1962, 155). According to one source, at the time, 
Javanese traders had decreased their purchase of spices, so the arrival of Portugal 
was especially welcomed by the kingdoms in the North Moluccas. Tujimah 
reports that when Portugal began to open their network in the Moluccas, the 
Sultan of Ternate didn’t want to engage in business with him because they were of 
a different religion (Tujimah: 1971,4). Therefore it is interesting to question why 
the North Moluccans then accepted Portugal. Evidently economic interests were 
stronger than religious ties. Another historian reports that the kingdoms in the 
North Moluccas frequently violated the trade agreements, which stipulated that 
they should only trade with Muslims (Meilink-Roelofsz: 1962,154). 
 
Competition between the rival Sultans in the Moluccas also influenced the 
forming and reforming of new trade coalitions. Portugal built a trade network with 
the Sultan of Ternate who controlled the spice trade at the time. Ternate’s 
partnership with the Portuguese delegation led by Francisco Serrão, shows that 
they dominated the competition between the local kingdoms of the area (Lapian: 
1990, 2). However Magellan’s expedition from Spain soon arrived in the North 
Moluccas and built a rival trade coalition with the Sultan of Tidore (Andaya: 
1993a, 116). The Sultan of Jailolo also built a trade partnership with Spain. 
However the Sultan of Bacan used Portugal as a means to attack Ternate. 
 
The Sultan of Bacan proved his commitment to Portugal by converting to 
Catholicism. Bacan became one of the centres for the Portuguese Catholic Church 
in the 16th century. However the Sultan of Ternate, Hairun, killed the Sultan of 
Bacan and all of his offspring (Lapian: 1990, 8). Small Islamic kingdoms in 
Eastern Halmahera, like Morotia and Morotai used the shifting presence of 
Portugal to join the attack on the powerful Sultanate of Ternate. Some of the 
smaller kingdoms converted from Islam to Christianity as a sign of their rebellion 
against the great power of Ternate. In those days, many of the other islands in the 
area felt oppressed by Ternate. 
 
The trade coalition between Jailolo and Spain threatened the interests of Ternate 
and Portugal. Jailolo’s antipathy towards Portugal took the form of violent 
oppression of local people who became Catholics. This sparked the anger of 
Portugal who then attacked Jailolo. In 1551, Jailolo collapsed (Andaya: 1993a, 
130). The Ternate Sultanate sided with Portugal and the ensuing war annihilated 
the Kingdom of Jailolo. Ternate ordered the burning of the palace and forced the 
Jailolo Sultan to give up his title. However Ternate permitted the former Sultan to 
use the title Sangaji, which carries a lower status than Sultan. The title of Sangaji 
shows that Jailolo was directly under the Sultan of Ternate and was also a servant 
of the King of Portugal (Andaya: 1993a, 130). Some of the Jailolo Sangaji’s 
offspring later immigrated to the island of Ceram while others spread out over the 
land of Halmahera. 
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According to Lapian, after the annihilation of the Jailolo Sultanate in 1551, the 
remaining powers moved to create a lasting federation called Maluku-Kie-Raha 
(Lapian: 1990, 9). Maluku-Kie-Raha means ‘four mountains’, all of which can be 
seen from the island of Halmahera. The four mountains, listed by their locations 
from South to North are: Makian, Moti, Tidore and Ternate (Lapian: 1990, 9).  
According to local traditions, clove trees grew first on Makian island. The 
legendary king, Jafar Sadek, had four sons who ruled the four volcanic islands. 
Jafar Sadeik’s first son ruled the island of Makian (Lapian: 1990, 2, 7). The three 
younger brothers ruled over the islands of Moti, Tidore and Ternate. The youngest 
son of Jafar Sadek ruled Ternate. This myth suggests that in the beginning 
Maluku-Kie-Raha included a hierarchy of kings that were geographically listed 
from South to North, i.e., Makian, Moti, Tidore and Ternate (van Fraassen: 1987, 
26). There was no mention of the recently destroyed kingdoms of Bacan and 
Jailolo. However, volcanic eruptions in the islands forced the Makian ruler to 
move to Bacan while his brother in Moti moved to Jailolo. After their 
resettlement, the descendants of the royal families from Makian and Moti united 
with the remnants of Bacan and Jailolo and continued their struggle to retrieve the 
royal prerogatives that they had lost to Ternate.  
 
Lapian doesn’t explain how or why Maluku-Kie-Raha, was created. What was the 
function of this ideology of a united kingdom, especially in light of its creation 
after the fall of the Kingdom of Jailolo? Who created the idiom: Jailolo or 
Ternate? Lapian states: 
 
 The story of Jafar Sadek prevalent in North Moluccan 
tales of its early history should also be seen in the context 
of this tradition about a stranded ship from abroad, fraught 
with cargo, the beginning of a flourishing trade which was 
based on its clove production. Although the principle of 
Maluku-Kie-Raha was upheld, in actual fact only Ternate 
and Tidore prospered during this new era of commercial 
resurgence (Lapian: 1990, 10). 
 
However, the tale of the creation of Maluku-Kie-Raha has greater significance 
than is suggested by Lapian. The mythology of a united kingdom strengthened the 
identity and pride of the people in Halmahera, from ancient times until the 
present. In those days, the island of Halmahera was called Jailolo (Gilolo). But it 
remains to be seen how these ancient tales and names are linked with the political 
struggle to recover the  existence of the Jailolo kingdom. Ternate was the centre of 
commercial clove trade during the era of Portugal and the Netherlands. It makes 
sense to assume that the tale of Maluku-Kie-Raha was created by Ternate to 
reassure the remaining kingdoms after the demise of Bacan and Jailolo, and to 
bolster unity among the kingdoms in order to regain control of the trade routes 
after Portugal withdrew from the region. 
 
The geopolitical position of Ternate didn’t change after Portugal left the 
Moluccas. However the concept of Maluku-Kie-Raha was an ideological tool to 
bolster the legitimacy of Ternate and justify the extension of its power. A new 
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relationship was built between Ternate and the Dutch traders. Ternate was clearly 
the leader of the remaining four Sultans in the Moluccas. The hierarchy of power 
was now the reverse of the ancient mythology. Now the hierarchy was from North 
to South: Ternate, Tidore, Bacan/Makian and Jailolo/Moti (van Fraassen: 1987, 
25). 
 
In spite of the political realities, the tradition that the first-born child of the 
original king (Jafar Sadek) should have pre-eminence in the kingdoms of the 
North Moluccas is still influential. In the 19th Century a man named Nuku 
claimed to be the legitimate heir of the Jailolo Sultan who remained in Tidore. He 
led a struggle against Ternate. The name Nuku means “The Carrier of Blessing” 
(Pembawa Berkat). He led a movement that was supported by the British colonial 
government and appointed Sultan of Tidore. Under the rule of Nuku, an offspring 
of Makian was chosen to become the Sultan of Jailolo (Lapian: 1990, 9). Later in 
the 19th century, a man named Dabu Abu Hasan, who lived on the island of 
Ceram, claimed to be the legitimate heir of the Sultan of Jailolo. He succeeded in 
uniting the people of Halmahera to attack the Sultan of Ternate, however his 
movement ultimately failed because the Dutch missionary, van Dijken and the 
colonial government refused to support him (van Baarda: 1995 [1905]; Magany: 
1984, 99). 
 
In Chapter V we will see how the idiom of Maluku-Kie-Raha reappeared in 1999. 
After the violence of 1999-2000, the politics of Maluku-Kie-Raha were used to 
resurrect the ancient Jailolo Sultanate. 
 
4.2.2.  Religions as New Loyalties   
 
In this sub section, I will discuss how rulers used ritual as a political means to 
build new loyalties. Medieval cultural politics shaped the trade motives of 
Portugal and Spain. 169 At the end of the 15th Century, Spain was just recovering 
from a civil war. However Portugal was already a sea power embarking on 
worldwide exploration. The 15th Century was known as the Year of Invention in 
Portugal (Andaya and Andaya: 1982, 55). The main motivation for Portuguese 
expansion was trade. The Portuguese were searching for a sea route to the Asian 
spice trade, since spices were at that time worth many times their weight in gold 
(Andaya and Andaya: 1982, 55). The Portuguese journey to the East proved that 
Asia was indeed closer to the European continent than had been thought 
(Scammel: 1981). Catholic monasteries in Lisbon carried out the scholarly 
research and preparations to find a sea route to Asia. Therefore it is not surprising 
that Catholic pastors accompanied the ships on their voyage to the East. 
 
During the colonial era, trade and religion were interwoven. The Muslim Sultans 
of Ternate and Tidore were suspicious of the Catholic Portuguese traders. The 
palaces tolerated the trade activities of the Portugal but they feared the religious 
influence of the traders and priests, especially as they spread their religion among 
                                                 
169 Portugal and Spain were united as a single country in 1589 (Andaya: 1993a, 137). 
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the local people who were subjects of the Sultans. Their fears increased when 
several members of the royal families in Ternate, Jailolo and Bacan converted to 
become Catholics.  
 
Sultan Hairun of Ternate was concerned that the religious conversions might 
threaten the loyalty and obedience of his subjects. Andaya writes that Sultan 
Hairun complained to Galvão, the Portuguese Governor about those who 
converted to become Catholics. He claimed that they no longer obeyed him or 
accepted his instructions (Andaya: 1993a, 125). However, Sultan Hairun could 
not do anything since the Portuguese also had a religious mission.  
 
The Portuguese planned to install Tabarija, the stepbrother of Hairun, as the new 
Sultan of Ternate, to replace Hairun. Tabarija was a Catholic. However the plan 
failed because Hairun poisoned his stepbrother and he died in Malacca on June 
30, 1545 (Andaya: 1993a, 125). Portugal did not have any good reason to reject 
Hairun as the Sultan of Ternate. Portugal respected Hairun because of his attitude, 
which was open-minded even though he was a pious Muslim. Hairun even sent 
his son Baabullah to study at the Jesuit College in Goa, India.  
 
Nevertheless Portugal soon began to show a lack of respect for the local rulers. 
The Portuguese Governor in Ternate, Duarte de Sã treated Hairun rudely 
(Andaya: 1993a, 131). De Sã had just begun his new task in Ternate. He took over 
the harvest of cloves in Makian Island that was supposedly the right of the Sultan 
of Ternate. He also refused to guarantee the security of the Ternate people who 
harvested the cloves. Ternate could not accept de Sã’s attitude and asked for help 
from the Sultan of Tidore to attack Portugal. Facing these new challenges, de Sã 
tried to embrace Sangaji Gujarati who was the leader of Jailolo. De Sã promised 
to give back the title of Sultan to Jailolo and free him from the duty to obey the 
commands of Portugal. The Sangaji accepted this offer and for a short period of 
time he again used his old title of Sultan (Andaya: 1993a, 131).  
 
On February 28, 1570, Captain Diego Lopes de Mezquita gave a command to kill 
Sultan Hairun at a dinner party. He was executed by treachery in the Portuguese 
fortress (Andaya: 1993a, 132). The murder of Hairun brought disaster to Portugal. 
Under the leadership of Sultan Baabullah, Hairun’s son, Ternate became 
committed to driving Portugal out of the North Moluccas. The war between 
Ternate and Portugal went on for 14 years at great cost to both sides. But in the 
end, Portugal was forced to leave the Moluccas in 1605. 
 
The war against Portugal extended into the Central Moluccas. The Dutch traders 
(Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie=VOC) had already arrived in the region of 
Hitu, an island under the control of the Sultan of Ternate, which was a gathering 
place for spice traders from Java and Makasar (South Sulawesi). The harbour of 
Hitu was the central market for clove collectors from Buru and Ceram Islands and 
for traders in nutmeg and mace from the Islands of Banda. The Portuguese had 
initiated the planting of cloves in Buru. According to Nunailaita, VOC traders 
banded together with Muslim traders to attack the Portuguese at Hitu in 1599 
(Nunalaita: 1966, 24). 
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The Portuguese was active in the Moluccas for about a hundred years. Their 
presence created new social structures and inspired cultural practices that are still 
apparent in the modern era. Many regions of the Moluccas, such as Mamuya (in 
Northern Halmahera) and the island of Morotai still show Portuguese influences. 
In the Central Moluccas, the city of Ambon became the centre of Catholicism. 
During the war against Portugal religion played a part. The Muslims united with 
the Calvinist Dutch to drive out the Catholics. Historical accounts record that the 
war killed many Catholics.  
 
Efforts to end the war included several treaties that were signed before the 
Portuguese left the region. For example, a treaty was signed to protect the 
indigenous Catholics, who remained in Ambon. It is possible that during this 
period of civil war, the Ambonese developed the ritual of pela in which Muslim 
and Christian villages vow to defend each other. However research on this subject 
is not yet conclusive. Leirissa shows that the people reinvented pela in the 
interests of social unity.  According to Leirissa, the term pela comes from the 
region of Leitimor (Ambon), and formalizes relationships that already were strong 
among the Captains in the Moluccas, long before the colonial period (Leirissa: 
1983, 7). Dieter Bartels examines the genealogy of pela relationships using an 
ethno-historical approach. He concludes that the people in the Central Moluccas 
built pela relationships to defend their unity against outside attack (Bartels: 1977).  
 
Pela is a family bond that is established through vows that are declared between 
villages. The word pela means, “finish” or “solve”. According to Leirissa, the 
early meaning of pela relates directly to the process of settling a dispute between 
two Captains who were hostile towards each other. Pela is divided into several 
types (see Bartels: 1977, Leirissa: 1983).  For example blood pela mixes the 
physical blood of the participants and creates a very close family bond similar to 
adoption.  Betelnut (sirih pinang) pela, creates a more distant family bond.  The 
two parties eat betel nut (sirih), acreca nut (pinang) and lime (kapur) together.  
They eat from the same plate to show their new family relationship.  
 
One of the basic principles of pela is to proscribe marriage between people of 
villages who are tied with the pela bond. This is an incest taboo, since villages 
with a pela relationship are considered members of the same blood family. The 
prohibition of marriage is applied regardless of the religions of the participants.  
Pela extends family relationships beyond conventional kinship ties and builds 
social solidarity through rituals of exchange that reguire each party to contribute 
services or materials and physical support to their pela partners. The ritual of pela 
is only practiced in the Central Moluccas. 
 
Before finally leaving the Moluccas, the Portuguese took temporary refugees in 
the kingdom of Tidore. Tidore invited Portugal for political reasons, because of 
the tensions between Ternate and Portugal. Tidore and Ternate were still rivals for 
power. Ternate saw Tidore’s alliance with Portugal as a new obstacle  against 
reaching its ambition to achieve a monopoly over maritime trading in the area. 
Portugal made use of the competition between Tidore and Ternate.  
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The arrival of the VOC in the Moluccas coincided with the tension between 
Ternate and Portugal. Terna te benefited from the religious differences between 
the Protestant Dutch and the Catholic Portuguese. The Sultan of Ternate and the 
VOC wanted to evict Portugal from the area in order to set up a new trading 
network of spices from the Moluccas to the European market. According to Peter 
Boschberg the eviction of Portugal from territorial trade in the Netherlands Indies 
was regulated formally in a legal paper of the VOC. The Netherlands considered 
Portugal an enemy of the state (Boscherg: 2002). J.J. van Klaveren states that 
during the Portuguese empire, Dutch traders bought spices directly from the 
Portuguese King in Lisbon (van Klaveren: 1953, 37). However the two centres for 
Portuguese trading in Asia were in Goa (India) and Malacca (Malaya) (Boscherg: 
2002). The Dutch created the VOC in 1602 after the British set up the CCE 
(Chartered Company for the East) in 1600 (van Klaveren: 1953, 37). Therefore 
Ternate had no trouble establishing a partnership with the VOC traders to attack 
the remaining Portuguese survivors who were harboured in Tidore. Ternate could 
see that the Dutch had better shipping technology and armaments than the 
Portuguese. Making allies with the Netherlands was easier than squandering all of 
the Sultan’s wealth in a costly war with Portugal.  
 
In the 17th Century, the war in the Moluccan Sea was just between the Dutch 
traders and the Portuguese traders. Ternate gave an ultimatum to the VOC that 
they must avoid a direct war with the Sultan of Tidore because Ternate still 
wanted to build an alliance with Tidore. The target of attack was only the 
Portuguese, not the Tidorenese civilians. This ultimatum not only prevented open 
war between Ternate and Tidore, but also benefited the VOC. At the end of the 
fighting, the VOC claimed to be the protector of the Sultan of Tidore. Therefore, 
after the collapse of Portugal, both Ternate and Tidore became allies of the VOC 
traders. This became a pattern for VOC activities. Before the VOC engaged in a 
conflict to help one kingdom against another, it would first lay out an agreement 
or treaty that gave benefits to the Netherlands.170   
 
 
4.2.3.  De-mythologizing Local Power 
 
In the beginning of the 17th Century, the flag of the VOC waved over the land of 
the Moluccas. VOC traders built their trading relations with the Sultan of Ternate 
in two ways. First, the VOC avoided the mistakes of the Portuguese by 
downplaying the difference of religion. Since the VOC was mainly interested in 
trade, they discouraged Christian evangelism and emphasized the separation of 
church and state. Nevertheless they maintained a close relationship with the 
Christian Ambonese. Secondly, the VOC moved the centre of economic power 
from the North to the Central Moluccas (Ambon). Since they could not control the 
Sultan of Ternate and his brothers, they avoided confrontation by establishing a 
                                                 
170 See Nanulaitta: 1966, 102.  Nanulaitta gives an example of the treaty between the VOC and 
king of Banten. 
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new centre. Simplifying the old structures of the local government continued this 
process. 
 
The policy of VOC to separate religion from politics in the Moluccas, was related 
to similar policies being tried in the Netherlands. In contrast, Ternate strengthened 
her position by using a combination of religion, charisma and economic incentives 
to gain help from Javanese and Makasar traders. Ternate appealed to Islamic 
brotherhood to strengthen solidarity and disguise her ambition to control the spice 
trade after the departure of Portugal.  
 
Separation of religion and politics was consistent with the changing social context 
of the Netherlands at the end of the 16th Century. The spirit of Calvinism had 
already transformed the Netherlands from a fishery region into a Republic and a 
powerful centre of trade. The Dutch took over the trade roles of the Baltic traders 
like the Portuguese and Spanish (see Andaya: 1993a, 40). Several cities in 
Holland, like Amsterdam, became the meeting points for many people with 
different ethnic and religious beliefs. Relative to the rest of Europe, the 
Netherlands was one of the most tolerant countries towards religious diversity. 
 
The VOC introduced the politics of hongi following the power shift from the 
North to the Centre of the Moluccan Isles.  On July 31, 1652, Sultan Mandar from 
Ternate signed a treaty with the VOC to destroy their clove trees (Andaya: 1993a, 
167). In the treaty, the VOC agreed to pay compensation to the Sultan of about Fl. 
12,000. plus Fl. 500 to his “Prime Minister,” Kaicili Kalamata and Fl. 1,500 to be 
divided by the bobata-bobata (lower leaders of the Sultan) (Andaya: 1993a, 167, 
201). The politics of hongi was the policy to cut down all of the clove trees, 
including the roots of the trees, in exchange for payment from the VOC. The VOC 
claimed that this was necessary in order to maintain the stability of clove prices in 
the world market. However this justification concealed the larger purpose of 
destroying Ternate’s control of cloves. While the Dutch destroyed cloves in the 
North, they planted clove trees in the Central Moluccas, around the Lease Isles. 
Within 10 years, clove trees already had spread all over the Central Moluccas.  
 
The VOC also controlled the right of the Sultan of Ternate to collect taxes. The 
Sultan had the right of taxation over several areas in the Central Moluccas, such 
as the islands of Buru and Ceram, which Ternate claimed as part of her territory. 
The 9th Sultan of Ternate, who was named Sultan Amsterdam, began to collect 
taxes (or tribute) in the form of crops, in 1675 (de Jongh: 1909, 756). However the 
VOC collected taxes from anyone who sold their spices and other crops to the 
company. Therefore the VOC monopolized the entire region of the Moluccas. The 
employees of the VOC reached directly into the villages, which produced cloves 
to buy their crops at standardized prices. 
 
During this period, the power of the VOC was already rooted in Java. They built 
Batavia (Jakarta) as a haven that was free from the claims of the Javanese 
Kingdoms (Ricklefs: 1993 [1981]). Batavia became the centre for trade from 
Eastern regions like Banda, Ternate, Ambon and Makasar. VOC ships carried 
their cargos of spices from Batavia to Amsterdam, passing Japan. The VOC also 
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controlled rice trading in Java. In Japan, the VOC started a business in trading sea 
cucumbers and other cargos from Indonesia (van Gulik: 2000). The traders 
employed troops of Japanese samurai warriors as security troops on the VOC 
ships (Mangunwijaya: 1987). VOC ships carried raw materials from the East 
Indies to the Netherlands, returning to the East Indies with trade ready products 
from the new industries in Amsterdam and Zeeland. They bought cloves at low 
prices but sold rice, textiles and other things at expensive prices to the local 
people in the East Indies. The VOC brought products from India and various other 
regions at which they stopped on their way to the legendary Spice Islands.  
 
A monopoly over the trade in raw materials from the East Indies brought great 
wealth to the Netherlands and stimulated the appearance of new social classes in 
the East Indies. Gold, pearls, tripang and feathers from ‘Birds of Paradise’ became 
all the rage in the new life styles of the rich Europeans (Andaya: 1993a, 176). 
They owned houses and slaves (Andaya: 1993a, 42). Slaves worked the clove 
plantations in Central Moluccas and the nutmeg plantations in Banda. Life styles 
of luxury and extravagance caused the VOC to go bankrupt in 1621 (van 
Klaveren: 1953, 75). The VOC passed on its debts to the Dutch government. 
These debts were only settled after the British returned control over the 
Netherlands East Indies to the Dutch in 1816 (van Klaveren: 1953, 87).  
 
In the North Moluccan Sultanates, luxurious life styles were a sign of power in the 
palaces as well. Besides the collection of taxes, the Sultan of Ternate directly 
controlled the pearl trade as well as the trade in sea cucumbers (Mangunwijaya: 
1987). According to historical accounts the Eastern part of Halmahera didn’t 
produce cloves but its seas were rich in pearls and sea cucumbers. The Sultan of 
Ternate controlled rich areas such as the Bay of Kao and the seas around Morotai. 
The Sultan also controlled the production of iron in Galela and Ternate (Andaya : 
1993b). Ternate controlled the natural resources in the region in order to pay for 
the costly, luxurious life styles in the palace. The Dutch used money that came 
from the exploitation of natural resources to construct a VOC fortress in Ternate. 
The Dutch negotiated permission to build the fortress in exchange for helping to 
drive the Portuguese out of the region.  
 
Historical reports show that the policies of hongi and the VOC trade monopoly 
created great suffering among the local people throughout the Moluccas. These 
policies only benefited the Sultans of Ternate and Tidore. Soldiers of the VOC 
killed the indigenous traders and inhabitants of Banda by burning down the entire 
island. The people in Halmahera, in the regions of Kao, Tobelo and Galela also 
suffered. When war exploded between Ternate and Portugal, the Sultan forced the 
people of Eastern Halmahera to contribute men, boats and pearls to the war effort 
(Mangunwijaya: 1987, Visser: 1989). The tribes of Tobelo that lived along the 
Bay of Kao were experts in shipbuilding but villages that resisted the Sultan’s 
request for help were wiped out (Andaya: 1993a, 121; see also Mangunwijaya: 
1987). 
 
The Sultan of Ternate appropriated the pearl resources of Eastern Halmahera and 
treated the people like slaves. Caught between the monopoly and hongi policies of 
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the VOC and the despotic pressures of the Sultanate, the tribes of Eastern 
Halmahera rebelled in the only way they could.  Outwardly they remained loyal to 
the Sultan, but secretly they took to the seas as pirates.  Since they were skilled 
boat makers, they designed their boats for speed and manoeuvrability so that they 
could easily escape from the pursuit of the Sultan’s navy. As a result, the Sultan 
of Ternate’s troops could not guaranteed the security of the maritime market from 
the 17th up to the early 20th centuries. 
 
4.3.  Coercive Systems of Political Loyalty 
 
The VOC already began to move the centre of power from the North to the 
Central Moluccas at the same time when the policies of hongi were being 
enforced in the 17th century.  However beginning in the 19th Century, the colonial 
government systematically and rationally continued the policy of undermining the 
power of the Sultanate in Ternate and transferring loyalty to the Dutch Colonial 
government. By the end of 19th Century, the power of the Moluccas as the source 
of spice production for the world market decreased drastically. Two factors 
determined this decline. First was the invention of the refrigerator in Europe that 
caused a sharp decline in the demand and value of spices.  Spices had been the 
primary means for preserving food prior to refrigeration. Second, the British 
successfully planted clove plantations outside of the original regions of the 
Moluccas. Stamford Raffles firstly established clove plantations in Malaysia and 
Zanzibar in Africa. This new approach caused the decline of clove prices in the 
world market (van Klaveren: 1953, 103). 
 
4.3.1.  Simplification of Old Structures 
 
Regime change transformed trade relations that were renegotiated in light of the 
power created by sophisticated maritime equipment. The agreement between 
traders at the grass roots level followed the big negotiations at elite levels that 
were conducted between the local kingdoms and the VOC (Nanulaitta: 1966). The 
colonial government continued the partnerships with the local elite structure and 
simplified the local kingdoms’ institutions. The Sultan’s palaces were separated 
from the central government. This simplification was linked to the control of 
regional income by the colonial government. As a result, local kings and their 
kingdoms didn’t have income resources to pay their officers. 
 
In the North Moluccas, the colonial government permitted the Sultan of Ternate to 
function as the tax collector for the society. But money gathered from taxation had 
to be delivered to the colonial government. During the era of the VOC, the Sultan 
of Ternate claimed particular regions as his resources for taxation. The Sultan of 
Ternate was part of the colonial apparatus that received salaries from the colonial 
government. He was also permitted to keep his title even though the colonial 
government established a policy to eliminate noble titles. The royal titles that 
were eliminated included Kapitan (Captains), Mahimo and Ngofamangira.  De 
Clereq states that these titles were still used in the palace of the Sultan of Ternate 
until 1890 (de Clereq: 1890, 20). Beside the title of Sultan, the Dutch permitted 
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two other titles: Jouhukum or the traditional legal experts and Kimalaha or the  
Village Head (de Jongh: 1909, 756). 
 
Colonial law nullified noble titles under the assumption that the old traditional 
power structures of adat prevented the local society from adjusting to modern life 
(Haar: 1948,11-12). The nullification of noble titles also eliminated the exchange 
systems that were practiced among the elite in the palace. The Sultan traditionally 
gave noble titles to the members of his family or associates who rendered 
outstanding service to the palace (Andaya: 1993a, 66). For example, the Sultan 
would give the title Kapitan to someone who showed leadership that resulted in 
military success.  
 
Colonial policies didn’t only destroyed the meritocracy in the Sultan’s palace but 
also the practices of exchange between the Sultan and his people. Andaya records 
that exchange rituals were common in marriages between family members of the 
Sultans of Ternate and Tidore (Andaya: 1993a, 67). After Ternate surpassed 
Tidore, there was an obligation for Tidore to give wives to the Sultan of Ternate. 
Tidore became the ‘wife giver’ or wife’s family (WF) while Ternate functioned as 
‘wife taker’ or husband’s family (HF)171. The WF may be thought to have a high 
position because HF has to present financial gifts to WF. However in the marriage 
rituals of the North Moluccas, the gifts given by the HF have to be paid back by 
the WF.172 Ternate’s manipulation of the exchange process in marriage rituals 
with the Sultan of Tidore mirrored marriage practices at the grass root level. The 
WF is located in a subordinate position that benefits the HF. For that reason the 
WF may negotiate for the HF to give fewer gifts so that they have fewer 
obligations.  
 
Exchange relationships between the Sultan and his people, including his exchange 
relations with other royal families, were woven together through the exchange of 
products. The people had to give the first harvest to the Sultan. Tributes included 
cooked food and raw harvest. The people ate the cooked offerings together in the 
palace rituals. They presented their raw products based on the assumption that the 
Sultan had a right to the first harvest (Visser: 1989; Andaya: 1993a, 57). 
However, the ritual language used reveals the reality that in exchange for their 
offering to the Sultan, the Sultan was obligated to give gifts in return. Gifts from 
the Sultan included clothes, ceramics, iron and guns. 
 
The process of ritual exchange guaranteed the Sultan’s larger circle of trading 
relations. The Sultan reduced his accumulation of imported goods that he received 
from clove traders from outside the Moluccas. However when the colonial 
government controlled a monopoly of trade and was responsible for regional 
security, traditional exchange practices between the Sultan of Ternate and his 
people became redundant. In light of this, the colonial government’s policy of 
eliminating royal titles makes sense. The Dutch took over the roles played by 
traditional titleholders.   
                                                 
171 I discuss the terminologies for the husband’s family (HF) and the wife’s family (WF) in 
Chapter III. 
172 cf. Jacobs: 1971: 115-116. 
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Why then did the title of Jouhukum persist right into the early 20th century (de 
Jongh: 1909, 756)? The office of Jouhukum did not exist in the old traditional 
practices of Eastern Halmahera where the people still practiced the local religion. 
The title is an honourable term of address to an expert on adat (tradition) and 
Islamic law. This position was created for the interests of the palace. The position 
of Jouhukum was the only space of substantive authority that was left to the 
Sultan of Ternate by the colonial government. The Sultan of Ternate claimed that 
the regions of Eastern Halmahera and elsewhere were under his authority. 
Therefore, adat law and Islamic law had to be enforced by the single legitimate 
authority, i.e. the Sultan of Ternate. 
 
The colonial government granted legal authority to the Sultan in conformity with 
their apparent commitment to separation of religion from the state. The Sultan 
played the role of a religious and traditional leader whose task was to control 
society through religious and adat law courts. Not only did this provide legal 
status for the Sultan, it also was a lucrative source of income. People who brought 
their problems to the court had to pay a fine or fee. The more juridical cases that 
were brought before the Sultan’s courts, the more income.  
 
The colonial government also continued the traditional position of Sangaji. The 
Sangaji was a district officer who was responsible for overseeing an area that was 
a vassal of the Sultan. Two interests combined to preserve the Sangaji position. 
Both the colonial government and the Sultanate needed someone to collect their 
taxes. The Sangaji also gathered judicial cases that had to be solved by the palace 
court in Ternate. Judicial cases were often about disputes between people from 
different religions. The colonial government appointed a European Secretary to 
accompany each Sangaji. The colonial government hoped that the appointment of 
a European secretary would provide a balanced report about the situation in the 
districts. The two district officers received salaries directly from the colonial 
government. However the salaries were not equal. The colonial government paid 
less to the Sangaji than to the Secretary (de Jongh: 1909, 757). 
 
While the religious court in Ternate continued to enforce Islamic adat law, the 
colonial government made changes in leadership policy. In the old policy, the 
Sultanate appointed only Sangaji who practiced Islam as leaders of the society, 
regardless of the religion of the local people.  In the new policy, the colonial 
government usually appointed Heads of Districts and Village Heads according to 
the religion of the society. The government only appointed Muslims to lead 
Muslim Districts. For example, Muslim regions included the area around the river 
of Kao/Jodoh, Akelamo, Sonoto, Gamsungi, Buran and Bobane Igo. Sangaji from 
Alfoeren backgrounds led the regions of Boeng, Tugutil, Madole, Pagoe and 
Tololiko (de Jongh: 1909, 757). The original term, alfuru came from the Ternate 
word for ‘farmer’ (Jacobs: 1971, 103). However the colonial government used the 
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term to refer to the people who still practiced ancestral rituals related to the 
agricultural life cycle.173 
  
In Halmahera, Muslims settled in the coastal regions that were accessible from 
Ternate. Muslims from Ternate often married with the local people. In Tobelo, in 
1909 there were only 174 Muslims, while the alfuru included 1.296 people (de 
Jongh: 1909, 758). Therefore the government appointed an alfuru Sangaji. 
However, the District Head in Galela was a Muslim from the village of Igobula 
who had family relations with the Sultan of Tidore. During this period there were 
already Christians in Galela as a result of evangelisation by the Dutch missionary, 
van Dijken. In 1889 Galela included 115 Christians (van Baarda: 1995 [1903], 
58). However the Colonial government (Regency) still chose a Muslim Sangaji to 
lead the district of Galela.  
 
4.3.2.  Territorial Borders  
 
In 1896 the colonial government began to establish territorial borders within the 
North Moluccas. There were two purposes for this decision. The first was to 
improve control and aid in the collection of taxes. Second, the government wanted 
to end local tensions over borders. The territorial borders between Ternate and 
Tidore were explicated. The island of Halmahera was divided into two Regencies 
controlled by Ternate and Tidore. This division coincided with the claims of each 
kingdom about their subject regions in Halmahera (de Jongh: 1909, 756).   
 
The region of Ternate included half of the Jailolo Sultanate’s territory in North 
and South Eastern Halmahera. The regency of Tidore included the area from the 
centre of Halmahera Northwards to the borders of the Kao Bay and Southwards to 
the region of Bacan, which was in the Bacan Sultanate’s territory. The Jailolo 
territory also included Dodinga within the regency of Tidore. The regions of 
Maba in Wasilea and Patani in Weda, which lie in the middle of the Eastern coast, 
were grouped with Tobelo as centres of administration and taxation. Tobelo 
joined the regency of Ternate. The island of Morotai had two Sangaji, one from 
Tobelo and the other from Galela.  According to historical data, before this policy, 
there was only one Sangaji on Morotai from the Tobelo tribe. However this policy 
caused conflict because both Galelans and Tobelans inhabited Morotai. The 
Galelans didn’t want to be led by a Sangaji from Tobelo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
173 The etymology is similar to the Latin term ‘pagan’. The Latin word pagan comes from the 
word pagus that means villagers or farmers (Williams: 2000 [1990], 39). The Church identified the 
ancestor religion of the farmers as pagan.  
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Map 8: Territorial Borders of Halmahera Island under the Netherlands Indies 
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The colonial government established territorial borders between the districts of 
Tobelo and Galela in order to stop the continual fighting between the two. The 
borders were set after hearing the claims of both Tobelo and Galela.  The 
government located the territorial border between Tobelo and Galela in the region 
called tona ma langi (see Chapter III).  When Ternate drove Portugal out of the  
North Moluccas at the end of the 16th Century, the Tobelans helped the Sultan of 
Ternate destroy the small Kingdom of Morotia in North Halmahera, which allied 
with Portugal. 174 As a reward for their help and bravery, the Sultan of Ternate 
gave a region in the Western part of Mamuya to the Kapitan of Tobelo who was 
alfuru.  
 
Tona ma langi means, “this border, from the earth to the sky is enough land for 
us.”  It refers to the region in the northern part of Mamuya beside the river Mede. 
This became the new border of the Tobelo tribe. Actually the people speak Galela 
in the border area of tona ma langi, from Mamuya in the North, up to the village 
of Gorua, including little islands such as Tolonua. Traditionally, a territorial claim 
was marked by a sago tree and a torch tree (de Jongh: 1909, 757). 
 
The people of Galela did not agree with the new borders declared by the Sultan of 
Ternate on the instigation of the Colonial government. However, they were afraid 
to oppose the government and could only submit. For generations, even up to the 
present, the Galelans remember how they lost part of their original territory. The 
marriage rituals still commemorate the resentment over the loss of the ancestral 
borders with the rite of ciko ma bobangu. A groom or bride from Tobelo who 
wants to marry a bride or a groom from Galela has to pay a fine as a symbolic 
payment to compensate the Galelans for their ancient loss of lands. 
 
4.3.3.  Taming the Halmaheran Pirates 
 
In the 17th Century, VOC prosperity declined and they passed on huge debts to 
the Dutch colonial government that were finally repaid in the 19th Century.  A 
representative of the Dutch government in the Netherlands East Indies took over 
management of the colony. The value of cloves was already in decline. War in 
Europe, including the expansion of Napoleon Bonaparte’s French troops into 
other countries including Holland, also decreased trade. To handle the crisis, the 
colonial government designed a new policy called cultuurstelsel. 
 
The colonial government chose Java as their centre of operations for their new 
policy in the Netherlands Indies (Ricklefs: 1993 [1981]). In Java, the British 
colonial government had already begun agricultural modernization, for example 
by introducing coffee cultivation in Priangan (van Klaveren: 1953, 158). The 
Dutch colonial government prohibited villages from contracting plantations, but 
recognized individual ownership of plantations and crop trading networks for 
export purposes (van Klaveren: 1953, 103). They also established project in Deli, 
                                                 
174 Now, the people in the region believe in the story of o Moro, which refers to individuals hiding 
and wandering around in the jungles of Halmahera. These are believed to be the people of Morotia 
and the Portuguese who ran away from the attacks of the Ternate Sultan’s troops. 
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Sumatra, cultivating coffee, tobacco, sugar cane and tea (van Klaveren: 1953, 
158; Carpenter: 1923). 
 
Within only a few years, the colonial government was able to pay off the debts 
inherited from the VOC (Carpenter: 1923).175 The colonial government used 
surplus profits to improve the working conditions and social security of the 
indigenous labourers and foreign workers in Java. The colonial government added 
more to the stock of rice to prevent shortages in case of crop failures in Java.  
They also built schools and public facilities. However there were sharp 
differences between the treatment of indigenous workers and the facilities 
provided for European workers. 
 
In the Moluccas, the development of educational and social facilities began from 
the Central Moluccas. There are several reasons. Firstly, in order to break the 
power of the Northern Sultanates, the Netherlands moved their centre of 
operations to the Central Moluccas. Cloves were still a major source of income, 
even though prices were not as high as before the rationalisation of agricultural.  
Clove cultivation flourished in the Central Moluccas, however the common 
people still suffer economically.  The colonial government determined the price of 
cloves and enjoyed the benefits along with the North Moluccan Sultanates 
(Nanulaitta: 1966). 
 
Secondly, the colonial government assumed that the Portuguese had already built 
some foundations for Western civilization through their mission work in the 
region. In the Central Moluccas, many people had become Catholics and found 
little difficulty in shifting their allegiance to the Dutch Reformed Church. With 
the subjection of the entire region, the Netherlands East Indies appointed 
missionaries as governmental officers in the Central Moluccas as agents of a new 
civilization. 
 
Royal families and landowners in the Central Moluccas received first priority for 
receiving an education. They were permitted to speak in Dutch. The government 
established schools in the Malay language for common people. According to 
Carpenter, an American who travelled around the Netherlands Indies in the early 
20th Century, the Colonial government built schools for the indigenous people on 
the island of Java. On the island of Ambon and in the central Moluccas the 
government didn’t build any more schools, however Dutch missionaries set up 
mission schools. In Java, Christian missionaries only taught at private schools. 
The indigenous people managed their own schools. Vocational schools in trade 
and industry were managed by local leaders who were administrative officers in 
the colonial government (Carpenter: 1923, 165).  
 
A formal report from the colonial government acknowledged their lack of 
attention to education for the common people outside Java (van de Wal: 1960, 5). 
The so-called “Ethical Policy” in the Netherlands prompted the Dutch government 
                                                 
175 cf. C. Fasseur who calculates that in 1830-1840, there was a great loss from the cultuurstelsel 
(Fasseur: 1994) 
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to open schools for the indigenous people. However this policy was only started in 
Java in 1851. In the North Moluccas, Dutch missionaries and teachers from 
Ambon and Minahasa served the Dutch community who were living in Ternate. 
According to historical records, the North Moluccan Sultanates sent their family 
members to a Catholic mission in Ternate. However there was no school built 
especially for the common people. 
 
A new era arrived when the colonial government began to send bright indigenous 
people to teacher training schools in Java. Indigenous teachers had to pass a 
difficult exAminahtion. However if they passed the exAminahtion, they received 
the same facilities, like salaries and health insurance that were paid to officers of 
the colonial government. They also received the right to take leaves of absence. 
Carpenter, in his travel report showed his admiration of the students at the people 
schools in Java who were just as smart as the European children. 
 
The situation described above was far from the reality faced by the people in 
Eastern Halmahera. They were still very poor. They had to pay taxes to the Sultan 
of Ternate and to the colonial government. The Sultan of Ternate directly 
controlled the sources of pearls and sea cucumbers in Eastern Halmahera where 
they used to make a profit. The Sultan of Ternate determined the prices of boats 
from people in Kao and Tobelo. He also determined the price of rice. Dutch and 
Chinese traders determined the price of other commodities like clothes, ceramics, 
and iron (cf. Visser: 1989, 21). 
 
In their apparent powerlessness, the people from Eastern Halmahera became 
pirates. In addition to obvious economic motivations the people also responded to 
the feeling of political oppression by rebelling against the system. The Sultan of 
Ternate didn’t permit the colonial government to provide education for the local 
people. The fears of the Sultan of Ternate were not unreasonable because the 
Dutch missionaries took over the entire management of education in the East 
Indies in the beginning of the 19th Century (van de Wal: 1960, 5).  
  
Regional factors also influenced the Halmaherans to become professional  pirates. 
The region supported a thriving slave trade. Lapian’s research shows that the 
Sultan of Ternate and the colonial government were overwhelmed by the 
mobilisation of sea pirates who operated on the Moluccan Sea all the way down to 
Sulawesi and Timor. The government could not arrest the pirates because their 
boats were just too fast. In addition to the people of Tobelo, Kao, Galela and 
Loloda on Halmahera, there were also pirates from Mindanao and the Sula Isles. 
The people of Mindanao were viewed as cousins of the Dayaks (Carpenter: 1923). 
Sea pirates from Loloda were actually Bugis (from Sulawesi) (de Jongh: 1909, 
757). 
 
The pirates captured and robbed trading boats carrying cloves and other goods. 
The pirates also attacked particular regions where the people could be captured 
and sold as slaves (Lapian: 1981). Some pirates took the heads of the enemies 
they killed. However the pirates from Tobelo, Kao and Galela just carved heads 
on their shields as a record of how many enemies they had killed. The abolition of 
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slavery in the Moluccas arrived later than in most other places. When slave trade 
became too dangerous it also helped stop piracy (Lapian: 1981). However in 19th 
Century colonial reports, the problem of sea and land pirates was still acute. 
 
The Sultan’s inability to control piracy may be the reason he finally accepted a 
petition from the Dutch Resident in Ternate and gave permission to allow a Dutch 
missionary to work in Halmahera at the end of the 19th Century. Since the arrival 
of the VOC in the end of the 16th century, till the end of the 19th century, Dutch 
Christian missionaries had not been permitted to work in this area under the 
control of a Muslim Sultanate. The VOC had also forbidden mission activity for 
fear that it might interfere with their economic policies.  However in the late 19th 
Century, the Christian Party, which designed “the Ethical Policy”, came to power 
in the Netherlands and introduced a new foreign policy. 176   
 
Why did the Sultan grant permission for Christian missionaries? Firstly, the 
Sultan must have been aware that he had already lost the allegiance of the people 
of Northeast Halmahera. Lapian says that the Halmahera sea pirates specialized in 
robbing the trading boats that were owned by the Sultan of Ternate (Lapian: 
1981). They didn’t attack boats from other tribes that sailed on the  Moluccan Sea. 
Attacks that were intentionally focused on the Sultan of Ternate seems to indicate 
that the people saw a connection between their poverty and the unjust policies of 
the Sultan of Ternate.  
 
Secondly, perhaps the Sultan harboured the hope tha t he could use the Christian 
missionaries to tame the sea pirates from Halmahera without changing their basic 
religion to Christianity. The people were resistant to Islam and still practiced their 
local religion. Thirdly, the missionaries brought basic education, agriculture and 
plantation training that could open up new fields of work and sources of income 
for the people in Galela, Tobelo and Kao. The Sultan hoped to tame their 
rebelliousness without giving up his monopoly over pearls and other sea 
resources, which had formerly belonged to the people. The people could start a 
new agro-export business, such as coconuts or tobacco, after the price of clove 
decreased.   
 
The first Dutch missionary of UZV chose to work in Galela in 1866, even though 
a Muslim Sangaji from Ternate ruled the area. The Galela region was strategic 
economically because the Northeast coast of Halmahera is sloping and has natural 
harbours. In contrast, the Northwest coast has sharp rock and no natural harbours. 
The position of the harbours in Galela and Tobelo later became crucial factors for 
the national and international trade of copra and bananas (see Chapter III and 
Chapter V). 
 
                                                 
176 Unlike the British, Dutch colonialism was very focused on economic matters and avoided a 
“civilizing mission.”  This orientation changed at the end of the 19th Century. 
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Almost 40 years later, at the turn of the 20th century, the Dutch Resident 177 in 
Ternate supported the Sultan of Ternate’s plans because of the colonial 
government’s new dualism or “ethical policy” that called for both improving the 
welfare of the people as well as promoting trade. Under the new policy, the Sultan 
still had the right to rule the common people according to practices of adat and 
Islam. However at the same time the policy guaranteed religious freedom for each 
person to choose or change their religion without coercion. Be that as it may, 
missionary reports from van Baarda (1995 [1903]) indicate that the colonial 
government showed very little enthusiasm for efforts to spread Christianity. Their 
interests were more in economics.  
 
4.4.  The Emergence of New Social Structures 
 
The Ternate Sultanate allowed missionaries into Halmahera in hopes that they 
would increase the social and economic well being of the society without 
changing their local religious practices. The Sultan of Ternate still claimed that all 
of his domain was Muslim and believed that regions where the society still 
practiced their local religion would sooner or later become part of the Islamic 
community. Then the entire North Moluccas would be united under his supreme 
leadership.  
 
4.4.1.  Starting from the Central Moluccas 
 
The colonial government established a coalition with the royal families, providing 
honour, education and employment.  The children of royal families received the 
same education as the children of Europeans in the Netherlands East Indies. They 
also had access to positions within the colonial governmental structure. 
 
The colonial government provided credit for those who wanted to expand their 
new businesses. This opportunity was open for those who had experience, 
including non-Europeans. The ethnic Chinese, Arabs, and Europeans used this 
moment well (Carpenter: 1923). They controlled almost the entire field of 
economics in the Netherlands East Indies. The common people acted as labours in 
the businesses owned by the rich. 
 
The development of the Central Moluccas had a direct impact on the life of the 
common people.  Dutch missionaries de-sacralized adat and sacralized Christian 
teaching.  This changed the meaning of adat.  The rituals of adat had directly 
related to material conditions; however, the new religious teachings changed the 
function of ritual adat into a mainly symbolic matter.  The missionaries assumed 
that the traditional practices didn’t fit with Christian teaching. 
 
The missionary attitudes must be understood in the context of what was 
happening in Europe.  The great power and subsequent collapse of the VOC was a 
sign of the social change that was happening in the Netherlands.  Overwhelming 
material wealth and the growth of rationalism eroded the position of religion as a 
                                                 
177 For an explanation of the Dutch Resident’s position, please see Chapter I. 
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sacred matter (Weber:1974).  People began to build their understanding from 
reason alone.  Religion became a personal matter that didn’t function in the public 
context.  The division of labour in society led to a new kind of community based, 
not on family, tradition and religion, but on specialized, functional relationships 
(Durkheim: 1964).  Religion lost its divine essence as the spiritual world was 
separated from the world of everyday life.  The French Revolution strengthened 
the modern rituals of rationalism.  However Protestant Pietism swept through 
Europe as a reaction to rationalism. 
 
This mainstream Pietism aimed at bringing back the loving commitment of young 
people, traders and common society to the moral way of Christian experiences.  
Groups for Bible study formed in Holland (van Baarda: 1995). The desire to 
recover the spirit of early Christianity and escape from the shackles of secular life 
pushed many young people to evangelise the natives in the Netherlands East 
Indies. Their evangelical message included both spiritual salvation and material 
progress.  Material progress required the moral virtues of the Dutch:  hard work, 
frugality and rationality.  Missionaries who left for the East Indies brought 
education and training in practical skills so that they could help the indigenous 
people leave behind their superstitions, increase their living standard, change their 
morality and become more civilized. 
 
The success of Dutch missionaries was influenced by the availability of the Malay 
language that was used as the communication medium in the society. The Malay 
language began to spread in the 15th Century and became the Lingua Franca of 
the people in the Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch government declared it to be 
the language of the indigenous people. This policy undermined local ethnic 
languages but helped unify the East Indies.  Language groups were disconnected 
from their cultures without the need to transform the people to become like the 
Dutch.  The people were changed but at the same time the distance between them 
and the Dutch colonizers was still maintained.  In the central Moluccas, according 
to the research of Frank Cooley, society still practiced adat ritual without 
understanding its meaning in their lives which had already changed (Cooley: 
1961, 96). Ritual practices from their adat (tradition) that originally linked 
cultural idea and the material conditions of their everyday actions became just 
symbolic ceremonies. 
 
The colonial government in the central Moluccas introduced new concepts, 
knowledge and practices.  The city of Ambon became one of the centres of the 
new culture, which had begun to appear from the 17th to the 18th Centuries.  The 
Dutch provided good facilities to the noble families and indigenous civil servants 
of the colonial government.  They were permitted to learn the Dutch language.  
However the common people were only allowed to receive basic education in the 
Malay language. 
 
The people who became Christians were separated from their kin-networks, which 
maintained the practices of the local religion.  Christian villages were separated 
from non-Christian ones. The differences also appeared in personal style and 
dress.  Missionaries decided that the people should wear white colour clothes for 
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everyday activities.  Black was the religious colour that should be worn during 
religious activities.  Indigenous women who had a European education wore hats 
just as the European women did.  Indigenous men had short hair and wore long 
pants.  Even up to the present, many Ambonese still wear black clothes to church 
on Sunday. 
 
Indigenous non-Christians kept their traditional clothes. Women wore the 
traditional blouse (kebaya) and men wore the traditional cap (peci). They were 
permitted to attend indigenous schools, where Malay was spoken. They didn’t 
work as teachers or civil servants, but they worked as labours at the market, the 
harbour etc. 
 
Education in European culture and knowledge spread from Java, the central 
Moluccas, and Northern Sulawesi.  The royal classes became civil servants. The 
Dutch mobilized these groups because they needed educators in the schools that 
were provided by the colonial government to empower society. Teachers were 
needed throughout the entire region of the Netherlands Indies (Nanulaitta: 1966). 
 
The colonial government also recruited soldiers from the central Moluccas. Two 
material conditions supported Dutch policies.  Firstly, the colonizers determined 
the price of cloves. Secondly, the colonial government limited the educational 
system to certain parts of society. The Dutch intentionally used poverty as a tool 
of control.  Poor young people were interested in becoming soldiers with the 
Dutch military (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger= KNIL) because they had 
no other future.  At one time, according to historical notes, hardly any young 
people stayed in the Central Moluccas.  Only old people, children and women 
stayed in Ambon.  The Chinese dominated the middle level of economic 
activities, whereas Bugis, Makasarese and Ambonese Muslims managed the lower 
economic sector.  The Ambonese youth became soldiers because of the social 
guarantees this made available to them (Nanulaitta: 1994). 
 
The attraction for youth from the central Moluccas, especially the Christians, to 
become Dutch soldiers was spurred by the myth of Captain Jonker. This myth had 
spread among the military and had had a strong influence from the era of the VOC 
to the time of the Dutch colonial government. The myth relates that success will 
follow Moluccan youth because Captain Jonker would protect their security in the 
field of battle (Nanulaita: 1966, 90-98). 
 
The colonial government provided systematic and orderly military training. The 
government used KNIL to overcome rebellious movements in the entire region of 
the Netherlands Indies. The centres for KNIL’ s military education were in 
Cimahi, West Java and several places in Batavia (Carpenter: 1923).  Participation 
in the KNIL was open to all indigenous people.  However the recruitment and 
promotion of a soldier depended on selection based on the ethnic background of 
each soldier.  At the beginning, soldiers who were Christians were classified as 
ethnic Ambonese; however, the Dutch added new classifications to distinguish 
ethnic groups such as the Ambonese and the Minahasans.  Dutch soldiers were 
placed in higher positions and categorized in a special group.  Muslim Moluccans 
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were also attracted to become soldiers although an assumption grew among the 
Muslims that to become a soldier of the KNIL was haram (forbidden), because 
they had to fight with the people in Aceh (Tudjiman: 1971, 18).178 
 
Those who didn’t want to be involved with benefits and privileges from the 
colonial government condemned those who worked as officers of the colonial 
governmental.  This reaction made sense especially for those who had already 
converted to Islam.  These groups rejected the efforts of the colonial government 
to provide public education and technical education for the common people.  
Dutch government also sent young people to the Netherlands for further education 
so that they could help the colonial government with the educational process for 
those who rejected the education delivered by Christian missionaries from 
Holland. 
 
However, education for the common people, those who were Muslim or non-
Muslim, was not widely available. The emptiness of the educational process 
stimulated the idea among the Islamic leaders in Java, who had also experienced 
public school and freedom of thinking, to create the Muhammadiyah movement. 
This movement aimed at facilitating education according to Islamic values. The 
Muhammadiyah movement also tried to pay attention to the economic aspect of 
the educational process in Islamic society (Nakamura: 1980, 276). 
 
Hajj Achmad Dahlan initiated this movement.  At the beginning, this organization 
was localized in central Java, but quickly spread to the entire Netherlands East 
Indies.  The Muhammadiyah movement in the north Moluccas began in the 1930s 
(Kiem: 1993, 102). The presence of this movement in the north Moluccas tested 
the dualistic policies of the colonial government.  The colonial government related 
the Muhammadiyah movement to the struggles for Indonesian independence. 
Kiem says that the flag of Indonesia began to rise on the roofs of the 
Muhammadiyah schools, the al- madrasah al- ibtidaiyyah (the elementary 
schools). The first of the  madrasahs in the north Moluccas were in the regions of 
Galela and Tobelo.179 
 
4.4.2.  Decreasing Power of the Sultan of Ternate 
 
Historians like Andaya and Andaya say that the imperial era of Malay rule was 
finished at the time of the Portuguese traders arrival in Asia (Andaya and Andaya: 
1982, 55). However, in the Moluccas, the end of the Imperial era of Ternate and 
Tidore had just begun after the arrival of the VOC, following the establishment of 
the colonial powers in the region.  The Dutch abolished the rights that had always 
followed the genealogical line of the Sultanate.  The Netherlands politics of 
loyalty destroyed the charismatic characteristics attributed to the Sultan such as, 
that his reign was eternal and that he had personal sacredness as well as divine 
and magical strengths. The important impact of the decline of his ritual authority 
                                                 
178 This can be shown through data about how many Muslim Moluccans, who had been members 
of KNIL, moved to Holland during and after the 1950s. 
179 See the detailed explanation at the end of this chapter. 
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was the erosion of his economic powers that were the foundation of all the other 
strengths he had had in the past (Andaya: 1975, 25). 
 
The only strength that still remained was his status as Sultan. This position was 
tied to the religious genealogical imagination, which gave him the special title of 
an Islamic prince.  This status as Sultan positioned him as the head of a religious 
hierarchy and member of a large Islamic brotherhood (Ummah) that included the 
Ottoman Empire and India.   
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Sultan of Ternate still claimed the power of 
religious charisma, which the colonial powers could not take from him.  The 
possession of this power was based on the Islamic teaching that the Sultan is the 
leader who has the right to protect his society.  In Islamic political theory, a leader 
is God’s representative in conducting God’s work in this world (Matheson: 1980, 
188).  After the colonial government removed the royal titles of the Sultan’s 
meritocracy, the only institution, which still supported the Sultan’s old powers, 
was the palace court in which the office of Jouhukum was still important.  
 
Another important factor was the extension of the function of bobato into eternity.  
The Ternate word bobato means ‘organiser’ or ‘official’. There are two types, 
namely the bobato dunia who is a kind of public official, and the  botato akhirat 
who is a spiritual leader (Mangunwijaya: 1987, 120ff; van Fraassen: 1996).180  
 
The meeting of the Ummah at the Friday prayer is the important moment where 
the bobata of eternity and the bobata of mortal life give their speeches.  The 
bobata of eternity leads the reading of the Qur’ân and the prayers in Arabic.  The 
political speech from the Sultan was also delivered in Arabic.  According to 
Bernard Lewis, in traditional Islamic practice the Friday prayer is the time to 
deliver policies on taxation and other crucial political problems (Lewis: 1995,10).  
Arabic was used as the formal language of the Friday prayers in the Sultan’s 
palace.  In addition to adding to the Sultan’s religious prestige, using Arabic also 
conveniently blocked the understanding of colonial government officials. 
 
Nevertheless, the Dutch continued to undermine the leadership of the Sultan of 
Ternate.  In 1914, the colonial government terminated salary payments to the 
heads of the Soa (district) and its officers. The payment that the Sultan of Ternate 
had received every year, about Fl.45.000, was stopped after 1912.  This policy 
was related to the decline of the spice income. However the Dutch still maintained 
official positions, such as the Jougugu and Jouhukum and the administrative 
secretaries who served the regions to the East and West of Ternate (van Fraassen: 
1996, 56). 
 
After the government abolished the Sultan’s subsidy they needed to clarify and 
finance the traditional leader in a new way.  In 1917, the colonial government 
wrote a letter to Sultan Mohammad Jabir Syah requesting that he take leadership 
education in Batavia.  In 1925 he further honed his leadership skills as Assistant 
                                                 
180 Compare this with the research of Lanny Probojo on Tidore where different terms are used:  
Sowali  or Jouguruy  (Probojo: 2000, 3ff). 
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to the Regency in Sumbawa.  After returning to Ternate in 1929, he was appointed 
Sultan with full authority according to the traditional leadership heritage (van 
Fraassen: 1996, 56). However, with the modern education that he had received, 
the governance model of the Sultanate was adjusted to fit within the bureaucratic 
structure of modern government.  The Sultan used the positions from the old 
Sultanate structure only in so far as they could function in the new situation.  
Traditional positions that were not relevant only remained as concepts without a 
practical concrete role. 
 
The rationalization of the bureaucracy in the governance of the Sultanate and the 
Sultan’s discontinuation as an officer of the colonial government, allowed him to 
conduct his own government freely.  In the 1920s, the Sultan of Ternate appointed 
three people to become a bobato akhirat.  The three religious leaders were Haji181 
Abdullah Hoatseng, who served as Imam in the district of Tobelo, Hajji 
Muhammad Tomagola who worked as the Imam in the district of Galela and Haji 
Umar Jamaah who functioned as the Imam in the district of Morotai.  These three 
important Hajjis joined in the Muhammadiyah movement (Tomagola: 2000b, 
25).182  They all had the title, Jouguru or bobato akhirat. However, the ir position 
of religious teacher was not a functioning position in the palace. Therefore, there 
was little work for these three persons to undertake. New work was created by 
changing their roles as Imams to include that of the Syari’ ah judges in several 
districts. With the extension of their role, the old position received a new 
meaning, one, which came through the Muhammadiyah movement. The 
traditional title of Jouguru was adjusted to the Arabic title Ustadz (Teacher). 
 
Muslim teachers began to systematically propagate Islam (dakwah) all over the 
North Moluccas and the pilgrimage to Mecca became a common occurrence.  
Anthony Reid says that the trip to Mecca was the main source of knowledge about 
ethnic life outside Java in the 19th century (Reid: 1967). At that time, Java was 
the centre of the socio-economics and politics of the colonial government.  
Islamic eschatological beliefs encouraged solidarity among Muslims throughout 
the East Indies and beyond.  They believed that all Muslims who are oppressed 
and poor will receive a new status in a new world after this mortal life. The 
Muhammadiyah movement, which had begun under the influence of the Islamic 
Brotherhood movement in Egypt, fit the needs of the local kingdoms in the 
Netherlands East Indies because the identities established by their former roles 
had started to disappear.   
 
4.5.  The Drums and the Bells call their Congregations  
 
This sub section discusses changes in the social structure of Muslim society in the 
North Moluccas and the efforts to spread Islamic teachings. We examine why and 
how the Christian missionaries worked in the Northeast of Halmahera and the 
                                                 
181 Haji is the title received by a male pilgrim to Mecca.  
182 Their work before becoming Jouguru (Imam)  was as successful traders. They qualified as Imam 
because of the religious experiences they had received from their regular teaching of “pengajian” 
(classes Qur’ân). 
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impact of the Japanese occupation on religious life.  This chapter closes with a 
discussion of religious practices in Ngidiho since Indonesian independence. 
 
4.5.1.  Religious Schools and the Resistance Force 
 
After the clove trade lost it profitability and the Sultan lost his power, the 
common people took advantage of the power vacuum by improving their 
education.  In the North Moluccas, the common people, who felt a part of the 
Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo heritage, competed for knowledge through the religious 
schools that were established since the 1930s.  The kin-network of the royal 
families from Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo, and those who were tied to the Makian 
and Kayoa kinship groups, sent their children to Makasar to attend the religious 
schools. After they graduated, they returned to the North Moluccas to help spread 
Islam (dakwah).  They carried out their mission (dakwah) in Tobelo, Galela,  
Morotai and Maba (the region of Patani, in Central Halmahera). Their targets 
were the hinterlands of the Halmahera Islands. 
 
Amal Tomagola states that at the beginning, Islam spread only among the 
communities which remained along the coastal area of Galela, the northern coast 
of Tobelo, the coastal area along Morotai Island, in Loloda, Jailolo, Ibu and Sahu 
(Tomagola: 2000a, 24).  The traders of Ternate and Tidore furthered the spread of 
Islam in the coastal areas.  Fisherman and immigrants also contributed to the 
spread of Islam.  They functioned as Imam to lead prayers and chanting from the 
Qur’an wherever they visited (Tomagola: 2000b, 21).  These people often married 
indigenous people and settled in the regions where they could make a living. 
 
The success of dakwah was determined by the methods employed by the original 
Jouguru who adapted the Islamic message to the local cultures. The rituals of 
birth, khitan (Arabic)  (circumcision), marriage, death and various thanksgiving 
rituals were the results of a melding of elements from the local religion with 
Islam.  The missionaries incorporated ancestral rituals as a part of Islam in order 
to attract the local people to Islam.  They justified respect for the ancestors and for 
local spirits in relation to the Qur’anic category of jinn.183  In Islamic teaching, 
worship is directed to God alone, but respect should be given to the Prophet and 
also to the ancestors (cf. Baker: 1988; Probojo: 2000, 3).  
 
The soa moagiowo (people who still practiced the old religion, prior to 
conversion) were not easily converted to Christianity because the Christian 
missionaries didn’t permit rituals to the ancestors or a belief in jinn.  In contrast, 
the Muslim Jouguru answered the people’s basic question about whether their 
ancestors could be saved if their descendents were converted to Islam.  In a simple 
way, the Jouguru changed the position of the stone tombs in the ancestral 
graveyard so that they faced the direction qiblah as in the tradition of the Muslim 
graveyard (Tomagola: 2000b). Qiblah, an Arabic word is the direction toward 
                                                 
183 In some parts of Indonesia, the distinctions between ancestors, local spirits and jinn are 
systematically unclear.  See, for example, the discussion about beliefs among highlanders in 
Central Sulawesi (Aragon: 2000, 38-32).  However in Galela, the distinction is clear as I explained 
in another part of this chapter. 
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Mecca, which Muslims face at the times of prayer.  After an entire graveyard was 
changed to face the qiblah, the heirs and the direct family members sprinkled a 
little water and poured mixed flowers and pandanus on the graveyard. The 
ceremony closed with a reading from the Qur’ân and Arabic prayers.  Following 
this ceremony, the Jouguru told the people that their ancestors were now 
Muslims. Islamization of the ancestors challenged other family members that 
were still alive to become Muslims too.  After reciting the words of syahadah (the 
profession of faith), they formally became Muslims. 
 
The spread of Islam became more organized after Muhammadiyah held a 
Consultation in Galela in 1938.  The Consultation created an organisation named 
Imam Permoesyawaratan Onderafdeling Tobelo (Consultation of Imams of the 
sub-district of Tobelo) that was abbreviated as IPOT.  The IPOT created a unified 
organization of Imams from the Districts of Tobelo, Galela, Morotai, Kao and 
Loloda. 
 
IPOT established the first madrasah ibtidaiyah (Muslim elementary school) in 
Soa Sio, Galela in 1940.   Muhammadiyah sent a teacher directly from its 
headquarters in Yogyakarta. His name was Ustadz Syamsuddin Yusuf.  The 
project was funded by donations and the income from drama performances. 
(Tomagola: 2000b, 29).  Muhammadiyah used dramatic performances as a 
method of dakwah in addition to the art of reading the Qur’ân and the art of 
kasidah (a religious chant in Arabic sung to the rhythm of a gambus).  However 
the activities of IPOT stopped in 1942 when the Japanese troops conquered the 
entire Netherlands East Indies including the North Moluccas.  Northeast 
Halmahera became the centre of Japanese defence.  Dutch missionary activities 
also ended at the same time. 
 
4.5.2.  Building a New Alliance for Resistance 
 
Dutch Protestant missionaries began work in Galela in 1866.  The Sultan of 
Ternate gave permission for them to enter Galela because it was a region where he 
had already placed a Muslim Sangaji as his representative. At the beginning the 
Sultan of Ternate permitted the missionaries to carry out their work along the 
coastal area, Tutu ma leleo, where the Muslim community had already formed. 
However, of three missionaries who arrived in Galela, two stayed in the coastal 
area and one moved to the hinterland (van Baarda: 1995 [1903]).184 
 
There is no statistical data left by the missionaries about the number of people 
from the district of Galela who still practiced alfuru when they began their work 
in the region. However according to a formal report from the colonial government 
in 1909, Galelan Muslims were located in only two villages, Tutu ma leleo and 
Saluta. Both villages were on the coast, in the Eastern part of Galela.  Other 
villages like Igobula, Soakonora, Mamuya, Dokulamo, Soa Tobaru Bale, Togawa, 
Longa, Gura, Ngidiho, Towara, Pune, Toweka, Limau Gotalalamo, Kira and Seki 
                                                 
184 Van Baarda later married a daughter of van Dijken and stayed at the mission house that had 
been built by his father-in-law. 
 179 
were alfuru villages. The people of these villages still practiced the local religion.  
In 1909 there was already a Christian community in the village of Duma. 
 
Duma is the name given to the village by the local people who converted to 
Christianity. After the missionary, van Dijken, was permitted to go to the 
hinterland, the Sangaji of Galela gave him a piece of land situated along the lake 
of Galela. Van Dijken was happy with the location because it suited his plan to 
carry out agricultural activities. However the local people considered this location 
very dangerous. In the Galela language, the location was called ma doa ‘the place 
of giants’. They contributed the land to the missionary because they believed that 
a giant, who was called o meki, would eat him. The word o meki comes from the 
Ternate language and refers to Satan (o toka) whose tall body has a big hole in the 
backside.  It is interesting to pay attention to how the Galelans came to call the 
village “Duma”.  The Sangaji of Galela, who was the representative of the Sultan 
of Ternate, gave the dangerous area of giants to the missionary in order to 
strengthen his claim that all of civilized Galela belonged to the Muslim Sultan.  
The only place given to the Christian missionary was a land of monsters!  
However, much to the people’s surprise, the missionary, van Dijken, did not die in 
that dangerous place.  The people said that only he was not touched by the giant 
(Duma una wi doohawa) (Magany: 1984, 96).  The word ‘Duma’ comes from that 
sentence. 
 
After the missionary’s success in overcoming o meki the community always relied 
on him, especially during storms. His house was always full of people who came 
for protection because they feared the evil spirits that would appear through the 
natural phenomena. They asked van Dijken to pray to God; many times his 
prayers were efficacious. He could address storm and plague.  In 1876 there was a 
rebellion led by Dano Babu Hasan, who claimed to be the offspring of the Jailolo 
Sultan.  He came, along with 600 followers, to ask van Dijken to become their 
king against the Sultan of Ternate, but van Dijken rejected this invitation.  Instead, 
he used this moment to stop the rebellion (Magany: 1984, 100). Van Dijken 
rejection of political rebellion created doubts among the alfuru people concerning 
his authority and the benefits they might receive if they became Christians.  The 
people saw religion as a political means to attack the power of the Ternate Sultan, 
whereas for van Dijken, religion was a spiritual matter that made people more 
civilised. 
 
As explained in Chapter III, van Dijken changed the agricultural schedule.  The 
first planting was changed from April to January with the harvest time in June, 
while the second planting was changed to August with the harvest time in 
December.  This influenced the agricultural pattern of the Galela people in 
general. However this new method didn’t make the Galelans become Christians.  
The experiment with crops like coffee did not bring hope because the plants were 
not in the lowlands.  The chocolate experiments also failed, due to the attack of 
insects.  Because of these failures, van Dijken asked the people to again plant rice. 
Van Dijken described those who converted to Christianity as coming from a slave 
background or those who were so poor that they could not pay for the marriage 
dowry (mas kawin).  His wife, a Manadonese taught the new Christians reading 
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and writing.  Therefore up to 1899, a year before his death, the number of 
Christians in Galela was only 65 people, including 33 men and 32 women who 
were already confirmed. 105 children had also received baptism for a total of 170 
Christians.  Among these, there were 60 students (van Baarda: 1995 [1903], 58). 
Van Dijken baptized each convert individually after in-depth teaching about the 
Christian faith.  He located the new Christians in the village of Duma that he built 
so that they would not go back to practice their old religion. 
 
Because of pressure from the Muslim communities along the coast, mission 
activities in the coastal region were closed in 1871.  The missionaries moved to 
the district of Tobelo but didn’t stay long.  Then in 1897, a missionary named 
Hueting began his work in the district of Tobelo after waiting a year for formal 
permission from the Sultan of Ternate.  Hueting writes that the Tobelo people 
were rude but proud that they were the offspring of sea pirates and had a sincere 
heart. The characteristics of the Tobelo people were so interesting to him that he 
carefully learned about their kinship relations (Hueting: 1901). Magany says that 
his capability to understand the traditions of the people made him a success in 
Christianising Tobelo (Magany: 1984). 
 
In the year of Hueting’s arrival in Tobelo there was a dispute between the Sultan 
of Ternate and the alfuru people.  The Sultan of Ternate decided to replace an 
alfuru Sangaji with a Muslim Sangaji.  The alfuru Sangaji was asked to move out 
to Bacan.  However he returned to Tobelo and hid on a small island called Raha. 
The missionary used this moment to persuade him to return from the island. 
Hueting helped the Sangaji solve the problem with the Posthouder (Hoofd 
Plaatselijk Bestuur = the local representation of the Dutch government).  The 
delivery of the Sangaji prevented the eruption of fighting between the people of 
the Sultan of Ternate and the alfuru people. The people began to trust him.  
 
The missionary prevented war between the old Sangaji who had returned from 
Ternate and the soldiers of the Sultan of Ternate. The old Sangaji then left Ternate 
because he did not get proper security. The return of the Sangaji caused 
restlessness in the society because there was a possibility the soldiers of the Sultan 
of Ternate would arrest him. In the village of Pitu, this Sangaji and his people 
stayed all night alert with swords and spears. At the suggestion of the missionary, 
the old Sangaji was asked to disperse the crowd and waited for a resolution after 
the arrival of the head of the Residentie (Resident) from Ternate to Tobelo. The 
Resident extended the working status of the old Sangaji for one year (Magany: 
1984). 
 
The presence of the Resident in Tobelo strengthened the people’s awareness of 
who were in fact the government leaders in the North Moluccas at the time.  The 
vacillation of society was connected with the information they received from the 
Muslims in Ternate that if anyone became Christian he would have to pay higher 
taxes than non-Christians.  Christians would also be asked to do heavy 
herendienst tasks.  The head of the Residentie knew that the Ternate people 
oppressed the alfuru community so he announced “everyone who lives under the 
flag of the Governor has to practice her/his religion without being forced” 
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(Magany: 1984, 112).  Actually the alfuru people in Tobelo were disappointed by 
the Resident’s statement.  They wanted a strong instruction from the colonial 
government.  They had hoped the Resident would say that Christianity was the 
obligation, because to their mind, becoming a Christian was the sign of kompeny, 
which means the VOC or the Dutch.  
 
On March 25 to 28, 1898, the alfuru people of Tobelo gathered to declare their 
commitment to convert to Christianity.  Christian teaching claimed the ancestral 
ritual materials were idolatry.  Therefore before anyone could receive baptism, 
they had to participate in an idol-destroying procession and burn all their ancestral 
ritual materials.  All the villages of the District of Tobelo requested baptism and 
burned their ancestral objects on a large stage.  Then the people asked the 
missionary to give them new names that were taken from the Bible.  Cutting the 
hair was another initiation sign for those who would become Christians. With the 
large number of people converting to Christianity, Hueting didn’t have to locate 
the new Christians separately from the alfuru villages, as van Dijken had found 
necessary.  All of Tobelo quickly converted to Christianity. 
 
Nevertheless, among the new congregations people still practiced the old customs.  
Sometimes they visited the healers.  If there was a disaster, they believed that o 
dilike or the ancestral spirits were punishing them and leading them astray 
because of their conversion. Some Christian theologians complained that 
Hueting’s method of mass baptism resulted in the continuance of old religious 
practices within the form of Christianity (Djurubasa: 2000). Even today the 
Tobelo people weave together their world religion with local religious practices in 
their everyday life.  
 
However the missionaries tried to strengthen Christian faith in the society through 
a rational process, which changed the system of thought and practices of the 
people.  They introduced new knowledge of health, nutrition, agriculture, 
carpentry and public education. The new knowledge aimed to block the use of 
adat rituals and traditional knowledge, which remained in their practices.  The 
missionaries built basic schools and schools of agriculture, carpentry, theology 
and teacher training.  They also provided a hospital.  Missionaries even adopted 
children as a means to educate candidates for ministry.  
 
With the opening of schools in Tobelo, both theological and public, teachers from 
the Central Moluccas moved to the North Moluccas. The Christianisation process 
that had already begun earlier in Ambon, along with available human resources in 
Minahasa, helped the progress of missionary work in Tobelo. Because of this, a 
new social group appeared in Tobelo, foreigners from Minahasa and Ambon who 
were more educated than the indigenous people of Northern Halmahera.  The 
Ambon and Minahasa missionaries adjusted their methods of Christianisation to 
the context of the traditional beliefs of the local society.  For example they 
followed the example of Islam in addressing the fears of the people with regard to 
the fate of their ancestors.  They held a special worship service to hand over to 
those who had already died, the results of God’s work of forgiveness, salvation 
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and resurrection. The spread of Christianity throughout the North Moluccas 
started from Tobelo. 
 
In North Halmahera, the people’s new loyalty to Christianity not only led them to 
support the colonial government but also freed them from the power and authority 
of the Ternate Sultanate. The colonial government used religion to strengthen its 
position in the Netherlands East Indies.  Groups that allied with it through 
conversion to Christianity accepted the transformation of their rituals and 
submitted to a new hegemonic worldview.  The same pattern had already taken 
place in the politic s of ritual conducted by Muslim Kingdoms before the arrival of 
Western traders. 
 
4.5.3.  The Moluccas under the Japanese Empire  
 
The Japanese samurai who were used by the VOC as its bodyguards in its trading 
boats in the 17th – 18th Centuries, returned to the Netherlands East Indies in 1942 
and took over the power of the Dutch colonial government. The Japanese 
conquered Chinese territory in 1937.  Japan’s power was extended quickly to the 
entire region of South East Asia.  In 1942, Japanese soldiers occupied the 
Netherlands East Indies. Although the occupation of Japan in the region only 
lasted three years, the impact of its presence sharpened the tension in the society 
of the Netherlands East Indies.  The Japanese colonial government used ritual 
elements to raise feelings of nationalism in the East Indies and opposition to the 
Dutch colonial government. The Japanese forces again used the politics of ritual 
to sharpen ethnic and religious divisions that were already deeply embedded in the 
society. 
 
Richard Chauvel states that Japanese colonizers used nationalism to gain 
acceptance in the East Indies especially among the nationalists (Chauvel: 1986).  
The royal classes, including the Sultan’s network, and those who were loyal to the 
Dutch colonial government, were set aside from the governance structure.  
Nationalists were appointed leaders at the local level.  The Sultan of Ternate, 
Mohammad Jabir, escaped with his followers to Australia and resided there from 
September 1944 to August 1945 (van Fraassen: 1999, 57).  The Japanese sought 
support from the Muslim majority by using religious differences between 
Muslims and Christians as the criteria for selecting candidates for government 
management positions. In the beginning of 1943, the Japanese promoted Islamic 
organizations and emphasized Islamic identification in everyday life.185 
 
The Japanese used the politics of ritual to destroy the educated social classes that 
tended to be loyal to the Dutch and were dominated by the Christian communities 
in the Moluccas. Destroying the identity and status of the dominant group meant 
destroying the Dutch identity that still remained in the political formation of the 
people.  In this era, as reported by Chauvel, Muslim groups looted the houses that 
                                                 
185 cf. Feith who records the interview with Indonesian people who lived in the era of the Japanese 
occupation who now live in Australia. 
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were left behind by the colonial government. They also looted Chinese stores 
(Chauvel: 1986, 10). 
 
The Japanese shut down Christian organizations and schools.  Churches were used 
as warehouses for the war equipment of the Japanese.  The nationalist movement 
in Ambon had little influence because of the closeness of the Moluccans with the 
colonial government (van Fraassen: 1999, 57).  However, in this period, there 
were also some Christian nationalists who worked together with the Muslim 
nationalists especially in Java.  In Ambon, a Christian nationalist named E. U. 
Pupella led the Sarekat Ambon (“Ambon League”).186  He received a position 
from the Japanese colonial government.  
 
In the North Moluccas, after the Sultan of Ternate and his followers escaped to 
Australia, the remainder of the Dutch colonial government, along with pro-Dutch 
local people, defended themselves against the attack of Japanese soldiers.  North 
Halmahera became a staging area for the Japanese troops.  The Japanese recruited 
Javanese and local people into a force called Heiho, which fought on the Japanese 
side.  At the same time, churches and all the Christian mission activities were 
closed.  However the Japanese colonizers permitted the operation of churches 
under leadership of indigenous people such as the one in Tolo, Jailolo, who had 
no connection with the Dutch colonial government (van Fraassen: 1995, 57; cf. 
Haire: 1981). 
 
The defeat of the Japanese in the Second World War stimulated Indonesia to 
declare national independence on August 17, 1945.  The Sultan of Ternate 
returned in August 1945.  The Dutch colonial government also soon returned and 
welcomed the Sultan of Ternate by giving him a position to lead the Dutch army 
(KNIL) with the rank of Lieutenant General.  The Dutch hoped he would unify 
the Moluccan people to side with them.  However, it was clear that the people did 
not support the Sultan as the head of the KNIL.  The people saw it as just another 
Dutch political manoeuvre (van Fraassen: 1999, 57). 
 
In northern Halmahera the nationalist movement initiated by Muhammadiyah 
received fresh impetus from the Japanese colonial government. It is said that 
when they heard of the Declaration of Indonesian Independence in Jakarta, the 
people in Galela shouted with joy. The news of Independence came to Galela 
through the members of Heiho who were from Java.  They mobilized the Galela 
people, both Muslims and Christians, to parade the red and white Indonesian flag 
to Tobelo where the Dutch army (KNIL) tried to control the demonstration. This 
red and white parade was related to a movement to carry the flag from Java to the 
Moluccas.  Both Christian and Muslim Moluccans who lived in Java participated 
in the movement.  The Moluccan youth returned to their homeland to set up 
centres for the Indonesian Republic’s government in regions that could not be 
reached easily from Jakarta (Lapian: 1975, 116).  
 
                                                 
186 See (Chauvel: 1986, 7); see also Chapter V. 
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The Red and White Parade from Galela to Tobelo was a sign of rebellion against 
the Dutch colonial government (Leirissa: 1983).  However the people of Tobelo, 
who still had contact with the Dutch, felt humiliated by this movement.  In 
reaction, the Tobelans used abusive language against the Galelan nationalists.  
The Galelans still maintain the memory of this abuse in their ritual practices.  
Until now, if a young man or a young women from Tobelo is going to marry a 
young woman or a young man from Galela, he/she and her/his family have to pay 
a fine, called the “red and white fine” (denda merah putih). The Galelans created 
this fine in order to repay their humiliation at the hands of the Tobelan masses 
during their march with the red-white flag in 1945. 
 
During the struggle for Independence from 1945 to 1950, the Sultan of Ternate 
switched roles from appointed administrative leader under the Dutch, to politician.  
When the Sultan joined the PASMU party, the nationalist leaders in Jakarta 
terminated his administrative position because they felt he was not nationalistic 
enough.  The nationalist Party of Indonesian Unity (PI) was the popular party in 
the North Moluccas.  Although PASMU did not win in the northern Moluccas, the 
Sultan of Ternate got the position of Minister of East Indonesian Affairs in the 
cabinet of Tatengkeng during the period of the East Indonesian State (NIT) (van 
Fraassen: 1999, 57).  In 1950 the government of the East Indonesian State (NIT) 
was dissolved and the Sultan received no position.  In April 1950, the Southern 
Moluccan Republic (Republik Maluku Selatan= RMS) declared its independence 
from Indonesia and the Indonesian government accused the Sultan of Ternate of 
being involved.  He was arrested and moved to Makasar. After going through the 
formal process of arrest, he was returned to Ternate but then moved to Jakarta to 
work as an officer of the Interior Ministry.  In 1960 he retired with a position 
parallel to the head of the Regency. 
 
4.5.4.  Ngidiho:  1945 to 1965 
 
The Netherlands united many regions, with different ethnic backgrounds, 
religious complexities and local kingdoms within one colonial territory called the 
Netherlands East Indies.  In a sense, the Dutch created the unity of Indonesia.  
However the Japanese seized on the already growing nationalist sentiments as the 
key to her politics of ritual.  By using nationalism and Islam as tools of anti-
Western colonialism, the Japanese colonizers had to accept the likely result, i.e. 
the independence of Indonesia.  When they lost the war, the Japanese troops were 
kicked out. 
 
After the dissolution of the East Indonesian State (NIT) in 1950, another rebellion 
broke out in South Sulawesi. The Darul Islam/Islamic Army movement (DI/TII) 
was led by Abdul Qahar Muzakkar, a Bugis from Palopo (de Jong: 1996, 9). This 
movement was related to the movement of DI/TII in Java led by S. M. Kartowirjo 
(de Jong: 1996, 682). DI/TII aimed to set up an Islamic state ruled by Islamic law.  
The DI/TII movement in Makasar criticized the dominance of Sukarno, who had 
centralized Javanese power (Muzakar in Feith and Castle: 1960).  Dissatisfaction 
with Sukarno led to criticism of the power structure of NIT and the Indonesian 
army (TNI/APRIS) for including too many Christians. Therefore the ritual 
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language inherited from the Japanese, i.e., anti-Chinese, anti-Dutch, anti-West and 
anti-Christian was central to the DI/TII movements. This political language 
quickly spread to the entire territory of East Indonesia. 
 
DI/TII received a positive response in Galela especially in Soa Sio where the 
nationalist movement was rooted in the Muhammadiyah movement.  However, in 
the hinterland, this movement provoked opposition from a society, which was 
mostly alfuru. The soldiers of DI/TII murdered the kimalaha (the head of the 
village) in Ngidiho.  The local people accepted the man’s murder as his fate, 
because he was not indigenous to Ngidiho.187  However, the murder of their 
kimalaha united the people in Ngidiho in rejecting the DI/TII movement and they 
even helped the Indonesian military (TNI) to destroy the movement. 
 
After the coup of 1965 and before the parliamentary election of 1971, the 
Indonesian government declared that each citizen must affiliate with one of the 
‘universal’ religions that are practiced in Indonesia (see Feith: 1971 [1957] ).   
According to the testimony of the local people, in Ngidiho, the formal process of 
conversion had already taken place in the 1950s and was completed on a single 
day.188  The people gathered in an open field and two religious leaders, one 
Christian and one Muslim stood in front of the community. Then those who 
wanted to become Muslim moved to the left of the gathering to join the imam 
whereas those who wanted to become Christian moved to the right side joining 
with the reverend/minister (pendeta).  This process of conversion resulted in some 
family members of the same household becoming Christian and others becoming 
Muslim. In Ngidiho, the number who chose to become Muslim was higher than 
those converting to Christianity.  However, they stayed together in the same 
village although they rearranged the locations of their living-quarters. The 
Muslims moved their houses to the west side of the village while the houses of 
Christians were on the eastern side of Ngidiho. 
 
Because the conversion of the society in Ngidiho was conducted without force, 
the people perceive their religious practices as different from other Islamic 
villages which had became Islamic earlier.  Before the 1999-2000 violence 
Ngidiho was a heterogeneous village where Christians and Muslims lived 
together.  The Muslim majority in Ngidiho opposed the efforts of Muhammadiyah 
to change their religious practices, which were accused of not conforming to the  
religious practices written in the Qur’ân.  The Muslims of Ngidiho still use the 
pre-Islamic drum (bedug) to call people for worship.  Muhammadiyah declared 
that the authentic call for prayer is the voice of prayer (azan).  According to the 
Qur’ân, the use of the human voice distinguishes that call from the sound of bells 
that were used in the churches. 
 
                                                 
187 The position of kimalaha is inherited, however, he was appointed kimalaha  because of his 
marriage to a woman from Ngidiho. 
188 I received this information first from Oom Din.  Then in February 2002, I also reconfirmed the 
story with the Christian elders from Ngidiho who were in Tobelo as refugees. The interview was 
carried out with Oom David Tunepe and his wife. 
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In 1957, another movement appeared in Galela called Perjuangan Semesta Alam 
or Permesta (Universal Struggle).  This movement began in Minahasa.  Muh. 
Saleh Lahade, a Bugis from Barru led the movement along with J. F. Warouw, a 
former KNIL member who was from Minahasa (de Jong: 1996, 683). The 
movement was very critical of the central government and struggled for regional 
autonomy and the economic development of Eastern Indonesia.  Permesta used 
political language that distinguished between Java and the territory outside Java; it 
succeeded in uniting people who organized against the central government. In the 
north Moluccas, most immigrants from North Sulawesi followed the movement. 
The guerrilla fighters of the movement wandered in the forests of Halmahera, 
including in the Galela region, and influenced the every-day life of society.  
 
The so-called September 30, 1965 Communist Movement (G 30 S PKI) was a 
traumatic experience for village people throughout Indonesia, including Galela.  
The attempted coup d’etat killed eight top Indonesian Army Generals.  However 
the reaction by the military killed hundreds of thousands of people suspected of 
involvement with the Communists.  Ngidiho directly experienced the results 
because the neighbouring village of Makete included suspected communists, who 
were immigrants from Sangir, North Sulawesi.  Their presence in Makete village 
had begun when several Sangir people were accepted to reside in Ngidiho.  These 
people could be described as pioneers. The family of Madelu, in the village of 
Ngidiho inherited land from the Sultan of Ternate in 1936.  This land is called 
gogasa, i.e. land that was owned by the Sultan of Ternate (cf. Visser: 1989, 
especially Chapter IV). 
 
The Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) tried to 
expand its territorial influence through the method of cell growth.  They built their 
movement with the rhetoric of family.  Family became the centre of unity and 
distribution.  In 1963, Oom Madelu, a charismatic Communist leader, was 
appointed Secretary of the village of Makete.  Under his leadership an elementary 
school was built in Ngidiho.  However his  charisma could not win over the people 
of Ngidiho to choose the communist party.  Why not?  Because the indigenous 
people of Ngidiho thought that Oom Madelu was not an indigenous person.  The 
people of Ngidiho, like most other indigenous people in Galela chose the party of 
Masyumi. Nonetheless, Oom Madelu was very popular and was obviously 
accepted in Makete:  the communist party won in this village. 
 
After the attempted coup in 1965, several leaders of the communist party in 
Makete, including Oom Madelu, were categorized as "A Class" communists and 
arrested.  He was sent for 5 years of prison in Ternate.  Then he was moved for 
another 5 years to the prison in Tobelo.  For the last five years he was kept under 
house arrest in the prison of the police office in the District of Galela, which 
permitted him to return home every weekend.  During the last 5 years of his 
punishment, he could gather with his family and try to replace what he had lost by 
planting coconuts. Before the arrival of the banana company in Galela in the 
1990’s, Oom Madelu was one of the owners who had many hectares of coconut 
plantation. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
 
My analysis takes an historical approach to show how the politics of conflict 
changed under different conditions but always used ritual to distinguish and to 
unite a community.  This approach shows how people shaped their identities over 
a long period of time in the North Moluccas.  The Moluccas enviable position in 
world trade failed to create prosperity but instead resulted in the hegemony of 
colonialism from the 15th to the 20th centuries.  
 
Every period of colonialism shows how the politics of ritual differentiated 
different groups from each other.  Each new power created new idioms, tactics 
and policies to oppose the power structures that were left behind.  The Sultan of 
Ternate, Portugal, the Netherlands and Japan all used the politics of ritual 
differently.  However, the Portuguese and the Sultan made greater efforts to 
achieve religious uniformity in their realms.  The Dutch were content to use 
economic incentives to reward those who followed the preferred religion, but in 
general opposed the link between religion and political power.  The Japanese 
however explicitly used religious rhetoric to attract support in their war against 
the West.  They all favoured certain groups based on their religious loyalties and 
all seemed more interested in their own economic and political interests than they 
were in the religious practices of the local people. 
 
This chapter shows the ability of grass roots society to defend its rights against 
exploitation by bureaucratic elites. For example, the Galela people are proud of 
their ancestors’ involvement as pirates in the early 19 century because they were 
able to protect their land.  The people sculpted their memories of oppression into 
stories and dance that are open to reinterpretation from time to time.  Religion and 
ritual provide ways to build collective identity.  Religion also is a means to create 
coalitions against the enemies of the community.  Often the people accepted and 
modified an outside institution of power as a means of increasing their knowledge 
but without engaging in depth with its ideology. 
 
Sometimes feudal relations based on ancient ties, such as the territories claimed 
by the Sultan of Ternate, were radically changed by the intrusion of a new power 
from outside through trade.  Religious loyalty tied the society together in the 
North Moluccas, but was always influenced by competition such as is shown in 
the trading relationships.  In Halmahera, the spread of Islam and Christianity 
occurred slowly at the end of the 19
th Century.  Although the Sultan of Ternate 
was a Muslim who helped form the political identity of society in Halmahera, this 
did not occur smoothly because his policies were often oppressive to the local 
people.  Indigenous groups that felt oppressed by the Sultan tended to retain their 
tribal religion or convert to Christianity.   However the most profound relationship 
between religion and politics began in Halmahera when religious identity was 
required as a part of political identity before the first parliamentary election in 
1955.  The people in Ngidiho were forced to convert to Islam or Christianity 
before they could vote.   
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Chapter V 
National Political Rituals and Regional Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I am going to discuss how political forces in Indonesia established 
their legitimacy by using ritual elements to unite the Indonesian people. This has 
been done to such a degree that some observers call the political scene in 
Indonesia “ritual politics.”  Sukarno was a master at ritualizing his style of 
administration.  Political parties competed by using symbols, myths and 
ideological discourse.189  Under the New Order and in the present reformation the 
use of ritual has been a major characteristic of Indonesian politics. The quotation 
from Sukarno at the beginning of this chapter shows his struggle to build a 
democracy in Indonesia. This struggle still continues up to the present. 
 
5.1.  Watching the Presidential Election from Ngidiho 
 
On the afternoon of October 20, 1999, the guest room of the Ngidiho Village 
Head was packed with villagers who gathered to watch the fourth election of the 
President of Indonesia. No one wandered about in the village.  Everyone gathered 
in those houses that had television sets to watch this historical moment in 
Indonesia. The election of the President and Vice-President in 1999 was relatively 
democratic and often compared with the legislative elections of 1955.190  
 
The head of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat or MPR), 1999-2003, Amien Rais, announced the names of the three 
participants in the 1999 presidential election: Yusril Ihaza Mahendra from the 
                                                 
189 cf. Schulte Nordholt:1980, 199-203; Dracklé:1996, 33, n14. 
190 See the explanation from Herbert Feith on the issue of the Indonesian election in 1955 (Feith: 
1971 [1957]). See also (Latief: 1998) .  Latief writes about the history of the weak dynamics of 
Indonesian presidential elections. There are several reasons for this. First, the Indonesian state was 
created and the president and the vice president were chosen on the basis of a suggestion of one 
member of Persiapan Penyelidikan Kemerdekaan Indonesia=PPKI (The Investigation Committee 
for the Preparation of Independence) that met on August 18, 1945.  Second, the state was in a 
period of transition in the system of governance in which it was likely to change from a unitary 
state to a federal republic. Third, the state was in a crisis at the time of the announcement of the 
Presidential Decree in July 1959. Fourth, the replacement of government because of the 1965 
September 30 movement that brought Suharto to leadership of the government after the 
Temporary People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara) had 
abrogated the appointment of Sukarno as the heroic revolutionary leader and life -long  president. 
Fifth, during the New Order era, the election of the president had been by agreed nomination and 
consensus. However, the first direct presidential election was held in 2004 when every Indonesian 
was given the right to vote for their chosen candidate. 
“You ask, why should the parties be buried? Is that not 
burying democracy? No, brothers and sisters! If we bury the 
parties and, having done that, do nothing, and then if there 
arises an individual who governs by himself, and particularly 
if he rules by the whip – yes, in that case democracy is dead” 
(Sukarno, as quoted in Feith and Castles: 1970, 83).  
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Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB);191 Abdurrahman Wahid 
(also called Gus Dur) from the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa or PKB),192 who was also supported by the Reformation Parties,193 and 
the “Central Axis” (Poros Tengah)194 namely the United Development Party 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) and the National Mandate Party (Partai 
Amat National or PAN);195 Megawati Sukarnoputeri from the Indonesian 
Democratic Part of Struggle (PDI-P). Akbar Tanjung announced the cancellation 
of his candidacy from Golkar, followed by a formal explanation that his 
nomination was supported by some who were supposed to nominate B.J. Habibie. 
These groups had then been committed to the Golkar single nomination of 
Habibie who had already withdrawn himself after the rejection of his 
responsibility report by the General Meeting of the MPR. 
 
When the head of the MPR struck the gavel as the sign that the presidential 
election process had begun, Yusril Ihza Mahendra formally withdrew in favour of 
another candidate which he hoped would be Gus Dur.  Clapping to show their 
respect, the members of committee welcomed his withdrawal. The head of the 
MPR then reviewed the names of the presidential candidates. The process of 
election began at 12.00 noon. Gus Dur and Megawati were competing for the 691 
votes of the members of the MPR. 
 
The vote counting began at 13.36 pm and was very lively.  Clapping followed 
each count of a vote for either Gus Dur or Megawati.  In addition to the members 
of MPR, the balcony of room Nusantara V, was crowded with supporters of each 
candidate.  At the beginning Megawati was slightly ahead, but then the counting 
began to be in favour of Gus Dur until the lead grew greater and greater. Gus 
Dur’s name was called over and over and the hysterical shouts of Gus Dur 
supporters could not be blocked out as they crowded the room. 
 
The television camera focussed on the faces of the two politicians. They both 
appeared cool and calm.  The droning sound of Allahhu Akbar (God is great) 
began to be heard but was  stopped by the chair of the meeting.  Gus Dur clearly 
led the count; he ended up with 373 votes against Megawati’s 318.  So Gus Dur 
was elected as the fourth Indonesian President. 
 
Megawati got up from her seat and walked to Gus Dur holding out her hands to 
him. Then they hugged each other.  After the room had calmed down, Gus Dur 
with Megawati greeted the people by delivering a speech in which he invited all 
Indonesian people to unite. Through the television, Megawati calmed down her 
supporters who were gathered in front of Hotel Indonesia in Jakarta waiting for 
                                                 
191 PBB which was formed on July 17, 1998 and is based on Islam. Historically, it is relates to the 
Masyumi  party of the Old Order  (Orde Lama) era. 
192 PKB was created on July 23,1998; based on Pancas ila, it was founded by the Islamic 
community, especially by  the members of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama). 
193 The Reformation Parties is a joint grouping of small parties, such as PUDI, which only got a 
small number of votes in the 1999 election. 
194 The name Central Axis was given to an alternative grouping that identified itself as a bridge 
between Golkar and PDI-P. 
195 PAN was formed on May 20, 1998 and is based on Pancasila. 
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the announcement of the presidential election. She asked people to honour the 
result of the election that had just taken place.196 
 
The joy in the meeting room of the MPR was not reflected in those of us who 
were watching the national election on the television.  People were astonished at 
seeing the fourth presidential election.  In this remote region, far from the centre 
of the government, the people of Ngidiho were attentively observing the process 
of this Indonesian presidential election that was different from the last one. The 
presidential election in the New Order era had been with a single candidate and 
the decision was consensual.  However the most surprising result for the Ngidiho 
people watching the election was that someone like Gus Dur could be elected 
president.  Reflecting on the complexity government tasks in the village, the 
Village Head of village questioned how a blind man like Gus Dur could become 
President.  He then answered his own question by saying, “God has chosen a blind 
man to become the leader of Indonesia because the leaders are fighting”.197  
 
The surprise of those present led to the further question of why Golkar, which had 
been the winning party in Ngidiho and was presumed to be the pioneer of 
development in Indonesia, did not have either a presidential or vice-presidential 
candidate before this general meeting of the MPR.  This community regretted the 
fact that Golkar did not provide the leadership of the Indonesian government.  The 
economic crisis that had just occurred in Indonesia did not influence their 
judgment.  The majority of the farmers who produce copra had not experienced 
the negative impact of the Indonesian crisis.  On the contrary, they benefited from 
the collapse of the rupiah since they could sell their copra at a very high price on 
the world market.  The frustration and despair expressed by this audience raised 
questions about the political and material conditions in Ngidiho that affected the 
people’s response to the May 1999 general election in Galela. 
 
5.1.1.  Golkar and the 1999 Political Map in Ngidiho 
 
There are several phenomena which suggest that kin-networks played a strong 
role in determining which political parties individuals chose.  In Ngidiho, Golkar 
won the 1999 general election with 114 votes from the total of 194 votes.  The 
second was the PPP with 49 votes.  The third was the Justice Party (Partai 
                                                 
196 PDI-P won 33% of the 1999 votes. It dominated the seats in the MPR. The remaining seats 
were divided between Golkar, PPP, PKB and the party of Reformation. The position of the PDI-P 
as the winner of the general election highlighted the issue of gender that was then used by the 
Islamic parties to force a compromise which resulted in  Megawati not becoming the fourth 
president of Indonesia.  
197 Tthe next day, October 21, 1999, we could not watch the live recording of the vice presidential 
election because the electricity went off.  However, a few people gathered in the house of Oom 
Din where I was staying and together with them we followed the process of the election through 
the radio. The result was that Megawati won against Hamza Has who was nominated by the PPP.  
Megawati was nominated by the PKB. The partnership of Gus Dur and Megawati then lasted a 
little more than a year. On July 23, 2001, the MPR impeached Gus Dur and installed Megawati as 
the fifth Indonesian President. Megawati ran for the next presidential election, in September 20, 
2004 with Hasyim Muzadi as her vice presidential running mate, however they lost the election to 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla, both of whom were former Ministers in Megawati’s 
Cabinet.   
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Keadilan=PK) with 24 votes. PDI-P was fourth with 18 votes. The rest were 
divided between three new parties: the PKB with 6 votes, the Krisna Party with 5 
votes, and the Democratic Love the Nation Party (Partai Demokrasi Kasih 
Bangsa=PDKB) with 2 votes.  Among the 114 Golkar votes, 100 came from 33 
families, 27 Muslim families and 6 Christian families. The additional votes for 
Golkar came from 14 families, whose members also chose the PPP, PK, PDI-P, 
PKB and Krisna Party. The 49 votes for the PPP came from 36 homogeneous 
Muslim families.  11 homogeneous Muslim families also chose Golkar. Of the 16 
votes for the Justice Party, 6 were from homogeneous Muslim families and 8 were 
from just 2 Muslim families whose members also chose Golkar and the PPP.  The 
13 votes of the PDI-P included 3 from homogeneous Muslim families, 1 from a 
homogeneous Christian family, and 4 votes from 1 Muslim and 1 Christian 
heterogeneous families whose members also chose Golkar. 3 homogeneous 
Muslim families supported the PKB with the additional votes from 3 Muslim 
heterogeneous families whose members also chose Golkar. 3 homogeneous 
Christian families and 2 heterogeneous Christian families, whose members also 
chose Golkar, supported the Krisna Party. The PDKB was supported by 1 
homogeneous Christian family and 1 heterogeneous Christian family who 
members also supported the PDI-P. 
 
From this data, we can draw several conclusions. First, there was mixed voting in 
both Christian and Muslim families whose members chose their parties according 
to their own priorities.  This phenomenon shows the development of democracy at 
the level of the family where the members are not forced to choose the same 
party.  Even though the number of votes for the small parties was few they still 
voted for the party of their choice. 
 
The second phenomenon relates to the choice of open parties that were not limited 
by a particular religion. This can be seen in the number of votes for the PDI-P that 
include both Muslims and Christians.  Votes for parties that were based on a 
particular religion came only from members of that religion.  However the vote 
shows that family was still the primary variable in voter patterns. Families became 
the political target for various parties.  Political parties made many promises 
directed to families during the campaign.  The most prominent discourse 
concerned the improvement of living conditions for families at the village level.  
For example, the people saw Golkar as the leader of national development.  Its 
campaign elicited support by reference to development projects and promises of 
further ones.  Two Islamic parties, PPP and PK, both increased their share of the 
vote by campaigning in the same way as Golkar.  There were few supporters for 
PKB (Gus Dur) which gained a large following in Java.  PAN (Amien Rais) 
received no votes in Ngidiho. 
 
People in Ngidiho supported Golkar and former president Suharto.  The Muslims 
in Ngidiho told me that they did not like the way Amien Rais dropped Suharto. 
They supported Suharto and were angry when he was forced out of office because 
they had benefited from development projects he had initiated, such as the 
Presidential Instructions (Instruksi Presiden or Inpres) concerning agriculture and 
schools.  Amien Rais’ attack on President Suharto led the community to change 
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the meaning of the acronym “P.A.N.” from Partai Amanat National (National 
Mandate Party) to Partai Anak Nakal (Bad Boy Party).  They also created a  
meaning for PAN in the Galelan language, Pang Dauku Ka that means the black 
bottom of a frying pan. The acronym PAN was associated with the word pang 
which means a frying  pan and is pronounced “pan.”  This play on words shows 
the feeling of the community and that they believed this new party was already 
dishonest.  Similar mockery was made of  the PKB which was called the Blind 
Kiai Party (Partai Kiai Buta). 198 
 
5.1.2.  The Victory of Golkar in the North Moluccas 
 
The success of Golkar in the North Moluccas in the Reformation era cannot be 
separated from the success of Golkar in the whole region of Eastern Indonesia. 
One of the factions of Golkar, Kaukus Iramasuka, was able to bring about this 
success of Golkar in the regions of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian Jaya. 
Kaukus Iramasuka is the abbreviation used for the Eastern Region namely Irian, 
Maluku (the Moluccas), Sulawesi and Kalimantan.  Iramasuka was first proposed 
in 1979 as a forum for sports, to create friendships among youth people and 
students in the region.  However, the New Order government blocked it because 
Suharto feared that it might be used to create political solidarity and threaten 
national integration.  The New Order feared regional movements that were 
organized in the Moluccas, Southern Sulawesi, Northern Sulawesi and NTT.  Of 
course their primary fears were of independence movements in East Timor, Irian 
Jaya and Aceh. 199 
 
In the Reformation era, the Iramasuka forum was reactivated in Manado, 
Northern Sulawesi on March 24-26, 1999.  The leaders of Golkar claimed that this 
forum would stimulate national development in the eastern region of Indonesia, 
however their political motivations were clear.  The Golkar campaign in Eastern 
Indonesia during 1999 used the name of B. J. Habibie as its political center since 
he is from Sulawesi. The success of Golkar in Eastern Indonesia contributed to the 
suprising result that nationally Golkar won the second highest number of votes 
after PDI-P.  
 
In the North Moluccas, the results of the 1999 election for the regional parliament 
(DPRD Tingkat I) were as follows200:   
Golkar, 16 seats 
PPP,   7 seats  
PDI-P  7 seats 
PDKB  2 seats 
PAN  1 seat 
PP  1 seat 
PK  1 seat 
Krisna Party 1 seat 
                                                 
198 Kiai refers to a Muslim religious leader. 
199 See Kompas (April 6, 1999).  In Chapter IV I have already explained about several political 
movements that were organized in the period 1950-1959 in Sulawesi and the Moluccas. 
200 See Ternate Pos (August 10-16,1999). 
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PDI  1 seat 
PKB  1 seat 
PSII  1 seat 
PBB  1 seat.   
 
The success of Golkar resulted in the Sultan of Ternate, Mudaffar Sjah, the head 
of the Committee for Regional Organization (DPP) becoming the head of the 
Regional Legislature (DPRD Tingkat I). Mudaffar Sjah is the son of the former 
Sultan of Ternate, Usman Sjah who is discussed in Chapter IV.  After 1965, 
Usman Sjah and his family returned to Ternate (van Fraassen: 1999, 60).201  The 
political career of Mudaffar Sjah in Golkar began in 1971 when he was a Golkar 
representative in the Regency level parliament (DPRD Tingkat II).  In 1977 he 
was elected as a Golkar representative in the national parliament (DPR) (van 
Fraassen: 1996,60). 
 
The supporters of Mudaffar Sjah as a 1999-2003 candidate for the provincial 
parliament (DPRD I) included members of Golkar, PDI-P and small parties such 
as the Krisna party, PDKB and PP.  It seems contradictory that supporters of the 
PDI-P as an anti status-quo party, supported Suharto’s Golkar Party.  However, 
the supporters of PDI-P wanted to pay for the good services which the Sultan of 
Ternate had given to Megawati Sukarnoputeri. In 1995, during the Suharto period 
when the leadership of Megawati was banned, the Sultan of Ternate helped her to 
talk freely with her supporters at the Sultanate Palace. The security provided by 
the Sultan was for political services that Megawati had given him.202  Those from 
the small parties who supported the Golkar candidate also saw Golkar as less 
threatening than PPP or one of the other strict Muslim parties.  The same 
assessment applied to the Krisna Party203 and the PDKB204 who found it easier to 
cooperate with Golkar. The Unity Party (Partai Persatuan=PP), which was also 
an Islamic party, resulted from an internal conflict with PPP.205 
 
The centre organization of Golkar in Jakarta appointed the Sultan of Ternate as 
Head of the DPD-Golkar in the North Moluccas. The Sultan formed cadres within 
Golkar by using party functionaries who had positions in the government 
bureaucracies, leaders of social organizations, and leaders of functional 
                                                 
201 Bureaucratization by the colonial government decreased the sovereignty rights of Ternatese 
Sultan. During the Japanese occupation, the anti-Dutch movement caused to the family of the 
Sultan to flee to Australia. In the Old Order period, after the dissolution of the Eastern Indonesia 
State, and the rise of the Southern Moluccan Movement (RMS), the central government in Jakarta 
removed the Sultan of Ternate from power because he was assumed to support that movement. He 
was pulled in to strengthen the Internal Affairs Department in Jakarta. After his retirement, he 
stayed in Jakarta. See the further details in Chapter IV. 
202 See Ternate Pos  (August 10-16,1999). 
203 Krisna Party is the abbreviation for the National Christian Party of Indonesia. Although this 
party was labelled Christian it is based on Pancasila. The Krisna Party was formed on May 20, 
1998.  PP and several Islamic parties, based on Islam, were created on August 3, 1998. 
204 PDKB is the abbreviation of Party Democracy Affection Nation (PDKB), which bases on 
Pancasila. 
205 PP is the abbreviation for the Unity Party (Partai Persatuan). PP, which is bases is on Is lam; it 
was formed in January 1999 as a split-off from the PPP. There was a leadership competition 
between Naro and Hamza Has. See Kompas (March 6, 1999). 
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organizations (cf. Samugyo: 1982, 112). The Sultan formed links with the social 
leadership in order to increase public support for the party in his region. As a 
social leader, the symbolic sovereignty of the Sultan of Ternate enabled him to 
mobilise people to trust Golkar.  Golkar campaigned in North Moluccas for the 
region’s right to become an independent province, separate from Ambon.  
Governmental reform under Habibie highlighted the development of North 
Moluccas as a means to strengthen political relationships between Golkar, the 
society in the region and his government.206  Moreover, the government seemed to 
be forcing the implementation of the  regulation (UU) for regional development of 
the Moluccas and Irian Jaya, before the general election in 1999.  However the 
plan could not proceed because of technical obstacles.207  The social elite had 
discussed the idea of the separation of North Moluccas from Ambon as early as 
1964.208  However, the government of Suharto saw the idea of separation as a 
threat to national integrity.  Therefore the idea of separation between North 
Moluccas and Ambon was not on the agenda of the New Order government. 
 
Sultan H. Mudaffar Sjah was installed as the Head of the DPRD at the beginning 
of November 1999, when I was doing my fieldwork in Ngidiho.  However, after 
the violence in North Moluccas, the members of the DPRD I fired him from this 
position.  Akbar Tanjung as the general chairman of Golkar pushed the 
Indonesian Police to investigate the Sultan to find support for this suspension. 
Political rivals of the Sultan who competed for the  leadership in North Moluccas 
gave the reports to Akbar Tanjung.  The Sultan was condemned as a provocateur 
who had escalated the conflict between Christians and Muslims because of his 
political ambitions.209  His suspension was influenced by the situation in national 
politics in which Golkar failed to nominate Habibie; this failure also meant that 
the political promises of the Kaukus Iramasuka could not be fulfilled.210  
 
At this point, before returning to an explanation of the use of power in the politics 
of ritual in  North Moluccas, I will examine how the use of power has been 
exercised by national leaderships from the Sukarno era to the eruption of the 
1999-2000 violence in North Moluccas.  This explanation will help to show the 
role of commandos in politics. 
 
5.2.  The Politics of Integration during the Sukarno Era 
 
The Sukarno government introduced the politics of integration and national 
identity to the Indonesian people in their struggle for independence from Western 
and Eastern colonialism. The political identity formed before and after 
colonialism was different.  The political identity that was shaped during the 
colonial period was related to the achievement of independence.  At the beginning 
of the 20th century the style of Indonesian colonial politics had changed because 
of the  movement in the Netherlands demanding an ethical foreign policy and the 
                                                 
206 See Republika Online (May 9, 1999). 
207 See Kompas (April 26, 1999). 
208  See (M.S.Djahir:1964). 
209 Bernas  (October 9,2000) 
210 A further explanation can be found at the end of this chapter. 
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resulting success of Abraham Kuyper of the Christian Party.  The growth of 
liberalism in the 19th Century and the creation of a socialist party at the beginning 
of 20th Century, stimulated the growth of a nationalist movement in the 
Netherlands East Indies. The nationalists first became organized in 1901 in Java 
(Vandenbosch: 1933, 52).  The twin pillars of national politics and nationalism 
became entwined, particularly in the region of the Moluccas. 
 
5.2.1.  The Pillar of National Politics 
 
The ethical policy emphasized social justice for the indigenous people in the 
colony. This  led to the improvement of education and social prosperity 
(Vandenbosch: 1933, 252). To achieve such improvement, the colonial 
government began to support the work of missionaries who could speed  up the 
development of education. In the previous policy, missionaries had not been 
permitted to be involved with development activities in the indigenous 
communities for fear of interfering with profits.   
 
Army Vandenbosch described several movements that appeared before the 
independence of Indonesia. The first movement began with educated, indigenous 
Javanese who worked for the colonial government.  It was organized in Surabaya 
by Dr Soetomo who then organised the first congress in 1908 (Vandenbosch: 
1933, 349).  This movement was inspired by Javanese and by 1910 had 40 
branches.  However it did not reach the whole society.  The second movement 
was that of nationalists who formed the Indian Party in 1912.  Its  background was 
the class policy in the social structure in the colonial system. The colonial policy 
of offering different forms of legal citizenship based on ethnicity was targeted by 
the Indian Party in their struggle for equality in society. 
 
Another movement was Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union or SI). This movement also 
arose to oppose social inequality in Javanese society.  Javanese were employed at 
middle levels of the colonial bureaucracy and as labourers for Chinese 
entrepreneurs who benefited from the policy of the colonial government to grant 
credit for Chinese investments. The Chinese were in a distinct category of law, 
higher than the “natives” but lower than the Europeans.  The SI supported 
economic access to credit for indigenous Javanese in the management of the batik 
industry.  Moreover, protested the preferential treatment given to foreign elites, 
such as Chinese, Arabs and Europeans, while the local people remained poor.  
The government tried to stimulate economic growth in the Netherlands East 
Indies by giving generous credit to a foreign elite (cf. Carpenter: 1923). 
 
Political language drew from religious and ethnic symbols.  The SI combined 
socialist ideology with religious sentiments, but their struggle was not successful 
because of their support for violent labour strikes in Java and Sumatera 
(Vandenbosch: 1933, 343, 346).  Other movements concerned with education 
appeared in Surabaya, Bandung and Yogyakarta.  Movements using ethnic labels 
were organised by young people beginning with the movement of Javanese Youth 
in 1915.  Other youth organisations based on ethnicity included the Sunda Youth, 
Sumatra Youth, Minahasa Youth, Ambon Youth, etc. (Vandenbosch: 1933, 359).  
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The women’s movement in the Netherlands East Indies also began to take shape 
after the death of R.A. Kartini in 1904.211 
 
5.2.2.  Nationalism among the Moluccans  
 
Nationa lism using non-religious symbols did not develop in the North Moluccas. 
Among the Ambonese, a parallel kind of religious nationalism grew that used the 
symbolism of Christianity to protest against the discriminatory policies of the 
colonial government at the time.  Leirissa reports that in 1947 there were 4000 
Moluccans living in different parts of the island of Java.  This diaspora was the 
result of the colonial government policy to organize army units of indigenous 
people, especially those from the central Moluccas (Leirissa: 1975, 113). 
 
During the same period there was often tension between the KNIL soldiers and 
the colonial authorities because of the poor economic conditions of the soldiers 
and their families. Looking to solve this problem, the Moluccans created an 
organisation called Mena Moeria in Magelang in 1915.  It aimed to raise support 
for the education of children from military families. Mena Moeria received 
support from Ambonsch Studiefonds (AS), an organisation established in Jakarta 
in 1909, which provided educational funds for people from Ambon, both those 
who lived Java and those in the Moluccan archipelago (Leirissa: 1975, 59). 
 
Because the activities of AS was directed to Christians (Leirissa: 1975, 59), an 
organisation called the Ambon Union (Sarekat Ambon=SA) was established for 
the common people with no religious limitations. The establishment of the SA 
was originally planned to take place in Surabaya in the early 1920s.  However the 
board of the SA decided to centralise its activity in the Moluccan archipelago 
where nationalist ideas were not well developed well. In 1923, one of the board 
members, A. J. Patty, went to Ambon to start their activities. SA in Java worked 
in cooperation with Budi Utomo and received full support from it. 
 
The people of Ambon and the Moluccas generally welcomed the arrival of the SA 
(Leirissa: 1975, 65).  Its activities developed quickly because it approached the 
community through the organization of a cooperative and agricultural activities. 
                                                 
211 The target of Kartini’s movement was the women in Java. She built a special school to educate 
women commoners.  The publishing of her book Habis Gelap Terbit Terang (At the End of the 
Night Comes the Dawn) which was an anthology of her letters to friends aboard, inspired the 
women’s movement in Indonesia.  The women’s movement was organized in 1928 to try to unite 
smaller movements and carefully avoid political and religious propaganda.  An important issues m 
for the movement were the polygamy practices in Muslim society in the Netherlands East Indies 
(Vandenboch: 1933, 360). The movement, which targeted both ethnic and religious groups  for 
support at the national level, was formed by Indonesian students who were studying at the 
Technical College, the Medical College and the Law School.  On October 28, 1929 in Batavia, 
there was a second Congress of Indonesian Youth that supported the Indonesian movement 
without using religious symbols for political identity. This congress was successful in organizing 
the Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) and sang for the first time the Indonesian National Anthem 
Indonesian Raya  (Vandenbosch: 1933, 359).  After that, at each meeting this national anthem was 
sung and helped to build enthusiasm for national awaking among the indigenous people 
(Vandenbosh: 1933, 352).  Young people also formed a nationalist movement with religious ties 
such as the Committee of Islamic Youth (Persekutuan Pemuda Islam) that was created in 1926. 
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However, the wide support it received created fear in the Ethnic Christian Party 
(Christenlijk Ethische Partij).  Ambonese aristocratic families belonged to this 
party and they claimed the Moluccas as their political territory.  A parallel claim 
could also be seen in the North Moluccas where the Islamic aristocratic politicians 
claimed the territory for themselves. The Ethnic Christian Party was related to the 
organisation of the Regentenbond, an organisation of local elites like the raja 
patih (village leaders), and other powerful people (Leirissa: 1975, 65).  Therefore, 
after the arrival of the SA, the Regentenbond used its power to ban its activities on 
the grounds that the SA broke tradition (adat-istiadat) (Leirissa: 1975, 68).  The 
colonial government supported the opposition to this party because they had built 
mutual interests with the aristocratic community in the Central Moluccas. 
 
According to Leirissa, the Regentenbond engineered the ban on SA on the pretext 
that the SA violated tradition (Leirissa: 1975, 71).  However, its main purpose was 
to pressure the colonial government to expell A. J. Patty from Ambon.  In the end, 
Patty returned to Surabaya and left the management of SA in the hands of the 
local leaders in the city of Ambon.  By 1929, there were three nationalist political 
organisations in the Moluccan archipelago: the Christenlijk Ambonsch Volksbond 
(CAV), made up of Christian cadres from the SA, Sarekat Ambon and Sarekat 
Islam.  CAV was led by a member of the Sarekat Ambon branch in Surabaya 
(Leirissa: 1975, 98). The membership of Sarekat Islam was directed under the 
leadership of Sarekat Islam in Yogyakarta (Leirissa: 1975, 76). 
 
The relationship between the Christian and Muslim leaders improved after the 
Christian leader E. U. Pupella, who held a position in the colonial government, led 
a protest against a colonial regulation on education. They judged that the 
regulation did not benefit the private schools, which were managed independently. 
The regulation was that permission to open schools would be given only if the 
teachers had proper diplomas (Leirissa: 1975, 92-93).  At that time, the only 
schools that qualified were government schools, for example, in the villages 
(desaschool).  The teachers in the private schools did not hold diplomas.  This 
protest opened up the possibility to also run non-Christian schools such as 
Muhammadiyah in the Moluccas. 
 
Expressions of nationalism in the Moluccas surfaced primarily in disputes about 
education, which was still very expensive for anyone who was not related to the  
aristocratic families.  The political impact of education could also be seen during 
the time of the Japanese who used Islamic symbolizm against the Christians and 
sharpened differences between the  indigenous people.  Nevertheless, E. U. 
Pupella was an exception to the rule.  He was a nationalist Christian leader who 
worked with Muslim leaders as part of the governmental bureaucracy in the 
Japanese colonial era (see Chapter IV). 
 
Heterogeneous political interests inspired the nationalist struggle in the 
Netherlands Indies.  The struggle for independence often united people across 
political, religious, ethnic and linguistic barriers (Rejai: 1991, 48). The presence 
of the Japanese made the maturing of the Indonesian independent preparation 
possible.  After the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, the Indonesian 
 199 
leaders immediately proclaimed Indonesian National Independence as a sign that 
the people were ready to become a free and sovereign state.  
 
5.2.3.  National Integration and Pancasila 
 
Sukarno used elements from Javanese cultural discourse to maintain unity and 
reduce competition among the different ethnic groups in Indonesia (cf. Drake: 
1989, 75-80).  Drake differentiates between national political integration and 
nationalism.  Conceptually, the politics of integration emphase the mutual aspects 
that ensure the participation of different parties in national life and government 
(Drake: 1989, 5). Nationalism awakens patriotic feelings that overcome the 
particularism of local loyalties by replacing them with loyalty to the whole nation; 
nationalism has imagined characteristics that can unite people from different 
religious and ethnic backgrounds (Anderson: 1999, 37-46). 
 
The nationalist leaders were concerned about the uneven implementation of law in 
the pre-independence period even before the defeat of Japan in the Second World 
War.212  The institution preparing for Indonesian independence (abbreviation: 
BPUPKI=Badan Pekerja Umum Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) began to 
think in depth about an ideal foundation for the Indonesian state.  On June 1, 1945 
Sukarno proposed the five principles of Pancasila as the state ideology.  Pancasila 
means ‘five foundations’. His speech received support from the members of 
BPUPKI.  
 
Pancasila was developed in several versions.  On June 22, 1945, BPUPKI 
accepted an early formulation of Pancasila known as the Jakarta Charter (Piagam 
Djakarta).  The Jakarta Charter stated that Muslims are required to follow Islamic 
law (…”dengan berdasarkan kepada ke-Tuhanan, dengan kewadjiban 
mendjalankan sjari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja” (“…based on the Deity 
with the obligation of Muslims to carry out Islamic law.”).  The Japanese 
occupation of Indonesia is part of the background of the Jakarta Charter.   At that 
time, the Japanese promoted religious nationalism and directed the hatred of the 
indigenous people against the Netherlands and all Dutch influences in the 
Netherlands Indies.   However the majority of Muslims, including Muslim parties 
such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), joined in rejecting the Jakarta Charter, not only 
because it put Islam in a preferential position, but also because it positioned the 
                                                 
212 The complexity of society can be seen from the legal systems that were employed in the 
Netherlands Indies. The courts system differentiated between a European court which applied 
modern law and family courts that ensured that the Muslim society fulfilled the Shari’a obligations 
especially those related to divorce (Drake: 1989, 79).  Moreover, the colonial government also 
applied adat through the court system. Juliet Lee comments  that the implementation of adat law 
was implemented as a political policy to block the extension of religious courts based on Islam 
(Lee: 1999).  However, the only structure of the old government that was not changed by the 
colonial government was the legal institution by which the Sultan of Ternate was free to use both  
Islamic law and adat law to judge cases that were related to the different backgrounds of the 
communities. The adat system was for non-Muslims and the Islamic system applied to Muslims. 
 200 
government as responsible for enforcing religious law.  Such a postion violated 
Indonesian Islamic principles of religious tolerance (Feillard: 1999).213  
 
The nationalists rejected the Jakarta Charter because they knew that national unity 
was impossible without respect between the different major religions, i.e. Islam, 
Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism (Niswah: 1999).  Just one day after the 
proclamation of Indonesian independent on August 17, 1945, the Committee for 
the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI) declared that Pancasila 
(without the controversial Jakarta Charter), was the foundation of the state.  The 
wording of Pancasila was according to the version of the National Constitution 
1945 (UUD 1945) which remains till the present.  The UUD 1945 contains an 
introduction and 137 passages. The five principles of Pancasila symbolized the 
five obligations that are practiced in Islam and the five heroes (Pandawa) in the 
Mahabarata narration of Hinduism (Drake: 1989, 77). 
 
Sukarno invented many rituals, ceremonies, slogans, movements, projects and 
social activities as a means of propagating Pancasila (Drake: 1989, 77).  Acting as 
a charismatic leader who could unify Indonesia, Sukarno personally developed the 
idea of political integration without limitations (Cribb and Brown: 1995, 87). The 
presidential decree of 1959 also ensured presidential powers without limitation as 
had been the pattern practiced by the Javanese kingdoms. Many authors note a 
change in Sukarno’s leadership style in which he used the discourse about 
national integrity to centralize political leadership (Drake: 1989, 4). 
 
President Sukarno was able to assume unlimited political power because Supomo 
had already conceptualized an “integralist” state that ruled out opposition in the 
name of a total unity based on family relationships.  These principles are still 
enshrined in the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945) (Feith and Castles: 1970, 188). 
Supomo developed the idea of integralism on the model of the Japanese imperial 
family (Koshitu) in which the Emperor was the spiritual centre for the people of 
Japan. This model had parallels with the traditional power structure of Javanese 
Kingdoms in which the relationship of king and people is portrayed as a unity of 
kawula-gusti, similar to the feudal relations between Master and Servant (Supomo 
in Feith and Castles: 1970 [1945], 189).  Sukarno centralized power during the 
period of “guided democracy” (1959 –1965) in a way reminiscent to the 
bureaucratic control of the ancient kingdoms in Java (Crouch: 1978, 176).  
Several revisions of the Constitution between 1950 and 1959 eased the way for 
the President to centralise power in his own person. 214 
                                                 
213 As a term, “Islamic Nationalism” was used by later political scientists to distinguish between 
this movement and another nationalist group who supported “Secular Nationalism” (see Ismail: 
1995, 47-48). The terms used  presently are related to the party colours such as: Communist, 
Muslim, and Social Democrats (Feith and Castle: 1970).  Feith and Castle categorise Sukarno as a 
radical nationalist. In my opinion, the term “secular nationalism” as used by Faisal Ismail contains 
a bias as if all nationalist groups outside Islam are secular. In the earlier context where all parties 
acknowledged their belief in the unity of Deity as the foundation of the state, the term “secular 
nationalism” as used by Ismail should be reevaluated.  
214 See for example the research of Latief which shows the influences of state regulations (UU 
negara) in extending the presidential position from Sukarno to the end of the Suharto era (Latief: 
1998). 
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The creation of a temporary Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Supreme Advisor 
Council)  and the simplification of parties through a presidential regulation 
(Panpres No.7) of 1959 was a way to control national political integration 
(Samugyo: 1982, 10). The Presidential Decree indicated a transition from a  
political system that empowered civil society into one that gave a greater role to 
the military. The military, which had been marginalized by Sukarno, gained more 
power after the announcement of the emergency law in 1957 (Crouch: 1978). This 
law explicitly named the President as the Great Revolutionary Commander.  The 
military became the counsellor to Sukarno, who especially rewarded the leftist 
faction.  However tensions between communists, moderate Muslims and pro-
western supporters outside Java continued to grow (Andrea and Ra’anan: 1969, 
46). 
 
Sukarno manipulated the rewritten Regulations (UU) and declared that they 
supported cooperation, not conflict between the Representatives of the Legislature 
(MPR) and the president.  This made Sukarno very difficult to remove from 
office.  Finally, in 1963, the MPRS (No III MPRS/1963) appointed Sukarno, the 
great Revolutionary Leader/ Military Commander, President for Life.  This 
appointment was against the UUD 1945, article 7 that called for the election of the 
president every 5 years with the possibility of re-election (Latief: 1998).  
However, only two years later, the 1965 September 30 Movement effectively 
finished the power of Sukarno.  Crouch (1978) writes about two versions of these 
killings which initiated a dark political period, the mystery of which is still to be 
revealed.215 
                                                 
215 In one version, the entire plan of the PKI was known by Sukarno (Crouch: 1978, 106). The 
kidnapping and killing of the seven generals was successful, but the transference of power did not 
come about according to the plan of the PKI.  State power was directly taken over by Major 
General Suharto who was in charge as the commander of the strategic army  unit (Kostrad).  A 
second version is bas ed on the analysis of working networks investigating the background of the 
people who were involved in the bloody violence of this affair. Wertheim has said that only Aidit, 
Untung, Latief and Supardjo had close relations with Suharto (quoted in Crouch: 1979, 123).  
They were the members of his group.  At the wedding of Untung in 1964, Suharto was present. 
Untung was his representative in Centre Java during the campaign for the control of Western Irian 
(Irian Barat). Latief has identified him as a former official in the Diponegoro military division who 
had fought under the command of Suharto during the revolution.  Suharto and Supardjo were in 
Kolaga together when Suharto was the commander of the fighting troops.  Wertheim analysis was 
based on an interview of Suharto by the American journalist Brackman in 1968. In the interview, 
Suharto said that he was visiting his son at the hospital on September 30, 1965.  In the hospital he 
met Latief who came not to visit his son but to check for him. Wertheim assumes  from this 
statement of Suharto that the idea that he had indeed received information about the coup plan 
from his followers is strengthened.  He then concludes that perhaps those who killed the generals 
and massacred the communists were the same group (Crouch: 1978, 124). The research of 
Wertheim could not go any further because the leaders whom Suharto knew were not brought 
before the military court (Mahkamah Militer).  Latief was not permitted to be a witness in court 
until 1975.  Even then his evidence was presented only in written form.  Crouch assumes that 
Latief was intentionally excluded because of the regime’s fears that the public might know about 
the meeting between Suharto and Latief from which they could conclude that Suharto was a friend 
of the initiators of the movement.  However, at that time, the public already knew about the rift 
which had taken place in the military in 1963 when Suharto opposed Muhammad Yani, one of the 
general who was killed on September 30. Their dispute was about the role of Kostrad (Crouch: 
1978, 125). This rift sharpened differences concerning loyalty and ethnicity in the military.  The 
feelings of loyalty that developed between Suharto, Untung and two other colleagues, was based 
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The different versions of the “G 30 S PKI” and its bloody aftermath raises the 
question of what do we actually know about the history of Indonesia?  Major 
transitions in power are followed by a rewriting of history from the new ruling 
party’s perspective. Even now, North Moluccan history is being reconstructed to 
conform with various historical claims that support particular interests in the 
politics of the region.  Indonesian history is rewritten by those in power in order to 
discredit those whom they have defeated so that they cannot rise again.  Secondly, 
the new regime reevaluates and reconstructs a new history in order to tell the story 
of the people’s identity and past from the perspective of the new historical elite.  
In the case of Indonesia’s political history, it is hard to escape Michel Foucault’s 
conclusion that the truth is a product of power. 
 
5.3.  The Politics of Identity in Suharto’s  ‘New Order’ 
 
Suharto used national development as a pillar of his political discourse.  He 
arranged and controlled the political system in order to maintain the continuity of 
the developmental process. The discourse of development and a me taphysical 
explanation of Pancasila within the Javanese concept of power were a means of 
rational control. 
 
5.3.1.  Students as a Means of Revolution 
 
After the events of September 30, 1965 (Gerakan 30 September=Gestapu or G 30 
S PKI),216 the power of Sukarno was still strong even though Suharto was in 
control of the military. 217  The student movement, later called the 1966 
                                                                                                                                     
on their Javanese origin and indirectly identified them as outside the circle of Nasution and Yani 
who were ethnic Sumaterans. The circle of Yani who formed the core of the General Board did not 
agree with the declaration which made Sukarno long-life president.  Therefore those who were 
loyal to Suharto knew with whom they could ally and build a coalition. By getting rid of the 
generals who were in the circle of the president, and placing another person trusted by the military 
outside of that circle, Suharto who was Javanese would not be afraid when a sudden presidential 
declaration was issued. He could deal with the transformation of power smoothly (Crouch: 1978, 
124).  From the side of Sukarnoism, the counter revolutionary movement conducted by the army 
was supposedly related to CIA.  It played an important role during the cold war (Crouch: 1978, 97-
98).  Beyond various conspiracy theories about the bloody movement of  September 30, 1965, 
there are two factors that should be noted.  First, the collapse of Sukarno and secondly, the rise of 
Suharto.  At the grassroots level, this moment started a huge massacre that spread through  
Sumatra, Java and Bali whereever the PKI was engaged with its peasant followers. The number of 
people who were killed in Java is reported to have been 800,000 and in Bali 100,000. The 
massacre continued from October 1965 to 1969 (Crouch: 1978; Cribb and Brown: 1978; 
Robinson: 1995). 
216 See Chapter IV. 
217 Sukarno was still supported by the military branches, which were intentionally separated from 
the centre of the army (Crouch: 1978, 159).  Because the Ppresident was the leader of the 
revolution, he was the only center.  Close partnerships among different forces in the Indonesian 
military were minimized.  Support was received from the naval forces, the Indonesian police and 
the air forces to limit the power of the army. The political leaders of the NU and the National 
Indonesian Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia=PNI) supported the president, although they also 
supported the army in the annihilation of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (Crouch: 1978, 
159).  Crouch shows that this support was the result of patron-client relationships as developed by 
Sukarno with his people.  Moreover, there was a sign that Sukarno had created space for a political 
maneuver to benefit from the sma ll parties as the result of the growth of tension between himself 
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generation, played a crucial role in finally overthrowing Sukarno.  There were 
daily demonstrations and pressure of the students became more severe  after the 
death of Arief Rahman Hakim, a medical student at University of Indonesia and 
of a senior high school student.  Both were shot by the army (tentara 
Cakrabirawa) (Crouch: 1978, 182).  The transfer of power from Sukarno to 
Suharto was speeded up through a letter of instruction on March 11,1966 (Surat 
Perintah 11 Maret 1966 or SUPER SEMAR).  As a result, the MPRS declared that 
Suharto was the new leader of Indonesia. 
 
5.3.2.  The Single Principle and No Opposition 
 
Suharto named his government “the New Order” after he took power.  This term 
differentiated his rule from the regime of Sukarno, which he called “the Old 
Order.”  In the new social-political situation, the military was seen as the creator 
of order (Samugyo: 1982, 10).  The goal of the New Order was to strengthen the 
building of the nation based on Pancasila and the UUD 1945 to achieve 
democracy and development.  Suharto rewrote the history of Indonesia, especially 
the genealogy of Pancasila (see Suharto: 1979; Notosusanto: 1983).  In the 
version of the “palace historians,” Muhammad Yamin was credited as the 
designer of Pancasila, rather than Sukarno (Risakotta: 1995b).  The new version 
pictured the centre of Indonesian modern history as beginning in 1965.  A 
particular vision of the past was evoked to direct the road to the future.  
 
The New Order inherited two perceptions of Pancasila from the two versions of 
the Constitution: UUD 1945 and the Jakarta Charter. To control the 
implementation of Pancasila, the New Order merged all the political parties and 
their ideologies into just two parties, PDI and PPP (Hadiz: 2001).  The aim was to 
retain all the unique characteristics of the parties but in the form of permanent 
coalitions (Samugyo: 1982, 12). The parties’ merger was codified in a regulation 
about political parties and the Government Working Group (Golongan Karya or 
Golkar) (See UU No.3/1985).  Golkar was formed on October 20, 1964 as a social 
organisation, a non-political party.  However, it became the political machine of 
the New Order, a kind of super party for those in power. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
and the army. Therefore, the army tried to get support from the groups of parties that were 
oppressed under the leadership of Sukarno. The military built support from Masyumi and PSI 
(Crouch: 1978,179).  The Indonesian Islamic Student (Pelajar Islam Indonesia=PII), which was a 
Masyumi influenced organisation and led by Husni Thamrin, with the student organisation in 
Jakarta (KAMI), began to demonstrate their support of the army.  KAMI, which means the Unity 
Action of Indonesian Students (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia=KAMI), was formed by anti-
communist the student organisations at a meeting at the house of the Minister of Education, Brigen 
Sjarif Thajeh (Crouch: 1978, 165).  At the meeting, the National Indonesian Student Movement 
(Gerakan Mahasiswa National Indonesia=GMNI) which was affiliated with PNI refused to accept 
The Indonesian Student Association (HMI) which became a target group of communists, 
nationalists, and the September 30 mo vement (Crouch: 1978, 165). Nevertheless, despite the 
disunity of student groups they all used the slogan of Tritura as their organizational agenda.  
“Tritura” is the abbreviation for three demands of the people (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat), that there be a  
decreased in prices, the dissolution of the PKI and the dissolution of the cabinet (Crouch: 
1978,166). On January 10, 1964, thousands of students  gathered at the front of the Medical School 
of the University of Indonesia to shout their slogans. 
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According to Verdi Hadiz, the New Order’s definition of democracy as “Pancasila 
Democracy” and its elimination of the power to form political parties or a political 
opposition shows a continuation of the “guided democracy” that was alive in the 
Old Order era (Hadiz: 2001).  The New Order practiced a concept of democracy 
based on mutual cooperation, community self-help and harmony, rather than fair 
competition among political parties. To fulfil its political agenda, the New Order 
passed a regulation (UU no.1-8 1985) that made Pancasila the state ideology and 
the only legal foundation for all Indonesian organisations. The elimination of 
political differences was to avoid the conflict and brutality characterized general 
election campaigns.  According to Samugyo, however, conflicts in the general 
elections occurred because there were the big gaps between voters who were not 
experienced in the process of cadre formation (Samugyo: 1982, 6).  Since political 
parties had no power to create public opinion in opposition to the government, the 
campaigns were transformed into public demonstrations of physical force and 
masculine display. 218 
 
5.3.3.  Economic Modernisation and Developmental Projects 
 
The New Order wove together institutionalization, economic development and 
distribution of wealth. Institutionalization through networks of functionaries was 
one way to create social stability.  The government carried out and evaluated 
                                                 
218 The research of Samugyo shows the inequality of facilities between Golkar and the two other 
parties. As the state organ, Golkar was well supplied with materials and human resources in order 
to plan and effect public opinion. Its followers acquired capability and maturity in politics. 
Therefore it received most of the votes.  I have already discussed the success of Golkar in the 
North Moluccas. The campaigns of the PDI were determined by the abilities of the orators 
(Samugyo: 1982, 110).  The forming of cadres in the PPP was not realised so there were 
substantial differences within itself. The interest of party failed because of the larger personal 
interests of the different groups, which had emerged.  PPP was a coalition between NU, Muslimin 
Indonesia, Perti and PSII (Samugyo:  1982,117). The break-up within the PPP could be seen in the 
transformation of the fatwa (religious instruction) that was issued in 1977 and changed in 1987.  In 
1977, K.H.Bisjri stated that: 
“… barang siapa diantara umat Islam yang menjadi peserta Pemilu, tapi tidak menusuk tanda 
gambar PPP, karena takut kehilangan kedudukan atau mata pencaharian maupun sebab-sebab lain 
adalah orang yang meninggalkan hukum Allah” (dikutip dalam Samugyo: 1982,168). 
“ …As election participants those in the Muslim community who do not punch the sign for the 
PPP because of feeling threatened by the loss of position or economic resources or for other 
reasons, are  people who have deserted God’s law (quoted in Samugyo: 1982,168). 
However in 1987, another fatwa was issued that said: 
“ wajib mencoblos PPP, tidak haram mencoblos Golkar and PDI” (dikutip dalam Samugyo: 
1982, 167). 
“[Muslims] must vote for the PPP, but it is not forbidden to vote for Golkar or the PDI” (quoted in 
Samugyo: 1982, 167). 
According to Samugyo, these different fatwa have to be understood in the context of the existence 
of NU and PPP. In 1977, NU was still joined together with the PPP so that the fatwa’s aim was to 
encourage the traditional voters. In 1987, the fatwa assumed that the traditional voters would 
choose Golkar or the PDI instead of the PPP. This fatwa, ensured that the NU’s voters in Eastern 
Java would be influenced  by the efforts to deflate the PPP (Samugyo: 1982, 167).  In the circle of 
the PDI, since the beginning of the 1990s, the name of Megawati Sukarnoputri was targeted to 
increase the popularity of the party. However, according to observers, to maintain the unity of state 
party the goverbment intentionally created dissension within the party. The attack on the 
headquarters of the PDI on July 27,1996 showed the way violence was practised by the New Order 
government.   
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Indonesian development plans according to the “Five Year Developmental Plans” 
(Repelita).  The three foundations of development (Trilogi Pembangunan) were 
security, development and distribution. In the period from 1964 to 1970 the 
emphasis was on maintaining national stability while the  institutionalization of 
the government was strengthened.  
 
The government established institutional order through both the civil bureaucracy 
and the military.  For civil institutions, the New Order government created a sense 
of loyalty among civil servants through an organisation called KORPRI, the Corps 
of the Republic of Indonesia Civil Services (Hill: 1994, xxvii). The government 
required that the KORPRI uniform be used by the civil services throughout 
Indonesia. The military had a dual role, both to protect the state and also to be a 
political force to maintain the New Order government (Hill: 1994, xxii - xxiii, 7-
9). The government appointed commanding officers from the military as General 
Inspectors in government offices and the state business institution (Badan Usaha 
Milik Negara= BUMN). These military officers headed regional and regency 
governments.  At the village level, the position of babinsa was established to 
control village government and to ensure that the community chose Golkar in the 
general elections (Singh: 2000, 8).   
 
With the political situation under control, Suharto hoped for continuious 
development consistent with the five year plans. Jeffrey A. Winters examines how 
institutionalisation in the field of economics allowed for control of income 
resources (Winters: 1996).  The 1970s and 1980s were boom years for Indonesian 
oil. In this period, according to Winters, the surplus of oil income should have 
been used to strengthen resource development and pay for the state investment 
that had already been made.  Instead, the income was used for personal gain 
(Winters: 1996, 41). Winters shows how the economic structure of power in the 
government protected the interests of the Suharto family.219 
 
The benefits of the oil boom were used less for serving society.  Economic 
projects, which required large investments were in the hands of Indonesian-
Chinese as they had been in the colonial era.  The policy of Berdikari, an acronym 
for “standing on your own two feet” (Berdiri di atas kaki sendiri) emphasised 
ethno-nationalism and was introduced by the Old Order regime to help indigenous 
Indonesians.  The Chinese were marginalized by being denied access to most 
sectors of Indonesian society except the economic sphere.220  Chinese investors 
                                                 
219 In the process of planning the income of the state from oil, the government formed Team 10, 
which was not structured under Bappenas, the National Planning Institution. Bappenas was 
responsible for designing the patterns of national development.  Indonesian technocrats who were 
known as “the Berkeley Mafia” because many were graduates of the University of California, 
Berkeley, were appointed to lead  Bappenas and to hold such strategic positions as Minister of 
Finance.  Team 10 was directly under the Secretary of  State, which was held by Sudarmono 
(Winters: 1996, 133).  Sudarmono was a military officer assigned to governmental office.  
Therefore Hill was right in calling the military officers cukong, which means ‘boss’ (Hill: 1994,  
34).  Team 10 reported directly to the Secretary of State or the President (Hill: 1994, 131). This 
economic structure maintained the Suharto family’s access to income from state oil resources. 
220 The marginalisation of ethnic Chinese included the denial of their right to own land or 
participate in government.  However both Dutch and Indonesian governments gave preferential 
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returned to Indonesian economic activity under the Suharto government.  The 
result of this policy was the economic marginalization of Islamic indigenous 
actors (Hefner: 1998a, 226).  The government began to emphasize indigenous, 
grass-roots, economic growth by allowing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) become involved in development 
projects in Indonesia.  One of the projects of the ADB was the Small Coconut 
Development Project (SCDP), which took place in Galela.221  This plan to develop 
coconut hybrids spread among the farmers in the region before the arrival of the 
banana export agribusiness. 
 
Development projects in Eastern Indonesia began with the cooperation and 
funding of the ADB.  Several studies of the impact of large investment projects in 
Java and the Moluccas have been carried out.  In the Moluccas, the projects were 
mainly successful because long-term cultivation plans for export were introduced 
to farmers. In Java, farmers were trapped by the limitations of rice cultivation and 
the agricultural credit system that seriously affected them during the economic 
crisis of 1997.  The system of credit (in U.S. Dollars) organised by the 
government agency Bulog, caused grave suffering among the farmers in Java 
when the Indonesian currency collapsed. 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 45-46:  A ship waits to finish the loading of banana boxes before it 
sails to Japan, Taiwan or China. 
 
In 1980 the Indonesian government invited investors to invest in Eastern 
Indonesia.  The invitation was taken up at the beginning of the 1990s (cf. Barlow 
and Hardjono: 1996).  The ADB coconut project transformed the developmental 
model of the people to an export orientation.  The development of Eastern 
Indonesia helped fulfill the governments obligation to pay attention to equal 
distribution, as stated in the three goals of Indonesian development.  However, the 
export and free market orientation adopted by the government resulted in strong 
pressure on the farmers to sell their land cheaply to the banana company, PT GAI.  
This laid the groundwork for the social chaos of the violence.  Visser has reported 
the same lack of benefits and suffering that occurred when the people in Irian Jaya 
were forced to give up their rich land (Visser: 2001).  At the grass-roots level 
                                                                                                                                     
treatment for non-indigeneous Indonesians (especially Chinese, Indians and Arabs) to participate 
in business.  
221 See Chapter III. 
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communities are  changed by the activities of companies that are not directly 
subject to the development plan. Yunus Ukru and his friends from a non-
governmental organisation published tragic case studies about the marginalizing 
of the indigenous people in the archipelago of the Moluccas extending from North 
Moluccan areas such as Tobelo, Sahu, Modole, Sawai, Bacan, to the Central 
Moluccas including Buru, Huaulu, Waemale, and to the Southern Maluccas as far 
as the South East, Evav-Atnabr Evav, and Jarjui (Panjaitan and Topatimasang: 
1993). 
 
In the 1980s there appeared to be different of goals in various government 
development policies.  After President Suharto appointed B.J. Habibie as the 
minister of Technology and Research to design models for middle industrial 
development that could be achieved in Indonesia, there was competition between 
the model developed by Bappenas and that of Habibie.  The Habibie model, 
which emphasized the advance of technology and the growth  of heavy industry, 
was not supported by Bappenas (Tjondronegoro: 1995, 72-73).  The resulting 
tension not also involved a dispute between two different developmental 
ideologies but also became politicised by differences in religion.  The Habibie 
group used the acronym for the Moluccan independence  movement, RMS 
(Republic of Southern Maluku), as a slur against three prominent Christian 
officials associated with Bappenas, namely, “Radius, Mooy, Sumarlin”.  Thus 
Habibie associated religion with power conflicts over differences in 
developmental ideology. Bappenas, at the time, was filled with economists who 
were abangan Muslims and Christians.  The three “RMS economists” were from 
Christian backgrounds, both Catholic and Protestant (cf. Bahtiar Effendy: 1998).   
 
The center of the RMS political rebellion was in Ambon where the majority were 
Christians.  In 1999, RMS again became associated with Muslim-Christian 
conflict in the Moluccas and was even applied to the conflict in the North 
Moluccas.  Historically the RMS movement never reached the northern part of the 
Moluccas, although Sukarno was suspicious that the Sultan of Ternate (a Muslim) 
supported the RMS. 
 
According to Robert Hefner, Habibie was expected to bring Indonesia to a high 
level of industrial development, which would provide the middle class with work 
(Hefner: 1995a). This expectation grew among middle class Indonesians 
centralised in Jakarta and they used their Islamic affiliation as a new identity 
expressed in the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI); this 
organization supported Habibie as a candidate for national leadership.  However, 
it should be noted that many Indonesian economists were doubtful about the 
developmental model dreamed up by Habibie. To build projects such as the 
National Airplane Industry (IPTN), the state had to invested more than it received.  
In the Reformation era, the large size of the IPTN debt has been discovered. The 
construction of IPTN used  resources which had been designated for other projects 
such as reforestation. 222 
 
                                                 
222 See Kompas (September 7, 1998). 
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5.3.4.  The Politics of Spirituality 
 
At the same time that political affairs and economics were being institutionized, 
religion was coming under the same kind of policy.  The stated purpose of 
institutionalizing religion was to avoid conflict and achieve religious harmony in 
the nation. The government issued several regulations to direct regulate and 
control religions in Indonesian society.  The Ministry of Religious Affairs and 
society leaders accepted these regulations because of their concern about 
conversion from one religion to another.  After the purge of Communists 
following the coup attempt in 1965, a large number of nominal Muslims 
converted to Christianity or Hinduism.  Government policy had permitted 
Christian missionaries to visit political prisoners who, as suspected communists, 
were under severe pressure to adopt a religion (Hefner: 1995a, 22).  However, in 
later research, Hefner noticed that some people who had converted to Hinduism or 
Christianity had  already reconverted to Islam.  
 
The Indonesian state only acknowledged Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Hinduism and Buddhism as valid recognized religions.  In 1973, MPR tried to 
propose local religious practices (aliran kepercayaan, which especially refers to 
Javanese mysticisms) as another authorized religion. However, the Muslim 
community rejected this proposal (Hefner: 1995a, 7).  For the government, 
religious formalism aimed at controlling the society; however, many Indonesians 
found these regulations intrusive and detrimental to harmonious relations between 
religious believers.  
 
Religious formalism that is intended to control the religions, actually can become 
a boomerang.  Enforcing a single religious identity creates homogeneity. 
Homogeneity is created when the majority forces minorities to conform to the 
religious identity of the majority. The government created policies with which the 
majority agree in order to influence public opinion, but the result is not always 
what is expected.  In the 1970s and 80s, the Javanese elite searched for spiritual 
power and identity through ancestral rituals.  Javanese mysticism was used as a 
means of political legitimation.  Pemberton has described the efforts of the New 
Order government to revive Javanese religious ritual as a source of power 
(Pemberton: 1994).  He states that in the period before the 1990s, government 
spent many resources in renovating old graveyards of kings and Javanese families 
in the regions of Central and East Java.  In this period, people close to Suharto 
practiced Javanese mystic meditation (kejawen) while also practicing Islam in 
order to find revelation that could become input to Suharto for leading the state. 
 
Suharto himself was acknowledged as a pandita (religious leader) who had 
received a revelation that he should lead the state (Singh: 2000, 20). In this 
context, power is considered a unity that comes from one divine source.  Pancasila 
formulates the source of all power as a great unity (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa).  
Just as Divine power is unified, so political power must be unified in the person of 
a single leader (cf. Singh: 2000,20).  The New Order government institutionalized 
the power of the state as single and homogeneous. 
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Islamic politicians saw Suharto’s politics of spirituality as an  effort to divert the 
attention of the middle class from politics.  According to Ismail, among  Muslim 
politicians, Suharto treated Pancasila like a religion (Ismail: 1995).  Suharto was 
also close to the followers of kejawen (Javanese mysticism)  and to the Catholics 
who established the research institution and think-tank called CSIS (Hefner: 
1995a). Islamic politicians categorized CSIS and the New Order government as 
having an Islam phobia (Singh: 2000, 170).  Nevertheless, the government also 
built Islamic institutions such as the Council of Indonesian Ulamas (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia), the Coordinative Institution of Islamic Brotherhood (Badan 
Koordinasi Ummat Islam) and through the foundation of the Mosque Board 
(Yayasan Dewan Mesjid) built a large numbers of mosques throughout Indonesia 
(Hefner: 1995a, 122).223                  
 
5.3.5.  Using Islam to Block the Rise of Sukarnoism   
 
Many people were surprised when in December 1990, President Suharto, dressed 
completely in traditional santri (strict Muslim) clothing, opened the first congress 
of ICMI (Hefner: 1995b,  1). Hefner says that the birth of ICMI came from the 
pure motivation of five students of the Muhammadiyah University in Malang who 
organised the meeting among leading Islamic thinkers and leaders from the whole 
                                                 
223 The whole legal system was unified, modified and centralised in the National Law and national 
court system which had already replaced the traditional courts and local institutions (Drake: 1989, 
79). The government issued UU No.5 1979 concerning traditional law.  The increase in the use of 
religious courts resulting in their separation from the state courts. The efforts of the government to 
homogenise the law on marriage and divorce by limiting the authority of Islamic courts was 
rejected by Muslims (Hefner: 1995a,7). However, the UU No.5 1979 about the limitations of 
traditional law was reviewed in the Reformation era (see, Sjah. In: Bernas. Dec.13, 1999). The 
model of spiritual politics was the hegemonic political model of the Suharto government. Nung 
Runua explains that the impact of this political system created fears among the supporters of 
Golkar as to who could be a candidate for president (Runua: 1992, 44). This was taboo! (Runua: 
1992, 47). It was believed that mentioning the name of another candidate for president could 
“create misunderstanding.”  For example, another candidate might not fit the expectations of the 
current president.  It could be that the society wanted another name to be nominated, but they were 
afraid that Suharto would be the proposed candidate.  A week before the general election in 1992, 
the name of the presidential candidate from Golkar had not yet been announced.  Rumours about 
the name of the presidential candidate caused nervousness and uneasiness in several political 
leaders from small parties. They came to the house of Alam Syah Ratu Prawiranegara, the former 
Minister of Religion and asked about this matter.  However, he could not give an answer except to 
promise that he would organise a meeting to celebrate Idul Fitri and he would invite all the 
political organisations to attend the ceremony. This meeting would propose a special prayer for 
Suharto. According to Alamsyah, when normal methods of communication between human beings 
is cut off, the only way to communicate is with God. The people’s prayer indirectly expressed that 
every social organisation formally declared support for Suharto. This prayer for national politics 
was strengthened by the inclusion of 36 names with their signatures that were the leaders of the 
social organisations. There was one organisation, which refused to sign the list, and that was 
ICMI. The prayer was neutral. In the prayer, the board leader of Golkar requested the blessing of 
God for the health of Pak Harto (Suharto) so that he would be in  TOPP condition (Runua: 1994, 
45). TOPP is the abbreviation of Tegar (Strength), Optimistis (Optimist), Prima  (Prima) and 
Pasrah (Submission). The words TOPP appeared in the political prayer as a spiritual satire that 
was taken as a joke made by Suharto who saw himself as having the qualities of TOPP (Singh: 
2000, 9). The word TOPP was used by Suharto in a address at the meeting of the Committee for 
National Indonesian Youth (KNPI) in 1991 to stand for Tua (Old), Ompong (Toothless), Peot 
(Battered) and Pikun (Senile) (Runua: 1994, 45). 
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of Indonesia (Hefner: 1995b, 37).  The orginal idea was academic and included 
the desire to promote Islamic spirituality because it was a meeting of Islamic 
intellectuals.  In the end, however, it turned out to have two faces: the practice of 
Islam and the performance of the New Order.  The Congress recognized the new 
culture of the middle class.  The performance of the New Order government was 
seen to have initiated a genuine new social order. These conclusions then became 
the vehicle that would be used by Suharto in the 1993 general election.  After the 
official declaration of ICMI, Suharto went on what many observers called a 
political hajj (Karim: 1999). Bilveer Singh has well described Suharto as being 
Machiavellian in his use of Islamic religious symbols without committing himself 
to strict Islamic practice (Singh: 2000).  
 
Hefner explains in depth the new strategies for empowerment that were used by 
Islamic intellectuals in facing the marginalization of Islam in the New Order 
policies (Hefner: 1995b). He quotes the thoughts of Nurcholis Madjid who  
believes that the Muslims need to change their strategy by giving greater emphasis 
to Islamic inculturation in society. This countered the common political thinking 
of Islamic politicians who did not consider the structure of Indonesian society 
when they proposed the concept of an Islamic state.  Johan Effendi proposed the 
same idea after the formation of ICMI.  However, history has shown that ICMI 
was just a hope for these Islamic intellectuals.  ICMI soon became involved in 
hegemonic politics that supported the New Order agenda. 
 
In his wide-ranging explanation of the Indonesian political situation in the 1990s 
does not even touch on the reappearance of Sukarnoism in the figure of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the first Indonesian president (Hefner: 1995b). 
Later, in his book Civil Islam, Hefner discussed Megawati in relation to state 
politics under the government of Suharto who planned to destroy her popularity 
(Hefner: 2000, 174 ff).  The government feared the political gossip that Megawati 
was prepared to be involved in the 1997 general election campaign.  The PDI, 
since the forced merger of political parties in the 1970s, had never won in the 
general elections.  Megawati, as the daughter of Sukarno, could be the right 
person to change their fortunes.  Suharto’s fears about the reappearance of 
Sukarnoism in the person of Megawati led him to accept the challenge of ICMI to 
grant a greater role for Islam in Indonesian politics and especially in the 
government bureaucracy (Gaffar: 1996, 57).  
 
The relationship between ICMI and the government was based on mutual 
interests.  ICMI was formed in Malang in December 1990.  After its promising 
beginning several members, such as Emha Ainun Nadjib withdrew because there 
was no freedom to express opinions without making the military and the 
government angry (Hefner: 1995b; Hefner: 2000, 155).  ICMI became vocal 
through the involvement of Adi Sasono in the think-tank CIDES, a research 
institute affiliated with ICMI. 
 
The state began to use a politics of terror against its enemies. As ICMI was 
accepted into the power circle of Suharto, other former political partners such as 
CSIS were excluded. Anti-Chinese and anti-Christian rhetoric began to be heard.  
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Militant Islamic groups that seemed to enjoy government protection attacked 
religious symbols, such as churches. Some people called for a political jihad 
against non-Muslims, based on evidence that non-Muslims in the state had acted 
violently against Islamic groups.  In particular, Benny Moerdani was accused of 
the slaughter of Muslims at Tanjung Priok.  The religious identity of a particular 
state officer was used to legitimatise violence against members of the larger 
society that share the same religion. 224  
 
Suharto seemed to succeed in maintaining his hegemonic power by using political 
violence to terrorise his political rivals. However when the economic crisis 
occurred, the same Islamic organizations that Suharto used for his own political 
purposes rose up and, along with other social forces, defeated the New Order 
government.  Islam becomes one of the pillars of power that would need to be 
taken into account in the present and future political democracy in Indonesia. 
 
5.4.  The Economic Crisis and Scenarios to Overthrow Suharto 
 
The economic crisis that shook South East Asia in the middle of 1997 erupted in 
Indonesian politics.  Indonesian investors had to repay their debts in American 
Dollars.  The economic crisis began in Thailand and quickly spread to Indonesia. 
As both domestic and international confidence in Suharto’s government reached 
an all time low, the Indonesian rupiah collapsed. In one year the Indonesian 
currency plunged from Rp. 2,000 to the US dollar to Rp. 14,000 to the dollar.  The 
government repeatedly intervened in the market but to no avail.  The government 
reserve of foreign exchange could never match the depth of the crisis.  In 
additions to the economic factors, I will consider the political aspects that led to 
the collapse of Suharto and the creation of a new government. 
 
5.4.1.  The Unity of Various Interests 
 
In the presidential election of 1997, Suharto was re-elected in partnership with 
B.J. Habibie as the Vice President (Singh: 2000).  After reelection, Suharto 
rejected the cabinet suggestions of ICMI.  On the contrary, many cabinet posts 
were given to Suharto’s friends and relatives, including his daughter, Tutut Indra 
Rukmana. Tutut became Minister of Social Affairs.  In the face of this political 
reality, ICMI felt that Suharto had used the organisation for his own purposes. 
 
The collapse of Suharto was caused by a combination of political conspiracies and 
popular revolution (Singh: 2000, 99).  Suharto was overwhelmingly reelected in 
                                                 
224 Hefner discusses the involvement of the army in political violence such as that which occurred 
under the leadership of Benny Moerdani in the slaughter of  Muslims in Tanjung Priok (Hefner: 
2000, 185ff). A coalition between Prabowo, who had been a part of the Indonesian military, and 
Ahmad Sumargono from the Committee for Indonesian Solidarity with the Islamic World (KISDI) 
blamed the political violence led by Moerdani for the   attack on the Christian community in 
Situbondo in 1996.  The reason for choosing Situbondo was related to efforts to destroy the 
popularity of  the moderate Islamic leader, Gus Dur. The appearance of Megawati as the leader of 
the PDI-P in which there were nationalists with different religious affiliations also became the 
target of state politics.  The religious political rhetoric that supported state legitimacy evoked the 
involvement of the army in its attack on the headquarters of PDI-P on July 27, 1996.  
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October 1997, but after just seven months in office, he was forced to resign. The 
efforts the had been made through approaching religious leaders and social 
activists were not successful. Who were the people who arranged this and how did 
they do it? 
 
According to the mass media, Amien Rais as the leader of Muhammdiah was the 
most visible critic of the New Order.  Gaffar reports that ICMI supported Suharto 
in the presidential election of 1997 (Gaffar:1996).  The ICMI members could 
hardly believe that after ICMI led the puppet show of the 1997 elections they were 
completely ignored by Suharto in the appointment of national leadership (Gaffar: 
1996, 52).  
 
According to Singh, Adi Sasono was one ICMI leader who intentionally planned 
the mass movement of students that brought about the collapse of Suharto.  
However, support for the struggle also came from groups outside the students, 
such as traditional Islamic organisations (e.g. NU), Modernists, Nationalists, 
Sukarnoists, Catholiks, Protestants, Hindus, Buddhists, Socialists, former 
generals, the mass media, and many other social elements (Singh: 2000, 149).  
The people’s movement looked natural and spontaneous. It included leaders from 
many groups who supported the protesters.  However this was a political scenario 
that was also planned (Singh: 2000, 15; cf. Chapter II).225  
 
Jakarta and Yogyakarta were the central cities where the student movement 
pioneered the protests which tied-up the entire nation (Singh: 2000, 55).  The 
DPD Golkar of Yogyakarta had even rejected the re-nomination of Suharto before 
the 1997 general election.  On the 21st of May 1998 I joined an estimated crowd 
of 500,000 protestors who filled the squares (alon-alon) and streets of the Sultan’s 
palace, one day before Suharto was forced to resign.  The event included political 
orations, satires of President Suharto and a speech by Sri Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono X.  The people were united by their common belief in the need 
                                                 
225 After four students from Trisakti University died on May 12, 1998, many societal leaders 
arrived at the demonstrations to speak and to show their sympathy for the loss of these flowers of 
the struggle.  Most  Indonesians reacted to the presence of Megawati at the demonstrations as an 
ascetic who had just come down from a high mountain where she had meditated, however the 
students shouted their support for her.  National leaders who participated in this scenario did not 
know that they were acting in accordance with the wishes of an architect of the plan. Students 
were pioneers of the movement, while Adi Sasono lobbied at the higher levels to explain how the 
movement for change was part of the same process at the grass roots (read: students).  The protests 
of the students became more vocal and militant after the death of the four Trisakti students who 
were shot by anti-riot troops (pasukan huru-hara).  It seemed like the political drama of 1966 was 
occuring again as the students who energized the movement were sacrificed.  Several times 
Sasono threatened Harmoko as the Head of MPR-RI for the period 1998-2003 and Syarwan 
Hamid who was the Internal Affairs Minister in Suharto’s 1998-2003 Development Cabinet, when 
they refused to believe that an effective process of transformation was taking place at the lower 
levels.  If they would not help Sasono, they would fall with Suharto (Singh: 2000, 125).  When 
there was a parliamentary meeting (DPR) the students occupied the DPR/MPR- RI building to take 
advantage of the momentum.  The press speeded up the collapse by portraying Suharto as the 
enemy of the entire nation.  All over Indonesia people watched the protesters on the streets of 
several big cities in Java and began to question Suharto’s claim that his  legitimacy came from 
God (cf. Singh: 2000, 138). As a result, more and more people dared to be involved in the 
demonstrations. 
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to remove Suharto.  Along the streets leading to the Palace the protestors received 
free drinks and snacks, provided by the local merchants. 
 
However the events in Java were only a strange story  to the people in Ngidiho 
and Galela.  On the island of Halmahera societal resistance to the influence of the 
Sultan of Ternate was so high that they submitted to his authority only as long as 
they received benefits from his administration.  They also supported the Suharto 
regime because it gave them cows and elementary schools. Java was seen as the 
centre of power from where development was planned and mobilized.  However 
this tradition of politics was shaken by the collapse of Suharto.  The fall of 
Suharto was part of a national political conspiracy that was strange and difficult 
for the people of Ngidiho to understand. 
 
5.4.2.  Reformation: Islam, ABRI and Regional Autonomy 
 
Suharto tried to appease the student movement and its supporters by replacing the 
cabinet members whom the groups demanding reform disliked and appointing 
reformers to it; in the end this strategy did not succeed because those he tried to 
appoint to the ministries rejected the job.  The reform groups rejected Bob Hasan, 
whom he wanted to included in the cabinet.  Adi Sasono insisted that it was the 
task of Habibie to convince President Suharto that he had to resign because there 
was no longer any political support for him and he had lost God’s mandate 
(Singh: 2000). 
 
On May 21, 1998, Suharto resigned from office and Habibie was installed as the 
third President of the Republic of Indonesia. The debate over whether his position 
was legal did not prevent him from running his government for 512 days.  Habibie 
appointed a new cabinet, called the Reformation Development Cabinet.  Adi 
Sasono played an important role as the Minister of Cooperatives because he was 
trusted by Habibie (Singh: 2000, 156). 
 
In a strong bid to gain popular legitimacy, Habibie reevaluated the developmental 
ideology of the New Order.  Habibie initiated a reconsideration of the double 
function of the military, the end of political arrests, the freeing of political 
prisioners, a referendum for East Timor, regional development and regional 
autonomy.  The economic crisis had not stopped development projects, such as 
airplane manufacturing, even though they were inefficient industrial projects 
rumored to be full of corruption and very costly to the state.  Habibie committed 
himself to combat KKN (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism) and agreed to the 
resignation of his brother and son from their strategist positions.  
 
During Habibie’s government SARA riots began to spread through the country. 
The acronym SARA was created by the New Order to stand for conflicts based on 
Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antar Golongan, i.e. tribal, religious, racial and inter-
group conflicts.  In his annual presidential address on Independence day, August 
17, 1999, Habibie did not touch on efforts of the government to seriously address 
the social violence that had already broken out throughout Indonesia.  Hendardi, 
Head of the Association for Legal Help and Indonesian Human Rights (PBHI), 
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along with Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara from the Federation of Indonesian 
Advocates, and Albert Hasibuan from the National Committee of Human Rights 
(KOMNAS HAM) report that a combined team had carried out careful research 
about the violence in several places and made a series of recommendations to the 
President.  However the government which did not follow up on the 
recommendations.226 At that time, the riots which were labelled “religious” had 
already been occurring for about eight months in Ambon and the Central 
Moluccas.   
 
Some theorists suggest that the riots in the Moluccas were part of a chain of 
political scenarios planned by ICMI before the fall of Suharto.227  ICMI was 
supported by parts of the military (Suaedy: 2000).  The Habibie government 
collapsed in the end, in part because of the Bank Bali scandal which involved top 
leaders of Golkar using the people’s money for their 1999 campaign.  Habibie’s 
name was still too associated with extensive corruption during Suharto’s reign and 
he never earned the trust of the Indonesian people.  Moreover, there was a split 
within Golkar related to an event which took place before the general election of 
1999.  The People’s Mandate Party (Partai Daulat Rakyat=PDR)228 nominated 
Habibie and Adi Sasono as the pair to run for president and vice president in the 
1999-2003 general election. 229  Golkar then put Adi Sasono onto a non-active 
status because the PDR had published his picture as a candidate for state 
leadership before the general election campaign had begun and he was still a 
member of Golkar.230 
 
5.5.  The Beginning of a New Chapter for the North Moluccas 
 
How did national political change influence regional development in the North 
Moluccas in the midst of the Moluccan conflict at large?  This sub-section 
examines ideological connections made with the history of the Moluccas, the rise 
of Tidore and Makian, the struggles in the provincial capital for the Governor’s 
position, the land dispute in Kao and Malifut, and the beginning of the riots in the 
North Moluccas. 
 
5.5.1.  The Awaking of the North Moluccan History 
 
The Islamic Sultanates traded on the seas throughout the Netherlands East Indies 
since the 15th Century (Reid: 1993; Hefner: 1998a).  The Sultans lost their power 
to the colonizers, especially the Netherlands. The North Moluccas were 
increasingly marginalized after the fall of the spice prices.  Therefore, the 
inauguration of the Province of North Moluccas on October 20, 1999, which 
began with the delivery of a pataka, a letter concerning the regional development 
                                                 
226 See Kompas (October 5, 1999). 
227 Gus Dur suggested the names of officials who supposedly were the provocateurs of the riots in 
Indonesia such as Adi Sasono, Fuad Bawazier, Ginanjar Kartasasmita and Mar’ie Muhammad but 
did not directly mention ICMI.  See Kompas (July 30, 2000). 
228 The PDR which was based on Pancasila, was formed on January 1, 1999.  See Kompas (March 
6, 1999). cf. Hefner: 2000. 
229 See Kompas (April 29, 1999). 
230 See Kompas (May 31, 1999). 
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of the North Moluccas, was read as a sign of the reawaking of North Moluccan 
glory.  The Sultans of Tidore and Bacan were also reinstalled after the 
inauguration of the Province of North Moluccas. These provincial events were 
followed by a party for the people (pesta rakyat), which was one of the most 
lively events in the modern history of the North Moluccas.  The residents of the 
North Moluccas participated in an exhibition of traditional shows that brought 
back the ancient fame of Maluku-Kie-Raha.  In the ceremony to welcome the 
caretaker Governor and his group, along with the delivery of the pataka, the 
Sultans of Ternate and Tidore accompanied the local government bureaucrats.  
Local officials like the Regional Secretary and the Head of the Regency (Bupati) 
most of whom were from Makian, claimed that they were represented by the 
Sultan of Bacan. 
 
The delivery of the pataka represented a meeting of the old powers and the new 
ones.  The reappearance of this ancient ceremony gave a new meaning to the 
event.  One of the rituals performed was called, joko kaha, “stepping on the land.”  
This ceremony is performed to welcome important guests who are requested to 
step on the shore or land, and their feet are washed with water from the earth of 
the Moluccas. This signifies that the guests have become a part of society.  
Dozens of kora-kora boats, representing the ancient glory of their ancestors 
during the period of the spice trade, were arranged in a row along the sea coast to 
show respect to the important guests.   
 
The procession in the welcoming ceremony memorialized the victory of the 
Ternate Sultanate. The people celebrated their religious spirituality and the 
greatness of their kingdom by readings from the Qur’ân and to mark the 
installation of the interim government of the new province. The installation 
included the giving of a set of traditional clothes and a crown as official symbols 
of the governor’s position which paralleled the sovereignty of the Sultanate in the 
old period. When the North Moluccas had been part of the Province of the 
Moluccas with the center of government in Ambon, the position of the Regency of 
the North Moluccas was not parallel to the historical position of the Sultanate. 
 
The position of Governor is the target of most leaders in the North Moluccas.  
With the inauguration of the Province of North Moluccas, the people and the local 
press began to predict who would be the first North Moluccan governor.  The 
caretaker government was to prepare the Province of North Moluccas to control 
the government independently.  The caretaker government was assigned to govern 
until April 2000, whereas regional autonomy was scheduled to begin on January 
1, 2001. However, the new Governor of the North Moluccas wasn’t appointed 
until April 2002, after a year of polemic and disagreement. 
 
 
5.5.2.  The Role of Tidore and Makian Sultanates 
 
The inauguration of the Province of North Moluccas appeared to be open and 
generous.  In fact, it was a public event created to hide the real local politics that 
were that were still being whipped up at the moment.  The political problems 
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related to particular interest groups which wished to gain power in the North 
Moluccas.  The most critical problems included the location of the provincial 
capital, who would be the North Moluccan Governor, and how to restore the 
Sultans of Tidore and Bacan. 
 
The Sultan of Tidore was installed just a few days before the inauguration of the 
Province of North Moluccas.  During the New Order, the Sultan of Ternate had 
been much more conspicuous than the others.  He still maintained his palace 
tradition even though his power was limited.  Regular government functions were 
carried out by the centrally appointed bureaucrats.  During the New Older the 
Head of the Regency of the North Moluccas was not from the power circle of the 
Ternate Sultanate.  Nevertheless the Sultan of Ternate never disappeared even 
though he did not have a strong governmental position.  He used his symbolic role 
to win votes for Golkar and was the head of Golkar in the North Moluccas. 
 
The appointments of the Sultans of Tidore and Bacan reawakened the buried 
history of hundreds of years of decline for the North Moluccas in Indonesian 
politics. With the beginning of reform, historical reflection opened the question of 
why the Bacan Sultanate, who was known in ancient history as the Makian 
Sultanate, had to leave his region and move to Bacan.  The Makians remembered 
the resettlement of the Sultan of Bacan from the island of Makian to the island of 
Bacan before the arrival of  Western traders as a result of the oppression of the 
Makians by the Ternate and Tidore Sultanates who competed for control of their 
clove island.231 
 
The Bacan Sultanate also argued that the suffering of the Makian people who had 
been evicted from their original land even prior to colonialism, created uncertainty 
as a characteristic of the people.  The Makians, besides following the Sultanates 
orders to settle on Bacan, also settled on the island of Tidore and in Gane, which 
is the region of South Halmahera facing Bacan island.  Even before the arrival of 
the Portugese, warfare had forced the Makians to move to different islands. The 
VOC recognised the territorial borders of Maluku Kie Raha.  However, they did 
not return people to their original territories because the VOC did not recognise 
genealogically defined regions. The colonial government accepted the request of 
the Ternate Sultan to maintain the status quo because tradition did not prohibit 
people, as individuals, from living in a region, which they had already inhabited 
for many generations (Andaya: 1993a, 187).  However the Dutch did initiate large 
scale resettlement when they asked the Makians who were living in Gane to move 
back to Moti because the colonizers needed them to build a fort in the 17th century 
(Andaya: 1993a, 153).  
 
The New Order also encouraged migration. The central government initiated 
transmigration projects to move people from densely populated areas of Java and 
Bali to less populated areas on other islands. This policy affected the local people 
in regions that received such transmigrants.  In the North Moluccas  several areas 
such as Gane Timur (East Gane), Jailolo and Kao received transmigrants, 
                                                 
231 See Ternate Pos (November 2-8, 1999). 
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including the former residents of Makian Island. In 1975, even though some 
Makians had moved to the district of Sahu, especially in area near the village of 
Goal, the regency government moved the entire population of Makian Island to 
Northern Halmahera into the region of Kao.  People were moved to the new 
location in anticipation of the eruption of the volcano on their home island.  
 
The Makians rejected this plan at the beginning because they thought resettlement 
to Northern Halmahera was difficult.  Geographically, the location of Kao in the 
interior did not guarantee easy transportation from their homeland to the new 
place.  Several Makian families surveyed Kao and decided not to join the 
transmigration to Kao. Their coconut plantations, inherited houses, and ancestral 
graveyards were all obstacles to just leaving their homes in the Makian Islands.  
They wanted to be able to commute from the new location to their homes. 
Therefore, some people who favoured resettlement chose to move to Bacan and 
Gane, which are located close to their original island.  Many of these people are 
now successful bureaucrats in the government offices in Ternate.  
 
Resettlement in Gane was the ideal place according to the Makians.  Why, then, 
did the government relocate the Makians to Kao?  After the riots in Kao and 
Malifut that forced the  Makian population to leave the area, this became a hot 
political topic (Tomagola: 2000a, 7).  Tomagola suggests that the relocation of the 
Makians to Kao by the North Moluccan government was to block the expansion 
Christians in the Central and Southern parts of Halmahera.  His opinion is based 
on the assumption that the struggle was for religiously defined territory.  This 
opinion should be situated in the historical context of religious politics as 
explained in Chapter IV.  Kao was chosen as a transmigration location not only 
for the Makians but also for Javanese transmigrants who lived in Biang and 
Toliwang.  Javanese Muslims and the Kao people still live together in peace.  The 
difference between the Javanese and the Makians was that the Javanese integrated 
into the district of Kao whereas the Makians wanted to set up a separate district 
within Kao territory.  The Makians have lived in the territory of Kao since 1975 
but the policy to allow an independent district government was introduced just 
after the inauguration of the new Province of North Moluccas.232 
  
However, the indigenous people of Kao did not agree with the government’s 
decision to create a separate district for the Makians.  They felt that the 
government, which included many Makians, discriminated against them.  The 
government provided houses, land, a rice subsidy, crop seeds and a clinic to the 
Makians in Malifut for almost 10 years.  This caused tension with the indigenous 
Kao who did not receive the same assistance as the Makians.  The Makians 
prospered in Kao, not just because of assistance but because of their hard work 
talent and social soliderity.  However, the prosperity of the Makians in Malifut 
was considered meaningless by the Makians who settled in Bacan and Gane 
because they had become disconnected from their ancestral homes which they 
were supposed to visit regularly. 
 
                                                 
232 A further explanation will be found in the end of this chapter. 
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The relationship to their ancestral land is very important for the Makians, as for 
most ethnic groups in the North Moluccas, because the land is the place where 
their ancestors are buried. For the Makians living away from their land, visiting 
the island of Makian was not only to harvest their produce but also to visit the 
graves of their ancestors.  Because of  transportation difficulties in the years 
before the 1990s, the Makians in Malifut, Halmahera did not have a complete 
relationship with their home island.  After the riots overwhelmed them in August 
1999, some Makian leaders reflected that this disaster happened because of their 
disconnected relationship with their homeland on the island of Makian.  233  Few 
people realised how great would be the impact of transmigration policy on the life 
and social-cultural environment of the Makians themselves.   
 
Since pre-colonial times, whenever the Makians were resettled, they had to search 
again for their political identity as an ethnic group in the North Moluccas.  In spite 
of being scattered they have retained a high degree of ethnic soliderity.  In the 
1970s they formed the Association of Makian Kayoa Brotherhood as a federation 
to tie together the Makians whereever they were located.  This association meets 
once a year.  The invitation is circulated through the radio.  In each place where 
Makians live there is always a branch of this Association, which meets regularly 
each month. The benefits of the Association are experienced directly by the 
people because it is the place where they get information about the recruitment of 
civil servants for governmental offices or for religious teachers. 
 
5.5.3.  Competition for the Provincial Capital and the Governor’s Position 
 
The inauguration of the North Moluccas as a Province separate from the Province 
of the Moluccas centred Ambon, allowed for the liberation of this new province 
from the hegemonic government in Ambon, which historically had dominated the 
North Moluccas since the Dutch colonial era.  However this liberation also 
renewed old political sentiments among the ethnic groups, which were inherited 
from the local competition among the kingdoms in the territory of Maluku-Kie-
Raha.  The colonizers transformed the elite social structure.  They established 
control over the Sultan of Ternate and ensured that other ethnic  groups remained 
under Ternate hegemony.  The Indonesian government essentially followed the 
same policy until 1998, using the Sultan but not granting him any real power.  The 
Makians found new status and identity as civil servants of the government in the 
era of the New Order. 
 
After the collapse of the New Order, ethnic sensibilities grew rapidly in the North 
Moluccas.  The Makians had already achieved the highest social rank in North 
Moluccan society because of their success in education and government service. 
A combination of the genealogical myth of Maluku-Kie-Raha and the Makians 
high social rank brought the Sultan of Tidore to ally with the Makians.  However, 
the Makian-Tidore coalition was not a new phenomenon.  During their brief rule, 
the British granted the Sultan of Tidore the right to control the island of Makian in 
the place of the Sultan of Ternate (Andaya: 1993a).  Being in such a fortunate 
                                                 
233 An interview with Amran Mustari, a leader of the Makians in Ternate, took place in Ternate in 
November, 1999. 
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position, the Sultan of Tidore restored the power of the Sultan of Moti in Jailolo 
and the Sultan of Makian in Bacan.  Therefore, in the politics of regional 
reformation, the Makian bureaucrats paid back to the Sultan of Tidore the debt 
they owed for the great policy followed by his ancestors. 
     
In the present context, the two Sultans of Bacan and Tidore fo rmed a coalition to 
compete with the Sultan of Ternate to determine the location of the new 
Province’s capital.  Ternate assumed that the capital of the Province would remain 
in Ternate since it was the principle city in the Regency of the North Moluccas.  
However, the Tidore-Bacan coalition, supported by Makian government officials, 
argued that the provincial capital should be moved to Soa Sio on the island of 
Tidore where the Sultan of Tidore still had authority. The central government 
knew about the conflict of interests over the location of the new capital so they 
postponed the decision.  Perhaps the delay was part of Habibie’s plan to use the 
regional development of the Moluccas as part of his strategy to increase the 
chance of Golkar winning in the general election of 1999. 
 
It the end, the central government came to a decision based on a feasibility study 
using the 1964 survey when the first plan for separating the North Moluccas from 
Ambon had been made.  The result of the study was that the capital of the 
Province should fit with the growth in population anticipated by the central 
government and would be located in Jailolo. The government proposed Sofifi in 
Sindangoli, Jailolo as the new capital. This region was historically in the territory 
of the Moti Sultanate, which had moved from the island of Moti to Jailolo, 
Halmahera. 
 
When I arrived in Ternate in the middle of August 1999, there had been 
demonstrations organised by several social groups that were divided between two 
positions. The first group were those, siding with the Sultan of Ternate, who 
wanted the capital to remain in Ternate.  The second group demanded that the 
capital be in Soa Sio on Tidore Island.  Most of the political elites and people of 
the North Moluccas did not support the government’s proposal of Sofifi, Jailolo.  
     
The group which wanted Soa Sio as the provincial capital had to negotiate with 
the Sultans of Tidore and Bacan and as well as professional groups from the 
Makian bureaucracy.  The principle topic of political negotiations related to the 
position of the Governor of the North Moluccas. The Makian bureaucrats wanted 
the position of Governor.  At that time, the second highest position in the North 
Moluccas was the regional secretary who was a Makian. Their position was that if 
the Sultan of Tidore received the right to locate the provincial capital in Soa Sio, 
Tidore, then the Sultan of Bacan should be given the position of Governor of the 
North Moluccan Regency. 
 
This political calculation included the proposal that the Sultan of Ternate would 
become the head of the regional parliament (DPRD) of the North Moluccas.  
However, the Sultan of Ternate also wanted the position of Governor of the North 
Moluccas.  Tomagola says that the Sultan of Ternate used the youth organisation 
Gemusb (Youth Generation of Sultan Babullah) as his means for campaigning for 
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the provincial capital to be located in Ternate and to nominate him as the 
Governor of the North Moluccas (Tomagola: 2000a, 8). However, with the 
political bargaining described above, it was difficult for the Sultan of Ternate to 
find support, even among members of Golkar in the provincial parliament (DPRD 
Tingkat I).  Few would support his nomination because the local elite had already 
decided on a leadership packet.  The Sultan of Ternate at least needed the support 
of the PDI-P and small parties as they had already committed themselves to 
choose him as the Head of the parliament.234 
 
After the first outbreak of violence between the Makians and the Kao in the 
middle of July 1999, the Sultan of Ternate visited the Kao people and the Makians 
in Malifut.  However, the local elites suspected that his visit as Sultan was just a 
strategy to gather support from the people on Halmahera.  Genealogically, the 
royal descendents from Tidore, Makian, Bacan and Ternate considered the people 
of Halmahera as lower class. In earlier days this region was not desired because it 
had no cloves (Andaya: 1993a, 186).  However, politically, Halmahera was under 
the power of the Sultan of Ternate who used the island and the people as a major 
source of food, pearls, boats, metal and soldiers.  The Halmaheran people were 
loyal to the Sultan of Ternate, but not totally because they also had attacked him. 
Their conversion from their local religion (alfuru) to become Christians was also 
an expression of their liberation from the hegemony of the Sultan of Ternate (see 
Chapter IV). 
 
The people in Halmahera had developed and progressed.  The most important 
district in Northern Halmahera is Tobelo.  It has a modern society with a majority 
of Christians. Muslims are a minority but they control the small scale economy in 
the Tobelo town market, which is also the most densely populated area.  The elite 
class, which controls the ownership of stores and manages the copra collectors, 
are Chinese Indonesian Christians.  Many indigenous people of Tobelo work as 
civil servants, teachers, or church workers.  In Tobelo there is a Theological 
College (STT GMIH),  the GMIH church headquarters and a GMIH hospital.235  
 
The slogan Maluku-Kie-Raha became the symbol for the autonomy movement in 
the North Moluccas after the New Order collapsed.  Maluku-Kie-Raha was even 
proposed as the name of the new Province of the North Moluccas.  A Makian-
Tidore coalition of the power elite as well as the Sultan of Ternate, initiated the 
proposal.  In earlier times, the Sultan of Ternate used the expression Maluku-Kie-
Raha to create unity among the North Moluccan kingdoms in the fight against the 
Portuguese traders.  However this proposal was rejected by the people of 
Halmahera who did not see themselves represented by the expression Maluku-
Kie-Raha.  In the current situation, the people from North Halmahera, including 
those from Kao, Tobelo and Galela, are a new class which is succeeding in their 
economic life.  The central government in Jakarta also rejected the slogan 
                                                 
234 See the narrative of this bargaining at the beginning of the chapter. 
235  The history of religious development  in Halmahera can be found in Chapter IV. See also 
Chapter III for a description of the connection of social structures and religious divisions in 
Ngidiho. 
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Maluku-Kie-Raha because of its connotations of feudalist ideology and the danger 
of seperatism. 
 
The elite in the North Moluccas viewed the Sultan’s visit to the refugees from the 
two burned villages of Kao, as a campaign for Christian support of his political 
ambitions.  Even Christian officials from the local government were suspicious of 
the use of traditional (adat) power by the Sultan of Ternate to manipulate public 
opinion for his own benefit.  They doubted the ability of the Sultan to lead the 
North Moluccas through the use of adat power, especially since there were many 
other candidates for Governor whose potential and ability had already been tested 
in politics and management. The debate over candidates for Governor and the 
location of the provincial capital did not help solve the territorial dispute between 
the districts of Kao and Malifut.  Rather, it aggravated the situation. 
 
5.5.4.  The Land Dispute as the Beginning of Conflict 
 
In June 1999, the government of the North Moluccas issued regulation PP 
No.42/1999, which established the District of Malifut Makian Daratan, made up 
of five villages from the Kao District and five villages from the Jailolo District.  
The people of Kao and Jailolo both rejected the government decree on the 
grounds that the people from each of the groups could not be separated from their 
own ethnic community.  The Kao villages wanted to be joined together with other 
Kao villages and the Jailolo villages assumed the same. 
  
The rejection of the regulation by the Kao was especially strong. The social 
leaders of the five villages, as well as all the village Heads and social leaders from 
the District of Kao signed a letter rejecting the decree.236  The letter was sent to 
the government of the North Moluccas in Ternate and to the leader of the GMIH 
Church in Tobelo. The community of the Kao was 90% Christian living in 27 
villages and 10% Muslim who lived along with Christians in the District capital of 
Kao. 
 
The government argued that the five villages were not located close to the other 
Kao people.  Therefore they were logical candidates for a new Makian District.  
However, the Kao people believed the real motivation behind the decree was 
related to the gold mine operation which was a join investment between Australia 
and Indonesia.  The gold mine was located in the area of Gosowong, in the village 
Wangeotak of the Kao district.  This was one of the villages being transferred to 
the Makians.  When the government issued the decree that placed five Kao 
villages in a new, Makian District, the tension between the Kao and the Makians 
exploded.   
 
The Kao community was already committed to rejecting the regulation.  This 
rejection created tension between the two ethnic communities each of which 
portrayed the  other as their enemy.  As neighbours, the Kao felt that the Makians 
discriminated against them and looked down upon the Kao.  Most of the Kao 
                                                 
236 See the letter which was written on August 27,1999. 
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people are farmers or hunter gatherers.  In 1982, a fight broke out between the 
Makians and the Kao.  This had happened because Makians had taken over land 
from Kao people from Pagu. The Makians are a relatively educated community, 
which received subsidies from the local government for many years.  The Kao 
people were already jealous of the Makians success in politics and business, and 
did not want to submit to the implementation of regulation no. 42/1999.  
However, pressure from the Makians became so strong that it evoked physical 
conflict with the Kao.  On 22 July 1999, the first riot occurred.  It began when 
Makians attacked two Kao villages, Wangeotak and Sosol, that were decreed to 
become part of Malifut Makian Daratan.  The villagers’ houses and the church 
were burned.  As a result, Kao people began to congregate from all over Northern 
Halmahera in order to retaliate. 
 
After intermitant fighting that was only restrained by the military, the violence 
reached serious levels again on 24-25 October 1999.  The government of the 
North Moluccas decided to evacuate the outnumbered Makians from Halmahera 
in order to avoid an even greater conflict between the two groups.  The Mayor of 
the Ternate Municipality did not have any legal authority to evacuate the Makians 
from Malifut.  However he claimed it was an act of humanitarian mercy. 237   
 
However, it appears that the Mayor and officials of the regional government who 
were allied to the Makians, agreed to evacuate them to Ternate as a political 
strategy in opposition to the Sultan of Ternate.  The Sultan of Ternate was trying 
to negotiate an agreement between the Kao people and the Makians regarding the 
government decree that transferred the five villages to Malifut.  The Makian-
Tidore alliance viewed the policy of the Sultan of Ternate as a tactic that would 
sacrifice their interests in order to gain sympathy from the Christians so that they 
would support his candidacy to become the new Governor of the Province of 
North Moluccas. 
 
The Sultan of Ternate opposed the evacuation of the Makians to Ternate on the 
grounds that there was no room for them in addition to the various refugees that 
were already fleeing from Ambon.  The decision to aid the evacuation 
exacerbated the regional government’s conflict with the Sultan of Ternate and 
became a means to attract religious sympathy for the Makians who claimed they 
were oppressed by the Christians from Kao.238  At that time, the Sultan of Ternate 
suggested that the Makians of Malifut should be moved back to their original 
villages on the island of Makian. 239  The Makians and Tidorese considered this 
                                                 
237 See the statement of the Mayor of Ternate in an interview with a reporter from the Ternate Pos: 
“It’s true that Malifut is not in my jurisdiction, but for the sake of humanity I must help them. The 
local government of Ternate only sent vehicles.  We did not send people to Malifut”.  The vehicles 
were used to evacuate the Makians.  See Ternate Pos, (November 2-8, 1999). 
238 cf. (Alhadar: 2000).  A Kompas reader named H. Taraweh Dajamaluddin SH, Head of the 
Advocacy Team to discover the Facts about the North Moluccan Riots, responded to this article.  
In his letter to the Editor he doubted the involvement of the Sultan of Tidore as implied by Smith 
Alhadar.  In Dajamaluddin’s opinion, the riots in the North Moluccas were purely religious riots.  
He rejected Alhadar’s analysis that argued that there was a political-economic element.  See his 
letter in Kompas, (January 20, 2000). 
239 See (Tomagola: 2000a).  
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suggestion favoritism and a further ploy to gain sympathy with a certain group, 
especially since the Sultan of Ternate showed concern for the Christian refugees 
in Bitung and Manado and urged them to return to Ternate.240 
 
Before the last riot, on November 3, 1999, there was an announcement on the 
radio inviting the all Makian Kayoa to return to Malifut Makian Daratan to 
rebuild their mosque.  This was inflamatory, since during the riots, the Kao 
(including 10% Muslims) were careful not to damage the mosque of the Makians.  
The riot on November 3, 1999 occurred when the Christians were worshipping at 
the Sunday service in their church in the village of Jati.  The Muslims of Kao 
were in charge of security for the district capital, so when the riots began they 
were guarding the church.  The Christians ran out of the church and fought along 
side of the Muslims from Kao, against the Makians.  In addition to their greater 
numbers, the Kao were traditionally warriors while the Makians were more 
accustomed to trade and politics.  As a result, the Makians had very little success 
in fighting against the Kao and many Makians were killed.  The result of this riot 
was the removal of the Makians from the Malifut district where they had already 
lived for more than 25 years. 
 
The evacuation of the Makians from Halmahera to Ternate created new tensions 
in the city. The Sultan of Ternate, with his palace guards, the yellow troops, began 
to take control of strategic sites to protect the city of Ternate from further riots as 
a consequence of the  arrival of the Malifut Makians.  On November 6, 1999 riots 
began in Tidore where there was a slaughter of Christians.  This violence was 
provoked by the counterfeit letter that was purportedly signed by the Head of the 
Moluccan Protestant Church (Gereja Protestan Maluku=GPM) in Ambon.  The 
letter was addressed to the Head of the GMIH Church in Tobelo, Northern 
Halmahera.  The letter was provocative because it claimed there was a plan for 
Christians to take over the whole of the Moluccan islands.  Because of this letter, 
the GPM church on the island of Tidore was destroyed and the Christians were 
expelled. 
 
The tension increased because of the violence in Ambon and its neighbouring 
islands.  Many Muslim Tidorese fled from Ambon and returned to Tidore.  The 
returning refugees brought their pain and grief with them.  At the beginning of 
1999 there was a movement in Tidore to evacuate the Christians.  However, the 
local government stopped the plan after several Christian civil servants, who had 
lived in Tidore for more than 15 years, requested permission from the government 
to live in Soa Sio, Tidore.241  The riots in Tidore were emotionally linked to the 
riots that occurred in Ambon.  However political competition among the elite in 
the North Moluccas continually fed the tensions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
240  See (Tomagola: 2000a, 9). 
241 Refugees from Tidore were interviewed in Bitung, August 2000. 
 224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 47-48:  Two members of the Sultan of Ternate’s yellow troops guard 
the area around the market; in this picture, several Village Heads from 
Galela have just arrived in Ternate.  I was with them entering Ternate 
several days after the killing of Christians spread from Tidore to Ternate 
during November 3-11, 1999. 
 
On November 7, 1999 riots broke out in Ternate.  Ternate was now divided into 
North Ternate where the Sultan was in control and South Ternate where the 
Makians and Tidorese were running things.  The Moluccan Protestant Church 
(GPM) was in the center of Ternate and in the South.  The killing which drove out 
the Christians began in the South and moved North to the border between the two 
groups.  The yellow troops controlled northern Ternate, including the Chinese 
neighbourhood where the centre of business was located.  The violence was 
provoked through leaflets and loudspeakers from the local mosques.  A few days 
before this happened, attackers had already stoned the houses of Christians.  
Christians began to leave Ternate before the slaughter occurred in Tidore because 
they felt the increase of terror in the region where they lived.  Christians who 
defended themselves were killed, especially those in the area around the GPM 
church. The rioters were not local people, but rather persons unknown to their 
neighbours.  The attackers came from different villages and cities. 
 
After this conflict, the violence escalated and spread to the whole of the North 
Moluccas. The Sultan of Ternate had to leave Ternate after the fighting between 
his Yellow Troops and their enemies on December 27-28, 1999.  This battle was 
related to the riots which had erupted in Northern Halmahera during what was 
called the Bloody Christmas of 1999. The Yellow Troops fought against the 
Makian and Tidorese forces from Ternate who wanted to cross over to attack 
Tobelo in Halmahera.  The Yellow Adat Troops prevented reinforcements from 
reaching the Muslims in Tobelo, but in the end the joint forces of the Makians and 
Tidorese defeated the Yellow Troops of the Ternate Sultan. 
 
 
5.6.  Conclusion 
 
Through this analysis of Indonesian political history, we can conclude that ritual 
politics are commonly used from the village level right up to the national stage.  
Power relies on symbols, words, myths and violence.  A political project carried 
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by either negotiation or coercion can be reinforced by the articulation of symbols. 
When negotiation is blocked, violence becomes a means of determining political 
directions.  
 
The Youth Vow Movement (Sumpah Pemuda) eloquently called for unity based 
on ethnic politics.  This unity was transformed and channelled according to 
religious and non-religious ideological categories.  Learning from the history of 
Indonesia, Sukarno united people by employing populist rituals. Pancasila and 
local traditions were trademarks of Sukarno’s leadership.  In the period of 
Suharto, unity was enforced by tight controls, the suppression of dissent, 
economic growth and technological solutions to social problem.  During this 
period of Reformation, the unity of the nation is under severe attack.  The nation 
lacks any coherent political format or ideology.  National rituals are in disarray 
and political interests are fragmented by region, religion and ethnicity.  
 
During the post colonial period in the Moluccas, the central goverenment in 
Jakarta has tried to control the political identity of the Moluccan people. The 
Moluccas are a part of Indonesian political history that illustrates how competition 
for power is articulated in symbols and rituals that help form coalitions for the 
benefit of each political actor.  Coalitions ensures the continuation of relationships 
of mutuality where each party both gives and receives. For example, Go lkar 
employed the Sultan of Ternate to become an elite cadre.  The last election before 
Suharto stepped down, shows that the local people still supported Golkar.  The 
success of Golkar opened the opportunity for the Sultan of Ternate to return to 
regional power, as he appeared to revitalize the historical memories of the region.  
Political rituals enlivened both national and regional politics.  
 
However the collapse of Suharto, which ushered in the Reformation era also 
reinvented the bitter political rivals from Ternate and Tidore who used the Kao 
and the Makians to stake out their differing claims to the ancient kingdom of 
Maluku-Kie-Raha.  The separation of the North Moluccas from the province of 
the Moluccas sharpens the old competition among the four kingdoms in the area. 
The political transformations among the regional elites drove the people to divide 
into different groups that distinguished themselves from each other through their 
history of loyalities, religions and sub-ethnicities. When the interests became great 
and the conflicts could no longer be managed wisely, the common people of 
Northern Halmahera had to pay the price in their own blood. 
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Chapter VI 
The Making of Ritual Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter begins with a description of the riots in Tobelo on December 26, 
1999 and its impact on the extended violence in Galela that followed.  We then 
examine local factors that contributed to the violence.  How did different actors 
structure the conflict through ritual in order to mobilize the masses in Ngidiho?  
We will try to disentangle all the rumours and perception of both Muslims and 
Christians in the conflict.  Our analysis attempts a “reconstruction” of the games 
people played and the strategies pursued by those “behind the screens” to achieve 
their goals. The key question is, why did the conflict result in ritualised violence 
and to what do these rituals refer?   
 
6.1.  The Dance of Invulnerability and the Water of Anointment 
 
After violent religious riots took place in Malifut/Kao, and then in Tidore and 
Ternate, riots also began in several other places in Central and Northern 
Halmahera.242  In this section I will discuss the dynamics of the beginning of these 
riots.  The account will also pay attention to elements of religious ritual that were 
mixed with the power of local magic in the riots. The riots were ritualised and 
employed ritual leaders in a liturgy of local worship that predates the coming of 
Islam and Christianity to the region. 
 
6.1.1.  The Fitri Dance 
 
Three young girls, about 8-9 years old, draped in transparent white robes that 
reveal every part of their bodies, are dancing.  It is said that the three young girls 
were chosen because they are virgins and have not yet had a menstruation.  These 
two elements are very important prerequisites for raising up the supernatural 
                                                 
242 On November 7, 1999 there were killings of Christian children and teenagers in the village of 
Lola, District of  Payahe, Central Halmahera. As already noted, in an account of the chronology of 
the riots in North Moluccas such as is taken from Forum Keadilan (January 23, 2000), there are 
discrepancies between the version of events according to the Christian community and the Muslim 
community.  The riots noted above are not recorded in the Muslim version.  I have used the data 
from the Christian version in this account because it is well attested by the research data I gathered 
from the refugees whom I interviewed in August, 2000, in Bitung and Manado. I received 
confirmation from responses of both Christians and Muslims about this data when I went to North 
Moluccas in February 2002 (see also Chapter VII). 
“Rhetoric, rituals, and images provided a 
symbolic framework for revolutionary political 
culture. Although the political content of 
speeches, festivals, and representations of 
authority, such as seals and coins, changed over 
the decade, many of the principles and 
aspirations that shaped them remained 
fundamentally the same” (Hunt: 1984, 123). 
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power, which will make it possible for them to dance a truly magical dance.  In 
the local tradition, young girls sometimes also have the power of revelation that is 
shared with other members of the society.  
 
The movements of the dance are very simple.  Their arms are raised with hands 
outstretched and open to the direction in front of them above their heads.  Their 
hands sway to right and left as the enemy shoots arrows in their direction.  Their 
hands grasp and throw away the arrows that they have caught.  In this first 
movement their little hands easily catch the arrows that are shot towards them.  
With a single change in the movement of their hands, the arrows they succeed in 
catching are thrown away to the right and left.  Very gracefully they dance, so that 
the many arrows that fly at them from all directions are plucked from the air. 
 
This dance of invulnerability is accompanied by the sound of a drum (tifa) that is 
played by an adult male dressed in white with a white headband.  The beating of 
the tifa gives energy to the three young dancers, who dance with the purpose of 
tearing down the physical strength and concentration for warfare of the male 
soldiers across the way who are shooting the arrows.  At the same time, other 
armed men with white headbands fill in the line behind the dancers.  They are 
only standing on guard.  They do not act at all because the three dancers and the 
musician are now in the midst of an effort to tear down the defences of the enemy 
before them.  While moving in imitation of the Cakalele dance, they cry out in 
unison Allahu Akbar.  Over and over again, the line of men behind the three, 
young, girl dancers, shout their praises to God with all their might. 
 
This scene is not a dramatic act from an artistic production, but a part of a ritual 
that emerged at the beginning of violence in December 27, 1999 in the village of 
Togolio, District of Tobelo.  Another term for this dance is the Fitri dance.  Fitri 
is from the Arabic word that means holy or pure.  In a condition of purity a person 
who dances this dance can receive bodily invulnerability that can overcome sharp 
objects that are sent by the enemy in an attack.  They choose to wear the colour 
white to differentiate their identity from the identity of the enemy, based on their 
understanding of the nature of purity. Due to their choice of this colour they are 
called the white troops (pasukan putih).  Only the Muslim warriors performed the  
Fitri dance, which became their trademark during the civil war in Tobelo and 
Galela.243   
 
The little girls actually serve as conductors of power, because the power that 
flows towards them is sent from an adult male who acts as the leader of the ritual 
in shaping the war that is taking place.  The leader of the war ritual, who in 
everyday life is their Imam (leader of worship), has supernatural power, gained 
through carrying out a ritual of fasting in which he is forbidden to eat, drink or 
have sexual relations.  Some of his followers, who were all men, support him by 
joining in the ritual of fasting. The achievement of invulnerability takes time.  
Fasting must be carried out several days before the dance.  In the conflict ritual 
                                                 
243 This reconstruction of the Fitri dance was obtained from various sources whom I interviewed in 
August, 2000 in Manado, North Sulawesi. Muslim informants in Galela also confirmed the story 
when I returned to the area in February 2001. 
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that took place in Soa Sio, Galela on December 27, 1999 there was only one man 
who played the role of warlord in dancing the fitri dance. 
 
The young girls in transparent clothes dance to confuse the enemy and take away 
their power.  When faced with the dancers, the enemy will feel sexually aroused.  
This will break down their resistance and concentration on war by stimulating 
their sexual lust for the strongly magical girls who dance before them.  When the 
concentration of the enemy is destroyed, then the warriors who are behind the 
dancers will attack and easily defeat their enemies.  The bodies of the warriors 
were wrapped with paper on which was written verses from the Holy Koran to 
increase their protection.  Rain made the girls appear even more naked but tended 
to reduce the effectiveness of the sacred dance because the verses from the Holy 
Koran written in Arabic became wet and disintegrated.  
 
6.1.2.  The Ritual of Sprinkling Holy Water 
 
The Christians also carried out rituals to support their war effort.  For example, 
before going to battle the troops would gather in a church to be sprinkled with 
holy water.  The Christian troops were sprinkled in the Protestant church (GMIH) 
in Kusuri,244 before marching to battle against the people who used the young 
girls for the Fitri dance in Togolio. The minister commissioned the congregation 
for war.  The role of the Tobelo ministers in the ordering and revelation of war 
strategy was limited to prayer and anointing the red warriors with sprinkled water 
after the worship service in church.  The task of directing the battle was carried 
out by the leader of the war, who is called the Kapitan (Captain) of Tobelo.  
Prayer and sprinkling was a characteristic ritual at all Christian villages during the 
civil war in Tobelo and Galela.  They closed the ritual with a blessing in which 
the minister stretched out his arms as a sign of the Lord’s commissioning to His 
congregation.  Then he came down from the pulpit and took water, which had 
already been blessed, from a font in the front.  This water was then sprinkled over 
the congregation before they left the church. 245 
 
From the necks of several men, a small bible was hung like a necklace.  This was 
believed to act as an amulet that inculcated invulnerability, so that they received 
the strength to withstand sharp objects that could kill their bodies.  When facing 
the Fitri dancers, they sang lively Christian hymns and swung a piglet held by 
several men in the direction of the dancers.  On the edges of their swords they also 
smeared pig fat and carried the flesh of pigs while repeating the name of Jesus 
Christ as an antidote against the holy Fitri dance.  With a strange irony, they also 
repeated the Hebrew word shalom meaning, “peace”, as a mantra to build their 
                                                 
244 Kusuri and Togolio are located to the South of Tobelo and are close to each other. Kusuri is an 
indigenous village, which is sometimes referred to as inhabited by suku terasing (alienated or 
strange tribe), but actually are the original indigenous people of the area.  Their religion is a 
mixture of Christianity and local religious practices.   Togolio is a new village created in the 
1980s.  It is a transmigrant village with inhabitants from Galela, Tobelo and Java.  Most of its 
people were Muslims.  
245 Note that this took place in Protestant, Calvinist churches that have no official Church tradition 
of holy water expect the water for baptism. 
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spirits.  Unfortunately shalom was opposite to their reality as people engaged in 
war. 
 
The Christian warriors wore red headbands.  The colour red is symbolic in the 
original culture of Tobelo-Galela.  Traditionally the colour red signifies courage 
and virility.  The people who wear this colour hope to receive the power of 
invulnerability from the spirits of their deceased ancestors.  The Christian warriors 
throughout the Moluccas were called the red troops (pasukan merah) during the 
conflict.  The ritual practices of the Christians, like the Muslims, mixed their 
religion with traditional beliefs.  The Christian minister or priest cleansed the 
people and dedicated them to war.  The minister purified his people from the evil 
influences of supernatural power that belonged to bad ancestral spirits while 
praying that God will strengthen them.  However the Christians in Tobelo were 
more open to ancestral rituals than the Christians in Galela. 
 
The church in Galela dedicated the fighters to God and cleansed them from evil 
by burning and destroying their magic amulets and bottles containing spells or 
charms.  If there was someone among them who still kept a magic amulet, the 
minister who found out about it would immediately carry out a ritual of cleansing 
by burning the offending items.  This rite was necessary in order to guard the  
unity of the red warriors in Galela and protect them from God’s displeasure.  The 
Galelans believed that violation of this requirement would result in the defeat of 
those who went to battle.  At the same time, those who stayed in the village, 
including the women, had to hold a worship service as long as the battle 
continued.  Prayers and praises were raised to God, pleading for help on behalf of 
those who are on the battlefield.  The rituals in the village are what determined the 
success or survival of the Christian warriors in their battle against the white 
troops.  The minister would not accompany the warriors, but would pray 
privately.  If he received revelation about the direction of the attack, he would 
send a messenger to communicate his vision to the  congregation that is on the 
battlefield. 
 
Nevertheless, the red warriors of Galela and Tobelo do not agree that the minister 
is a leader of the war.  They believe that the leader of the war is the Lord God 
whom they defend.  In Galela especially, the Red Warriors reject trust in the 
spirits of their ancestors.  This rejection is based on the history of Galela, because 
Galela (in this case the village of Duma), was the first place that the Gospel was 
preached in North Moluccas, therefore they belief they should keep to purer 
Christian beliefs.  Another reason that was not stated explicitly is that the 
ministers of the GMIH congregation in Duma and the surrounding area are not 
indigenous to Galela.  Thus they do not have the knowledge of, or sympathy with 
the local beliefs. 
 
Tobelo society is more ethnically oriented than Galela in their approach to war.  
Christians in Tobelo followed many of the ancestral rituals in their conduct of the 
war.  The appointment of a kapitan is based on the magic abilities that he 
possesses.  The Kapitan of Tobelo is said to have magic power, which he received 
from the spirit of his ancestors. The magic power of the Kapitan of war in Tobelo 
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is supported by his wife’s abilities who has a special relationship with the spirits 
of the ancestors in her house in the village of Kupa-Kupa in the area of South 
Tobelo.  This wife will not leave her room as long as her husband is leading the 
battle.  Her room smells of kemenyaan (incense).  This woman wears black 
clothes and fasts, as long as the battle is waged.   
 
The people who live in the villages, who are not directly involved in the fighting, 
provide other kinds of support for the war.  They must be obedient to various 
kinds of restrictions.  If these taboos are violated, it is believed that the people 
who participate in the battle can be destroyed.  The essential taboos include 
washing clothes or hanging them in front of the house; they are forbidden to leave 
the house, take a bath, have sexual relations or eat chillies, etc.  Certain names of 
objects and persons “out there” may not be spoken aloud or even referred to.  
These taboos are observed as long as a battle is taking place or may cover several 
days of a campaign. 
 
At the same time, the red warriors who participate in the battle are forbidden to do 
immoral actions such as stealing, raping women, or killing old people and 
children.  Violation of these laws of war would cause the loss of the power from 
the amulets, which were given by the spirits of the ancestors.  The Christians of 
Tobelo believe that the peoples’ and the warriors’ obedience to the taboos that 
were established by the Kapitan of War in Tobelo is the reason for their success in 
battle.  The Kapitan of war will reputably kill any warrior that violates a taboo.  It 
is said that on the second day of the riots, the Tobelo Kapitan of War meted out 
punishment to both red warriors and civilians who looted the stores of Chinese 
business people. 
 
The difference in war rituals between the red warriors of Tobelo and Galela was 
influenced by the GMIH Church’s ambiguous relation to the violence.  At the 
beginning, the GMIH Synod leaders located in Tobelo rejected the church’s direct 
involvement in the religious riots.  However when the war was taking place the 
Church supported the Christian warriors.  As more and more refugees escaped to 
Tobelo, the leadership of the Synod of GMIH had to help the many church 
members who were wounded and suffering from the war.246 At the same time, 
some GMIH leaders left the area during the conflict and lost credibility with the 
people in their congregations.  The war leaders sometimes silenced those who 
stayed and tried to restrain the violence.  During the violence, churches were used 
for war councils, but they were led by adat war leaders, not pastors.  In some 
cases, pastors were able to prevent the execution of Muslims but had little 
influence over the general fighting. 247 
 
The rituals performed by both sides signify a different approach to the technology 
of war.  Both sides were happy to use modern military technology, if they could 
get it.  But modern weapons never replaced magical power.  Beginning in 
February 2000, the military became more involved and the white warriors gained 
                                                 
246 From my interview with a leader of the Synod of GMIH church in Manado, in August 2000. 
247 From an interview with Rev. Marthen Budiman, a pastor who stayed in Halmahera during the 
violence and was later elected Head of the Synod. 
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access to modern weapons.248  However, the white troops still relied on magical 
power for protection.  Sometimes there were terrible slaughters when one side 
attacked without caution because they believed they were invulnerable.  The red 
warriors, like the white warriors,  continued to practice ritual conflict right to the 
end.  They combined mystical rituals to harness the power of their ancestors, with 
religious teaching that was supplemented with home made weapons that the 
people fashioned themselves.249 
 
Why did the people use ritual for war?  Mary Douglas says that ritual creates a 
process for formulating experience.  The act of killing and being killed is so 
powerful and so traumatic that people need to sacralize their actions.  Acts, or 
experiences, of unspeakable violence can be redeemed from the horror of 
meaninglessness if they are formulated as part of a sacrifice for God.  Ritual 
brings strengths to the people who admit that the unthinkable has happened and 
modify its meaning so that it becomes part of an experience that can be expressed 
as meaningful (Douglas: 1988 [ 1966] , 64).     
 
6.2. Analysis of Terror and Violence 
 
One way to explain the conflict in the Moluccas is to show how fears and tensions 
accumulated until they boiled over into violence.  Terror analysis must pay 
attention to how local people built their understand ing of what was happening 
during the build up of tension.  The media for spreading information in the North 
Moluccas included not only formal tools of communication such as newspapers, 
radio, and TV, but also banners, flyers, gossip, rumours, stories and graffiti. The 
informal media used in the everyday life of the people was a powerful factor to 
stimulate people to participate in violence. Detailed descriptions show how the 
media influenced the people.  Diverse kinds of information media carried 
ideological agendas.  The media developed a political discourse that discredited 
rival groups and mobilised believers to prepare for violent conflict.  This 
discourse of fear operated on many levels. 
 
The following report is based on my ethnographic notes and maps the increase of 
fears among the people during my four months in Ngidiho prior to the outbreak of 
war. Tensions were increasing every day at the village level, stimulated by 
apocalyptic rumours, interpersonal conflicts, and purportedly academic analysis 
that sowed fears and suspicions among the people in the area.  When fears reach a 
certain level, there is a tendency to “fight or flight”.  Those who stay to fight, may 
ritualise their actions to justify doing what they might never even dream of doing 
under normal circumstances.  
 
6.2.1.  Rumous of the Number Nine  
 
The first rumour concerned the number nine (9).  The people were frightened by a 
rumour that the apocalypse or day of judgment would occur on the ninth day of 
the ninth month in the year of ninety-nine.  This rumour frightened the whole of 
                                                 
248 See  Kompas (May  31, 2000). 
249 See Jawa Pos (April 30, 2000). 
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the North Moluccas and Central Halmahera.  Several local newspapers in the 
North Moluccas reported concerning the society’s response in facing the 
frightening rumours about the 9-9-99 prophecies.  In Ternate many schools were 
closed on 9 September 1999.  The school holiday was intended to anticipate the 
fear of the pupils regarding the date 9-9-99. The market places were also empty 
because most people had done their shopping prior to the fated day.  The people 
were hoarding rice, kerosene, and dried food to provide for the eventuality of 
riots.  Business people who sold swords benefited from the rumours of riots, 
because as long as the rumours circulated, they sold large numbers of swords and 
machetes. 
 
Local newspapers attempted to moderate the fears regarding the number nine.  
They said that it would pass without anything happening.  But the people believed 
in it anyway.  The local newspapers reported that the fear of the Day of Judgment 
terrified the people in the village of Guruapin, District of Kayoa.  Two days 
before the 9th the citizens there, according to the story they told to the newspaper, 
saw two ships sailing to the West of their village.  It was said that at 1 AM they 
observed the sailors from the two ships lowering bombs over the side of the ships.  
Later the young men who were on vigilant watch that night approached the place 
where this occurred, but failed to find anything.  Therefore they later assumed that 
the vision, which they saw earlier, was actually caused by sea ghosts.250 
 
People believed in the rumours of the Day of Judgment (Kiamat), regardless of 
their religion.  The word Kiamat comes from the Arabic word qiyaamah, which 
means resurrection. 251  Both Islamic and Christian theology affirms that on the 
Day of Judgment, God will raise the people who have passed away.  However 
many people of both religions accept the common understanding of Kiamat as the 
destruction of all of nature and the end of the world.  This diverges from the 
original meaning of the term. According to the Ternate Pos newspaper, the 
people’s belief in these rumours was a sign that the people didn’t believe any 
more in their local leaders, who often gave explanations that were unclear.252   
 
In Ngidiho where I lived, mama Iana, the wife of Oom Din, who usually sold 
bananas in the market, refused to leave home on the fated day.  She said that fear 
was rife among the people for a whole week before the dreaded date.  The trucks 
that usually carried workers past Oom Din’s house were empty.  Many workers at 
the banana plantation, who lived in the district of Galela, did not enter work.  
When I shared this story with some friends of mine, one of them who stays in 
Jakarta said that on that date his institution was also empty because people were 
afraid that it was the Day of Judgment.253 
 
 
                                                 
250 Part of the original traditions of North Moluccas includes beliefs in Sea Spirits, who are 
classified as evil demons.  However equally strong is the tradition of piracy and smuggling. 
251 See the conversation of a reporter from Tempo with Dr. Kautsar Azhari Noor (Noor: 1999, 54). 
252 See Ternate Pos (September 7-13, 1999). 
253 Thanks to Jajat Burhanuddin who shared this story with me.  9/9/99 passed without major 
incident. 
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6.2.2.  Rumours of the Outbreak of Riots in Tobelo 
 
A couple of months later we heard rumours of riots in Tobelo when we were 
preparing for the wedding party of the son of Permenas Budiman, who was 
marrying a girl from Manado, North Sulawesi.  She worked as a labourer at the 
banana plantation.  On November 6, 1999, both Muslim and Christian family 
members were gathered at the home of Permenas Budiman. 254  On the day before 
the wedding party, many members of the family, both Muslim and Christian, 
gathered at the family home in order to help prepare food for the party.  That 
afternoon, everyone was shocked by news from a passing bus carrying passengers 
to the banana plantation.  Someone from the bus shouted, “Tobelo has broken out!  
Tobelo has broken out!”  Everyone ran to the main road.  The men ran out to the 
main road carrying swords.  At the same time, several of the women started to cry.  
The people who were at the house preparing for the wedding ran home because 
they remembered their children and houses that they had left.  Not long after that, 
several old people that were walking from the West of the village came by calling 
out:  “People, please be calm!  We are all brothers and sisters!  Don’t do anything!  
Keep calm!”  The Ngidiho Village Head, wearing his official government 
uniform, gave orders to the village officials to calm the people.255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures 49-50:  Muslim and Christian Men cut the meat of a cow for the 
wedding party at the time when rumours were spreading in Ngidiho; 
The groom stands behind his Muslim aunt while the Christian and Muslim 
women cut vegetables for the party. 
 
But the people had already started to panic, especially after more and more people 
who worked in the banana plantation returned home.  Buses from the direction of 
the banana plantation went by Ngidiho full of people who where already carrying 
their mattresses and other possessions that could be saved.  In the midst of this 
panic, a loudspeaker blasted out announcements, reassuring the people that 
                                                 
254 Permenas Budiman is a Christian.  His father was a Muslim who married a Christian woman 
and later became a Christian.  In 1974, his older brother, Suaeb Budiman, married a Muslim 
woman and became a Muslim. 
255 The head village of Ngidiho told me that he only wore his official government uniform if the 
situation became dangerous, or for a formal occasion where he was expected to appear as the 
representative of the official government of the Republic of Indonesia at the village level. 
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nothing had happened in Tobelo.  Two highly respected elders were the voices 
behind these announcements.  The first speaker was a leader among the Muslim 
people (Oom Syarif) and the second was a Christian leader (Oom Nani).  These 
elders reassured the people again, saying, “People, we are all brothers and sisters.  
Don’t be fooled by various rumours.  Nothing is wrong.  Tobelo is calm.  Nothing 
has happened.” 
 
After these announcements, officials of the government of the District of Galela 
came by wearing official government uniforms and riding motorcycles.  They 
asked the people to remain calm.  Then I saw a government car, bearing important 
leaders from both the Muslims and the Christians, speed past in the direction of 
the Banana Plantation.  The concentration of workers from various areas and 
religions at the Banana Plantation was considered very dangerous, especially 
since workers could be seen starting to move their possessions from various 
housing locations.  The weeping of people in the buses going by Ngidiho was 
very loud and disturbing.  The buses were full of mattresses, tables and other 
possessions that the workers were moving as they fled from the Banana Company 
to their home villages. 
 
People from villages that included Muslims and Christians left together and 
together guarded the safety of their people.  However the view was different with 
homogenous villages of only one religion, Muslim or Christian.  In Soa Sio, 
where most of the population is Muslim, the men, armed with swords, spears, bow 
and arrows and hatchets, continuously guarded their borders against the Christian 
villages of Mamuya and Pune.  One of my respondents in Soa Sio felt shocked 
because Muslim men, armed with identical swords, suddenly prowled wildly up  
and down the streets.  They believed that people from Kao would soon attack 
Galela.  Actually the word Kao was only a name to them because what they meant 
was the Christians.  They were on guard for several days, but nothing happened. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 52:  This is a picture of a Bugis trader who had rented a small space 
in front of Oom Din’s house for his little store.  Here he waits for a bus to 
transport his belongings and himself back to South Sulawesi because of his 
fear of riots. This was just a few days after the rumours of trouble reached 
Ngidiho. 
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In the evening, I heard from the Village Head of Galela, what had actually 
happened in Tobelo.  In the afternoon, on that day, in the fish market of Tobelo, 
there was a fight between two relatives who were selling fish.  This fight caused a 
chase in the market area in which the man chasing the other yelled that he would 
burn the market.  This fight scared the people shopping in the Inpres market of 
Tobelo.  People fled the market shouting, “It’s already happened in the market!”  
Some even shouted that the market was already burning.  At that time it was not 
yet true, but it was a self- fulfilling prophecy.  The lie created the conditions in 
which it became true. 
 
6.2.3.  A Disturbance on the Following Saturday 
 
A week later, on Saturday, November 14, 1999, another disturbance shook 
Tobelo.  The people of Ngidiho ignored this rumour of riots and its influence did 
not spread dramatically in Galela.  However, once again the people in Tobelo 
were very tense because of the trouble.  A young man from the District of Kao, 
who worked as a teacher at a junior high school, was drunk in the marketplace.  
The guards in the marketplace, under the organization Gema Hilo, had already 
been increased because of the rumours of riots the week before.  Gema Hilo was a 
paramilitary organization of Muslim and Christian youth who were employed to 
keep the peace.  They ejected the drunken man because they considered him 
dangerous to the safety of Tobelo.  The youth then hired a motorcycle taxi (ojek), 
to take him out of town, towards the South.  Not far from the market, in front of 
the Bulog256 office building, he threw a section of pipe that was a bomb, but it 
didn’t explode.  Some people reported seeing smoke coming out of the pipe.  A 
group of young men from Gema Hilo, accompanied by police from Danramil in a 
patrol car, chased the ojek in order to arrest the youth.   
 
In the village of Efi-Efi, in the District of South Tobelo, the young man stopped in 
front of the house of one of his relatives from Kao.  While still half drunk, he said 
that his action at the market was just to scare those who were responsible for the 
disturbance the week before.   When the police and guards from Gema Hilo were 
about to arrest him, he suddenly picked up a big, black rock about the size of a 
mango, and ate it.  The people who observed this were shocked and said he ate the 
rock as if it were peppermint candy.  The police were also frightened by his 
apparent magical powers and allowed him to continue his journey and return to 
his home village in Kao.  This story (rumour) was widely repeated and generally 
believed by people from all ethnic groups and religions.  However among the 
Muslims, Kao people began to be identified as people with power and magic that 
had to be faced with an opposing spirituality.   
  
6.2.4.  The Counterfeit Letter as a “Scientific” Rumour 
 
Several days before the Ngidiho village meeting on November 14, 1999, a 
counterfeit letter, allegedly from the Head of the Moluccan Church, circulated in 
Ngidiho.  This document had influenced the outbreak of riots in Tidore and 
                                                 
256 Bulog is the national government organization in charge of national distribution of food and 
other resources. 
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Ternate.  Leaders called a village meeting in order to discuss the preparation of 
Ngidiho to face the increasing number of rumours about impending riots. The 
counterfeit letter257 circulated secretly among the Muslims of Ngidiho.  A son- in-
law of the ex-village head, who originated from Tidore, brought the letter.  The 
people made photocopies and the counterfeit letter began to spread.  Just as in 
Tidore and Ternate, in the Dis tricts of Galela and Tobelo the government did not 
ban or denounce the letter.  However, the Village Head of Ngidiho told me that he 
had already discussed the letter with the minister of the GMIH church in Ngidiho 
and had asked the Muslim community to surrender to him all copies of this 
dangerous letter. 
 
The contents of this letter were extremely provocative and intended to stimulate 
conflict between Muslims and Christians.  The ostensible sender of the letter was 
listed as the Head of the Synod of the Moluccas, Semi Titaley, on behalf of the 
Council of Elders S.G.T.-C.S.I.S.  The name of Semi Titaley was used as a 
symbol of Christian power.  As Head of the Synod of the Moluccan Church 
(GPM), he was portrayed as a person capable of mobilizing the whole society of 
Christians in the Moluccas.  The letter seemed to legitimise the spread of 
“religious war” from the Central Moluccas (Ambon and its surrounding islands) 
to the Northern part of the Moluccas.  On the basis of this documentary “proof” 
that the Christians were preparing to attack, the Muslim gathered in fear and 
quickly attacked the Christians in Tidore, Ternate and Pajahe in early November 
1999.   
 
The riots in the North Moluccas on November 3, 1999 began in Tidore.  Ternate 
was guarded by the adat (traditional) warriors of the Sultan of Ternate, referred to 
as the Yellow Warriors.258  In Ternate, according to reports in the newspapers, the 
rumours about the counterfeit letter spread very quickly.259  The counterfeit letter 
showed a deep understanding about the political situation in the North Moluccas.  
It refers to the conflict between officials of North Moluccas and Central 
Halmahera about the location of the capital city of the new province.  The writer 
understood the political challenges of the moment that could be exploited by the 
church to gain power throughout the Province of the North Moluccas. 
 
According to the writer of the letter, the church in Halmahera must establish itself 
because of several realities that are outlined in the letter.  First, it presents a 
general view of the geography of the North Moluccas and Central Halmahera that 
is squeezed between the Central Moluccas (Ambon), North Sulawesi (Manado), 
and Irian Jaya.  These are all areas that are majority Christian.  This perception is 
                                                 
257 In Indonesian this is referred to as a surat kaleng (letter in a can), or anonymous letter.  
However in this letter the author is stated, but apparently stated falsely.  Therefore it can be 
referred to as a counterfeit letter. 
258 The colour yellow is a royal color that according to the research of experts is connected with 
the religion of Hinduism.  After the Hindu kings converted to Islam, they still maintained the color 
yellow. The color yellow is the color of turmeric (kunyit) . See (Brierley: 1994).  See also the 
explanation about the use of special items in the Islamic Kingdom of Malacca, in the 16th Century, 
with attention to the division of colors determined by the status of those who wore them.  The 
color yellow was the color of princes.  See (Andaya and Andaya: 1982,  47). 
259 See, Ternate Pos (November 16-22, 1999). 
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accompanied by a prediction that North Sulawesi is ready to release Sangir Talaud 
to the North Moluccas because of its ties of history, tradition and culture.  The 
release of Sangir Talaud would strengthen the position of Christianity in 
Halmahera. 
 
Secondly, in order to establish the church, the Makian ethnic group must be 
evicted because they are considered fanatical Muslims occupying the land of 
Halmahera (Malifut).  This action to establish the church should be carried out 
through an ethnic war linked to land claims.  By taking an approach to war over 
land claims, according to the picture drawn in the letter, the ethnic Makians will 
lose their support from the Muslim community in the North Moluccas and Central 
Halmahera.  This loss of support would break the unity of Islam in the North 
Moluccas, which is isolated because ethnic identity is the priority in the region.  
However, although ethnic strength is viewed as the authentic face of Halmahera, 
the letter argues that Christianity transcends ethnicity and is the driving force that 
carries out its agenda through church programs in the Moluccas, North Sulawesi 
and Irian Jaya.  According to the local newspaper, the counterfeit letter’s 
reference to “marginalizing the Makian ethnic group in Halmahera,” effectively 
stimulated feelings of revenge among the Makians who had just been evicted from 
their houses on October 24, 1999.  Furthermore, the local paper wrote:  “The issue 
was designed in such a way that it appears that the attack against the District of 
Malifut was carefully planned and the church was the secret player in the 
background.”260 
 
Thirdly, it appears from the letter that the church planned a strategy for the bloody 
counter-attack against the village of Sosol based on the two considerations stated 
above.261  According to the counterfeit letter, this strategy was the product of a 
decision by Christians from the North Moluccas in Ambon, who attended a 
meeting with the Synod of the Moluccas and its Council of Elders S.G.T.-C.S.I.S.  
These decisions concerned the characteristics of war, the organization of power in 
the Christian community and among the Muslims of Kao, the establishment of 
taboos as long as warfare continues, and the funding of war. 
 
The discourse concerning motives for the Christian aggression, as described in the 
counterfeit letter, carried the same load of issues that appear in the accusations of 
Tamrin A. Tomagola, a prominent sociologist from the University of Indonesia in 
Jakarta, who originated from Galela.  After the riots in Tobelo and Galela broke 
out Kompas describes Tomagola’s opinion as follows: “According to Tomagola, 
especially regarding the riots in North Halmahera, he sees three primary causes, 
namely the struggle between religions for supremacy over the area, whose roots 
go back more than 127 years into the past…”, secondly, the struggle for control of 
a gold mine, and thirdly, the struggle for the Governor’s seat.262   
                                                 
260 See, Ternate Pos (November 16-22, 1999). 
261 The villages of Sosol and Wangeotak were two villages that were attacked by the Makians at 
the earlier conflict in June 1999 ( see Chapter I and V).  
262 See Kompas ( January  6, 2000).  See also, (Tomagola: 2000a, 7). Tomagola’s opinion that 
links the struggle for natural resources with the struggle for religious supremacy is questionable.  
Why?  Because when Dutch, Protestant missionaries entered the area approximately 127 years ago 
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The Synod of GPM (the Protestant Church in the Moluccas) in Ambon denied the 
authenticity of the letter and the Synod of GMIH in Tobelo also repudiated it.  
The denials and clarifications had already been sent on November 2, 1999 to the 
Governor of the Moluccas, the Commander in Chief of the Military Command 
Area XVI Pattimura and the Police Chief of the Moluccas.  Several points 
substantiated the formal denial of authenticity from the Synod of GPM in Ambon: 
 
1.The number of the letter, 028/S.G.T.-C.S.I.S./VII/99, as stated in the letter, is 
not a letter code that was ever used by the Protestant Church in the Moluccas. 
2.The organization code S.G.T.-C.S.I.S., used in the address of the letter, is 
unknown as a church organization in Indonesia and the Moluccas. 
3. The term Sinode Maluku (The Synod of the Moluccas) in the title Council of 
Elders S.G.T.-C.S.I.S. is also unknown and different from the official name, 
Sinode GPM (the Protestant Church in the Moluccas). 
4.The writing of the name, Semi Titaley, as the sender of the letter was not written 
in the proper way that was used in all official documents and letters of the 
Protestant Church in the Moluccas.  Official letters from the Head of the Synode 
state his name and title as:  “Ketua Sinode Gereja Protestan Maluku, Pdt. S. D. 
Titaley, S.Th.,” not “Semi Titaley.” 
5.The GPM stated that the contents of the anonymous letter were far from the 
understanding and knowledge of the GPM. 
 
A letter of clarification from the Elders of the Synod of GMIH also explained that 
the statement in the counterfeit letter about “organizing intellectuals from the 
Theological University of Ternate,” also showed that the writer of the letter did 
not understand that there is in fact no such thing as a Theological University, or 
indeed any school of Theology in Ternate.  In 1989, the Akademi Teologia GMIH 
(The Theological academy of GMIH) moved from Ternate to Tobelo.  This move 
simultaneously changed the status of the school from a theological academy to a 
seminary (Sekolah Tinggi Teologi GMIH).  The address for this institution is, 
Sekolah Tinggi Teologi GMIH in Tobelo and not Universitas Teologi, Ternate 
(The University of Theology, Ternate). 
 
There was no response from the government of North Moluccas to the denials 
from these two Christian organizations, nor any attempt to correct the falsehoods 
in the counterfeit letter.263  However subsequently the government of North 
Moluccas accused the Sultan of Ternate of being the origin of the counterfeit 
letter. Tomagola also accused the Sultan of Ternate of being a provocateur in the 
national press.264  Masdjid Abdullah, a professor at the University of Sam 
                                                                                                                                     
at the end of the 19th Century, they did so after the Sultan of Ternate and the government of the 
Netherlands were unable to overpower the people of North Halmahera (Tobelo, Galela and 
Loloda), who worked the sea lanes as pirates.  They primarily attacked the boats of the Sultanate 
as a sign that embodied their protest against the monopoly of the Sultanate over local economic 
resources such as pearls and sea cucumbers (see Chapter IV).      
263 See Ternate Pos (November  9-15, 1999). 
264 The newspaper Surya reported that there were mutual accusations between the Sultan of 
Ternate and Drs. Tamrin Amal Tomagola, M.A., Ph.D., about each other’s involvement as 
provocateurs.  See, “Saling Tuding Soal Provakator” (Surya, January  22, 2000).  However, on the 
same day in the newspaper Kompas, Tomagola who had stated four names as provocateurs in the 
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Ratulangi in Manado, suggests that Tomagola was unwittingly manipulated by a 
faction of the local political elite to support their cause.  Tomagola’s analysis 
further polarized the negative atmosphere that already existed.265  
 
The massacre of Christians in Tidore, Ternate and Pajahe received very little 
attention in the national press and was not recorded as part of the chronology of 
the North Moluccan riots in the version of events published by the Council of 
Imams (Majelis Ulama Indonesia=MUI) of the North Moluccas.  Nor is it 
mentioned in the accounts of several other Muslim groups.266  Why did the MUI 
ignore the facts about the massacre of Christians in November 1999, as recorded 
in the version of the Working Elders (Majelis Pekerja), of the Synod of GMIH?  
The simple answer is that each side downplayed events that discredited them.  
Christians also did not tell about their massacre of Muslims, as reported in the 
national media.267  The MUI account is interesting because of their distortion of 
facts in the chronology.   The MUI reported that in Ternate on December 27, 1999 
the Sultan of Ternate, along with the Christians, attacked the Muslims who 
wanted to go to Tobelo to help the Muslims there.  Actually, at the end of 
December there were not any Christians in Ternate or Tidore because they were 
all killed or had fled the month before, in November 1999.  By associating the 
Sultan of Ternate with the Christians, this account added to the discrediting of the 
Sultan in the eyes of the Muslim community.  The elimination of important events 
in the riots shows how each side used selectively chosen parts of the conflict to 
build momentum in support of their own interests at the regional and national 
level. 
 
6.2.5.  The Christians of Galela Help the People of Kao 
 
In August 1999, after the tension between Kao and Malifut had already started, 
several Muslim villagers from Ngidiho remarked to me that they sympathized 
with the resentments of the Kao against the Makians.  They said that if they were 
from Kao they would probably do the same.  Not only farmers but government 
officials in Galela also showed sympathy for the Kao people.  A Muslim District 
official told me that he had helped his counterpart from Kao communicate with 
the provincial government in Ternate after the fighting broke out.  The Kao 
villages that were assigned to Makian-Malifut included Wangeotak, Sosol, 
Balisosang, Tabobo and Gayok that are located near a profitable gold mining 
operation in Gosowong. The sympathy of the people of Ngidiho for Kao stemmed 
from their experience of also having lost their farmland.  They were forced to sell 
their land to PT GAI at a very low price, and thus felt cheated. The villagers 
                                                                                                                                     
Moluccan riots, namely, besides the Sultan of Ternate, were Dicky Wattimena (Ex-mayor of the 
city of Ambon), Bucek Sarpara and Yorrys Raweyai (Head of the Presidium of Pemuda 
Pancasila), then apologized to the last two people he had accused.  Tomagola’s apology to Sarpara 
and Raweyai was based on restudying the data that he had received.  But Tomagola still defended 
his accusations against the first two names, i.e. the Sultan of Ternate and Dicky Wattimena.  See 
Kompas (January 22, 2000).  In a personal conversation with me in July 2000, in Yogyakarta, 
Tomagola appeared to regret his accusations against the Sultan of Ternate as a provocateur.   
265 See Ternate Pos (November 16-22, 1999). 
266 See Forum Keadilan, (January 23, 2000). 
267  See Forum Keadilan, (January 23, 2000, 76-77) and Sabili (March  8,  2000, 34-35 ) 
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around Galela began to work as labourers at the company on the land they had 
formerly owned. The middle and upper management positions in the company 
were taken by outside labourers who were more educated than the local people.   
 
There were many land cases in Halmahera during the period of reformation, 
especially after February 1999, when violence broke out in Ambon.  Villagers 
demanded the return of their land or better compensation.  Some Galelan students 
left Ambon and returned to Galela to organise demonstrations.  Students returned 
home because it was not safe to attend school in Ambon.  Their return naturally 
brought stories about the violent conflict in Ambon.  These students organized a 
movement for the farmers to demand compensation from the banana plantation in 
Galela.  As tensions continued to rise in the area, several students who had 
returned home from Makassar began examining the identity cards of all 
newcomers to the area in order to determine their ethnic and religious identity.  
Consciousness of ethnicity and religion became more intense.  
 
During the new negotiations between farmers and the banana agro business 
company, the banana company agreed to pay a substantial settlement.  Apparently 
the money was given to the Head of the Farmers Reformation Group, who didn’t 
distribute all the money to the farmers. In the farmers meeting in Ngidiho in 
September 1999, farmers kept raising the issues. Some of the most critical farmers 
were Christians.  In order to deflect attention from the original issue rumours were 
spread that the Christians wanted to take over all the area in the North Moluccas.  
The local farmers became more aware that outsiders held all the higher positions 
in the agro business. Most of the new elite originated from Manado, Toraja, 
Sumatra or Java and included many Christians.  During interviews with labourers 
at the banana company I found out that there were suspicious feelings among 
them.  Although they still came to work, they stopped mixing with other ethnic 
and religious groups and gathered together during the break times according to 
their religions.  
 
As the rumours grew and the Galelans heard the news that the Kao people had 
forced the Makians to flee from their homes on October 24-25, 1999, the people 
of Ngidiho began to  change their view of the problem. Their sympathy for the 
Kao faded as their suspicions and fears grew in the District of Galela where I was 
living.  The Muslims of Galela accused the Christians of helping the people of 
Kao during their war with the Makians.  People from Makian and Tidore first 
spread this accusation when they came to Galela to visit their families.  As a 
result, the government of the District of Galela held a meeting with all the leaders 
of the community, including all the village Heads, on November 14, 1999, to 
discuss the truth of these accusations.  In this meeting they asked the Head of the 
Area for GMIH Galela to respond to the accusations from the people of Makian 
and Tidore. 
 
The Head of GMIH Galela acknowledged that the Christians of Galela did indeed 
give aid to refugees from Kao, but not to the people involved in the violence.  The 
people of Kao actually include both Christians and Muslims. Therefore, according 
to the church leaders, the help given was humanitarian, social aid in the form of 
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money, clothes and basic food items such as sugar, rice, oil, instant noodles 
(supermie), soap etc. These were intended for the refugees from the two villages 
in the area of Kao who had not received sufficient food from the area government 
for several months.  Since this help was considered social aid from Christians to 
their neighbours who were suffering, the GMIH office for the Area of Galela, that 
organized the aid, did not ask for permission or even report it to the government 
of the District of Galela.  The GMIH leader stated that the basis for the aid was 
the same as the aid given by the government (Pemda Tingkat I Maluku Utara), to 
the refugees from Malifut in August 1999.  In that case the Makians from Malifut 
were victims of the counter-attack by the citizens of Kao.  The Christians from 
Galela denied that they gave military help, such as swords, hatchets or other 
weapons of war, let alone that they intended to help the people of Kao fight 
against the government of the North Moluccas, as they were accused. 
 
6.2.6.  A Bloody Christmas in Tobelo 
 
After the November violence in Tidore and Ternate, Christians who originated 
from Halmahera returned home to Tobelo, joining Muslim refugees from the 
violence in Ambon.  Among those who returned to Tobelo were Christian 
officials from the government of the North Moluccas.  These officials were 
accused by Muslim officials from the government of the North Moluccas, of 
organizing the attacks against the Makian people in Malifut.  The influx of 
traumatized people who were fleeing to Ternate in October 24-25, 1999 from a 
scene of massacre added to the tensions in Tobelo.   
 
Tensions grew in Tobelo as rumours circulated, such as the statement that 
Muslims must dominate Tobelo because of its great potential.  Even though 
Christians far outnumbered Muslims in the District of Tobelo, a Muslim 
dominated Tobelo was not unrealistic, given the fact that the centre of the town of 
Tobelo was inhabited by around 70% Muslims and only 30% Christians.  
Muslims were concentrated especially around the Inpres marketplace while 
Christians filled the southern areas of the District. 268  According to a Christian 
source, the Camat of Tobelo publicly expressed his hope that Muslims might 
dominate Tobelo.  He also stressed that Ternate was ready to send help and 
human resources for defending Tobelo against the Christians.269  Supported by the 
counterfeit letter, similar but opposite rumours spread in the Muslim community, 
stating that Christians were planning to dominate all of Halmahera. 
 
According to rampant rumours in 1999, it would be a bloody Christmas.  This did 
not stop the normal Christmas activities of the Christians.  It was customary for 
Christians from the outlying areas to come into the centre of Tobelo to attend a 
Christmas service at the large, “mother-church.”  The leadership of GMIH asked 
Christians from the South of Tobelo to guard the area of the central Church 
                                                 
268 The District of Tobelo includes 25 villages, 17 of which are all Christian, most of which are 
located in the South, although there are a few in the North; there is one village of all Muslim 
transmigrants, and 7 mixed villages with both Muslims and Christians, located in the North, South 
and Centre of the city.  This data is drawn from, Informasi Kecamatan: 1993. 
269 Reported by a Christian refugee from Tobelo whom I interviewed in Manado, in August 2000. 
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located in Tobelo so that the Christmas activities of December 24, 1999 could 
continue smoothly.  In order to transport church members from the South to the 
Centre, the Synod of GMIH in Tobelo wrote a letter asking to borrow a truck from 
a businessman, with copies sent to the police and military headquarters.270  The 
letter explained that the truck was needed to carry people from the GMIH 
congregations in the villages of Kupa-Kupa, Tomahalu, Efi-Efi, Upa, Pitu and 
Gamhoku to the centre of the town.  Each congregation would appoint 10 people 
to guard the area around the Synod offices of GMIH, Bethesda Hospital and the 
area near the places of worship, during the services of December 24-25, 1999.  On 
the evening of December 24, 1999, the truck brought Christian villagers from the 
South to guard the area.  In the middle of the Christmas Eve service suddenly all 
the lights went out.  However the congregation continued the worship service 
right to the end.271 
 
The Muslim community in the city condemned the request for security help from 
the South.  Some Muslims visited the Chinese owner of the truck and a debate 
took place about the safety of the city, to the effect that the security of the city 
should be trusted to the Muslims of Tobelo.  As a result of this incident, the 
Forum for Solidarity in Halmahera (abbreviated as FSH), called for a meeting 
with Muslim community leaders.  Members of FSH were public figures from both 
the Christian and Muslim communities in Tobelo.  This meeting reached the 
conclusion that the Muslims of the city wanted security for the churches on 
December 25, to be handled by churches from the city (Gosoma, Gura and 
Gamsungi), rather than from villages to the South. The Christians accepted this 
suggestion. 
 
On December 25, 1999, at 9:30 PM, a mattress was burned in an empty house 
owned by a Makian Muslim, located next door to a retirement home owned by the 
Gosoma congregation of GMIH.  This raised the tension again between the 
Christian and Muslim communities around this complex.  Suddenly a man 
wearing a white headband appeared and accused the Christian community of 
burning the house.  Nevertheless, the riots did not break out.  The next day, 
December 26,  1999, the Gosoma congregation held a baptism.  The tradition of 
Christians there on the occasion of a baptism is to sing from house to house.  This 
custom, which has been carried out for many years, was continued in the midst of 
a very tense situation prompted by the rumours of a bloody Christmas.  The 
Muslims felt that this was another example of Christians provoking a riot.  But 
still the riots did not break out. 
 
That night the tensions reached a fever pitch.  The Raya Mosque repeatedly 
broadcast the sound of shouts of Allahu Akbar! (God is Great), while the GMIH 
churches all over Tobelo, rang their bells.  People beat on the metal electric poles 
and once again the electricity went out.  Everyone began running.  People were 
                                                 
270 See the letter, No. wil.1.1/1113/A-4/XXIV/99, dated in Tobelo on December 20, 1999, from 
Distric Working Elders (Majelis Pekerja Wilayah)  GMIH Tobelo addressed to Pak Jansen, 
regarding help with a vehicle.  Jansen is a Chinese who was born in Morotai and has lived in 
Tobelo more than 20 years.  Copies of the letter were sent to Kapolsek and Danramil Tobelo. 
271 See Suara Peduli Halmahera (1999). 
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running every which way in a panic.  According to the Christian account, 
simultaneously around 8 PM, rocks were thrown at the houses of Christians in 
several parts of the city, including the complex of Karianga field, the complex of 
the retirement home of GMIH Gosoma, the complex of the police dormitories of 
Tobelo, the offices of the Synod GMIH Tobelo and the homes of Chinese.  
However a Chinese eyewitness reported that many of the Christian young people 
were drunk and began looting stores.  A Muslim crowd set fire to two homes of 
Christians near to the retirement complex in the village of Gosoma.  The Christian 
side only began to fight back around 1 AM, however by 5 AM, after repeated 
attacks by the Muslim masses the Christians could no longer hold out.  Houses in 
the shopping area of the city began to be burned.  By the morning of December 
27, 1999 Tobelo was in the control of the Muslims. 
 
On the morning of December 27, 1999, reinforcements of Christians from the 
South of the District of Tobelo began to arrive.  They were delayed by a “line of 
steel” set up by the military between Tobelo and the nearest village of Wosia.  
However the Tobelo masses from the South entered by another route through the 
forests from the West and entered the city around 12 o’clock noon.  With 
reinforcements from the South of the city, the Christian masses were able to return 
to battle.  The Muslims defended with vigour, but the Christian masses began to 
burn Muslim houses in the city of Tobelo. 
 
At about 7 AM on the morning of December 28, 1999, the Muslim masses began 
to be beaten back, so they rallied at the Raya Mosque in Tobelo.  The Tobelo 
Christians succeeded in beating back the Muslims because the Muslim 
reinforcements that had been promised from Ternate never arrived.  In Ternate 
there was a battle between the adat warriors, or yellow troops of the Sultan of 
Ternate and the Makian-Tidore warriors led by the Sultan of Tidore.  The forces 
of the Sultan of Tidore finally won this battle and the Sultan of Ternate was 
forced to flee from Ternate.272  It was reported that the Sultan of Ternate stopped 
the Makian troops, which planned to depart to Tobelo to provide reinforcements 
to the Muslims there.273 
 
At the boundary between Tobelo and Kao there was a Muslim village named 
Togolio.  In this village, a competition in magical warfare took place. The Muslim 
people used the Fitri dance, the mystical war dance led by almost naked girls 
described at the beginning of this chapter. The Christians also used ancient magic 
rituals to oppose their enemies.  The Christian troops included people from 
Southern Tobelo and Kao.  The battle at Togolio lasted for a full day and resulted 
in many casualties on both sides.274   
                                                 
272 See Kompas (January 10, 2000). 
273 Support for this interpretation can be seen in the chronology, “Versi Umat Islam (MUI Maluku 
Utara, FPI Maluku Utara dan Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat),” that records that on December 27, 1999 
there was a battle between “Pasukan Dewan Adat Ternate” (the Council of Ternate Traditional 
Warriors) together with Christians, against the Muslims who intended to help the Muslims who 
were hard pressed in Tobelo, Forum Keadilan, (January 23, 2000). 
274  We don’t know the facts about the number of casualties of the war in Togolio. A radical 
Muslim magazine reports that the Christian troops killed many people (see Sabili: March 8, 2000, 
34). When I revisited Tobelo and Galela in February 2002, I was told by Christians and Muslims 
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In the Christian-Muslim village of Gamhoku, a large number of Muslims died 
after they took refuge in a church.  According to an eyewitness account, they were 
first promised asylum by the Batak pastor, if they stayed in the church.  However, 
during the night someone suspected of coming from the church killed a Christian 
from a neighbouring village in the jungles.  Enraged Christians from the 
neighbouring village came and killed all the Muslims who were sheltered in the 
church.  The Batak pastor tried to prevent the massacre but almost lost his life in 
the process.  A conflicting story claims that the Muslims planned to set fire to the 
church but were discovered and killed before they could carry it out.  Both of 
these accounts agree that the killing was done by people from another village.  
The Christians and Muslims from Gamhoku were family members and neighbours 
who enjoyed good relations.  The Batak pastor was devastated emotionally by 
these events and returned to Sumatra.275 
 
In the end, the Christians drove the Muslims from the town and District of Tobelo.  
Some of the Muslim masses in Northern Tobelo fled to Soa Sio a Muslim port on 
the coast of Galela.  From there they caught a boat to Ternate.  But the majority of 
Muslims from the centre of the town of Tobelo, numbering about 13,000 people, 
fled to the military dormitories of Rifle Company C, Battalion 732, where they 
were protected and eventually exited Tobelo by way of the navy ship, KRI Teluk 
Laksa.276 
 
6.2.7.  The Christians of Ngidiho Leave Their Village 
 
After the warfare broke out in Tobelo on December 26, 1999, on the next day war 
broke out in Galela. There were 20,062 Muslim inhabitants of Galela and 11,131 
Christians.  As a district with a large Muslim majority, fighting was first 
conducted from the three villages in the North of Galela, namely Soa Sio, Simau 
and Toweka.  According to the Christians, attacks were carried out by the Muslim 
masses from the East and West, encircling the interior of the District of Galela.  
On the other hand Muslims believed the Christians attacked first.  The people 
from Duma acknowledged the perception of Ngidiho Muslims that the Christians 
from Duma started the attacks on December 27, 1999.277  According to the 
Christians from Duma, they had to attack or they would be dead, foolishly killed 
by the Muslim masses that were coming from the West and the East. 
                                                                                                                                     
that the majority of the transmigrants from Java had already left the village of Togolio before the 
fighting occurred.  
275 I heard the first account in August 2000 from refugees in Bitung, North Sulawesi, including 
conversations with the Batak pastor.  Christians in Tobelo related the second story in February 
2002.  This was one of the worst incidents of the war.  It was exploited by radical Muslims who 
published a one sided account, complete with gruesome pictures of the bodies, that was distributed 
to mosques all over Java and used as part of a call for a jihad against Christians in the Moluccas.  
Interreligious killing seldom took place between Muslim and Christian members of the same 
village in Galela and Tobelo. 
276 See Kompas (January 1, 2000), and  Kompas (January 10, 2000). 
277 Interview with a victim of the war from Duma, with whom I met in the General Hospital of 
Malalayang in Manado, in August 2000. Oom Din also agreed that the Ngidiho Muslim attacked 
the Christians because the people of Duma had already attacked the village of Gotalamo. This 
confirmation I received in February 2002. 
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In the West, the Christian majority villages, including Seki, Pune, Soakonora and 
Togawa, were already empty.  These were mixed villages in which Christians and 
Muslims lived together.  The mixed villages were evacuated after they heard that 
the fighting had already started in Tobelo.  They left in order to prevent needless 
killing that might take place between Christians and the Muslims who were the 
majority in Galela.  The people in mixed villages were related to each other with 
family ties, even though they followed different religions.  They journeyed for six 
days through the jungles of Loloda, without carrying anything, to the village of 
Wangongira.  Wangongira is located on the border between the Districts of 
Tobelo and Loloda.278  The white forces from the three Muslim villages, while 
passing through these villages, burned the houses that had been left empty.  The 
stream of white forces flowed together with other Muslim masses from the village 
of Togawa to Igobula and then together attacked the village of Soatobaru.  
However the Christians in Soatobaru were well prepared and beat the White 
forces back to Igobula. 
 
At the same time, the interior attack from the East began in Ngidiho, as a village 
with mixed Muslim and Christian inhabitants, but a Muslim majority.  But before 
the Muslim masses arrived from the East, the Head of the village of Ngidiho, at 5 
AM, visited a prominent figure among the Christians, Permenas Budiman, 
advising him with tears that all the Christians should leave Ngidiho.  Budiman, 
like many others, has family ties with Muslims in Ngidiho.  The village Head 
explained that fighting had already broken out in Tobelo and very soon there 
would be an attack on Ngidiho by Muslims from the East.  The warning came, in 
part, because one of Budiman’s older brothers, Suaeb Budiman was a Muslim 
who was planning to go on the Haj to Mecca, together with the village Head, in 
February 2000.  Besides that, Suaeb Budiman’s mother is a Christian who still 
lived in Ngidiho.  Some of the Ngidiho Christians fled by a path through the 
jungle in the direction of Duma, which is a Christian centre in Galela.  Others 
continued their journey to Wangongira.                
 
After the Christians fled Ngidiho, the White forces arrived from the East and 
burned all the homes that were left by the Christians of Ngidiho.  The flow of the 
White forces from Ngidiho was stopped at Makete, a village of people from 
Sangir Talaud.  In Makete, the Christian forces from Duma had already arrived 
after defeating the Muslims in the village of Gotalamo, which lies between Duma 
and Makete.  Thus the Christian forces in Makete included a coalition of 
Christians from the villages of Makete, Duma, Dokulamo and Soatobaru.  These 
“Red forces” launched a counter attack against the White armies from Toweka, 
Simau, Soa Sio, Gotalamo and Ngidiho, driving them back to the coastal area in 
the North of Galela.  In this counter attack the Christian forces burned the homes 
of the Muslims in Ngidiho.  In this counter attack, 8 Muslims from Ngidiho were 
                                                 
278 This data was obtained through interviews with Christian refugees from the village of Togawa 
who were part of the six day exodus through the jungle.  The interview took place in August 2000 
in Tomohon, North Sulawesi. 
 247 
killed.279  One of those killed was the head of a household whose mother was a 
Christian from Duma.  He refused to leave Ngidiho because he was sure that the 
Christians would protect him, since he had family ties with Duma.  However the 
Christian forces did not believe him and he was killed.280  After hearing this tragic 
story, his mother, who had fled to Duma, experienced very profound grief. 281 
 
The leadership of the GMIH church for the District of Galela wrote a letter to the 
leadership of GMIH in Tobelo, requesting that Christians from Galela who were 
refugees in Tobelo, be sent back to their villages so that they could help in the 
war.  However the Galelans refused the request on the grounds that their houses 
had all been burned to the ground.  There was nothing to which to return.  Some 
of the refugees from Galela were only in transit in Tobelo and subsequently chose 
to become refugees in North Sulawesi (Manado).  Therefore the number of 
Christians involved in the war in Galela only included people from the 
homogeneous Christian villages of Makete, Duma and Soatobaru, with the 
addition of a few of the Christian inhabitants from the mixed villages of Ngidiho, 
Dokulamo and Bale.            
 
With limited numbers, after overcoming Ngidiho and Gotalamo in the East, the 
Christian forces attacked Igobula in the West and managed to drive the Muslims 
back to the coast, so that they were only concentrated in three villages on the 
North coast of Galela, namely Simau, Toweka and Soa Sio.  In this pressured 
situation, the Muslims of Ternate took over the ship Lambelu to come to Galela 
and pick up the Muslim refugees who were concentrated in Simau, Toweka and 
Soa Sio.282  Oom Din, as one of the leaders in the mosque (Badan Sara) of 
Ngidiho, quickly arranged for the safety of the children and women of Ngidiho by 
bringing them to Soa Sio.283  The refugees from the interior where driven to the 
beach using trucks taken from the banana plantation.  Oom Din told me the story 
of his experience during the Christian attack on Ngidiho.  He recounted how he 
stood defending his home.  He said that the arrows that were shot at him could not 
enter his body because of his magic.  However magic could not save the village.  
Finally the Muslims of Ngidiho had to leave their own village, just as had already 
happened to the Ngidiho Christians. 
 
 
 
                                                 
279 Earlier reports were much higher.  During the fighting, many people were often missing and 
presumed dead for days, weeks or even months, before finally turning up alive.  This illustrates the 
common tendency among people caught up in the trauma of the violence to overestimate the 
number of casualties.  On the other hand, official reports from the government are usually far too 
small because they only count casualties whose bodies are taken to the hospital.  See the next 
footnote. 
280 In the early days of the war, I heard from Muslims in Ngidiho that he had been killed along 
with his wife and children.  However this turned out to be a mistake, since his wife and children 
are still alive.  This illustrates how rumors often magnified what was already a terrible disaster. 
281 This story was related in an interview with people from Duma who subsequently became 
refugees in Bitung, North Sulawesi.  The interview took place in August 2000. 
282 See Kompas  (January 4, 2000). 
283 Interviewed with Oom Din was conducted through telephone, in January 2000. 
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Map 9: The mobilization of Violence in Galela 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following chronology summarizes the increase of tensions in Ngidiho and its 
neighbouring villages during the period leading up to the violence: 
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Chart 5:  Chronology of the Violence in Northern Halmahera 
According to Fieldwork Data 
 
 
 
 July, 1999:                       Publication of the Government Decree on  
                                                     the Extension  of The Malifut’s territory  
                                                     (PP No 42/1999) 
    
            18 July 1999:                   The announcement of the rejection among 
                                                      the people of Kao of the government decree 
 
            18 – 21 August 1999:      The riots began with an attack by the people  
                                                      Malifut against the Kao villages of Sosol and 
                                                      Wangeotak. The masses of the Kao respond  
                                                      by attacking the population of Malifut     
 
             9 – 9 – 99:                       The number nine rumors of the end of the world 
 
             12 October 1999:            The formal establisment of the Province of North  
                                                      Moluccas 
 
             24-25 October 1999:        Another attack by the Makians against the Kao,  
                                                      followed by a Kao attacks on the Makians. 
                                                      Makians evacuated by the mayor of Ternate to  
                                                      Ternate 
 
             3-4 November 1999:        Christian killed or driven out of the island of  
                                                      Tidore 
 
             5-11 November 1999:       Similar killings take place in the city of Ternate 
 
             6 November 1999:            Rumors of the Outbreak of Riots in Tobelo 
 
             13 November 1999:          Disturbance on the Following Saturday 
 
             14 November 1999:          A Counterfeit Letter was spread in Galela 
 
             14 November 1999:          Meeting of the leaders of the villages in Galela 
                                                       followed by a meeting of community leaders 
                                                       in Ngidiho 
 
             November 1999:              The Christians of Galela Help the People of Kao 
 
             26 December 1999:          Religious Riots break out in Tobelo 
 
             27 December 1999:          Religious Riots broke out in Galela 
                                                      The Christian in Ngidiho left their village 
 
             28 December 1999:          The Muslims in Ngidiho left their village 
 
             22 May 2000:                    The Fall of Duma and the Muslim of Galela 
                                                        conquer the whole area of their district        
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6.2.8.  Counter-Attack by the White Warriors  
 
The religious warfare in Halmahera quickly became national news.  For days on 
end, the news about Halmahera was the centre of attention on both government 
and private television stations throughout Indonesia.  Galela and Tobelo suddenly 
became household words spoken daily by people in Java, whereas previously they 
were unknown.  The newspapers wrote about the slaughter in Halmahera.  Several 
versions of the chronology of events came out.  But the stories that emerged in 
Indonesian newspapers, on television and in magazines primarily focused on the 
results of the fighting, such as how many Muslims were killed.  Most did not pay 
attention to the chronology of events or of how the process of conflict developed 
into violence.  Some accounts gave the impression that the Christians just rose up 
and slaughtered the Muslims.  Conversely, accounts by international Christian 
groups portrayed the conflict as though it were simply a matter of Muslim 
persecution of Christians.  Fundamentalist Christian accounts gave the impression 
that only Christians died. 
 
The story of the slaughter of Muslims by Christians in Halmahera became a kind 
of political discourse in Indonesia that was simple, uniform and whole.  These 
stories were enlarged after a team from Kostrad (Special Forces), arrived in 
Halmahera on January 1, 2000.  Kostrad documented the killings through 
television films that gave the impression that the only victims in the war were 
Muslims that were killed by Christians.284  Extreme cruelty could be seen in the 
pictures of people killed with their bodies burned, as they lay dead in a mosque.  
They gave the impression that the Muslims were killed while trying to shelter in a 
mosque.  However several Muslim eyewitnesses related that when a white soldier 
died, his body would be taken into a mosque by those who were still alive, 
because it was considered a sign of dying as a martyr.285  Christians from Tobelo 
told me the same story when I revisited them in February 2002.  Films or photos 
of corpses lying in churches or mosques do not show where they were actually 
killed or even which side they were on. 
 
Each group told stories of the war according to their own interests.  This could be 
seen in the way the Muslims of Ngidiho related the chronology of how the war 
started and progressed.  According to some Muslims in Ngidiho, the Christians of 
Ngidiho left the village because they already knew there would be an attack on 
Ngidiho from Duma.  They left in the early morning without the knowledge of the 
village Head.  This version differs from the story of the Christians who say they 
were advised to leave by the Village Head, who kept the promise made in an 
earlier meeting of village leaders, and also because of pressure from the older 
brother of a Christian who planned to go on the Haj to Mecca with him.  As 
already explained, the warning was based on the assumption that there would be 
                                                 
284 The report in Kompas said that Batalyon 512 Kodam V Brawijaya (Kostrad) started to arrive in 
Halmahera shortly after the fighting took place.  About 500 Special Forces troops were sent.  See 
Kompas (January 1, 2000). 
285 This account is from an interview with a Chinese businessman, who repeated what he had heard 
from his Javanese helper who was an eyewitness to the events in Tobelo.  The interview took place 
in August 2000, in Tomohon, North Sulawesi. 
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an attack on Ngidiho from the Muslims because their strength was greater than the 
strength of the Christians in Ngidiho.  Press bias sometimes led to strange 
anomalies.  For example, I read a newspaper account about “Christians attacking 
the Muslim village of Duma” at a time when Duma was the last remaining 
Christian village in Galela. 
 
A new counter attack came from the White forces after they received help from 
the Jihad forces from Ternate.  From Jakarta, ICMI sent a Health Aid Team, 
namely, the Medical Emergency Rescue Committee (MER-C).  This team 
acknowledged that as a result of the domination of the Red forces in Galela, they 
sought support from the Governor of the Moluccas and from leaders in Jakarta.286   
 
The magazine Forum Keadilan reported that there were about 400 Muslim 
fighters in Galela, in comparison with about 2,000 Christian warriors.  This was 
based on the assumption that the Red forces received help from Christians from 
other districts, including Christian refugees from Ternate and Tidore.287  However 
this report is not consistent with the data found in my research.  The refugees from 
Ternate and Tidore were mostly civil servants or business people who did not 
have any prospects for work in Galela.  Nor did they want to be involved in more 
fighting.  Most of them chose to move to North Sulawesi (Manado).  Furthermore, 
the geographical location of Galela and Tobelo does not facilitate rapid 
deployment of personnel from one district to another.  Prior to December 26, 1999 
there was no unusual influx of Christians into Galela, so it is unlikely that they 
received reinforcements so quickly. 
 
Therefore the media reports concerning the numbers of those fighting were not 
consistent with the reality that Galela is a majority Muslim District.  Rather, these 
reports were designed to draw national support for the plight of the Muslims in 
Galela.  The first support came in the form of a humanitarian project by the jihad 
troops.  The name “humanitarian project” does not mean that the jihad troops 
were not involved in the war effort.  The formulation to justify their involvement 
in fighting was stated in terms of the right to self-defence if attacked by the 
Christian troops.288  However in the case of Halmahera, the religious warfare 
resulted from an accumulation of various situations.  Government officials in the 
North Moluccas used the sentiments of religious solidarity to try to overcome the 
negative results of the conflict in Kao and Malifut. 
 
                                                 
286 In an interview between Dr. Joserizal Jurnalis with Sabili magazine, he stated that in order to 
open up the isolation of Galela, the medical team MER-C initiated communication with the 
Governor of the Moluccas and with the government in Jakarta.  See Sabili  (March 8, 2000, 26-
27). 
287 See Forum Keadilan (January 23,  2000, 76). 
288 The Laskar Jihad stated that they had three activities, according to a report from the Laskar 
Jihad Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah Korwil DIY.  See, Maluku Hari Ini (September 5, 2000). 
“Pertama , dakwah, tujuannya untuk mengangkat kembali keperayaan diri dan mental Muslimin 
yang ada dalam konflik.  Kedua, misi kemanusiaan, dengan melakukan bakti sosial untuk 
memperbaiki atau menciptakan infrastruktur bagi penduduk Muslim dalam keadaan perang.  
Ketiga, pembelaan terhadap kaum Muslimin, ketika diserang oleh pasukan merah dan penempatan 
kembali kaum muslimin ke tempat asalnya yang direbut oleh perusuh Kristen.” 
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The jihad troops at a provincial level consisted of jihad troops from several 
districts.  According to one source, the government of the North Moluccas even 
took a cut from the salaries of all government officials in the Province of the 
North Moluccas, both Muslims and Christians, in order to build a ‘Jihad Fund.’289  
In villages that joined with the Laskar Jihad, every Muslim man was required to 
join the jihad troops.  Refusal to join the jihad troops could have an impact on the 
safety of other members of the man’s family.  The involvement of the national 
jihad troops in the warfare in the Moluccas is well documented and sometimes 
included the active support of the Indonesian military.  Evidence includes the 
discovery of 900 men from Java, Ternate, Morotai and Galela, equipped with 
weapons of war, who were being transported in 17 ships from Morotai to Tobelo.  
Kapolsek Daruba, Morotai, (Inspector of Police) I. N. Saimima led this journey, 
on July 3, 2000.290 
 
Support for the jihad was also forthcoming from national leaders such as Amien 
Rais who considered the conflict in Halmahera as a slaughter of Muslims by 
Christians.291  Amien Rais proclaimed his support for a jihad agains t Christians in 
the Moluccas, in front of hundreds of thousands of people in the “Meeting of a 
Million Muslims”, on January 9, 2000, the second day of the Muslim holiday, Idul 
Fitri 1420 H.   Rais’ stance was a criticism of President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus 
Dur) whom Rais considered late in addressing the problems in the Moluccas and 
especially Halmahera.  But it is interesting to note that in March 1999, Amien 
Rais called for intervention from the United States to end the conflict in 
Ambon. 292 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
289 An official in the Religion Office reported this.  He was a victim of the riots in Tidore, Central 
Halmahera. 
290 See Kompas (July 4,  2000). 
291 See Forum Keadilan (January 23, 2000,  80-81). 
292 Sumargono who questioned whether Rais’ politics were Islamic or Machiavellian, condemned 
this kind of political maneuvering by Rais. See Sumargono (Kompas, March 12, 1999).  However 
it should be noted that in March of 1999, Christians in Ambon were apparently winning the battle, 
so US intervention might have been advocated in order to protect Muslims.  Later on, when 
Muslims, bolstered by the Laskar Jihad and military were winning, it was the Christians who 
wanted U.S. or UN intervention to stop the killing. 
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Picture 52:  Amien Rais Calls for a Jihad.  Source:  Cover of Forum 
Keadilan.  January 23, 2000.  
 
The “Meeting of a Million Community Members” (Pertemuan Sejuta Umat ), was 
held in Jakarta. This was an attempt to attract sympathy from Muslims from all 
over Indonesia.  Since most people had limited understanding of the geographical 
and political realities in Halmahera, the national society of Indonesia was 
influenced by reports of “genocide” or the slaughter of Muslims in Halmahera.  
These reports dominated the national media.  In addition to jihad troops being sent 
from Ternate, jihad troops began to arrive from Java and Sumatra.  The Laskar 
Jihad Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah, as a national movement for jihad, instituted a 
selection process for volunteers who wanted to join up to fight a holy war in 
Halmahera or more generally in the Moluccas.293  Even though Amien Rais said 
he attended the “Meeting of a Million Muslims” in order to understand the 
upheaval in society, his statement that he would “call for a Jihad” (menyerukan 
Jihad), was a sign that he supported the jihad in the Moluccas and Halmahera. 
 
This was the beginning of a counter attack by the White troops with national 
support.  The military became involved in the fighting in the North Moluccas after 
the war was constructed, as a war between Islam with the National Indonesia 
Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia= TNI), against the RMS (the Republic of 
Southern Maluku).  The military used same discourse about the conflict in 
Halmahera as the discourse about the conflict in Ambon, even though the 
conflicts were distinctly different.  The military and police legitimated 
involvement in the struggle against the Christians by equating the Christians with 
the RMS.  This interpretation started from the assumption that the Nation-State of 
                                                 
293 See (Hasan: 2002). 
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Indonesia was formed out of three primary elements: the Muslims, the 
Military/Police and the government.  These three elements must unit to prevent 
separatism.  On the other hand, the Laskar Jihad discourse about the 
military/police as the defenders of the nation/state was undermined by the Laskar 
Jihad themselves, when they condemned the military troops which the 
government later sent to stop the fighting in Ambon and the North Moluccas.294 
 
The North Moluccas, whose history had been completely free of the RMS 
movement, was then grouped as a part of the RMS Christian movement for 
separation from the State of Indonesia.  We can clearly see how this discourse was 
used, in the negative view expressed by the Jihad forces in their response to a 
letter, sent by the leadership of the Synod GMIH in Tobelo.  This letter asked the 
central government and the Human Rights Commission of the Moluccas and 
North Moluccas to bring together religious leaders from both sides in order to 
quickly end the fighting. 295 
 
6.2.9.  The Fall of Duma 
 
The village of Duma was the first Christian village in Halmahera, founded by 
missionaries of the Utrechtsche Zendings Vereeniging (UZV) at the end of the 
19th Century.  In light of this history, the Muslims consider Duma as the centre of 
missionary work in Halmahera.  Actually the church has been independent of 
Dutch missionaries since the Japanese occupation.  The great majority of 
Christians in Halmahera belong to the Evangelical Church in Halmahera, (Gereja 
Masehi Injili di Halmahera), known as GMIH, which is centred in Tobelo (see 
Haire: 1981). 
 
After the White forces were pushed to the North coast of Galela, the Red forces 
made their centre of operations in Duma.  The Muslim villages on the coast 
shared the same difficulties with supplies as the Christian villages in the interior 
of Galela.  The normal supply of food from Tobelo was cut off for the Muslim 
army.  At the same time, the supply of food in Tobelo, which normally came from 
Ternate, was cut off for the Christian army.  Trade links and humanitarian aid for 
the Muslims of Galela had to come from Ternate.  For the Christians, supplies 
were forwarded through Tobelo from North Sulawesi.  In order to reach Duma by 
land from Tobelo, one had to make a detour and journey for six days through the 
jungles on the border of Loloda.296  Communication was also cut off between the 
centre of the Islamic troops in Soa Sio and Ternate. 
 
Later, they could travel by sea, directly from Galela to Ternate, with a stop in 
Daruba, South Morotai.  This link was cut off, not because the Red forces 
dominated the sea-routes, as was suggested in several national reports about the 
fighting, but because Chinese business people had all fled and they owned all the 
ships that normally sailed from Tobelo to Ternate.  Even before the riots, there 
were no scheduled sailings from Galela to Ternate.  Indeed there were daily ships 
                                                 
294 See Maluku Hari Ini, (December 5, 2000).  
295 See Maluku Hari Ini  (June 14-22, 2000: 4). 
296 By the main road the trip only takes a few hours. 
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to Ternate, but they all sailed from Tobelo.  The refugees from Galela finally 
sailed directly from Galela to Ternate, after they received the promised help from 
the government of the North Moluccas.297 
 
The government of the North Moluccas installed the Indonesian army in Galela to 
guard the peace.  Unfortunately, the troops sent, Battalion 512 Kodam V 
Brawijaya, who were intended to keep the peace, actually took sides in the war.  
There are reliable reports that during the war, the army supported a certain 
scenario for the war by supplying weapons and war supplies to the White 
forces.298  I also heard many reports that the military sometimes stood by 
passively when the White troops attacked, but then fired on the Red troops when 
they launched a counter attack.  Christian eyewitnesses, who survived the battle 
for Duma at the end of May 2000, reported that the Indonesian army even opened 
a path for the White troops to facilitate their attacks on the Red forces.  Among 
the dead bodies, Christians discovered Muslim warriors dressed in white robes on 
the outside, but under the robes they were dressed in full army uniforms.  Some of 
the women of Duma committed suicide when they watched their husbands and 
children shot and killed with standard military weapons from the peacekeeping 
forces of 512 Brawijaya.299 
 
The Red troops often heard rumours of an attack before it occurred, either from 
sources within the military, or from members of their families who were on the 
White side of the conflict.  These rumours were taken very seriously and required 
that they prepare themselves.  The rumours of an attack were often accompanied 
by complete information about the date, time and direction of attack.  Rumours 
became reality and many people from both sides died.  On the bodies of white 
warriors who were victims of the war, Christian warriors discovered maps of the 
attack, complete with information about the day, date and time of the attack.  
Besides maps, they also found money in the pockets of some corpses, equalling 
about Rap. 200,000.300 
 
The goal of the attacks by the White troops, aided by the military and 
strengthened by jihad troops from outside Galela, was to destroy Duma.  The 
attacks were well planned.  And the government of the North Moluccas made no 
attempt to find a peaceful solution.  With these gathered forces, Duma was finally 
burned to the ground by the White forces on May 27, 2000.  The Christians of 
Galela who were in the area during the war, considered the fall of Duma as the 
result of their own failure.  At the beginning, they fought a kind war that relied 
heavily on prayer to God.  Even though the number of Christians was much 
smaller than the number of Muslims, they believed God gave them the victory.  
                                                 
297 This information came from a telephone interview in April 2000, with refugees from Ngidiho, 
Galela, who were in Ternate. 
298 Several times, the navy intercepted arms shipments off the coast of Halmahera, as explained 
above. 
299 See Kompas (May 31,  2000). 
300 From an interview with a wounded member of the Red troops who was being treated in the 
General Hospital Malalayang, in Manado, on August 2000.  Rp. 200,000 (about US$25) , is 
considered a lot of money to be carried by a peasant in Indonesia.  The maps and money suggest 
that these White troops were well prepared and perhaps paid.  
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However, after receiving victory after victory, they forgot themselves and forgot 
the basis of their victory.  Instead they succumbed to a style of life that was far 
from the holiness demanded by a form of war based on prayer.  Therefore they 
construed the fall of Duma as God’s judgment.   
 
In the trauma of defeat, the survivors constructed a discourse, which gave 
meaning to their suffering.  They suggested that their own vio lence, cruelty and 
arrogance, after their great initial victories, gave the impression that their own 
strength was the cause of their success.  In their self-reflection after the defeat at 
Duma, they explained that, unlike the Red forces of Tobelo who relied on a war 
leader (Kapitan), the Christians of Galela had no human leader.  Their war leader 
was the Lord God, who had given them victory.  However these Red warriors of 
Duma acknowledged that when they were in the heat of battle, their behaviour 
was like pagans who had no religion.  The love and mercy that lies at the base of 
their faith was obliterated as they entered into total warfare and murdered their 
own neighbours.  They believed their defeat was because God abandoned them in 
their sin. 301 
 
After the fall of Duma, on the 19th of June 2000, a ship named Cahaya Bahari set 
sail, packed with Christian refugees from Duma and elsewhere.  The Cahaya 
Bahari sank together with approximately 561 passengers.  This ship, overloaded 
with refugees sank in mysterious circumstances during a voyage in heavy seas 
from Tobelo to Manado.  All the passengers died except two small children. 302  
Among the victims who died, were 38 severely wounded survivors of the attack 
on Duma.  Their wounds came from military grenades, bombs and rifles.303  The 
cause of the tragedy is unknown but many people believe the ship was 
deliberately sunk.   
 
6.3.  The Connection between Material Preconditions and Violence 
 
In this sub-section I will examine the mobilization of people leaving one area of 
conflict and entering into another area of conflict.  How were they involved in the 
causes of the conflict? This sub section tries to answer this special question.  
 
6.3.1.  Returning Home and New Places to Live 
 
The return of refugees from other areas of conflict also influenced the situation.  
In Soa Sio there were several Galelans who came home after the riots broke out in 
Ambon on January 18, 1999.  One of them was a Muslim professor from 
Pattimura University in Ambon.  In Galela he did not have any income.  So he 
worked as a labourer, unloading ships in the harbour and became involved with 
                                                 
301 These sorrowful reflections came from several people from Duma who were severely wounded 
and recuperating in the General Hospital Malalayang in Manado, in August 2000.  Some were 
maimed and had lost an arm or a leg. 
302 See Kompas (July 14, 2000).  I met several people who lost their husbands, wives, parents, 
children or sisters and brothers.  One young man who is now living in Yogyakarta, lost his wife 
and both his parents in the tragedy. 
303 See Kompas ( June 30, 2000). 
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the labour union there.  His presence in the labour union opened the eyes of the 
labourers of Soa Sio, so that they became critical towards the labour policies 
established between the Banana Company and the Head of the labour union for 
Galela.  
 
The people, who live near the port of Soa Sio and don’t have income from a large 
plantation, often work as labourers at the harbour.  Every week a banana export 
ship comes into port in Galela to load tons of packed bananas for transport to 
Japan and China.  This provides a good opportunity for local labourers to earn 
money.  However, collusion between the Banana Company and the Head of the 
labour union resulted in labour policies that were detrimental to the labourers.  
Their daily wage was even lower than that of the labourers who worked at the 
factory. 304  The Company was able to get away with paying such low wages 
because they made weekly payments to the District Government every time a ship 
was leaving Galela.  The District Government was responsible for guaranteeing 
the smooth process of export and maintaining good relations with the Head of the 
labour union.  As a result the reformation movement made very little progress 
among the harbour labourers in Galela.   
 
Many Muslim students from Galela finally returned home because it was not safe 
to attend school in Ambon.  Their return naturally brought stories about the 
violent conflict in Ambon.  These students became involved in organizing a 
movement for the farmers to demand compensation from the Banana Company in 
Galela (see Chapter III).  As tensions continued to rise in the area, several students 
who had returned home from Makassar began examining the identity cards of all 
newcomers to the area.  During this period, before the religious war in the North 
Moluccas, the popular names “Obed” and “Acang” had already spread from 
Ambon to the North Moluccas as references to Christians and Muslims in Ambon.  
Obed (from the name Robert) refers to Christian warriors and Acang refers to 
Muslim warriors. These labels appeared during the religious conflict in Ambon 
and its neighbouring islands and are taken from a popular weekly radio program 
broadcast by the state radio (RRI).  In this program, the Muslim guy was named 
Oom Acang and the Christian one was called Oom Obed.  In the program, the two 
characters carry on a lively dialogue about routine life among the Ambonese.  
 
Throughout the North Moluccas people were returning to their home villages.  
After the Makians from Malifut were expelled from Halmahera to Ternate, the 
Christians were expelled from that area.  People from Tidore who lived in Irian 
Jaya also started to leave there and return to their hometowns.  There were two 
reasons for the movement to return home.  First, the exodus was connected with 
fears about the political tumult in Irian Jaya (West Papua) that threatened the 
position of immigrants in Papua.  Secondly, the change in status of the Province 
of the North Moluccas and upgrading several districts influenced people to return 
home.  The development of a new political structure promised to create many 
openings for civil servants, filling the offices of the government, from the 
provincial to the district levels. 
                                                 
304 In 1999 the labourers were paid Rp. 10,000. per day at PT GAI. 
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Most Christians who were expelled from Tidore and Ternate fled to Manado, 
North Sulawesi.  Many Christian refugees from Tidore and Ternate had a 
background as civil servants and business people.  Therefore they were more 
prepared to find work in Manado than in Halmahera, especially since there were 
very few opportunities for work in Tobelo.  At the same time, several civil 
servants in Galela who were ethnically Ambonese were forced by the young 
people of Galela to leave the district.  The movement to reject civil servants who 
were Ambonese took place after the Makians were expelled from Malifut in the 
area of Kao on October 24-25, 1999.  One government worker from Ambon was 
beaten by Muslim youths from Galela, so that he had to be admitted to the 
hospital.  He was accused of involvement in sending war aid to Kao. 
 
6.3.2.  Prosperity of Tobelo 
 
The diversity of the population of Tobelo is connected with Tobelo’s status as a 
city known for the sale of copra.  There were 41,392 inhabitants of Tobelo in 
1992.305  The native inhabitants of Tobelo who were farmers numbered about 
32%.306  Civil servants who came to Tobelo from various ethnic groups comprised 
about 2% of the population.  Newcomers who came from different ethnic groups 
such as Ambon, Tobelo, Jailolo, Sahu, Minahasa, Loloda, and worked as teachers, 
ministers and imams are categorized as private officials and composed 1% of the 
population.  Settlers of Chinese ethnicity who were Christians and worked as 
entrepreneurs or in the service industry numbered about 2.2%.  The people with 
mixed professions and various religions made up about 17% of the population. 
 
In 2000, people with mixed ethnic origins from Padang, Java, Gorontalo, Bugis, 
Tidore and Makian-Jailolo worked as small traders in the marketplace and 
comprised about 5.6% of the population. 307  Native, Muslim, Tobelo residents 
who worked as labourers at the harbour and fishermen numbered about 2% and 
were scattered through the villages of Gura, Gamsungi and Gosoma, which are 
integral parts of the city of Tobelo.  With this kind of diversity, the people are 
primarily related to each other through economic ties and the ties of religion. 
 
6.3.2.1.  Natural Resources and Economic Backgrounds  
 
The Muslims portray the city of Tobelo as “the city of the dollar” (Kasman and 
Oesman: 2000).  Copra is traded in Tobelo, following the fluxuations of the 
exchange value of the rupiah against the US dollar on the international market.  
Tobelo is therefore one of the most important district capitals in the island of 
Halmahera.  The sale of copra in Tobelo also results in the city serving as a 
                                                 
305 This data is drawn from, Informasi Kecamatan (1993, 35). 
306 The number 32% is taken from the percentage of inhabitants, both men and women, between 
the ages of 15 to 60 years old.  This is the age considered “productive”.  The following percentages 
are calculated based on the number of productive inhabitants of Tobelo in 1993, namely 25,593 
persons. 
307 I gathered this data in an interview with an official of Pemda Maluku Utara, in Manado, August 
2000. 
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storage place for copra from other districts such as Loloda and Wasilei.  In 
addition, the topography of Tobelo, with its flat land leading to a good harbour on 
the North coast, supports the business of cargo trade. 
           
In addition, Tobelo has good potential for trading timber, since the surrounding 
forests contain trees such as meranti (Shorea), gofasa (Vitex gofassus), kayu besi 
(Intsia), and linggua (Pferocarpus).  The company PT Widuri, located in the 
village of Katana has begun to manage the timber industry.  Tobelo is also a city 
of banks for the exchange of money resulting from the banana agro industry, PT 
GAI, located in Galela.  In 1995, around a billion rupiah passed through Tobelo 
each week as a result of exporting bananas to Japan (Risakotta: 1995a).  The 
change of status of the North Moluccas from a regency (kabupaten) into a 
province is expected to raise the status of the Tobelo area.  The government of the 
North Moluccas, with the agreement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(Departemen Dalam Negeri), planned to change four districts in the North 
Moluccas from the status of Districts into Regencies.  Tobelo is one of the 
Districts being prepared for an increased role in developing the new Province of 
the North Moluccas.  
 
However, at the same time, there was interest within the government of the North 
Moluccas in choosing Malifut as the capital of the new regency of North 
Halmahera.  This might be possible if Malifut included the five villages of Kao 
that contained the gold mine run by a jointed company, an Australian company, 
named Nusa Halmahera Minerals and the Indonesian Mining Enterprises (PT 
Aneka Tambang) which is a State Owned Enterprise (BUMN).  With the 
increased prosperity provided by the 1,672,967 hectar operation area of the gold 
mine,308 Malifut could enter the competition to become the capital of the regency 
due to the income from its local natural resources.   According to Makian 
government officials, the five villages of Kao failed to be incorporated into the 
District of Makian Malifut because several Christian bureaucrats who, were 
expert in planning, manipulated the process.309 The Regional Government issued a 
document called PP 42, 1999, which purposed to socialize the process of joining 
the five villages into the plan to make Makian Malifut as a new regency in 
Northern Halmahera.  However the villages rejected the plan and Christian 
officials were suspected manipulating their emotions in order to support the 
interests of the Church, GMIH (Kasman and Oesman: 2000). 
 
Competition over whether Tobelo or Malifut might become the capital of the new 
regency in the Province of the North Moluccas was connected with the potential 
natural resources of the whole area.  In addition to the potential of Kao/Malifut, 
Tobelo and Galela, a timber corporation named PT Taiwi, (part of the Barito 
Pacific Timber Group), was operating in Jailolo-Sidangoli.  In the area of Morotai 
there is a factory for canning fish for export.  In addition, PT Weda Bay Nickel 
operates a gold mine and PT Aneka Tambang (Antam-Buli) is exploring nickel 
                                                 
308 The Nusa Halmahera Minerals is the second largest gold mine exploration after Freeport 
Indonesia, which has an operation area of about 2,610,182 hectars (Kompas, July 16, 2004, 1). 
309 From my interview with an official from the local government of the North Moluccas (Pemda 
Malut), in November, 1999. 
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deposits.310  And Loloda appears to have potential for gold mining.311  Thus, as 
was noted by a Muslim official, “…with the carrying out of decentralization laws 
No. 22 and 25 in 1999, concerning regional autonomy and the balance of finances 
between the centre and local areas, this area (the North Moluccas), will grow 
quickly.”312  Halmahera will become a centre for industry that should not be 
underestimated. 
 
Unfortunately, conflict threatens development. In February 1999, the head of the 
Farmers Association did not distribute all the compensation given by the Banana 
Company to settle the farmer’s complaints about the low price given for their 
lands.  In the farmer’s meeting in Ngidiho, in September 1999, the farmers kept 
raising the issue.  Moreover, among the critical farmers there were some 
Christians who criticized the Head of the Farmer’s Association who was from the 
Muslim village of Toweka.  The Banana Company didn’t want to know about 
what happened to the compensation money after they paid it.  Officials from the 
Banana Company told me that the Head of the Farmers Association sometime 
came to their head office to threaten them.313  During this time, when the land 
conflict in Kao-Malifut was also a great concern to all of the people in the North 
Moluccas, rumours and accusations against Christians shifted attention away from 
the corruption of a large amount of money by the Farmer’s Association.  Before 
my departure to Java in November 1999, I interviewed labourers at the Banana 
Company and found out that suspicions were spreading among them. They still 
came to work, but they had begun to polarize on the basis of religion. 
 
6.3.2.2.  Government Officials in Tobelo 
 
After the violent riots in Tidore and Ternate, the Christians who originated from 
Halmahera returned home to Tobelo.  Among those who returned to Tobelo were 
Christian officials from the civil services of the North Moluccas.  It was these 
officials who were accused by Muslim officials from the government of the North 
Moluccas of organizing the attacks against the Makian people in Malifut.  Thus 
we can see that there were various local political agendas that contributed to the 
increase of conflict in Halmahera.  Actually, the Christian officials from the 
government of the North Moluccas and the GMIH church tactically supported the 
position of the Makian officials at the level of the Province of the North 
Moluccas, because they also supported the location of the Provincial Capital in 
Central Halmahera, rather than in Ternate.  This was consistent with the feasibility 
study carried out by Bappenas Level II (Planning Commission for Level II 
Areas), of the North Moluccas.  One of the key officials in Bappenas Level II was 
a Christian from Tobelo.  The eviction of Christians from Ternate began with the 
                                                 
310 “DPR Setujui Perpu No 1/2004 tentang Penambangan di Hutan Lindung” (Kompas, July 16, 
2004). Along with the Nuasa Halmahera Minerals, the total size of the exploration area provided 
by the natural resources in Halmahera Island is about 1, 822,407 hectars.  
311 cf. (Kasman and Oesman: 2000, 60-61). See also (Tomagola: 2000a) especially footnote 11 on 
page 3.  
312 ( Kasman and Oesman: 2000, 60). 
313 My interview in November, 1999 in Galela. 
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houses of Christian officials from the government of the North Moluccas, who 
originated from Tobelo. 
 
My research from the field differs from the analysis in “Tobelo Rusuh,”314 in 
which the writer says that the Christian leaders from Tobelo carried out political 
negotiations with the Sultan of Ternate as a means of causing division among the 
Muslims.  According to this writer, the Christians gave support to the Sultan of 
Ternate to become a candidate for Governor of the North Moluccas.  Actually, a 
local newspaper reported the names of potential candidates for Governor who had 
been suggested by the people.  These included the names of Muslim leaders, but 
there were also Christian names mentioned, for example Prof. Dr. J. L. Nanere.  
Apparently the GMIH church was open to giving support to the candidacy of 
someone from the North Moluccas other than the Sultan of Ternate, and 
especially to a Christian candidate, or perhaps someone who already had political 
experience in the government of the North Moluccas. 
 
6.4.  Efforts to Overcome the Violence 
 
This subsection will begin with an explanation of the further actions conducted by 
the local government to prevent the eruption of violence as the rumours and 
suspicions grew.  Meetings began from the district up to the level of village.  
 
6. 4.1.  The Role of the Sariloha Group 
 
On the second day after I came to Ngidiho in August 1999, a meeting was held 
between the Consultative Council of Leaders of the District and the directors of 
the Sariloha organization.  The Sariloha group was formed at the end of January 
1999, two weeks after the riots in Ambon broke out.  The Sariloha group was 
formed to provide a vehicle for promoting brotherhood and sisterhood among the 
people of Galela.  Since its formation, Sariloha carried out a campaign to promote 
living together in brother/sisterhood.  They had tried to elucidate how to guard the 
people against being swept away by rumours of riots.  The Director of Sariloha, 
who is a Muslim, is the Head of the Office for Religious Affairs of the District of 
Galela.  The Secretary of Sariloha is the leader of the GMIH for the District of 
Galela. 
 
Unfortunately, the members of Sariloha, who included community leaders from 
Galela and religious leaders from the district level, did not seem to have much 
impact at the level of the people.  The Muslim Imams and Christian ministers who 
worked at the village level were not directly involved in the campaigns to promote 
Galelan traditions and religious life.  The last time Sariloha pursued a common 
task was at a meeting where the political and religious elite of Galela met to 
discuss the problem of aid for the Christians to Kao.  Ironically, religious riots 
broke out later in Galela after rumours emerged that the Christians of Galela gave 
aid to the refugees from Kao.  After that, the activities of Sariloha in leading 
uplifting campaigns concerning religious harmony no longer functioned.   
                                                 
314 (Kasman and Oesman: 2000, 58). 
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At the first meeting I attended, the Head of Sariloha announced that the central 
government in Jakarta was giving an award to the Head of Religious Affairs for 
the District of Galela, namely the trophy for first class in exemplary work.  He 
was honoured for the success achieved by Galela in protecting the safety of 
religious life in the Moluccas.  This honour was announced publicly, so that all 
could learn from the success the government in protecting religious harmony in 
Galela even though riots had begun Ambon.  Little did we know what was about 
to happen. 
 
6.4.2.  The Meeting of Community Leaders in Ngidiho 
 
Since rumours and suspicions were growing, the District meeting for Galela 
concluded that they should hold meetings at the village level throughout Galela to 
discuss the Christians explanation of their aid for refugees from Kao.  In these 
meetings they also would discuss how to anticipate the possibility that riots could 
spread to Galela.  That evening, the village Head of Ngidiho gathered all the 
village officials, religious leaders, community figures and youth leaders to discuss 
the results of the meeting at the District level and the subsequent actions that must 
be carried out to protect the safety of the village. 
 
The meeting in Ngidiho was held on the 14th of November, beginning at 10 PM 
and ending at about 3 AM.  The meeting reached a decision to reject the 
possibility of riots in Ngidiho.  The government of the village would begin by 
setting out the points of their decisions in the meeting, in order to socialize them 
among the people.  This socialization would take place both among the people of 
the village and also among those who lived in the Banana Plantation. 315 
 
The meeting began with discussion about the reformation movement of students 
in Java, which they felt was causing chaos all over the country.  These community 
leaders felt that the demonstrations occurring in Java were not appropriate to be 
followed by the people in the North Moluccas.  Their reason was that the people 
of Java were not emotional, whereas the Moluccans become quickly upset, so that 
it would be easy for riots to take place.  The meeting also paid serious attention to 
the possibility of religious riots that might arise out of small fights between 
groups of young people who were drunk (both Muslim and Christian).  Often a 
drunken youth would strike someone else, without conscious reason.  Therefore, 
in a situation of rising social conflict, the village government hoped that the 
religious leaders would give guidance to the youth, so that they would be careful.  
Their freedom should not be used by irresponsible parties to create conflict 
between the village young people at a time when they were drunk.  At the same 
time, the older villagers should not take the law into their own hands and beat the 
young people when they were drunk, since that could also cause fights in the 
neighbourhood. 
 
                                                 
315 The following account of the meeting is taken from my own notes.  I was the only woman 
invited to attend the meeting.   
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At the same time, the community leaders were reminded to ask the women to 
restrain themselves from gossip and keep their mouths closed.  The explosion of 
rumours about riots, according to this meeting, started from women who returned 
from selling products in the Inpres market in the village of Soa Sio.  They 
returned to their neighbourhoods in Ngidiho with stories about the preparations of 
the Galelans, both Muslims and Christians, in anticipation of the possibility of 
riots.  The fear was that violence might occur as a result of the riots that had 
already taken place in Kao-Malifut, Tidore, Ternate and villages in North 
Halmahera such as Pajahe. 
 
The people who attended the meeting agreed that the District government should 
clearly confirm or deny the rumours that were circulating.  The government 
should find out how the rumours emerged, where they came from, how someone 
heard the rumours and then repeated them in the form of stories to someone else.  
In connection with this, the meeting also discussed how to differentiate between 
rumours and facts.  Facts are stories that are true.  However rumours emerge from 
gossip that cannot be proved, but are nevertheless dangerous because the people 
can be influenced to believe them.  If a person believes a rumour, he or she is 
already in the process of changing the rumour into a fact.  Therefore it was 
imperative for the people to report all rumours to the village government. 
 
If a rumour was connected to religion, the people should be instructed to report it 
to the village leaders and not to the religious leaders.  The instructions to report 
religious rumours to the village government rather than to religious leaders were 
justified because the village Head is the one who is directly responsible for the 
unity and safety of all the people.  Besides this, the village forum was conscious 
of the case of Ambon, where conflict was stimulated among the people based on 
religion and the religious leaders were unable to separate themselves from the 
conflict. 
 
Although the community leaders did not want riots to take place in Ngidiho, they 
did discuss how it would be if, finally, violence did break out in the village.  A 
village leader, who was Muslim, suggested that if there was an attack against 
Ngidiho by Christians from another village, then the Christians of Ngidiho should 
give protection to the Muslims of the village.  However other members of the 
forum felt that this would be hard to carry out because the Christians were only 
22% of the total population of Ngidiho.  The forum then agreed that the Muslims 
in Ngidiho should guarantee the protection of the Christian people of Ngidiho if 
there were an attack by Muslims from another village. This decision was built on 
the reality that the Christian and Muslim communities in Ngidiho had lived in 
peace together for a long time.  Neither Christianity nor Islam were new religions 
to the area. 
 
The forum of leaders also agreed with a suggestion to ask recent settlers from 
Makian and Tidore to return to their home villages.  However other settlers from 
outside Galela who had lived for a long time in Ngidiho were permitted to stay in 
Galela.  The forum decided to construct a gate across the road to control the 
coming and going of strangers through the area of Ngidiho.  On the day after the 
 264 
meeting, the people made a gate across the road, located close to the house of the 
village Head.  The construction of the gate was the only concrete action carried 
out as a result of the meeting.  The agreement to socialize the decisions of the 
meeting in each neighbourhood (RT), had not taken place before I left on 
November 25, 1999.  Unfortunately, the effort to come close to the people in 
order to suppress the rumours of riots was not carried out in any intensive or 
structural manner by the village government. 
 
The village Head complained to me about the difficulty of publicizing the leaders 
decisions in order to prevent people from becoming involved with violence.  He 
said that it was very difficult to determine a correct attitude towards the increasing 
tendency towards violent conflict.  The actions taken by heterogeneous villages 
such as Ngidiho, where Christians and Muslims lived together peacefully, was 
different from what took place in homogeneous villages like Soa Sio and Duma.  
Soa Sio is a homogeneous Muslim village, while Duma is a homogeneous 
Christian village.  The homogeneous villages did not have experience of living 
together with other religious groups in an atmosphere of mutual trust and social 
negotiation between people of different religions.  According to the village Head, 
the people from homogeneous villages were more prepared to face the possibility 
of riots. The homogenous villages were already arming themselves with guns, 
bows and arrows, swords and spears, etc., in preparation for battle.  In Ngidiho 
most people were totally unprepared for war. 
 
Even when village leaders in Galela took responsible action to discuss and 
suppress the possibility of violence, it appears from this account that the power of 
the dominant local media (stories, rumours, and fears spread by the mobility of 
traders), were much more powerful than official declarations of government 
officials. 
 
Several days after this meeting, the former village Head, who had become an 
imam (leader in the mosque), of Ngidiho stopped by Oom Din’s house to talk with 
me.  He asked me not to worry about the increase in tensions that was felt by the 
people after the violent conflict in Kao, Ternate and Tidore.  It was this man who 
requested in the meeting, that if riots broke out, only older people, i.e. male adults, 
should be allowed to go out and face the rioters from other villages.  Young 
people, who are emotional, women and children should stay inside their houses. 
 
Privately he told me that if riots finally broke out, he would walk weeping from 
end to end of the village, weeping like a person mourning the death of community 
between Muslims and Christians in Ngidiho.  He would weep so that others would 
feel guilty.  I did not witness whether or not this really happened, since I had 
already left Ngidiho before the violence broke out.  However I have no doubt of 
the man’s sincerity.  Oom Din, who was present during this conversation, also 
reassured me that I was safe.  He asked me to tell my husband not to worry about 
me because he would die before he allowed anyone to harm me.   
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6.4.3.  The Conflicts are Doomed 
 
In retrospect, it is easy to perceive a sense of the inevitability of violence in 
Galela.  Even though some leaders were working and hoping to prevent violence, 
many felt that violence was fated and could not be stopped.  Before I returned to 
Java, I arranged to meet with officials of the District of Galela.  In my 
conversations with the Secretary of the District of Galela, he expressed the 
opinion that if religious riots took place in a nation that is based on the ideology of 
Pancasila, then it was fated by God.  The Secretary offered this interpretation with 
the special note that officials of the District of Galela took sides with the officials 
of the Province of the North Moluccas, who are Makian, rather than with the 
Sultan of Ternate.  Therefore, he said, the suffering of the Makians must be repaid 
by the Christians who participated in helping the people of Kao. 
 
This official then explained to me the meaning of a jihad war that would be 
carried out by Muslims.  This war would be waged if there were insults to 
Muslims, such as had been suffered by the Makians.  Therefore if there was an 
order to wage a jihad war, it must be regarded as a part of Fate.  At that time, this 
official did not mention the unsubstantiated rumour that circulated that the anger 
of the Muslim community was caused by actions of the Kao people who, during 
the fighting, threw the Holy Koran onto the streets of Malifut.  However this 
conversation, over a month before the fighting broke out in Galela, illustrates how 
political alliances, personal relationships and religious convictions combined in 
the shaping of a discourse that justified violence.   
 
6.4.4.  The Forum for Solidarity in Halmahera and the Youth of Gema Hilo 
 
The Forum for Solidarity in Halmahera (abbreviated as FSH) was formed in 
Tobelo early in November 1999.  The FSH was established to suppress the 
rumours of riots tha t were circulating among the people.  The members of the 
FSH included Muslim and Christian public figures and carried out peacemaking 
activities in both Muslim and Christian villages.  To show their support for this 
effort, the people signed a banner proclaiming love and peace that was 50 meters 
long.  There were about 5,000 people who signed the banner.  About fifteen 
workers carried the Love and Peace banner from house to house, collecting 
signatures. 
 
On December 22, 1999, the FSH met at a command post located in the house of a 
Chinese in Tobelo who originated from Morotai.  About 10 people attended the 
meeting, five of them prominent Muslim figures and five of them prominent 
Christians.  On that night, one of the Muslim leaders scolded another Muslim 
leader by asking why he chose to only carry out peacemaking in his own villages, 
rather than cooperating with the rest of the group.  The Gema Hilo youth were 
already suspicious of the man who was criticized because he often travelled in the 
middle of the night, using the car of the local clinic (puskesmas).  The Gema Hilo 
youth from the South of Tobelo had seen this prominent man, together with the 
District Head of Tobelo (Camat), returning to Tobelo from the South in the wee 
hours of the morning.   
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The man answered that he was approaching the higher officials who were in his 
own network while the members of FSH were approaching people at the grass 
roots level.  He always attended the meetings of the Council of Area Leaders at 
the District level (abbreviated as MUSPIKA Kecamatan).  In spite of his 
networking, not all were happy with his activities.  If this man suddenly appeared 
at a MUSPIKA meeting, the Chief of Police and the Military Head (Danramil) 
would immediately leave the meeting room.  On the other hand he was close to 
the Camat.  The Camat of Tobelo and his wife were both Makians.  Since the 
violent conflict had broken out in Kao, the Camat’s wife no longer stayed in 
Tobelo.  However the mysterious Muslim leader was a medical doctor who was 
native to Tobelo and had family ties with Tobelo Christians through his mother. 
 
The dual role of the Camat, along with the doctor, could be seen in the gathering 
of funds from the people for the safety of Tobelo.  Donations were at first all 
received from Chinese business people in Tobelo.  A powerful Chinese figure 
gathered the donations and then gave them directly to the Camat and the doctor.  
The people formed Gema Hilo in order to guard the public safety of Tobelo and 
help from the police and military. The Camat used the funds that were gathered 
from the Chinese business people to pay for the operational costs of Gema Hilo, 
as long as they guarded the safety of Tobelo. 
 
The Gema Hilo group were relatively successful in guarding religious unity until 
one night in the middle of November 1999, some of the Gema Hilo youth in the 
village of Gura came across a tailor who was sewing white pants, robes and head 
bands.  The police of Tobelo confiscated three hundred white garments, which 
later became known as the clothing of the jihad, and the tailor was arrested.  The 
doctor, who was friends with the Camat, tried to free the tailor, but the Christian 
youth would not allow it.  However they failed in their attempt to find out who 
was the mastermind (dalang), who gave instructions to the tailor.  The case was 
never tried in court.  The people of Kao also discovered jihad clothing in 
Pediwang, Kao, when the people checked all the buses that came from Ternate. 
 
After this event, the activities of Gema Hilo stopped.  The Christian youth started 
to form their own forum in order to protect the safety of Tobelo.  This forum was 
named, Forum for Communication in Halmahera (FKH).  Their first activity was 
to carry out a campaign to evict from Tobelo anyone from the Makian, Kayoa or 
Tidore ethnic groups, since they were suspected of inciting the people. The 
members of FKH included young men and women, including a leader who was a 
woman minister.   FKH issued a statement criticizing the military’s selective 
prosecution of rioters based on the concept of Human Rights (Hak Asasi Manusia 
or HAM).  Drawing from their experience of violent conflict in Ambon, they felt 
that the rhetoric of human rights had been misused by the military to refrain from 
stern action against Muslim rioters.  However the Muslims of Tobelo criticized 
the FKH declaration for rejecting the importance of human rights. 
 
The formation of FKH by the Christian youth drew a reaction from the Muslim 
youth of Tobelo who felt that the Christian youth were acting macho.  Therefore, 
even though the leaders of the Synod of GMIH started a dialogue forum between 
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Muslims and Christians, that involved the imams from the great mosque (Mesjid 
Raya), these efforts failed to calm the sharp competition going on between the 
groups of Christian and Muslim youth. 316 
 
Community forums based genealogical myths or on rational divisions according 
to religion and age were unable to prevent the coming the violence.  The 
breakdown of Gema Hilo was the beginning of the end of peace.  The new 
“peacekeeping groups” were created out of fear and competition with each other.  
The local governments both at the village and district levels were powerless to 
overcome the fears of the two communities. When a transition crisis becomes 
ritualised it also becomes dangerous.   Mary Douglas says, “Not only is transition 
itself dangerous, but also the rituals of segregation are the most dangerous phase 
of the rites” (Douglas: 1988 [1966], 96).  Ritual segregation of the two 
communities became more and more pronounced in the period leading up to the 
outbreak of war. 
 
6.5.  Conclusion 
 
People often use symbolic elements from their local culture with a variety of 
motivations.  The Halmaherans dance the Cakalele with different motivations and 
purposes during a period of warfare than they do during peace. The essence of the 
Cakalele that was danced by both Muslims and Christians to celebrate war was 
different from the Cakalele danced in a wedding ceremony.  In this chapter, I have 
explained how the discourse about violent conflict in North Halmahera was 
created, organized and propagated.  Mechanisms of terror created political 
instability that encouraged riots and disbelief among the people.  A powerful 
group intended to use the mechanisms of terror to establish its domination and 
control over the people. A conflict can occur because of many factors.  
Disinformation is only one aspect that leads to the explosion of conflict. 
 
Media functions as an instrument of social mobilization in conflict situations.317  
Some of the Islamic media, such as Republika, Sabili, etc., seemed determined to 
portray the conflict as a purely religious conflict even though the local people 
experienced the conflict in several stages. The sources of news were from outside 
the conflict area and were unable to understand the situation directly from the 
local people. This made it very difficult to distinguish fact from fiction, fear from 
fantasy, knowledge from suspicion. 
  
In both Kao and Tobelo, there were substantial economic, political, and cultural 
conflicts of interest that support a “rational-material” explanation of the violence.  
However in Ngidiho the Muslims and Christians had kinship ties with each other 
                                                 
316 From an interview with the leadership of the Synod of GMIH in Tobelo in November 1999. 
317 Agus Sudibyo argues that media played an important role in escalating the conflict in the 
Moluccas. He concludes that public media cannot free itself from bias based on ideological 
similarities and personal, organisational and economic interests.  National media tended to spread 
the news of what was happening in the local settings of the Moluccas without having a reporter in 
the field. Sudibyo’s analysis shows the role of the national media in shaping perceptions of the 
conflict in the Moluccas especially for the people in Java (Sudibyo:2001).   
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and were not substantially alienated by conflicting political, economic or ethnic 
differences.  The violence in Galela was the bitter fruit of a discourse of fear, 
shaped and moulded by imported information carried by the locally available 
forms of communication.  The local media, consisting of mostly oral 
communication empowered by high levels of mobility, created the illusion of 
predestined violence.  Conflicts that had origins far outside the boundaries of 
Galela led to unimaginable slaughter. 
 
Religions, with their noble values, often dream of creating a grand, religiously 
based hegemony, based on the Truth.  But religious identities are formed by a 
history of conflict that makes them vulnerable to manipulation.  They are often 
used for political purposes to bring conflict between those who follow different 
beliefs.  Religions view the death of martyrs as holy.  However these dead are 
victims of political violence, produced by powerful groups, who callously use the 
numbers of deaths to statistically justify the violent political struggle in which 
they are engaged.318  Muslims and Christians were both perpetuators and victims 
of political violence that followed patterns that were inherited from the New 
Order period.319   
                                                 
318  See Piliang (Kompas, February 10, 2000). 
319  Some people connected Suharto’s name with the ‘dalang’ (puppet master), who provoked riots 
all over Indonesia.  The assumption behind this suspicion is that the riots were a sign that Suharto 
wanted to survive in power.  But was Suharto really the dalang? See Tobing (Kompas, August 21, 
2000).  This accusation was easy to make because most people believe Suharto was able to create 
political history according to his own interests as long as he held power.  Maruli Tobing writes that 
he doubts the truth of the discourse that claims Suharto was the dalang of the riots.  Tobing puts 
more emphasis on factors connected with the transfer of government that stimulated instability in 
society.  Political instability then gave expression to attempts to defend territory and the borders of 
an area.  I can agree with Tobing’s opinion.  But in the case of the North Moluccas, Tobing’s 
analysis must be connected with the question of why the government changed territorial 
boundaries in such a one sided manner, without a process of socialization and communication with 
the people affected. Of course there is no one in Indonesia who will admit to being the dalang who 
used religion as a political tool to attract support from the majority group in society.  Such a 
confession would result in the dalang being cursed by humanity.  Essentially the people would 
know that they were being manipulated and deceived by political actors who dared admit publicly 
to creating this destructive scenario.  The theory that Suharto is the dalang behind the riots 
provokes pro and contra opinions among the people.  Those who doubt Suharto’s involvement 
question how the riots could go on and on, if only one individual, or the family of Cendana 
bankrolled them.  (Cendana is the neighborhood where the Suharto family lives in Jakarta. See 
Tobing (Kompas, August 21, 2000).  However those who believe Suharto was involved, argue that 
the riots all over Indonesia were motivated by the desire to protect an entire system that is still 
very strong in the structure of Indonesian politics. Maesa W. D. claims there is a connection 
between Suhartoism and the Laskar Jihad. See Maesa (Telegraf, August 14, 2000).  Regardless of 
the pro and contra of Suharto’s involvement, there are strong indications from the phenomena of 
riots in the field that indicate the use of military power, channeled through the aggressiveness of 
the masses from various religious groups. Adi Sasono, as explained in Chapter V, was a dalang in 
the overthrow of Suharto although he only represented one group working for Suharto’s demise.  
He could not have played that role if a gamelan, an orchestra made up of students and independent 
social groups had not supported him.  During Habibie’s presidency, riots began in Ambon.  But 
who would admit that religious riots were planned, similar to the demonstrations for bringing 
down Suharto?   The military, which appeared to be neutral, also played a part in the total political 
drama of that period.  It follows than, that the drama of political violence through riots involved 
various groups that shared a similar interest in power.  Therefore the question asked by many 
people of ‘who is the dalang,’ is not very important in the snowballing of riots.  Just a little push 
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It is interesting to understand why people are so quick to say that the riots were 
the result of the instigation of provocateurs.320  By referring to a provocateur, or 
dalang, a person can develop various kinds of analysis without fearing threats to 
his or her safety.  On the other hand, if a person should mention the name of the 
provocateur, it would indeed result in a serious threat to the writer.  We may see a 
direct example of this dynamic in the case of Tomagola, who accused several 
people by name, of being provocateurs of the riots in the Moluccas.  His analysis 
was published in the national newspaper, but only a few days later, he retracted 
his accusations in the same newspaper. 
 
The choice of certain areas was a very real phenomenon that can be observed after 
the anti-Christian movement in Halmahera started to have a structural affect on 
riots in various other areas of Indonesia.  At that time, the riots began almost 
simultaneously in various places.  Amien Rais said that the riots, like a blazing 
ember moved from area to area as a reaction to the violent conflict that took place 
in the Moluccas, and especially that had just taken place in Ambon. 321  Was this 
spread of riots truly the simple result of sincere people who were moved by the 
basic human suffering of their fellow human beings?  Actually, it is likely that the 
riots in Mataram were the result of the manipulations by a provocateur.322  
Ironically, the low level provocateur was arrested, while his powerful boss was 
left untouched.  The Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, said 
he himself had been contacted by someone who claimed to be able to contact the 
provocateur so that no disturbances would take place within the area of 
Yogyakarta.323 
                                                                                                                                     
could set the ball rolling at a terrific speed, gaining size at ever rotation.  Like a bomb just waiting 
to be thrown, the rolling ball would have devastating impact in certain locations. 
320 The word provocateur has become a loaded word in the politics of violence that is now endemic 
in Indonesia.  This term that is usually used by the military has now become a common term 
among ordinary people.  The word was first used in the political practices of Italy, as shown by 
Machiavelli.  The Latin word provocare means challenge.  According to Harimurti Kridalaksana, 
the word provocateur is unknown in the objectification of Anglo-Saxon politics.  But the term 
agent provocateur is a French term.  The politics of violence in Indonesia uses the term 
provocateur to mean dalang (puppet master), i.e. the master and primary player in the Javanese art 
of wayang (puppet drama).  This meaning is close to the Latin term, auctor intellectualis.  See 
Kridalaksana (Kompas, February 4,1999). However, the lexical meaning of provocateur 
apparently does not provide a means for the government to act against people who are suspected of 
actions intending to foment lawless actions among the people.  Several community leaders have 
urged that the term provocateur should be further defined in a normative way.  This indicates that 
they know what is meant by the term provocateur. See Haz (Kompas, January 29, 2000).  
Megawati suggested that a provocateur is someone who receives money for the work of inciting 
other people to act in a lawless manner. See Megawati (Kompas, March 9, 1999).  In military 
circles, especially the Intelligence Branch, provocateur is  used to refer to particular persons who 
promote mutual suspicions among different groups in society. See Tobing (Kompas, August 21, 
2000).  In fact the Indonesian Army caused a sensation with its claim that there were about 5,000 
provocateurs who were trained outside the country, to disrupt the election campaigns during the 
month of May 1999. This claim was written in Kompas, May 8, 1999, as the opinion of the 
Commander of V/Brawijaya, Mayjen TNI Ryamizard Ryacudu, who was quoted in a report from 
Khotib Aam PBNU, KH Aqiel Siradj.  
321  See Rais (Forum Keadilan. No.41, January 23, 2000, 80-81). 
322  See Kompas (January 19, 2000). 
323  See Kompas (April 26, 1999). 
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The police claim that they must be obedient to the legal norm of presumption of 
innocence unless proven guilty.  Therefore it is very difficult to arrest a 
provocateur from the upper class.324  They also use the principle of respect for 
Human Rights as another excuse for not firmly guarding the peace.  This 
reasoning is connected with the long history of the “New Order” that used 
violence in its politics of accommodation in order to tame the people.  In a 
situation of political transition, the logic of Human Rights is used to protect the 
groups that use violence with impunity, and free the police from the responsibility 
for keeping the peace.  However these police excuses need to be questioned.  
According to the research of the Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM), 
there has never been a serious effort to investigate those responsible for the 
violence in the Moluccas.325 
 
In such a condition, where the police function is paralysed, private soldiers, who 
are paid by rich people, provide the primary security in the nation.  This could be 
viewed as opening up a new field of employment for local thugs.  This type of 
situation is fostered by the difficult economic situation.   Recruits to private 
armies are easily manipulated by the status of being a private soldier.  Feelings of 
solidarity in suffering, history, religion, or just the pull of money, are also potent 
means of manipulation.  For example, many members of the Laskar Jihad were 
recruited from unemployed, marginalized youth (Fontana: 1993, 20; Grant: 1997, 
49).  The military denies that private soldiers, such as the Laskar Jihad, are a 
legitimate part of national defence.326  Nevertheless, given the abundant evidence 
of links between the military and the Laskar Jihad, it is not unreasonable to 
suspect that some factions of the military supported the Laskar Jihad. 327 
  
In Halmahera, it is clear that the riots were not just the result of the local people’s 
will.  National politics transformed regional power struggles over control of local 
natural resources.  Political instability then gave expression to attempts at 
defending territories or the borders of an area. The elite used a politics of violence 
to force the people to defend themselves.  The only means of defence was through 
direct participation in the war.  Political rituals swept people up in an 
overwhelming movement that forced them to go to war.   
 
The people defended themselves at two levels.  First, among the common people, 
those who had formerly lived together in peace attacked and murdered each other.  
The people had to free themselves from their awareness of family and kinship 
networks.  To justify their actions the people employed a new synthesis 
combining universal religious identity with local, ancestral rituals that 
                                                 
324  See Kompas (January 26, 2000). 
325  According to the Commission for Investigating the Violation of Basic Human Rights in the 
Mediation for the Moluccas (KPMM), the information and communication that has already been 
gathered by the government and the military has never been properly coordinated.  The state has 
never handled the information in an integral or comprehensive manner in the areas of conflict.  See  
Kompas (April 19, 2000). 
326  See Bernas (April 25, 2000) 
327 The same dynamic can be observed in the military’s involvement in creating the pro-integration 
militias in East Timor (Robinson: 2002). 
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strengthened their structures of power and claims to the truth. This stimulated 
them to commit violent acts.  Ritual gave sacred legitimacy to their actions, 
promised invulnerability to their bodies and clarity against the ambiguities of their 
identity and status (Douglas: 1988 [1966], 103-104).   
 
Secondly, at the level of the elite, leaders of each group published many books 
and articles that aimed to give a rational explanation that would justify the warfare 
in which they were involved.328  These books and articles developed a political 
discourse that rewrites the genealogical history of their tribe and religion, 
claiming a uniqueness over other tribes and religions that has been passed down 
from their ancestors.329  Even though these interpretations of history lack internal 
consistency they still provide an interesting source of social discourse that springs 
from the suffering of this profound tragedy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
328  See for example, the book published from the Muslim side by Kasman and Oesman (2000) and 
from the Christian side by J. A. Nanere ( see Nanere: 2000).  
329  See especially the discourse that dominates the book edited by Kasman and Oesman (see 
Kasman and Oesman: 2000). 
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Chapter VII 
The Politics of Memory and Forgetting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political changes in national and regional society created religious segregation in 
villages.  Each party defended its beliefs, pride, and access to material resources.  
Different interest groups used ancestral and religious rituals to manipulate the 
emotions of the people.  Rituals brought symbols of war from the past into the 
present life of the people.  
 
This chapter examines how memory and forgetting structured the politics of 
reconciliation after the ritua lized violence stopped.  It begins with a description of 
how survivors of the civil war shaped and interpreted rituals of reconciliation.  
The people modified their rituals by combining universal and local principles that 
are rooted in their common experience. A system of negotiation through rituals 
that is based on a common commitment to material justice is crucial for 
understanding the process of reconciliation in Halmahera.  This chapter addresses 
the question: how did the people construct rituals out of the material principles of 
their religious and cultural life to achieve reconciliation? 
 
7.1.  Meetings at the Boundary Point 
 
Ethnic groups construct both secular and messianic national ideologies to sustain 
an imagined identity and inspire the political struggles of their people.330  Political 
labelling based on divisions between the religious loyalties of the people resulted 
in sharp divisions in the society.  People are divided by identities corresponding to 
ethnicity, religion and race. In the North Moluccas and elsewhere in Indonesia, 
the boundaries between people are not only imaginary but also a physical reality.  
The violence in the North Moluccas resulted in the geographical division of 
society by religion.  Muslim refugees fled to Ternate and Tidore while Christian 
refugees escaped to Tobelo (Northern Halmahera) and Manado - Bitung in North 
Sulawesi. 
 
Imagined religious identities that are constructed by violence threaten the physical 
identity of a common people.  However, when people are isolated from each other 
by physical threats their physical segregation may only continue as long as the 
physical danger persists.  The people respond by searching for free space in social 
relationships with parties that are not threatening to them.  They free themselves 
from the limitations of imagined space that was created by their different political 
                                                 
330 See (Anderson:1999). 
“Where memories come from, how we create 
them, and how “true” they are, are questions 
that require perceptive and thoughtful 
consideration, for memories illuminate what it 
means to be human and alive” (McBeth: 
1993, 151). 
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identities and negotiate renewed relationships through economic exchange based 
on assumptions of equality. 
 
Unlike the violence, the reconciliation process is hardly mentioned by the mass 
media.  Academic analysis also tends to focus on the violence and neglect the less 
dramatic process of building peace.  When I returned to the North Moluccas in 
2002, my ‘family’ in Ngidiho assured me that it was safe.  But many people in 
Amsterdam and even in Java, were worried about my trip.  No one knew about the 
peace process.  This chapter examines how the actors in the reconciliation process 
work through larger structures such as families, villages, economic institutions, 
churches, mosques, the government and the military.  The process of 
reconciliation started with economic practices that directly addressed the material 
needs of the survivors.  People with different religious identities began to trade 
with each other again.  However, individual actions for peace are not enough.  
They need to be followed with formal, public and institutional actions to establish 
reconciliation. 
 
7.1.1.  A Story of Fickle Fortune  
 
Pak Thamrin is a Muslim from the village of Bisui in East Gane, in the eastern 
part of southern Halmahera.  After two nights of sailing he arrived safety in 
Bitung, North Sulawesi.  The skin of this fifty old man was burned from his 
journey crossing the Moluccan Sea to sell copra in the northern part of Sulawesi, 
near Manado.  Two other men accompanied him.  One was about 25 years old and 
wore a military uniform.  The other was about the same age, dressed in casual 
clothes.  The military man was paid to guard their trip from Halmahera to Bitung.  
After the boat let down its anchor in Bitung harbour, Pak Thamrin jumped 
carefully off the boat onto the pier of the harbour.  He walked slowly to reach the 
crowd where people were gathering.  He looked happy seeing somebody he knew 
among the crowd.  Pak Onni, a Christian Chinese-Gane man shouted loudly to 
him, “Hoi, what are you bringing?” Pak Thamrin replies, “Ce! Only a little 
copra!”  Pak Onni shouts back, “I’ll take it!” 
 
Before the 1999-2000 violence occurred, Pak Oni used to travel around the 
eastern and the western parts of southern Halmahera, buying copra.  He also sold 
necessities to the people he visited.  His boat was like a travelling store.  People 
bought his wares after they had sold their harvest.  However, his boat was burned 
in the 1999-2000 violence and he and his family had to leave their home in 
Ternate.  With his new refugee status he could not continue his work.  Even if he 
could get hold of a boat, as a Christian he was not allowed to enter areas 
considered Muslim territory.  Therefore, the system of trade in the north Moluccas 
changed. Instead of a Christian copra collector coming to the villages, Muslims 
delivered their produce to a town where there were buyers waiting for their 
harvest.  Pak Thamrin took this responsibility along with two other Muslim 
businessmen.  Bitung, which is located in the northern part of Manado, was their 
target because there is an oil company there. 
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Bringing some porters with him, Pak Onni went to the boat of Pak Thamrin.  The 
porters carried out each sack of copra to the closed store where Pak Onni 
recommended he sell the copra. After measurement, the total amount of copra was 
23 tons or 23,000 kg.  The store paid Rp. 2,100, per kg.  That meant that Pak 
Thamrin received Rp. 4,800,000 ($533)331, while Pak Onni received Rp. 
1,200,000 ($150) as a commission for arranging for Pak Thamrin to sell his copra 
at the store.  Pak Onni receives Rp. 50 for each kg. of copra he brings to the store.  
Pak Onni told me, this good fortune is rare.  He doesn’t often get such money 
since he lost his business.  With no financial capital, his fortune is determined by 
his success in assisting the collectors of copra who come from the north 
Moluccas.  Sometimes he only gets Rp. 20,000 - 30,000 for a commission or just 
some money for bus transportation given by the store, which always encourages 
him to look for new suppliers. 
 
7.1.2.  Continuing Business  
 
Continuing business after the violence was necessary for the people.  However, 
they returned to everyday affairs cautiously, without endangering themselves.  
The military’s provision of security became important to people’s lives after the 
war.  For protecting their security, the military charged the people.  A Chinese 
trader told me that the cost of selling products became higher due to service 
charges for physical safety that they had to pay to the military.  At the beginning 
of November 1999, the Chinese communities fled from Ternate but left behind 
their stores to be run by the military or other parties appointed by the authorities 
in the region.  A Chinese family, which owned the biggest supermarket in 
Ternate, hired naval officers to continue their business.  The supermarket had a 
normal turnover of Rp. 30 million per day, before the violence erupted.  After the 
violence, its turnover decreased sharply to about Rp. 5 million a day.  The 
decrease in turnover was linked to the decline of the kinds of products sold.  The 
store mainly sold basic necessities, but there was a limited supply.  It took about 
two weeks on a waiting list for a person to buy a product because they were 
quickly sold out.  The owners stocked a limited supply in order to minimize their 
risk in case the riots broke out again. 
 
The government of North Moluccas supported the decision to continue operation 
of stores owned by the Chinese-Ternate traders.  Due to the violence in November 
and December 1999, many Chinese-Ternate residents left Ternate.  Some hired 
local people to manage their businesses.  The Sultan of Ternate guaranteed 
security to protect the Chinese area where all of the stores are located.  However 
the Chinese-Ternate traders closed their stores after the Sultan of Ternate was 
forced out of Ternate by his political rival, the Sultan of Tidore at the end of 
December 1999.  The closing of Chinese-Ternate stores hurt the economy in the 
new province.  During the absence of the Chinese-Ternate traders, other traders, 
such as the Arab Ternatese tried to fill the void.  However, the local people 
complained that the products the Arab-Ternate traders sold were more expensive 
than the ones sold by the Chinese traders. 
                                                 
331 This was the exchange rate at the time of that transaction.  In 2003 the exchange rate was 
considerably lower.  
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The Arab-Ternate traders had access to trade through Makasar in Southern 
Sulawesi.  However, the Chinese-Ternate traders network was through Manado-
Bitung, Northern Sulawesi.  The cost of selling was affected by the cost of 
transportation and the distances between islands.  The trade distance between 
Ternate and Manado is closer and cheaper than the one between Makasar and 
Ternate.  Even though the distance between Ternate - Makasar is farther, the fact 
that both areas have a majority Muslim population suggests the reason why the 
trade network was considered safe for the Arab-Ternate traders.  
 
Considering the need for reducing the high cost of living in Ternate, in August 
2000 the government of North Moluccas approached the Chinese-Ternate traders 
who were refugees in North Sulawesi.  They invited the Chinese-Ternate traders 
to return to Ternate with special security protection.  In August 2000, Ternate was 
inundated with about 111,000 Muslim refugees from all over North Moluccas.  
The special invitation to the Chinese traders from Ternate is remarkable because 
about 90% of the Chinese-Ternate traders are Christian and 10% of them are 
Confucian or Buddhist.  Prior to the violence, the Chinese-Ternatese were about 
10% of the total population of Ternate, but controlled most of the business.332   
 
In August 2000, about 10 months after the violence, the Chinese Ternate traders 
began to return home to Ternate.  The government facilitated the reopening of 
their stores with a special request for them to hire the military to manage and 
secure their stores.  For example, the biggest supermarket spent about Rp. 
1,500,000 per month for security.  The increase was about 600% as the owner of 
the supermarket only spent about Rp. 250,000 per month before the violence.  In 
addition, the profit was to be divided between the owner and the military as 
security officials.  The owner was required to give 5% of the profits to the naval 
officer who managed the supermarket security while the owner stayed in Manado. 
 
After paying other required “contributions”, the owner of the supermarket 
complained that the remaining profits are very small. The owner entrusts the 
process of buying and sending supplies to his cousins whose wives are indigenous 
Muslims from Ternate.  These new couples are Muslim. They come and go from 
Manado-Ternate-Manado without being afraid.  In Ternate, they are not pushed 
out because they are accepted as Muslim.  Their presence in Manado does not 
create a problem even though this city has accommodated whole groups of 
Christian refugees from areas of conflict like North Moluccas, Ambon and its 
neighbouring islands. The people in North Sulawesi counter the discourse of 
religious conflict by strengthening their relationships within their own community 
at the level of village, as well as accepting people who come to their area for trade 
purposes.333   
 
                                                 
332 The statistics of the population of Chinese-Ternate traders are derived from the northern 
Ternate population. In 1993, the population was about 39,423. See, Informasi Kecamatan (1993, 
86).  
333 My interview was with Drs. Lengkong, who is the head of the Social Biro in the Governor’s 
office. The interview was conducted in August 2000. 
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7.1.3. Longing for their Homeland 
 
Christian refugees arrived in North Sulawesi in several stages.  Based on the date 
of their arrival, refugees can be classified into three groups.  The first group 
includes those who left their original home in North Moluccas after the violence 
broke out.  For example, the Christian refugees from Ternate and Tidore escaped 
to Manado and Bitung in early November 1999.  The second group includes those 
who had already moved their families to a safer region such as Manado or Bitung 
when they heard the rumours of riots that might take place in their home region.  
Most of this group were civil servants and businessmen.  One example is the 
refugees from Tobelo who escaped before the violence occurred in December 
1999.  The last group is the refugees who left their area when they could not 
defend their land and property; they suffered terrible loss.  The refugees from 
Galela are one example of this group. They arrived in North Sulawesi in May 
2000. Because of the violence they were unable to save their property to support 
themselves as refugees.  
 
The authorities located the refugees in camps according to their original districts 
or villages.  The date of the violence also affected the location of people.  
Refugees from the first and third groups of arrivals stayed together.  The second 
group tended to stay with their families or rent a house for themselves.  
Professional background determined the economic autonomy of refugees.  For 
example, refugees with civil servant status in the Indonesian government could 
arrange to be transferred to the new region where they had settled.  This 
opportunity encouraged the refugees to stay in their new location. A refugee who 
had worked at the Regency office (Kantor Bupati) in Tidore told me that he did 
not want to return to Tidore.  He had already sold his land and house in Tidore.  A 
Tidorenese bought his house. The transaction was carried out in Bitung where he 
and his family were staying in a refugee camp. An Islamic Tidorese acted as 
mediator between the buyer and the seller.  Even though he had sold his property 
far below the standard price in Tidore, the family was happy to have some cash to 
start a small business to continue their new life in Bitung.  
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Pictures 53-55:  The burnt out remains of a ruined house in Kao, August 
1999; The situation in a refugee camp in Bitung, North Sulawesi; 
The refugees in Bitung celeberate Independence day on 17 August 2000. 
 
Compared to civil servants and business people, the refugees with an agricultural 
or manual- labour background had the most difficulties.  For them permanent work 
was limited.  Manual labour placements in Bitung and Manado are only available 
seasonally.  At times there is work at such places as food factories, oil 
installations, and restaurants.  Because of this situation, there was a strong 
demand from these refugees to return to their original homes. Their desire to 
return was also determined by the fact that they still owned their plantations, even 
though their houses were damaged.  The same demand could also be found in the 
second group of refugees, especially those with a business background.  The 
protection of businesses belonging to the second group of refugees was provided 
by the military, the first and the third groups had no money to hire security 
officers. 
 
The Muslim refugee groups in Ternate and Tidore also wanted to return home.  
As a new province, North Moluccas with Ternate as the centre of government 
tried to accommodate Muslim refugees from all over the region.  The majority of 
these refugees were peasants. Neither land nor agricultural activities were 
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available. The lack of industrial work, as in North Sulawesi, encouraged the 
Muslim refugees in Ternate and Tidore to go home. 
 
At their homes, kin-family or neighbours had managed their plantations. After 
security was achieved, the refugees returned to their home village and reorganized 
their work by involving those who had helped them during their absence. This 
occurred in both Muslim and Christian communities.  For example, Pak Kasim 
who is a Muslim from the village of Gorua, in Tobelo, told me the story of how 
his plantation was managed by his Christian neighbour.334  The neighbour, along 
with others from the village, worked the land along with his own plantation in 
order to prevent expropriation of his property by other refugees who were not 
from the village.  Another land management arrangement occurred in Ngidiho 
where Muslim neighbours agreed that Christian refugees could farm their land to 
avoid the stealing of the plantation harvests.  
 
7.2.  The Politics of Recognition after the Riots 
 
It is interesting to understand how Christian and Muslim groups who left their 
village have reoriented themselves.  There is a tendency among the refugees to 
reorient themselves according to the material factors that link them with their 
place of origin rather than whether they are Muslim or Christian.  The 
reorientation of Christian refugees from North Moluccas was aimed at supporting, 
spreading and recognizing their identity and solidarity with Halmahera.  However, 
Muslim refugees identified themselves specifically as from Ternate, Tidore, or 
another particular district. The process of reorientation illustrates the potential 
strength of original location that can be recognized in different groups.  
Affirmation of identity from the original location is a rational category that can 
assist the process of reconciliation in North Moluccas because of common social-
cultural practices.  Agreements can be reached together by people as a 
community.  
 
7.2.1. Naming Themselves  
 
Juliet Peteet says that location is only a beginning in the struggle of identity 
formation (Peteet: 2000, 183).  Designation of an identity linked to the 
identification of self with a particular location is often related to political 
legitimacy.  Generally, identity is expressed by naming the centre of the region 
from which the person comes. Benedict Anderson states that the regional centre is 
often referred to especially in the process of solving social and political problems 
that occur among people who live within a multiethnic community (Anderson: 
1999). 
 
However, in the case of the refugees from North Moluccas who stayed in both 
North Sulawesi and Ternate-Tidore, the formation of their identity is linked with 
their ownership of land rather than with politics.  Refugees from North Moluccas, 
who remained in North Sulawesi, call themselves Halmaherans.  Why do they not 
                                                 
334 The interview was conducted on February 5, 2002. 
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identify themselves as people of Ternate where the centre of government is 
located?  The shift in identity relates to the fact that during the violence in 1999 - 
2000 there was no political or security protection from the regional government in 
Ternate.  On the other hand, they do not call themselves Minahasans (North 
Sulawesi).  When someone identifies himself as a Minahasan he intends to stay 
and to work in the region.  As a consequence of the refugees’ inability to compete 
in the Minahasa labour market, they do not identify themselves as Minahasans.  
 
Identity, as verbally expressed by the people from Halmahera, is rooted in their 
material context and expressed in their political struggles.  Three elements can be 
seen in this.  First, identity relates to the struggles to return to their original home.  
Second, their rights as Halmaherans is linked to the land that was inherited from 
their ancestors on the island of Halmahera and not in Ternate and Tidore.  Third, 
land is the place where they can actualise their potential.335 
 
The refugees who fled to Ternate also made claims of political identity.  The 
evidence for this claim can be seen in how the Muslim refugees in Ternate chose 
to identify themselves as people from Gale la, Loloda, and Tobelo rather than 
more generally as Halmaherans.  This identity relates to the fact that during the 
period of conflict the jihad troops were organized at the district level and for the 
Muslims that became their identity in North Moluccas during the violence. 
 
Among the Muslim refugees, the claim of identity according to ethnicity took on a 
new meaning after the violence, when they returned to their home villages.  
Identity based on ethnicity and being indigenous to a particular district gave them 
leverage to face claims against the land that was left behind by Christians.  
Indigenous Galelans protected their neighbours’ lands against illegal claims made 
by people from outside village.  In Galela, the participants in the violence came 
from the regional and national Islamic Jihad.  After the Christians were expelled 
from Galela, Islamic Jihad members from other islands attempted to seize the 
Christians’ lands.  However, Muslim Galelans rejected this effort because they 
believed they had to protect the land of their Christian neighbours or families.336 
 
The Christians who did not flee from Halmahera also expressed their identity as 
Halmaherans.  This usage can be found among the people in Tobelo.  They 
created a Team for the Defence of Halmahera Society (Tim Ketahanan 
Masyarakat Halmahera = TKMH) in January 2000, after the outbreak of violence 
on December 27, 1999.337   The TKMH intended to replace the District leadership 
after the former Head of the District, the Camat, left his office during the violence 
in 1999-2000.  This team was a consultative one and its members came from 
various layers of society, which represented religions, tradition (adat) and other 
                                                 
335 This research did not include the impact of the religious conflict in Ambon.  There was a 
different process of identification among the refugees from North Moluccas than there was for the 
refugees from Ambon and its neighbouring islands.  Unfortunately that is beyond the scope of this 
book. 
336 See Telegraf (August 21, 2000). This news was reconfirmed on February 10, 2002 on my trip 
back to Galela, . 
337 The interview was conducted on February 2, 2002. 
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social organisations.  Their use of the name Halmahera, rather than Tobelo, shows 
they claimed to be part of a unity made up of the indigenous people of the island.  
Identification as Halmaherans gave meaning to the process of reconciliation.  The 
Tobelo Christians believed that they must attempt to bring back both Muslim and 
Christian refugees to Halmahera.  This attempt had to be conducted from the 
island itself.  Therefore, in April 2001, after the violence had ceased, Christians 
and Muslim together created a new body named the Organisation for Defence of 
Halmahera Society (Organisasi Ketahanan Masyarakat Halmahera). 
 
Paying attention to the way the people identified themselves after the violence, it 
can be concluded that their identity is related to both ownership of the land and 
the new context in which she/he wishes to remain.  Some groups tried to 
manipulate land ownership by categorizing someone’s identity by religion and 
appealing to the name of Allah and to religious ties of solidarity.  The people who 
were not refugees called themselves Halmaherans as a sign of solidarity with the 
whole refugee population, both Muslim and Christian, that went into exile.  On 
the other hand, the non-Muslims who remained in their original homes used 
ethnic identity as a means of defending their territory.  Both Christians and 
Muslims identified themselves according to their ethnicity.  This shows that they 
still have a strong identity based on land and rooted in local traditions.  
 
7.2.2.  Tona ma langi:  The Meeting Point for Reconciliation 
 
Longing for their homeland was a strong pull for the refugees to return.  However, 
this desire could not easily be fulfilled without facing up to the violence that had 
taken place.  The people needed to acknowledge the concrete facts of what 
happened, even though they might not ever agree on all the details.  Everyone 
needed to recognize the rights of all groups to live together on Halmahera and the 
government needed to provide a guarantee of security.  This sub section considers 
how the people faced up to the conflict and increased their communal confidence 
in law. 
 
Recognition of the rights of the original inhabitants to return to their homes was 
the beginning of the reconciliation process.  On October 9, 2000, several 
representatives of the Muslim refugees from Tobelo were accompanied by the 
military on a visit to the traditional leaders of Tobelo to state their desire to return 
to Tobelo.  This news of the presence of the Muslim Tobelans was surprising for 
the Christian community.  Some Christians found the meetings between the 
Muslims and the leaders of the Christian community controversial.  After the 
meeting on October 9, 2000, meetings were held among Christians in Tobelo to 
generate a common perception that the Muslim Tobelans needed to return to their 
homes.  Although the community still had strong feelings of hatred and injury, the 
leaders developed a plan for a meeting between the Muslim and Christian leaders 
of North Moluccas.  With the protection of the military, these leaders met on 
October 11, 2000 in a historic place tona ma langi on the border of Tobelo and 
Galela in the area of the village of Mamuya.   
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They chose Mamuya as the place for reconciliation because of their collective 
memories of making peace between Galela and Tobelo at Mamuya.  Those 
Christians who were involved in the violence said that their attacks on Galela 
could not succeed because they were prevented from winning by their ancestral 
oath of tona ma langi.  According to the Muslims who tried to attack Tobelo after 
they defeated the Christian majority village of Mamuya, they had great difficulties 
fighting after crossing the border.338  For example, a Muslim Galelan whom I 
interviewed said that often they got sick when they had to cross border of tona ma 
langi.  The Christians in Tobelo shared the same experience.  Both Christians and 
Muslims shared the same convictions about the power of their ancestors’ oath at 
this ancient site.  
        
They began the meeting with the traditional ritual of makan sirih dan pinang (the 
chewing of betel and areca nuts).  This ritual is to calm the situation before 
meaningful conversation takes place in the gathering. 339  The people traditionally 
exchange betel and areca nuts as a sign of respect and brother/sisterhood.  In ritual 
marriage negotiations the groom’s family gives betel nut to the bride’s family (see 
Chapter III).  However in the ritual of tona ma langi, the Christian and Muslim 
community leaders served each other with betel and areca nuts.  Each side 
recognized their mutual equality as their ancestral heritage of tona ma langi.  
Before they chewed the betel and areca nuts, they together proclaimed the words 
tona ma langi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
338 The interview was conducted on February 11, 2002. 
339 Eating sirih pinang  actually combines three elements, betel nut, acreca nut and lime (kapur).  
Throughout Eastern Indonesia it is eaten together as a sign of mutual acceptance.  Participants all 
eat from one plate to show that they trust one another and that there is equality among all the 
people who eat together.  It has a mild narcotic effect that is enhanced by being combined with 
smoking and drinking coffee.  Habitual users are easily identified by their red teeth. 
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Map 10: The spread of Christians and Muslims before and after the violence of 
1999 
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According to the tradition, their ancestors shouted tona ma langi while driving 
their spears into the ground during the swearing of the oath of tona ma langi in the 
16th Century. Historical accounts report that the Sultan of Ternate, Baab’ Ulah, 
gave the land of Galela to the Captain (Kapita) of Tobelo and his people because 
they helped him drive out the Portuguese and their allies from the local kingdom 
in the Mamuya area.  However at the meeting of tona ma langi in October 2000, 
betel and areca nuts replaced the spears.  The spear was a sacred symbol of 
strength to protect the ancestral oath.  In contrast, eating betel nut is a sacred 
symbol of brotherhood that is embedded in the everyday practices of both 
Muslims and Christians in North Halmahera.  The people use sacred symbols to 
express their connection with the ancestors who are still present in their midst.  At 
this very important moment, as they performed their ancient ancestral ritual, the 
people believed that the good spirits of their ancestors, o dilike were present.  The 
presence of the ancestral spirits reconfirmed the sacred, material rights of the two 
ethnic communities of Galela and Tobelo.  
 
Platenkamp says that symbolic exchange in the ritual system of the Galela and 
Tobelo people represents the meaning of the concrete situation (Platenkamp: 
1988, 199).  Communities may replace or change a symbol in the historical 
tradition without loosing its meaning in the present situation.  In the past, swords 
or spears were symbols of the time (Hoskins: 1996).  The people change their 
symbols as a result of a dialectic between changing material conditions and the 
reformulation of their ideology.  Betel nut symbolizes equality, respect, 
brotherhood and negotiated exchange without the presence of weapons.  The 
renewed practice of tona ma langi shows a shift from an oath of ethnicity to an 
oath of ethnicity and religion.  Galela became the region of ethnic Galelans who 
are Muslim and Tobelo became the region of ethnic Tobelans who are Christian.  
 
On December 24, 2000, in the presence of the Vice President of Indonesia, 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, the people held the second Mamuya Meeting. They chose 
this date because in the year 2000, Christians and Muslims celebrated their most 
important religious holidays at almost the same time. According to astronomical 
calculations, this occurs only every 35 years. December 25-26, 2000 was 
Christmas and December 27-28 was the Islamic celebration at the end of fasting:  
Idul Fitri 1412 H.  December 24, 2000 as the date for the second Mamuya 
meeting, had both cultural and religious significance for Muslims and Christians 
in North Moluccas.  The cultural meaning is seen in the declaration of the tona ma 
langi ancestral oath.  However the cultural oath was infused with religious 
meaning by it’s timing just before Christmas and Idul Fitri.  Christmas symbolizes 
the coming of the peace child while Idul Fitri celebrates victory over sin and 
forgiveness of your neighbours.  The Galelans and Tobelans reinterpreted their 
territorial history to become a history of reconciliation.  This shows the influence 
of a universal ideology of peace that is embedded in both Islam and Christianity.  
Both groups emphasized that God forgives sin and this inspired them both to 
forgive each other.  
 
A special ritual was prepared for the meeting.  Two adat leaders represented the 
Muslim and Christian communities; the Muslim was from Galela and the 
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Christian from Tobelo.  They served each other betel and areca nuts, chewing 
together as a sign of the opening of the meeting.  Following this action, they 
spoke, each in their own language, on the topic of the relationship between the 
people of Galela and Tobelo.  They delivered their speeches as though they were 
conversing.  One began talking while the other agreed by nodding his head. They 
said that their ancestors were all from Lake Lina, which is located at the border of 
the hinterlands of Tobelo and Kao.  They said that during that time, their ancestors 
did not embrace ‘religion’ such as they had now.  However, they lived in peace.  
They questioned why after embracing universal religions, their relationships as 
family had broken and now contained violence.  They asked all the people to be in 
peace and to reconcile, as this is the core spirit of their religious teachings. Then 
they hugged each other while reciting the ancient oath tona ma langi.  They 
closed their presentation by conducting a ritual of prayer according to the Muslim 
and Christian traditions. 
 
In the meeting that followed, participation was opened up so that the people could 
use the moment of religious celebration to forgive each other.  Besides the 
meeting of Muslim and Christian leaders, the gathering also reunited kin and 
affinity networks whose members were separated into Christian or Muslim 
clusters.  The kin and affinity groups that included family members from both 
Muslim and Christian sides used this important moment wisely.  One eyewitness 
said,  
 
People seemed to forget their pain from the violence 
because of their longing to touch and to talk with their 
family.  Hugging, and pulling each other out from the 
group was the scene of the moment.  Each family met 
separately, under the banana trees, to talk and to observe.  
The people uttered only serious words and careful 
observations from each person, as if to show their 
determination to go beyond the disaster with resignation 
and repentance.340  
 
The meeting left a deep impression on both Muslim and Christian families in 
North Moluccas.  It eased the fears on both sides and the feeling and decreased the 
sense of each side just being victims of terror from their enemies.  Allah (God), 
their ancestors, the government and they themselves all guaranteed the safety and 
legitimacy of the meeting for reconciliation.  It took time and careful preparation 
for the meeting to take place.  Why?  Many people, who had lost family members 
because of the war, were still very fragile and traumatized.  They could not easily 
accept a meeting for reconciliation because of their deep grief, anger and hatred.  
It would have been easy for them to block the process of reconciliation.  
Therefore the process had to be carried out carefully without confronting the 
wounded hearts those who had been traumatized by their experience of violence.   
 
 
                                                 
340 From an interview with Permenas Budiman in February 2002, in Tobelo. 
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7.3.  Structuring Reconciliation 
 
Building trust through the everyday practices of people is one purpose of the 
reconciliation. The people negotiated reconciliation by allowing each side to share 
their perceptions so that peace could be initiated in several stages.  A collective 
ritual, such as the meeting in Mamuya, had to be followed up with everyday 
practices that demonstrate the meaning of the negotiations for peace.  This sub-
section is a discussion of how the conditions for reconciliation were prepared 
structurally with the involvement of the central government.  It clo ses with a story 
from my return to Ngidiho in 2002. 
 
7.3.1.  Constructing Commitments 
 
Regional, national and even international groups supported initiatives to create a 
lasting peace.  The central government in Jakarta played a very important role in 
facilitating reconciliation in the North Moluccas.  Through the initiative of the 
British Council, the centre government facilitated a meeting on April 1-3, 2000, 
between Christian and Muslim leaders from North Moluccas in Manado, North 
Sulawesi.  It was a meeting reaffirm their brotherhood.  This meeting was 
arranged by members of the provincial parliament (DPRD) who were Christian 
refugees in Manado.341  One of the members of the provincial parliament is also 
the Vice Head of the Synod of the GMIH.  The Kapita (Captain or Adat War 
Leader) of Tobelo also attended the meeting.342  Among the Muslim leaders who 
attended were the Vice Head of the provincial parliament in North Moluccas and 
several officials from the local government of North Moluccas (Pemda Maluku 
Utara). 
 
Following the Manado meeting there was a meeting in Jakarta in September 2002, 
sponsored by the Interior Ministry of Indonesia.  In the Jakarta meeting Christian 
and Muslim leaders discussed with government officials who should take the 
initiative to solve the conflict.  They all agreed that reconciliation had to be 
initiated by the community itself.  The government should support the process by 
improving those conditions that were sources of the conflict, related to regional 
autonomy and territorial development. The participants included Christian leaders 
from GMIH and governmental officials, including both Christians and Muslims. 
  
Christians from Tobelo initiated a follow-up meeting on October 7, 2000, called 
the meeting of Gosoma, since it was held in the village of Gosoma.  A leader from 
the Team for the Defence of Halmahera Society (Tim Ketahanan Masyarakat 
Halmahera=TKMH) organized the meeting to address the complaints of a 
prominent Muslim family.  Some people who had kin-ties with the family of 
Lobiua and claimed to be part of the kin-network of the Sultan Paku Alam of  
Solo.  These people did not agree with the efforts for reconciliation so they left the 
                                                 
341 The four Christian officials of the Provincial Parliament (DPRD) were living as refugees in 
North Sulawesi. This interview was in August, 2000, in Manado, with Rev. Pai. 
342 The Captain  (Kapita) of Tobelo was commissioned at the beginning of the conflict to lead the 
Christian troops. The Kapita was Benni Doro, but his commission as Kapita was not according to 
the legal authority of the Sultan of Ternate.   
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room during the Gosoma meeting.   However, the majority of the community did 
not believe the ir claims and this spread to the wider community.  Many people 
believed that the rise of the Lobiua family was related to a new political faction 
that intended to divide the unity of the society in Tobelo. The leader of the Lobiua 
family organization had earlier been the head of the Attorney General’s office in 
Ternate.  This family protested after GMIH received responsibility for managing 
aid supplies for Christian refugees in Tobelo.343  It was reported that the Lobiua 
family managed aid packages from the government of North Moluccas that were 
intended for distribution to the Christian refugees in Tobelo.  Apparently the 
Lobiua family wanted to centralize management of aid distribution under their 
control.  However, the TKMH opposed their plans.  Several leaders of the TKMH 
were influential because they had worked at various state institutions in 
Ternate.344  One of them had even been in the Regency level parliament (DPRD) 
from the Golkar party.  
 
The fruit of the meeting was to build a dialog with Muslim families and 
neighbours.  On October 3, 2000 there was a meeting of Tobelo Muslims in 
Ternate.  They agreed to communicate to the Christians in Tobelo the desire of 
Muslim refugees in Ternate to return to their homes.   Muslim representatives 
brought this news to Tobelo, on October 9, 2000. This communication became 
important because the tona ma langi meeting (the first Mamuya meeting) would 
be on October 11, 2000.  Mamuya II followed on December 24, 2000. 
 
Christian leaders from Tobelo and Galela and Muslim leaders from Tobelo and 
Galela discussed a set of principles for reconciliation at the Mamuya II meeting.  
They agreed to the following principles.  First, reconciliation will be built through 
social interaction and dialogue.  Second, exchange visits between Muslim and 
Christian communities through kin and affinity networks or neighbours will need 
to be repeated many times in order to diffuse tensions.  Third, leaders at the 
village level must support this process of visiting.  Fourth, the government must 
provide legal protection of land properties and plantations.  Fifth, calling Muslims 
Acang or  Christians Obed was prohibited.  Sixth, reconciliation had to be agreed 
to and the process followed at the village level, especially in families.   
 
These principles of reconciliation had to be agreed to by both Christians and 
Muslims and were created with an emphasis on indicators that could be directly 
measured by society.  They avoided a dogmatic approach or an emphasis on 
religious principles from either party.  Each side was called to respect the ritual 
practices of the other religion with the conviction that both Muslims and 
Christians are free human beings in the state of Indonesia.  
 
Following these principles of reconciliation, the Christian community in 
Halmahera began slowly to approach their families and communities to unite 
                                                 
343 GMIH created a Crisis Centre to take over the role that had been carried out by the Evangelical 
Church in North Sulawesi (GMIM) to help North Moluccan refugees in North Sulawesi 
(especially Manado and Bitung).  
344 The interview was carried out with one of the leaders of the Team for the Defence of 
Halmahera Society  in Tobelo. The interview took place in February 2002 in Tobelo. 
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them in an agreement to receive the Muslim families and neighbours who wanted 
to return to Tobelo.  On January 27, 2001, there was a general meeting of 
Christians, Halmahera Bakudapa I (Halmahera Reunion I).  The motto of the 
meeting was Torang samua Basaudara (we are all brothers and sisters).  The 
result was a declaration that the Christian community was ready to enter the 
reconciliation process.  On April 19, 2001, in the village of Togawa in Galela 
there was a meeting at the village level of those from the districts of Galela and 
Tobelo.  The agenda concerned a declaration of peace between the Christian and 
Muslim communities in the village.  The Muslim and Christian participants 
formulated an agreement for reconciliation based on the general principles 
declared by Mamuya II.    
 
Permenas Budiman described to me the detail of the reconciliation process. 345  
Before the formulation of a treaty, each side, Christian and Muslim shared their 
expectations of the other side in order to live together in the village.  Generally, 
they expected that the family relationships had to be strengthened with respect 
shown to the ritual practices of each side. The Muslim leaders requested the 
Christian leaders to explain the GMIH church activities at the level of village, 
district and the synod.  The Muslim leaders described the role of Badan Sara as 
the local Islamic court, which guides everyday practices in the Muslim 
community. They also explained how Mus lim rituals are conducted in Ngidiho.346    
 
The discussion identified several differences in the ritual practices of Muslims and 
Christians in Ngidiho.  A basic difference was the structure of religious 
leaderships in church and mosque.  The GMIH Synod decides the assignment of a 
minister to the church in Ngidiho whereas the villagers make the appointment of a 
member to the Badan Sara.  The former Village Head is now one of the members 
of the Badan Sara.  Both sides agreed that in the future, the minister of the GMIH 
church in Ngidiho should be an indigenous Galelan so that he or she could 
understand the traditions of the local people.  
 
They also agreed that only the minister of the church or a member of the Badan 
Sara in Ngidiho is permitted to deliver religious sermons.  The background to this 
agreement was the policy of district level church leaders to arrange for the 
exchange of ministers within the area.  Ngidiho Muslims do not exchange  
religious leaders with other areas because they claim to follow unique religious 
practices, which are different from other Muslims in Galela.  The Muslim 
                                                 
345 This information was re -confirmed with Oom Din and several Christian leaders from Ngidiho.  
346 Lee explains that mosques in the villages in the Moluccas function to serve political activities 
as well as religious ones  (Lee: 1999).  However, the function of the mosque in Ngidiho was for 
religious activities only. The role of the Badan Sara  is to administer Islamic law in the Muslim 
community.  The village administration is the responsibility of the village head. Sometime the 
Village Head delivered speeches about the behaviour of young people who had become a problem 
to the community at large.  During my stay in Ngidiho, the police officers in the district of  Galela 
several times had to settle conflicts between young people from Ngidiho and labourers from the 
Banana Company. The Village Head used his house for his office and for general meetings of 
governmental institutions such as the Village Assembly (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa=LMD), and 
the Institution for the Defence of Village Society  (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat 
Desa=LKMD).  
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community in Ngidiho claims that they are Salafiyyah (jemaah Salafiyyah), which 
means that their ritual follows the tradition brought by the early imams (Muslim 
missionaries) when they spread Islam to the people in the 1950s.  
 
They also discussed the lack of closeness in relationships between Muslims and 
Christians in Ngidiho.  According to the Muslims, the problem lay with the 
domestication of pigs and dogs in the village.  Ecological changes in Ngidiho and 
its neighbouring village resulted in a lack of wild pigs that could be hunted by the 
Christians.  Therefore, Christians raise pigs in their back yards.  However, their 
pigs and dogs often wandered freely.  The Muslims frankly shared their 
expectation that, while Christians may still hunt for wild pigs, they would no 
longer be permitted to allow pigs or dogs to wander freely in the village.  The 
Christians agreed. 
 
Both sides also agreed that the Muslim practice of delivering sermons openly by 
using a loudspeaker would also be followed during the Sunday services in the 
church.  If both Christians and Muslims could listen directly each other’s sermons 
delivered in the mosque and church, this would reduce suspicions that religious 
rituals were used to sharpen the conflict that led to violence.  When I first stayed 
in Ngidiho, Oom Din argued that the assumption that a place of worship is only 
for the followers of that particular religion had to change and be reinterpreted.  
Religious messages are assumed to be sacred and are accepted by the faithful.  
But religious messages influenced the disintegration of society.  As a result, he 
felt that religious messages had to be controlled.  Of course this raised the 
question of whether the “border” between the different religious groups might 
become permeable.  If they controlled religious messages by listening to each 
other’s sermons, some members might be lured to change religions.  Be that as it 
may, perhaps this moment offered a good chance to build dialogue about the 
different practices, rituals and beliefs of Muslims and Christians living together in 
Ngidiho. 
 
Both sides agreed that guests from outside Ngidiho were not allowed to stay in the 
village. Only those who had family ties with a villager would be allowed to stay in 
Ngidiho.  Moreover, Christians would be required to formally notify the Heads of 
the District in Tobelo and Galela if they wanted to bring Christian guests back to 
the village.  At the time of my visit, the Ngidiho Christians had not yet returned to 
their home, so family or neighbours who were Muslim cared for their land and 
plantations.  The Muslims would return their property when the Christians 
actually returned to Ngidiho.  This agreement encouraged Christians to approach 
those who had been taking care of their property.  
 
The follow-up of the meeting on April 19, 2001 can be seen directly in the process 
refugees returning to both Tobelo and Galela.  This resettlement became a model 
for the return of refugees in other conflict areas in North Moluccas.  On April 23, 
2001, Tobelo Christians received Muslim refugees who were from the villages of 
Gorua, Tolonua, Mede, Luari and others.  The acceptance of the Muslims in 
Tobelo followed an agreement not to receive back those who had provoked the 
riots between Christians and Muslim in December 1999 in Tobelo.  There are 
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several Muslims from Tobelo who are still not permitted to stay in Tobelo 
because they are suspected of having enflamed the conflict prior to the violence.  
However the interpretation of this agreement depends on the development of the 
political situation at the district and village levels. 
 
The Muslim refugees from Tobelo returned after the Heads of their villages came 
to pick them up in Ternate.  The Tobelo Christians welcomed the Muslims with a 
special ceremony at the harbour conducted by the Head of District (Camat).  
Christians from each village waited for their neighbours and families.  They sang 
traditional songs and held a communal meal in the meeting hall of the district 
office.  This welcoming ritual was also used to welcome back refugees in other 
districts such as Jailolo, Morotai Utara, Gane, Sahu, and Loloda where the process 
of resettlement of refugees was still ongoing when I visited in February, 2002. 
 
The local government supported the communities in helping their returning 
neighbours and families to rebuild their houses. The people constructed new 
houses together.  While waiting for aid from the government, they built temporary 
houses from bamboo because bamboo was easily available in the forest. The local 
government worked closely with international aid agencies to provide basic needs 
for the refugees.  USAID distributed material aid such as cement, zinc roofing, 
nails etc., for the refugees to rebuild their houses. 
 
The return of Muslims to Tobelo opened the way for the Christians of Galela to 
also return home.  In February 2002, the villages which accepted the return of 
Christian refugees included Mamuya, Pune, Seki, Togawa, Samuda, and Bale.  
Christians from Ngidiho, Duma, Soatobaru, Makete and other villages were still 
preparing for their return.  At this time the public market and the stores in Galele 
were only open for limited hours and only sold nine types of necessities. Soon 
after the reconciliation began, Ngidiho Muslims came to Tobelo to sell their 
harvest and to buy their basic needs.  People started to sell copra directly to 
Tobelo despite the fact that there were several collectors in Galela.  People from 
Galela also came to Tobelo to search for the things they could not find in Galela.   
 
7.3.2.  Kin-Ties as the Entrance 
 
In February 2002 I revisited the region after having lost contact with most of my 
Muslim and Christian friends because of the violence.  I stayed for a few days 
with a Makian, Muslim family in Ternate before crossing to the island of 
Halmahera.  This made a deep impression on me because the process of 
reconciliation had proceeded much more quickly in North Moluccas than in 
Ambon, Poso or other places of violent conflict in Indonesia.  With the help of a 
mediator, the pattern of relationships between Christians and Muslims in North 
Moluccas had become much more direct and open.  Relationships between 
individuals within kinship and affinity groups were the princip le means of 
reconciliation.  Traditional practices of negotiation and exchange, as well as 
assistance from the local government fostered the remarkable progress of 
reconciliation in the area. 
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Setting aside the misgivings of my advisors and friends, I left Amsterdam with a 
deep longing to visit my household in Ngidiho.  When I had arrived in Ternate, I 
did not know if it would be possible to visit my household in Ngidiho.  On 
February 5, 2002, I left for the island of Halmahera on a speedboat from Ternate 
to Sidangoli.  The regular ferry was out of operation. At the bus station in 
Sidangoli, I decided to buy a ticket that would take me all the way to Galela even 
though I planned to get off in Tobelo, before the bus entered Galela.  We left 
Sidangoli at 9.30 am and began to enter the district of Tobelo at 13.30 pm. 
 
I decided to take the bus that was bound for Galela so that I could learn about the 
situation in Galela by talking with the other passengers.  They were all from 
Galela and Tobelo.  In the bus, I reached the conclusion that I should first visit the 
second cousin and family of Oom Din’s wife who were Christian refugees from 
Galela, now staying in Tobelo.  Oom Din and his family had been refugees in 
Ternate, however in  September 2000 they retuned to Ngidiho.347  I shared my 
plan with a young Muslim man, Faisal Sekolah, who sat beside me in the bus.  
“Before I go to Ngidiho to meet Oom Din and his family, I am going to visit 
Permenas Budiman who is now in Tobelo”.  The name of Permenas Budiman was 
familiar to him. “I can show where he works.  He works at the second of the 
stores selling motorbikes”, the man explained.  
 
When the bus entered Tobelo, Faisal watched carefully for the store where 
Permenas worked. However the store was closed. The bus was travelling quickly, 
but suddenly he shouted loudly the name of Permenas. The bus stopped. Then the 
driver turned the bus around to go back in the  direction where Faisal had seen 
Permenas. He was sitting at the front of a store about 30 meter away from the 
store identified by Faisal. 
 
Permenas approached the bus because our hands waved at him.  “Ibu”, he 
exclaimed in surprise when he realized I was in the bus.  “I want to go to Ngidiho 
but I would like to stop at your house,” I explained to him.  “Ibu, please get out”.  
When this 45-year-old man invited me to exit the bus, I said goodbye to all the 
passengers.  From the bus I heard a voice explaining:  “Permenas is the youngest 
brother and is Christian but Suab, the elder brother is Muslim and lives in 
Ngidiho, Galela.”  It was the voice of Pak Hajj Syarif who was in the bus that I 
had taken from Sidangoli to Tobelo.348 
 
My arrival in Tobelo was a surprise to Permenas Budiman’s family.  Chapter VI 
described the wedding party of Permenas’s son that was disturbed by the spread 
of a rumour that riots had broken out in Tobelo in November 1999.  Before the 
1999-2000 violence, Permenas was a successful businessman.  However, after the 
violence, he and his family were refugees.  He and his family fled from Galela 
                                                 
347 The violence between Muslims and Christians stopped after the village of Duma was destroyed.  
Duma was widely regarded as the original centre of Christianity in Halmahera.  It collapsed after 
repeated assaults, in May, 2000. 
348 In Chapter VI, I mentioned the two leaders of Galela who rode around the village on a 
motorbike, to calm the panic, when rumours were flying about the outbreak of violence in Tobelo.  
These two older men were Oom Nani who is Christian and Oom Syarif who is Muslim. 
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after December 27, 1999 but later returned.  They stayed in a bamboo walled 
house that was abandoned by a family who had returned to Sanger in North 
Sulawesi.  The assumption of the young man on the bus, that Permenas worked at 
the second automobile store was incorrect.  Actually his 19-year-old son, Mimi, 
worked at the store.  Permenas’s self- image as a successful businessman, formed 
before the violence, made it  difficult for him to work as a labourer in the harbour 
or as a driver of an ojek (motorcycle taxi) as many of the Christian refugee men in 
Tobelo were doing.  Permenas decided just to help his son selling and buying 
motorbikes. 
 
On the afternoon of my arrival, Permenas sent a message to Oom Din in Ngidiho 
that he would like him to come to Tobelo the next day.  “We are thankful that Ibu 
came here first to visit us”, Permenas said to me.  I remembered again the time 
when I had been welcomed by the Village Head in Ngidiho and invited to stay 
with Oom Din and his family before the violence.  Now the situation was more 
complex.  Permenas and his wife explained to me: 
 
Now Christians and Muslims are visiting one another.  We 
go to Ngidiho and they visit us in Tobelo.  Oom Din has 
stopped at our house a few times.  If we go to Ngidiho, 
sister Iana (the wife of Oom Din) calls us to have a cup of 
tea at her house.  Although we all are poor now, as a 
family it is more important to show our presence, 
according to the Galela expression, teke si doohawa.  
Sometime, my brother Suab, who became a hajji in 
February 2002, brings us fish.  If we can, when we go to 
Ngidiho we take rice from Tobelo.   
 
I was reminded of how the practice of exchanging of food (hike de dota) had 
always been a way to tighten relationships between Muslims and Christians, 
especially those who are from the same family.  Permenas explained that I could 
not just go directly to Ngidiho, “Because Ibu is not a resident of Ngidiho, you 
must first wait to meet Oom Din here, before arranging a visit to Ngidiho.  
Permenas then explained to me about the reconciliation agreement between the 
Muslim and Christian communities.  One of the agreements was to restrict anyone 
who is not indigenous to the village from staying there.  “I understand.  If it is 
God’s will, I will be able to meet Oom Din tomorrow”, I replied to them. 
 
My meeting with Oom Din was very touching.  He said, “God permitted us to be 
tempted so that the violence occurred.  Disaster happened to us because we were 
all possessed by an evil spirit.”  He watched me very closely.  “Alhamdulillah, we 
all became aware that there was nothing to be gained by violence.  Now we are 
ready to accept back the Ngidiho Christians in our village.  When they have 
returned, with the permission of God, Ibu can stay with us in Ngidiho.  But for 
now, it is better to stay with Permenas and his family.  They are also my family.”  
Oom Din reassured me. 
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Oom Din then told me the story of his neighbour, Pak Hajj Tari who lost his son 
during the violence.  Hajj Tari was still not yet able to meet Christians, due to his 
grief over the loss of his son.  Oom Din was afraid that my presence in Ngidiho 
might open up traumatic feelings in the family.  Then Oom Din reminded me of 
the accusations made about him and the Head of the village.  He was a refugee in 
Ternate at the time when the Laskar Jihad Ternate (the Islamic Troops from 
Ternate) had condemned him and the Head of Village for having me at his house 
in Ngidiho where I was doing my fieldwork.  Fortunately, all the documents of 
my research could be found in the city hall of the government office (Kantor 
Daerah) in Ternate. The documents described the permission I received from the 
central government in Jakarta, from the Province, the District and the village to do 
my research.  My research at that time was on the impact of agricultural 
globalisation on social change, since I did not yet know I was studying ritual and 
violence.  Fortunately they were able to find my academic research permits and 
the prosecutors freed Oom Din and the Village Head of Ngidiho.  I heard the same 
story from Pak Amran, my close Muslim colleague in Ternate. 
 
In Chapter I, I described the meeting between Oom Din and Pak Amran when we 
were in Ternate before my departure to Jawa at the end of November 1999.  Oom 
Din had accompanied me from Ngidiho to Ternate along with all the Village 
Heads from the District of Galela, right after all Christians were expelled from 
Ternate.  After Oom Din and his family fled to Ternate in January 2000, I 
telephoned Pak Amran to ask him to search for Oom Din.  Pak Amran found Oom 
Din in the refugee camps where he was on trial, trying to defend himself against 
accusations that he was a provocateur because he had housed a Christian spy 
before the outbreak of war.  Pak Amran provided confirmation that I was in North 
Moluccas to do research for my Ph.D. studies at the University in Amsterdam.  
Together they found the government documentation that released Oom Din and 
the Village Head from charges. 
 
In reunion meeting with Oom Din, I again apologized for what had happened to 
him.  I also made it clear that I understood why he could not invite me 
immediately to stay in his house.  I respected him very much.  He left for home 
taking my love and longing to see the whole family and promised to bring his 
wife to meet me in Tobelo. 
 
On Sunday, February 10, 2002, I again met Oom Din at the house of Permenas.  
He came with Mama Iana and their three grandchildren, Imam, Dila and Umar.  
For mother Iana, this was her first trip to Tobelo, even though Oom Din had 
already gone back and forth several times between Galela and Tobelo.  The 
meeting was a touching reunion for me.  I could see regret in their faces that 
afternoon.  “Disaster happened to us”, Oom Din said.  That same afternoon, Oom 
Din and mama Iana agreed that we could accompany them to visit their home in 
Ngidiho.  I am thankful for their trust, which allowed me to be with them on their 
return to Ngidiho.  I rented a van and with the family of Permenas Budiman, Oom 
David Tunepe, one of the adat leaders of Ngidiho, and his wife, we all went to 
Ngidiho along with Oom Din and his family. 
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Arriving in Ngidiho, I was welcomed with tears by the family of Oom Din.  After 
hearing that I was at Oom Din’s house, the Head of the Village, his wife and 
several leaders of Ngidiho visited me.  Several married women with whom I had 
talked about their everyday life came to see me.  I used the moment to ask for 
their forgiveness for what had happened to the Head of the Village and Oom Din 
during the time when they had been prosecuted as provocateurs by the Laskar 
Jihad Ternate.  We were all touched by the moment.  Many times I heard them 
say, “It was a disaster.”  The Head of the village reminded me of the donation I 
had made for them before their trip to Mecca in February 2000.  “We were six 
people who were going to Mecca but we had nothing.  Alhamdulillah, the cash Ibu 
sent could help us.”  While smiling, his wife only nodded her head.  They are now 
Hajj and Hajjah. 
 
We were all gripped, bowed and broken hearted.  As though in a trance, I felt like 
I was transported back to the time when I lived in Ngidiho a few years ago, before 
the violence occurred.  However, the voice of grandmother Yap, the stepmother of 
Oom Din returned me to their presence. “We all had to begin our lives from zero!” 
she said while hugging me closely.  They were thankful that I had already left for 
Java just before the war broke out, even though they knew that I had not planned 
to leave Ngidiho so early.  
 
We all laughed when mother Iana made a joke about their suffering in Ternate. 
She said that they suffered as refugees because they could not just pick their own 
food from their own garden as they did in Ngidiho.  Repeatedly shaking her head, 
she said a stem of bananas cost Rp. 10,000 there, whereas before the violence, she 
sold bananas at the public market in Soa Sio, Galela for only Rp. 3,000 or ate 
them free from her garden.  Sometimes, they compared their past suffering with 
their present condition or with the period before the violence occurred.  Many 
times the women repeated the word “repent” (bertobat).   When I asked what they 
meant by saying the word “repent,” they explained that they wished they had 
repented so that God would have saved them from the trance of Satan into which 
human beings fall.  The evil of the riots created nothing but suffering for society. 
 
Before maghrib (sunset prayer), we departed for Tobelo.  Our van was full with 
four stems of  bananas given by Oom Din for his relatives who visited him in 
Ngidiho.  While I stayed in Tobelo, several time I received visits from the 
members of the Budiman family and others who heard that I was at Permenas’s 
house.  I am thankful that I was accepted as a member of their family.  I also 
received visits from the Ngidiho Christians who were still refugees in Tobelo. 
 
7.4.  A Politics of Honesty for Empowering Society. 
 
Violence sacrifices ordinary people, the grass roots of the society.  However, it 
seems that such people easily forget the violence that happened to them.  The 
word “disaster” contains a particular construction of the meaning of an event.  In 
the context of the violence in Halmahera, “disaster” includes regret and grief.  The 
violence was a disaster for everyone.  This recognition can strengthen the 
rebuilding of broken lives that were damaged by violence.  Violence is organized 
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actions or intentional behaviour that harms the body and the soul.  Awareness of 
the disastrous character of violence creates a strong motivation in society to renew 
the structures of human society that collapsed during the war.  A peace agreement 
has to be made with due consideration for the aspirations of the various groups in 
a fair process of negotiation.  The communities that seek peace need to be 
supported by powerful structures of society such as government bureaucracies, the 
military and religious institutions.  These structures and support or undermine a 
politics of honesty that must undergird the reconciliation process.  In this sub 
section, I will describe the challenge of addressing the material and political roots 
of the conflict that are related to regional policies and economic development. 
 
7.4.1.  Territorial Naming by the Government   
 
In keeping with the development plans of the Government of Indonesia, North 
Moluccas became a separate province and the Districts became Regencies in the 
new province.  Before the violence, the government of North Moluccas planned to 
raise the status of the regions in northern Halmahera, southern Halmahera and the 
archipelago of Sula.  In this plan, the regency areas of Northern Halmahera that 
were scheduled for development included Morotai, Galela, Tobelo, Kao, Jailolo, 
Sahu and Northern Loloda.  Regions that were included in the Southern 
Halmahera regency were Weda, Gane, pulau Obi and the archipelago of Bacan.  
The development of the district of the Sula archipelago to a regency contains the 
islands of Taliabu, Sanana and Mangoli.349 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
349 This information comes from my interview with the former head of Badan Perencanana 
Daerah (Bapeda) Tingkat I Propinsi Maluku Utara.  Bapeda is the Regional Planning Institution at 
the Provincial level.  However during my visit in March 2004, I discovered that the plan I 
discussed above had already stabilized into a regulation, UU No I tahun 2003 that announced the 
extention of regencies in North Moluccas. The new regencies include Northern Halmahera with 
Tobelo as the capital and Southern Halmahera with Batjan as the capital.  Sanana is the capital of 
the Regency of the Sula archipelago, while Western Halmahera was transfered from the old 
Regency of North Moluccas and became its own regency with Jailolo as the capital.  The Regency 
of Center Halmahera expanded to become three regencies:  the Regency of Eastern Halmahera 
with the capital in Buli, the Regency of Center Halmahera with the capital in Weda and City of 
Tidore archipelago. 
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Map 11: Government Plans for Regency Territories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, after the 1999-2000 violence, the government of North Moluccas made 
a new plan for regional development. This plan designated regencies for Northern 
Halmahera, Western Halmahera and the Autonomous Region of Morotai (daerah 
otorita Morotai).  The regency of Northern Halmahera includes both Galela and 
Tobelo. The Autonomous Region of Morotai is considered to be independent and 
not part of any regency. The regency of Western Halmahera includes Jailolo, 
Sahu, Ibu and Southern Loloda.  However, the government of the North Moluccas 
gave a special opportunity for the Makian communities in Malifut and Kao to 
choose which regency they wished to join. 
 
The communities in North Moluccas questioned the plan for the regional 
development of northern Halmahera, which would divide western Halmahera 
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from northern Halmahera. Although the idea of the regional development of 
western Halmahera had already been discussed in 1964 by the Regency Planning 
Institution (Bapeda Tingkat II), the people questioned why changes had only 
occurred in the regional plan for northern Halmahera.  No changes were made to 
the plan for the regional development of the regency of Southern Halmahera or 
the archipelago of Sula. 
 
According to the geographer H. Manetemo,350 Western Halmahera was divided 
more on political grounds than as an application of the principle of regional 
distribution or justice as the core of regional development.  The idea of 
designating western Halmahera as a regency of  the Province of North Moluccas 
is confusing.  The use of ‘western Halmahera’ makes no sense  because it does not 
agree with regional divisions as they have been formulated.  The term ‘western 
Halmahera’ designates a administrative region on the west side of the island of 
Halmahera. However, on the west side of the island, there are already two 
developed areas, namely the municipalities of Ternate and Tidore.  Ternate is the 
capital of the existing Regency of North Moluccas that includes the whole area of 
northern Halmahera down to the middle and includes both the western and eastern 
sides of the island.  Soa Sio on the island of Tidore is the capital of the Regency 
of the Centre Halmahera, which includes the whole area starting from the middle 
down to the southern part also including the western and eastern sides of 
Halmahera Island.  
 
The regional developmental plan after the violence included a double function for 
Jailolo, which would be the capital of the Regency of North Moluccas and the 
Regency of Western Halmahera.  The Regency of the North Moluccas is the old 
structure that still remains in place after its status had been raised to that of the 
Province of North Moluccas.  The Regency of North Moluccas was created when 
North Moluccas was part of the provincial government of the Moluccas cantered 
in Ambon.  According to Manetemo, efforts to keep the Regency of North 
Moluccas will mean inefficiencies. The old structure should be re-evaluated and 
the bureaucrats distributed to other regions in the province. 
 
The proposal by the government of North Moluccas to create the Regency of 
Western Halmahera used a term already seen in the 1964 plan.  This term has 
some cultural meaning for the territory. 351  However, it seems to be in opposition 
to another plan of the government of North Moluccas to create stability in the 
District of Malifut within the District of Kao. It also seems to contradict the map 
of social mobility of all the ethnic groups in the north Moluccas. For example the 
Makian people live everywhere in southern and northern Halmahera. Relations 
between communities that speak the same language can become a motivation for 
people to move to an area where the people share the same ethnic origins. The 
distribution of languages includes the Makian languages in the island of Makian, 
Bacan and Kayoa, which is located on the western coast of Halmahera.  The 
linguistic clusters of Sahu are spread in the districts of Jailolo and Sahu on the 
western coast of Northern Halmahera. The linguistic clusters of Galela/Loloda are 
                                                 
350 The interview was conducted on February 7, 2002. 
351 See (Djahir: 1964, 20). 
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found in Galela, Loloda and Southern Morotai.  The linguistic cluster of 
Tobelo/Tobaru/Modele are in Kao, Tobelo, and Northern Morotai (Voorhoeve: 
1988, 181-209; Platenkamp: 1988, 6). 
 
On February 8, 2002 in the district of Kao there was a meeting between the 
government of North Moluccas and the leaders from Kao and Makian-Malifut.  
The government called this meeting to discuss the plan for the regional 
development of Western Halmahera and Northern Halmahera.  The planned 
border between Western Halmahera and Northern Halmahera would be at Kao.  
Therefore the government wanted the Kao people to choose which regency they 
wished to join.  However, government had still not settled the Kao people’s 
disagreement with governmental regulation (PP142/1999) that created the district 
of Malifut Makian Daratan. The government stated that the name of the District of 
Malifut Makian Daratan would be changed to become the District of Malifut.  
However the Kao community still questioned the nature and status of the regional 
regulation, which detailed the regional development of Makian Daratan and Kao. 
 
According to the Kaos, the development of the District of Malifut within the 
territory of the District of Kao was not legal because there was no new 
government regulation establishing it. The regulation being applied was number 
142, 1999 that had caused the outbreak of conflict.  Even the government’s 
change of the name of the District of Makian to Malifut, was considered illegal.  
At this meeting, the Kao people proposed the assimilation of the Makian people 
within the District of Kao and that they should postpone regional development 
plans until later when they could be centred in the District of Kao.  The idea of 
assimilation was taken from the model of Javanese transmigration, which 
integrated the Javanese into Kao society in the villages of Toliwang and Biang.  
However, the government referred to the fact that Makian people had been present 
in the Kao territory since 1975 and it rejected this proposal.  The result was that 
the District of Makian would have the right to develop into the Regency of 
Malifut.352  The government supported their position with a formal planning 
report that showed the border between the District of Malifut Makian Daratan and 
the District of Kao, Jailolo, and Sahu. 353  
 
Considering the confusion in the regulations to move the District of Makian from 
the island of Makian to the District of Kao, this disagreement underlines the 
differences in assumptions underlying the principles of regional development.  
Sometimes the plan for regional development did not show a balanced perspective 
concerning the physical division of the region and the importance of cultural 
territory that is inherent in the society’s tradition.  The Kao used the principle of 
cultural territory in choosing to join the region in which Tobelo is the centre.  Not 
only are there cultural connections between Kao and Tobelo, but also the Kao 
territory is much closer to Tobelo than to Jailolo. 
 
                                                 
352 In my 2004 visit, I found out that both the Districts of Kao and of Malifut Makian Daratan were 
finally joined to the Regency of North Halmahera with Tobelo as the capital.  One reason for this 
decision was that their location is geographically close to Tobelo. 
353 See Informasi Kecamatan: 1993, 45 
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7.4.2.   A Common History after the Conflicts 
 
Before the 1999-2000 violence, PT GAI, the Banana Company, which operated in 
Galela to export bananas to several Asian countries, hired about 4,635 labourers.  
People came from every region in North Moluccas as well as from outside the 
region as far as Java.  After the conflict the company no longer operated.  This 
expensive investment in eastern Indonesia had been lost for nothing.  The 
Company created an economic infrastructure of work for the common people, 
such as labour in the harbour, on the banana plantation and in small  businesses, 
which had grown like mushrooms in the rainy season.  Now they had already 
disappeared. 
 
After the violence, people began realize that in order to rebuild their region, they 
needed each other.  The people of Tobelo needed the people of Galela and vice 
versa.  This awareness became stronger after the people in Tobelo and Galela 
realized that the government of North Moluccas only gave attention to the 
refugees so that corrupt elite bureaucrats could make use of the aid funds that 
were earmarked for refugees.354  Awareness of corruption in the government 
caused people to focus and strengthen their struggle against the plan for regional 
development that included new territory divisions that did not respect their 
collective identity. 
 
On February 1, 2002 in Tobelo there was a meeting attended by representatives 
from Kao, Jailolo, Tobelo, Galela, Morotai and Lo loda.  They declared together 
that it was urgent to create the Regency of Northern Halmahera.  Before they 
announced the declaration they opened the assembly with a performance of the 
Cakalele dance.  Two pairs of dancers from Tobelo and Galela performed in a 
crisscrossed pattern.  In the first pair, the male dancer (o soda) was from Galela 
partnered with a female dancer (o sisi) from Tobelo.  The second pair was a male 
dancer from Tobelo and a female dancer from Galela.  The dance began with the 
performance of two female dancers who danced while holding pieces of cloth. 
The two male dancers entered the arena choosing their partners from the other 
district.  Then the two male dancers kneeled in front of the two female dancers 
who opened their cloths and each unwrapped a wooden sword and shield. Each 
woman gave a sword and shield to their dance partner.  The drums beat 
incessantly and the screaming voices of the people filled the air.  
 
The Cakalele dance is a symbol of courage.  The people of Ngidiho believe that 
when they dance the Cakalele, the presence of the good ancestral spirits are united 
with the dancers.  Whoever dances the Cakalele enters into the joyfulness of the 
celebration to welcome their ancestors who had returned from a long voyage as 
sea pirates.  In the marriage ceremony, the father of the groom acts as the male 
dancer (o soda) who dances with the sister of the bride (o sisi).  After they have 
danced, the shield, sword and spear are given to the bride’s family (cf. 
Platenkamp: 1988).  There are two purposes for giving the weapons to the bride’s 
family. First, they are quite valuable as gifts.  Second, by giving these weapons, 
                                                 
354 See Kompas (December  28, 2001). 
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the mother of the bride can purify them by cleaning them with her cloths and then 
covering them with her cloths.  This purification ceremony cuts the web of 
violence and revenge inherited from sea-pirates, which threatens her family.  
According to tradition, these weapons are thirsty for the blood of human beings 
and might cause trouble if not dealt with wisely.  
  
The Cakalele dance performed in the ritual at the declaration of support for the 
creation of a North Halmahera Regency in February 2002 is a fascinating 
innovation.  The two pairs of male and female dancers performed a union between 
the ethnic groups of Galela and Tobelo.  The exchange and purification of the 
weapons was to extinguish their desire to kill each other.  Perhaps it also 
suggested a union to fight together against their common enemies.  This ritual at 
least shows that they must both, Galela and Tobelo, struggle together to escape 
from the disaster of war and recreate their common welfare.  The two ethnic 
groups were beginning to mix at this meeting.  The leader of the Galela Muslims, 
who was head of a political party and a member of the provincial parliament, 
attended this meeting, which declared their support for the establishment of a 
Regency of North Halmahera with its capital in Tobelo. 
 
The success of this meeting illustrates the process of reconciliation and the 
reuniting of the people of Tobelo and Galela.  The history of Galela and Tobelo 
suggests that these two ethnic groups reinvented themselves by migrating 
throughout the North Moluccas.  Evidence for the large impact of their migrations 
can be seen in the influence of their language on the other languages of the region.  
Therefore, according to the people of Tobelo and Galela, the declaration of a 
Regency of the North Moluccas inspires reconciliation and the creation of 
coalitions within the society of the North Moluccas. 
 
7.4.3.  The Election of the Governor 
 
The reunification of Tobelo and Galela inspired other regions, such as the 
archipelago of Sula and Southern Halmahera, to struggle for the legitimacy of the 
other regional governments. The need for justice and fair distribution was a reason 
for speeding up the process of legitimacy.  The people also wished to speed up the 
installation of a new system because the election of the Governor on July 25, 
2001, had left a vacuum.  Abdul Gafur and Yamin Tawari represented the 
Golongan Karya (Golkar) Party and won the DPRD election with 24 votes; 
Thayeb Armaen and Yamin Wa Saleh, from the Party of Reformation, won 20 
votes.  However, the Reformation Party claimed that the winners used ‘money 
politics’, so the government did not declare the result of the election for almost a 
year.  The controversy about money politics in the Governor’s election in North 
Moluccas created confusion.  Surprisingly, one member of the provincial 
parliament from Abdul Gafur’s group (Golkar) signed a declaration admitting that 
he received money in exchange for his vote.  Later he withdrew his 
confession/accusation. 355  
 
                                                 
355 See Kompas (January 15, 2002). 
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The Golkar Party chose to pursue this case to the national level for a legal 
judgment as to whether the result of the election was proper or not.  At the 
national level the Golkar Party won the case, but on appeal to the Supreme Court, 
the judges ruled that the government must hold a new election.  Although Golkar 
was the party of Suharto’s New Order, and widely despised, it still enjoyed a fair 
amount of legitimacy among the people of North Moluccas, especially among 
those who supported the Sultan of Ternate.  The Sultan of Ternate was fired by 
the central Golkar organization because he was accused of being responsible for 
the riots in North Moluccas.  However, many people doubted the accusations 
against the Sultan of Ternate and still believed that his leadership was needed to 
bring unity to the different ethnic and religious clusters. 
 
Some people in North Moluccas believe the postponement of the installation of 
the new Governor was related to the issue of corruption in the management of 
refugee aid.  Interim governments lack power and have difficulty stopping 
corruption.  During the period 2000-2002 North Moluccas had a caretaker 
Governor, Muhyi Effendie, while Thayeb Armaen was the Secretary of the 
Regency of North Moluccas.  In April 2002, another caretaker governor, from 
North Sulawesi, was appointed to provide leadership in North Moluccas. In the 
end the current governor,  Thayeb Armaen was supported by PDI-P, along with 
his vice governor, Prof. Majid Abdullah, who is actually a lecturer at Sam 
Ratulangi University in North Sulawesi.  
 
7.5.  Maintaining the Reconciliation Process 
 
Maintaining peace after the violence is both the responsibility of the communities 
involved, as well as of the government of North Moluccas.  In areas free from 
conflict, communities and  government must work together to maintain unity and 
trust.  What can we learn from particular communities that successfully defended 
their unity against external pressures that encourage disintegration.  The Galelans 
and Tobelans defended their peace by empowering their collective ritual.  
Collective rituals can remain powerful if the people pay attention to changes in 
the material context that influence the ideology that expresses the interests of the 
different groups that make up the community.  The size of the gap between the 
context and the material interests, which differ according to ethnicity and religion, 
will determine directly the formulation of an ideology that can create a common 
meaning.  People empower their collective rituals by making them effective 
vehicles for negotiation of their material interests so as to strengthen unity in the 
community.  This mechanism directly influences their negotiation of security and 
ability to block intervention by outside individuals or institutions, which provoke 
riots. 
 
 
7.5.1.  Social Cohesion and the Ancestors  
 
The conflict in North Moluccas was in part a result of the impact of change within 
the power constellation at the national and regional levels. The conflict was 
labelled a “religious conflict,” but it actually shows the unity of people from 
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different religions.  According to government statistics, of the 20 districts in the 
province of North Moluccas only 9 districts participated in the conflict labelled 
“religious”. 356  The rest of the districts maintained peace between the different 
religious communities, in spite of provocation.  Some of the districts that include 
a mixture of Muslims and Christians who stayed together are Ibu, Buli, Southern 
Morotai (Morotai Selatan), Taliabu, and Kao. 
 
How did these communities maintain unity between Christians and Muslims in 
spite of provocation?  Kao is a good example for explaining the process by which 
peace was maintained.  Even though Kao was directly involved in ethnic conflict 
with the Makians over land and faced a concerted attempt to divide the Kao 
people according to their religion, the Christians and Muslims of Kao remain 
united right up to the time of this writing.  This case shows how people are tied by 
collective rituals despite being followers of different religions. The Kao collective 
rituals are ancestral practices that they believe are binding.  They must be 
followed if the community does not want to experience a disaster.  Their 
collective rituals are moral actions that map the existence of each individual in the 
context of their togetherness as the people of Kao.  
 
Kao is important for the study of conflict in the Moluccas because it shows how 
riots about  borders may or may not shift into religious conflict.  Because of the 
increase of tensions in the Moluccas at large, the government of Indonesia 
proclaimed a Civil Emergency in the province of North Moluccas and the 
province of Moluccas beginning on March 4, 2000.  The term ‘Civil Regional 
Emergency’ meant that the national military (TNI), received responsibility for 
restoring regional civil security.  The military was meant to make peace.  
However, the people claimed that they had to maintain security themselves.  The 
people were already aware that the military had complicated the violence in 
Ambon.  Therefore the people in North Moluccas who lived in conflict free areas, 
worked together, both Christians and Muslims to decide whether they wanted to 
accept military units in their villages. 
 
For example, the people of Kao received military personnel to stop the violence in 
their region.  However, on April 27, 2000, they organized a meeting, proposed by 
both Christians and Muslims, to demand that the military account for what had 
happened in the district of Kao that very morning, April 27, 2000.  Early in the 
morning, the people in the village of Jati heard the sound of people running and 
encircling houses in the centre of the village.  In a state of terror, they heard the 
shooting of guns, the formation of ranks and the command to attack.   The people 
believed that this event in the early morning was a deliberate attempt to create 
terror and to provoke the people.  However the people did not respond at the 
moment and all the villagers remained inside their houses.  
 
The public meeting ended with an explanation from the government that this had 
been just a military training exercise.  Nonetheless, the Kao people elicited an 
agreement from the military officials to send in a request to the Civil Emergency 
                                                 
356 See Kompas (February  15, 2002). 
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(Kotis) government to change the troops who were stationed in the District of 
Kao.  The community did not believe the current troops were neutral regarding 
their conflict with the Makians and they could not accept such acts of terror from 
military troops who were supposed to keep peace.  Terror was being used in the 
name of one religious group to attack the other religious group with the hope that 
violence would break out.  The Kotis accepted the proposal of the Kao community 
and replaced the troops. 
 
The leaders of Kao said there were many intentional efforts to divide the 
community.  There were people who wanted to create conflict between the 
Muslims and Christians of Kao.  Fortunately, their ancestral oath and the 
protection of God maintained the unity of the society. “How deep is this unity 
among the Kao people?”  I asked the leaders of Kao.  In reply, one of the Muslim 
leaders pointed to their sacred graveyard in the village of Jati and began to tell of 
how their trust and unity is rooted in their ancestral history. 
 
Both the Muslims and Christians in the community of Kao believe that their 
struggles are part of a single, historical, ancestral narrative.  In the history of Kao, 
their unity has faced three great tests.  The first was in 1570 when, under the 
leaderships of Sultan Baab’Ulah, they expelled the Portuguese from the North 
Moluccas.  The second was in 1906 when they fought against the Netherlands 
because the Sangaji of Modele was taken to Ternate and then disappeared.  The 
government arrested the Modole Sangaji because he failed to collect the tax on the 
local people assessed by the colonial government.  De Jongh recorded that in 1909 
the colonial government chose two Sangaji in the district of Kao.  The first was a 
Muslim Sangaji for Kao Muslims located in Tololiko.  The second was the 
Sangaji of Modole who practiced the local region (alfuru) (de Jongh: 1909, 757, 
766).  The Sangaji had to collect taxes every year with a target for the districts of 
Tobelo, Kao, and Morotai of Fl.13.000 (de Jongh: 1909, 762).  Magany says that 
the people of Kao who lived along the coast became Christian in 1898 as the 
result of the work of the Dutch missionary, Hueting.  However, the people of 
Modole began to become Christian in 1906 (Magany: 1984, 453, 455). 
 
Their unity was tested a third time in June 1999, when the government of North 
Moluccas issued Regional Regulation, number 142, 1999 that joined five villages 
of Kao into the District of Malifut Makian Daratan.  According to the Kao leaders, 
their people succeeded in facing this third great test of their unity because they 
shared the same common history and practice of collective ritual, which inspired 
the moral strength of their ancestors to face the second conflict in 1906.  The 
struggle to bring back the Sangaji of Modole caused seven Kao to die during the 
war and they are still remembered as heroes.  Among them, four were Christian 
and three were Muslim.  They are buried together in one graveyard.  At that time, 
they began the funeral ritual with the ancestral oath Empat Sangaji Adat dalam 
Satu Bengawan Atap (“Four Sangajis of Adat under a Single Great Roof”).  The 
meaning of this oath is, first, that when one brother experiences a disaster, three 
others have to help and , second, if someone should betray his brothers he will 
face a disaster.  After that, the ritual closed with prayers from both Muslims and 
Christians.  
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This oath contains the memory of a primordial ritual oath that the community all 
believe was the foundation of their people.   According to their story, a long time 
ago there were four brothers named Modole, Pagu, Kao or Tololiko, and 
Boeng. 357  They lived together until the time came when each of them had to build 
his own household.  Before they separated, they promised to meet again.  For the 
next meeting, each of them had to bring something that showed his success.  Then 
they held hands and declared an oath that if one experienced a disaster, the three 
others would come to help him; however, if one betrayed the others he  would be 
punished by a disaster. 
 
At the next meeting, Modole brought palm leaves while Pagu brought joists 
(bengkawan or totori) to make the frame of a roof.  Kao brought loleba for sewing 
the roof and Boeng sewed the roof.  The completed roof was a sign of their 
success and unity.  They insisted that the oath of the roof, that signified their 
success and unity, had to be handed down by their offspring from generation to 
generation.  The continuation of the oath from one generation to the next was 
confirmed by a ritual in which they took one of the beams of the roof 
(bengkawan) and burned it.  They then collected the ashes and mixed them with 
vinegar from saguer (palm liquor).  With this they added 40-50 ground hot 
chillies.  The four brothers put this mixture into a coconut shell and passed it 
around for each to drink.  Before they began to drink, they again swore the oath 
they had made before leaving their family house.  Even up to today, the Sangaji of 
Modelo, Pagu, Kao and Boeng are considered the descents of the four brothers. 
 
In dealing with the border conflict with the Makians, the Kao people (10% 
Muslim and 90% Christian) protected their unity with the help of several layers of 
collective ritual that were inherited from their ancestors.  However, because they 
were now facing a new and different context, the Kao also made adjustments to 
their inherited collective ritual.  The leaders of both the Muslims and Christians of 
Kao conducted same collective ritual but began from their separate religious 
locations.  The Muslims gathered in the mosque and Christians gathered in the 
church, each to pray for the strength and wisdom that they would need to deal 
with the border conflict.  After that both congregations (umat) went to the  
graveyard of the seven heroes of Kao to begin the collective ritual.  In front of the 
graveyard of the heroes of Kao, they again swore the oath Empat Sangaji Adat 
dalam Satu Bengkawan Atap.  Then they solemnly took soil from the top of the 
graveyard and put it in a coconut shell.  While marching in procession to another 
ancient graveyard in the village of Popon Tua, they spread the soil on the ground 
to request  blessing and salvation so that they would be protected from disaster 
and maintain their unity. 
 
                                                 
357 According to de Jongh, there were five ethnic divisions of the Kao:  Boeng, Tugutil, Modole, 
Pagu and Tololiko, who were known as Kao Islam (de Jongh: 1909, 766).  However, according to 
Magany, the people of Tugutil were an independent ethnic group, which resided on the boarders 
between Tobelo and Kao.  They are categorized as nomadic due to their profession as fisherman.  
They had spread into Buli, Weda and Gane (Magany: 1984, 156; cf. Martodirjo 1991). 
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The modifications to the ritual of Empat Sangaji Adat dalam Satu Bengkawan 
Atap suggests three interpretations.  One is that the essence of the ritual remains 
unchanged and confirms that all the Kao people are linked to their inherited 
history.  Secondly, the soil symbolizes the rich natural resources of Kao, which 
shape their new history together and are now under threat of being taken away by 
immigrants.  Thirdly, the difference between Muslims and Christians is 
acknowledged by each congregations beginning with their own prayers.  However 
there is no sharp distinction between them in their ritual of unity.  In the ritual 
itself they participate together with no distinction between them.   
 
Symbolic presentations can create patterns of social-cultural ties that transcend 
class, religion and kinship (Bauman: 1982, 5).  However such ties did not exist 
between the Kao and the Makians, even though they lived within the same 
geographical area.  The priority that the government in Ternate had given to the 
Makian people in Malifut since their transmigration into the district of Kao in 
1975 until the outbreak of violence in 1999 had created a sharp social distinction 
between the Makians and the Kaos, both Muslim and Christian.  Culturally, 
politically and economically, the Kao Christians and Muslims were united with 
each other but divided from the Makians. 
 
There have been many influences that could have created divisions among the 
people of Kao, but they chose to strengthen the basic patterns that were already 
known and which tied them together rather than to accept a new legitimacy that 
they were not confident could give them security.  In dealing with social change 
in their everyday life, they chose the security of their ancestral traditions as the 
starting point to evaluate their actions.  They perceived the security provided by 
their ancestors as a stronger basic pattern than the pattern of religion. 358  A 
material base supports the guarantee of security through ancestral rituals because 
their ancestors provide legitimacy for their ownership of the land and the people 
of Kao rely on the rich natural resources of the area.   
 
7.5.2.  Development Policy and Reconciliation 
 
The process of reconciliation requires that development planners pay attention to 
the needs of all stakeholders in the area.  Reconciliation is unlikely without 
justice.  However justice and development of the rich natural resources of 
Halmahera are even more difficult after the devastation of violent conflict.  
Unfortunately, after the violence had ceased between the Kaos and the Makians, 
the Australian gold mining company in the area would not accept either Makians 
or Kaos as labourers in the mine, for fear of further conflict.359  The gold mining 
company began operations at the end of 1998 with exploration of land in the 
territory of Wangeotak village, at Gosowong in the District of Kao.  The 
                                                 
358 Some of the Kao are certainly deeply committed to their religion, but some are just nominal 
Christians.  One man from Kao responded with a blank stare when asked if he was a Christian.  
However he proudly acknowledged his membership in GMIH, which is the main Protestant 
denomination in Halmahera. 
359 From an interview with a former labourer from the gold mining company on in February  8, 
2002, in Kao. 
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exploration covered land owned by the Kao, which the government thought of as 
having no value.  The mining company has operated with imported labourers 
since the outbreak of the territorial dispute in the middle of July 1999.  During the 
violent conflict the production of gold for export to Australia was not optimal.  
Labourers were limited in number due to the fighting. 
 
The presence of PT GAI, the Banana Company, brought dynamic change to 
Halmaheran society that carried the seeds of increased tensions and the explosion 
of conflict in the region.  While the Kao people maintained their internal unity 
through historical memories of their ancestral traditions, the same mechanism did 
not work for the Tobelans and Galelans.  The Galela, Tobelo and Koa people 
believed in a common origins myth of Lake Lina that could have served a similar 
unifying purpose as the Kao myth of the four brothers.  In fact the myth of Lake 
Lina was re-told at the meetings of Sariloha, the brotherhood organization set up 
in January 1999 to prevent conflict.  However this myth did not work to unite 
people because of the new reality shaped by the presence of PT GAI.  The myth 
itself is more about family conflict than about undying unity.   
 
Apart from that, agro industry created fabulous new wealth and sharp 
dissatisfactions over how it was divided.  In the heat of controversy over what 
happened to the increased compensation paid by PT GAI, certain parties drew 
attention to the link between religious identity and control over natural resources.  
The business and managerial classes were mainly Christians from outside the area 
and they enjoyed differences in material conditions, education and social status.  
The owners of PT GAI were big investors, Chinese from Jakarta.  Directors, 
managers, and assistants were mainly Christians from North Sulawesi and Toraja. 
Therefore when the counterfeit letter circulated in Galela, people were already 
primed to believe there was a Christian conspiracy to take over all the natural 
resources from the Muslims in the area. 
 
The counterfeit letter resulted in the expulsion of Christians from Tidore and 
Ternate after the Makians were expelled from Kao.  Finally the violence moved to 
Tobelo, which was already swelled with refugees from Kao, Ternate and Tidore.  
Tobelo is the biggest centre for the lucrative copra trade in Northern Halmahera 
and the meeting point for various ethnic groups.  Therefore, Tobelo is the political 
barometer for Galela.  One day after the riots began in Tobelo, they moved to 
Galela and the Banana Company was closed.  The loss of employment and the 
stoppage of banana exports caused hardship for the local people.  Villagers from 
the southern coast such as  Soa Sio, Toweka and Simau, who had worked as 
labourers at the harbours, were also unemployed.  Long-term agriculture such as 
coconuts is the only economic resource for the communities, but agriculture needs 
financial capital.  
 
Beginning from the harsh realities of the local economy after the violence, a group 
of leaders from Tobelo and Galela met to discuss a new development plan that 
involved the local people. In Feberuary 2002, when Tobelo was still a district, the 
Head of the District (Camat) of Tobelo, H. Manetemo, whose leadership is 
accepted in both Galela and Tobelo, told me that it was important to follow up on 
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the regional development plan for Tobelo, which would also affect Galela. They 
were discussing a plan to develop Galela as a major public harbour for 
commercial traffic so as to open up labour markets in Northern Halmahera.  
However, political stability in the region is absolutely imperative for attracting big 
investors into the region.  Nevertheless, the key question remains how far any 
development plan will foster unity and mutual benefit while avoiding the 
development of too great a gap between the rich and the poor. 
 
7.5.3.   Negotiating Security   
 
After the reconciliation process began in Galela and Tobelo, people gradually 
stopped worrying about the  danger of travelling between Tobelo and Galela.  
However, three times there were mysterious shootings between Christians and 
Muslims in Galela.  It was not clear who were the perpetrators.  Nonetheless, the 
attempt to terrorize through these mysterious shootings, did not stop the efforts to 
maintain peace. The shootings were accepted by both Muslims and Christians as 
attempts to terrorize  them and prevent reconciliation.  A day after the shootings, 
the Tobelans requested the Galelans to block all transportation along the trans-
Halmahera highway whenever there was trouble.  This highway is the only 
significant road in Halmahera and runs from Galela in the North, right down to 
Ternate, passing through Tobelo. 
 
The leaders blocked off the road to remind people of their commitment to peace, 
declared in collective rituals like the oath of tona ma langi.  Cutting off all 
transportation for a few days caused significant hardship and decreased the 
likelihood of sympathy for the provocateurs.  It also prevented rapid travel in and 
out of the area by outside radical groups.  The Tobelans urged the Galelans to 
undertake an independent investigation of the shootings that occurred in Galela.  
The religious and traditional (adat) leaders as well as the common people were 
encouraged to carry out the investigation.  However, the investigation reached no 
conclusions.  No one knew the perpetrators.  If they did know, they didn’t dare 
give up their names.  This incident taught people to increase their awareness 
especially by going to their plantations together rather than alone.  
 
As a result of the increased security and the community’s success in guarding 
public safety, in May 2002 the Coordinating Minister of Social and Political 
Affairs, Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, declared an end to the status of civil 
emergency in North Moluccas.  This resulted in the slow reduction of military 
presence throughout North Moluccas.  While the central government wished to 
end the civil emergency status and reduce the number of military troops in North 
Moluccas, the caretaker Governor of the Province wanted to keep the military in 
the area.  He informed the Minister of Domestic Affairs of this desire at a meeting 
in Jakarta. These different perceptions of what structures were needed for 
security, did not influence the efforts for reconciliation worked out in the 
communities.  The request of the caretaker Governor could be considered a 
measured response because of the previous high level of regional conflict.  
Therefore the government ordered a very gradual withdrawal of troops. 
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7.6.  Conclusion 
 
There can be no doubt that “memory” from before and after the riots is one of the 
important factors that influences conflict and its resolution.  At the beginning of 
this chapter, I quoted the statement of McBeth who asked us to consider how 
memories are created and how true they are, because memories give meaning to 
the lives of human beings.  Memory also determines how we divide society.  
Bauman, in a book titled Memories of Class, shows how memories formed social 
class in England at the end of the 18-century (Bauman: 1982).  In this book he 
says that memory functions to continue history. Memory makes history alive.  
Societies need a living history in their efforts to understand the meaning of change 
from an old environment to a new one (Bauman: 1982, 3). 
 
Memory is needed, but at the same time people reconstruct their memories.  
Human beings forget a bitter history when it can no longer help them to survive 
the social changes they face. After the riots, a new history was written to give 
legitimacy to a new reality.  This revision of memories may have a political 
purpose as occurred in the writing of  Indonesian history from the perspective of 
various rulers.  At the grass roots level, however, people may try to understand 
bitter events by relating them their religious or traditional beliefs, such Satan 
tempting human beings.  The people used the word ‘disaster’ to efface the painful 
memories of their participation and construct the violence as something similar to 
what happens in nature.  Sometimes human beings can overcome disaster in this 
way, but sometimes they cannot. 
 
Therefore the history that lives in the memory of communities does not appear as 
one conceptualisation because it will always need to adjust to changing situations 
by reflection on the ideas and practices that are available in their tradition (cf. 
Bauman: 1982, 3).  The people processed the history of their ethnic groups and 
religions in order to recreate their memories of the society in North Moluccas as 
we have seen in the specific example of the people of Ngidiho. The borders of 
ethnic history that were not clear before the riots in December 1999 became clear 
after the conflict.  Ethnic identity became identified with religious identity. 
 
Both Christians and Muslims lost family members and the material heritage of 
many generations.  After becoming refugees, forced to flee from their own 
homeland, they became critical of the ideological propaganda that had led them 
into war.  They saw that religious ideological conflict was connected with 
material interests.  When outsiders began to take over the local people’s land, the 
indigenous farmers became aware that their land in Halmahera is rich and that 
they must protect it.   
 
Material facts stimulated the people to find or restore ancient meanings that 
legitimise their right to the land.  Genealogical myths and rituals from their 
ancestral traditions provided orientation for entering the process of negotiating 
reconciliation.  In the process they  recognised that their ethnic identities were 
strengthened by religious practices.  The people combined elements from the 
traditions of their ancestors with religious practices that answered their everyday 
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needs.  The people are creative in modifying rituals to meet new material 
conditions.  Their rituals always return to the basics of economic negotiation and 
the exchange of their surplus products.   
 
At the same time, however, communities were aware that they needed each other 
economically.  They needed to restore their economic relationships across the 
borders of religious or ethnic territories.  In the face of challenges from outsiders 
they needed to strengthen local solidarities without regard to religion or tribe.  The 
local government played an important role in providing a neutral position, which 
could support the process of reconciliation.  The people also had to renegotiate 
their share of power in the relationships between society, religion, government 
and the military.  They needed secure, safe places where former enemies could 
meet.  Not surprisingly, family relationships provided the most resilient bridge 
between groups.  However the government had to secure the borders of the 
territories that provided the people’s political identity.  The communities needed 
reassurance that words spoken in mosques and churches did not cause 
disintegration in the society.  Reconciliation worked in North Moluccas because 
the people wanted to stop the conflict. Given this strong desire, the communities 
emphasized the negotiation of security as the necessary reality that had to be 
supported by government and military. 
 
Reconciliation allowed a return to open and just economic activities but also 
required a collective ritual of forgetting and the creation of a new, regional 
solidarity (cf. Gulliver: 1979, 16).  In this process of reconciliation, economic 
interests cannot be divorced from collective rituals in which each person is tied 
into the community by their common acceptance of the communal rituals that 
allows them to accept and to forgive.  The collective ritual is a combination of 
religious and ethnic rituals, and both are important.  The people reinterpreted their 
ethnic symbols to integrate them with their religious rituals.  Second, they located  
their religious rituals within the context of ethnic particularity.  The people of 
Galela, Tobelo and the North Moluccas, successfully interpreted their universal 
values within particular cultural contexts.  This enabled them to create a new 
understanding of themselves and their communities after the violence of 
December 1999. 
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Chapter VIII 
Collective Ritual in State Formation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rise of the North Moluccas as a new province in modern Indonesia finally 
took place after 54 years since the independence of Indonesia. This moment 
created pride and competition.  The Moluccas, known as the Spice Islands played 
a role in the creation of world capitalism.  Malaka was known as the Venice of the 
East.360  Treaties were legitimised by religious conversions to Islam, Catholicism 
or Protestantism that reflected the politics of the world economic order in the 14th 
and 15th Centuries.  Local kingdoms competed to control natural resources like 
clove and nutmeg. The arrival of the Portuguese opened the door for Western 
trade in the Spice Islands.  The new powers used both religion and violence to 
stimulate obligation and loyalty, but not without resistance from the people (see 
Chapter IV).   
 
The Netherlands replaced Portugal and transformed the social system of the 
Moluccas. In Ambon, the indigenous people who were Catholics converted to 
Protestantism.  This brought them greater physical security, as well as economic 
and political benefits.  However, with regard to the Moluccas, the Netherlands 
was much more interested in economics than in religion.  They transformed the 
feudal bureaucracies and rationalised the market system.  It was the British 
however, during their occupation from 1811-1818, who instituted modern 
agribusiness principles by planting clove and nutmeg in different regions, thereby 
leading to the decrease in the price of spices on the world market.  The invention 
of refrigeration also decreased the value of spices that were no longer essential as 
preservatives.  Change in local politics within the Netherlands led to the new 
“Ethical Policy” which proposed to educate the indigenous people of the East 
Indies so that they could educate their own people.  During this period, with its 
emphasis on “civilizing” the people of the East Indies, the Dutch government 
finally gave permission for Christian missionaries to operate (see Chapter IV).  In 
the middle of the 20th Century, Japan replaced Holland as the imperial power 
ruling Southeast Asia.  Japan equated Christianity with the West and appealed to 
Islamic identity as a basis for driving the Netherlands out from the East Indies. 
 
                                                 
360 cf. Hefner: 2000. 
“Let us live within our own country. We have 
opposed imperialism all our lives. Let us not 
encourage our youth toward imperialism or give 
them the spirit of imperialism, the spirit of 
expansion. Let us educate our youth so that their 
expansive enthusiasm is converted into constructive 
work for the good of the country, for which so 
much has yet to be done” (Yamin, quoted in Feith 
and Castles: 1970, 436). 
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Through all the long history of the Moluccas, ritual functioned as a resource for 
resistance, protest and peace making.  Ritual gives meaning to ethical struggles by 
unifying human norms and divine values.  At the same time, it can be manipulated 
to create conflict and violence. Material conflicts in a society can be ritualised as 
ideological conflicts. Society is forced to divide according to ethnicity and 
religion.  When centralized state control is weak during a transition of power, 
violence can easily erupt.  Competing elites use religious discourse to sharply 
divide their ideology and practices from that of the old leadership, in order to 
attract support. 
 
This concluding chapter pays attention especially to how collective rituals serve 
as a means of negotiation that can empower modern society in the North 
Moluccas and Indonesia.  The practice of exchange in the politics of ritual in the 
North Moluccas is also used by the state.  In the context of Indonesia, religion 
serves as an ideological justification for territorial expansion in the discourse of 
religious conflict in the North Moluccas.  Ritual transformation is linked to the 
transformation of social structures in the Moluccas.  Indonesia is still struggling to 
build revitalized collective rituals for the common good.    
 
8.1.  Rebuilding a Politics of Stability 
 
In the North Moluccas ritual exchanges are used to strengthen social cohesion at 
all levels of society. Rituals linked the ruler with his people. At the micro level 
ritual exchanges of “work” (jojobo) are tying people together in families, kinship 
groups and villages. Meanwhile, colonial politics undermined the practices of 
ritual at the macro level due to the demythologisation of the feudal structures in 
the society. 361  However rituals are still very alive in the everyday life of the 
society. 362  
 
The ritual resolution of the 1999-2000 conflict of the North Moluccas in 
Halmahera did not really solve the land conflict between the Kao and the 
Makians. The Makians still do not have their own homeland.  The new provincial 
government in the North Moluccas is trying to rebuild stability in the region.  The 
bitterness of a particular ethnic group may be a means of responsible negotiation 
or just as a political tool in the ancient struggles among the local elite namely, the 
Sultans of Ternate, Tidore, Jailolo and Bacan. 
 
8.1.1.  A History of Bitterness 
 
The Moluccas has a bitter history.  When I was in Ternate in January 2002, a 
young Muslim man told me that the history of Moluccas is bitter because it is the 
history of Kings and not of the common people.363  The people know that the 
violence in the North Moluccas was fuelled by the political competition among 
                                                 
361 See Chapter IV. 
362 See Chapter III, IV, VI and VII. 
363 I would like to thank Thamrin for his openness, along with Sanni Mustafa in Ternate and their 
groups who have shown a deep understanding about the conflict in the North Moluccas. The 
interview was conducted on 30th of January 2002. 
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the local leaders in the region. 364  Therefore the question arises of whether the 
model of political competition between the ancient feudal leaders needs to be 
repeated in the new construction of modern bureaucratic institutions in the North 
Moluccas? 
 
The history of bitterness in the North Moluccas is inherited from one generation 
to another. The people remember the bitterness. They called the clove tree the 
cursed tree (kutuk) to express their bitterness at the competition and war brought 
to the archipelago during the colonial period.365  In the North Moluccas, the 
exploitation of cloves directly affected the common people.  Ternate and Tidore 
competed to take control of the islands of Makian and Moti long before the arrival 
of the Western traders.  Moti and Makian islands were fertile lands that produced 
wild cloves.366 The very prosperity of their ancestral land created suffering for the 
people of Makian and Moti as they were expelled from their own land.  Similarly, 
the suffering of the people of Northern Halmahera (Tobelo, Kao, Galela, etc) 
stimulated them to become sea pirates as they were caught between the twin 
tyrannies of the Dutch colonizers and the Sultan of Ternate. 
 
The people pass down from generation to generation, oral histories about the 
injustices experienced by their tribal ancestors.  They create rituals and myths to 
perpetuate their memories of bitterness and survival.  Political pressures, 
competition for the rich natural resources and oppression, made the people tough.  
However, in the North Moluccas, the toughest of all are the people of Makian. 
Theirs is the toughness of those who lost their rich ancestral lands for many 
centuries.  The toughness of the Makians was recognised by the kings who 
exploited them.367 
 
Since Indonesian independence in 1945, Indonesian power struggles are 
increasingly focused on the control of jobs in the government bureaucracy.  Civil 
service jobs, no matter how poorly paid, command much more prestige than 
farming.  Within the bureaucracy, kinship ties, ethnicity and religion have become 
major factors in determining the distribution of positions.  The economic crisis 
and the continuing erosion of the value of many agricultural products on the world 
market accelerated the shift. 
 
The politics of the New Order followed the politics of the Old Order and 
emphasised the formation of national identity, thereby devaluing local and 
                                                 
364 This statement is supported by various reports or articles that appeared in the newspapers after 
the explosion of conflict between Kao and Malifut in the middle of October 1999.  See especially 
Chapters V and VI.  
365 See Marinjo (2001, 8-9). 
366 The people of Makian moved to Bacan and those from Moti moved to Jailolo.  During the 
period of the British occupation, in the early 19th Century, the people of Makian and Moti returned 
to their homelands.  However, in 1975, the New Order government resettled the people of Makian 
in the region of Kao, Halmahera because of a threatened volcanic eruption on their island (see 
Chapters IV and V). 
367 See (Meersman: 1967, 67).  Meersman also relates that Ternate and Tidore didn’t plant any 
crops on their own lands because they looked down on the work of farmers.  Therefore they were 
always involved in war to take other people’s crops. 
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regional identities. This marginalized the power of local kingdoms.  
Exceptionally, Yogyakarta and Aceh received special rights to manage their 
regions. The limitations of feudal structures in the North Moluccas led to the rise 
of new leaders in the region.  Although the Sultan of Ternate has been a 
functionary of Golkar since 1971, most of the bureaucratic structures of 
government in the North Moluccas are filled with ethnic Makians and Tidorese.  
 
The Makian people have suffered much. After finally being allowed to return to 
their home island during the 19th Century, the Indonesian government evicted 
them again in 1975 due to a threatened volcanic eruption.  They were 
transmigrated to the district of Kao in Northern Halmahera.  However, the local 
government did not help with the process of socialization in both cultural and 
legal ways.  They were moved to Kao without paying attention to the Makians 
own aspirations to move to the region of Gane, in the southern part of Halmahera.  
Makian is much closer to Gane than to Kao.  After the 1999-2000 conflict and the 
Makians’ violent eviction from Kao, the government reopened the island of 
Makian, which had never in fact erupted. The Makians welcomed this policy 
because it fits with their belief in the ancestral promise that their happiness will 
only be fulfilled after they returned to their island.368 
 
However, at the same time, the government of North Moluccas still maintains a 
separate District of Malifut Makian within the District of Kao (see Chapter VII).  
The confusion of this policy is evident in the plan to include the island of Makian 
in the Regency of Southern Halmahera with Bacan as the capital.  In 1990 the 
island of Makian that lies close to Tidore was not included in the Regency of 
Central Halmahera.369 The island of Makian was included in the Regency of 
Southern Halmahera where Bacan is the capital, based on historical accounts that 
show that the King of Makian migrated to the island of Bacan.  According to the 
Moti treaty in the 17th century, the control of Makian and Moti was given to 
Ternate and Tidore respectively.  
 
Even though the island of Makian will be part of the Regency of Southern 
Halmahera, the District of Malifut Makian Daratan in the land of Kao, Halmahera 
was planned as part of the Regency of Western Halmahera.  However, in 2003, 
the District of Malifut Makian Daratan was added to the Regency of Northern 
Halmahera with the capital in Tobelo (see Chapter VII).  The policy to keep the 
District of Makian within the territory of Kao is supported by the Makians. They 
argue that even though they had conflict with the local people, they have already 
lived in Malifut for 25 years and were very successful economically.  They do not 
want to move out from the region of Kao. The basic argument shows a 
contradiction between the Makian’s success in adjusting to their new area of 
settlement and their conflict with the local people of Kao.  Actually their desire to 
return to Kao may not be caused by their history of bitterness but rather by the 
                                                 
368 This was related to me in an interview in Ternate on the 5th February 2002, with one of the 
residents of Makian who used to live in Kao but had now returned to the island of Makian.  
369 This information is from an interview with the former Head of The Institute of Regional 
Planning (Bapeda) of the Regency of the North Moluccas, in Tobelo, on the 9th February 2002. 
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discovery of gold in the Kao Regency.  Since 1998, Indonesia has been exporting 
gold from the region. 
 
The people of Kao are unimpressed with the history of bitterness in the Makian 
past.370   According to them, all the common people in the North Moluccas, 
whether Kao, Tobelo or Galela experienced the same suffering as the Makians as 
a result of the combination of hegemonic powers from the local Sultan and the 
colonizers. Their history is also a history of bitterness, although it is different 
from the self-history of the Makian people.  The people of Kao feel that they have 
been oppressed by the Makians.  Therefore, they reject a political policy that is 
based on correcting the injustice experienced by the Makians in their past history.  
They argue that discrimination can only create new violence within the society of 
the North Moluccas. Besides, the power structure of North Moluccas has changed.  
The Makians don’t need affirmative action since they are more successful than 
most other groups.  Most of Makian, who were marginalized in the past, now 
dominate most positions in government.   
 
Despite these problems, the efforts at reconciliation and local empowerment 
through rituals of exchange have enjoyed remarkable success in the North 
Moluccas (see Chapter VII).  The restoration of the Sultan of Jailolo in 2002, 
based on the myth of Maluku-Kie-Raha recreates balance by redressing damage to 
the kingdom of Jailolo that was attacked by both the Sultan of Ternate and the 
Portuguese in the late 16th century. The ordination of the Sultan of Jailolo 
depended on the recognition of the Sultan of Ternate who allowed him to return to 
the North Moluccas. The Sultan of Ternate fled to Java (Surabaya) after the 
collapse of his “Yellow troops” who were attacked by the Sultan of Tidore and his 
people at the end of December 1999.  The name of Sultan Jailolo is Abdullah 
Haryanto,371 who has mix blood from Java and Ternate.  He was born in Seram 
(near Ambon), where his ancestors lived in exile from the North Moluccas (see 
Chapter IV).  Of course the negotiation for his return is also part of a political 
move to transfer the symbols of government in the North Moluccas Regency to 
the District of Jailolo in the island of Halmahera.  In the March 2004 national 
elections, the Sultan of Jailolo ran for local parliament office in the Regency of 
Western Halmahera (DPRD).  He was nominated by the Partai Demokrat 
Kebangsaan (PDK).  However he had to compete for the position with the 
Jougugu who traditionally held the role of Prime Minister in the Jailolo Sultanate.  
The Jougugu was nominated by the PKB party and argued that it was not 
appropriate for the Sultan to become a mere member of the local Congress 
(DPRD).372 
  
Conflict resolution in the North Moluccas is often conducted to heal the pains of 
the past. Present history is the context for re-evaluating the past.  Powerful groups 
in the present shape the interpretation of past history.   Elite groups mobilize 
various minorities and other marginal group in the society to support their 
                                                 
370 This is from an interview with several Kao people, which was conducted in Kao on the 8th 
February 2002. 
371 Interview with a leader in Ternate on 28th January 2002. 
372 Data was collected during my visit to Jailolo in March 2004.  
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position.  However the interpretation of the marginal groups is not taken into 
consideration.  To avoid the bias of using past history to support the interests of 
only the elite, there is an urgent need to strengthen the process of democracy so 
that the voices of the poor are also heard.  
 
8.1.2.  Ritual Exchange and Collective Negotiation 
 
Van der Veer argues that kinship rituals are less used to mobilize the masses in 
comparison to religious rituals because religious rituals are more universal and 
ideological (van der Veer: 1994, 119-120).373  This distinction rests on a 
questionable dichotomy since the North Moluccans don’t distinguish between 
kinship and religious rituals.  In the process of reconciliation in the North 
Moluccas, local rituals rooted in the practices of families, kinship groups, clans 
and villages were expanded to give space for people from the same community to 
reinterpret their practices.  Local rituals were expanded to give a sacred dimension 
to the unity of the society. Even before the violence in December 1999 in 
Ngidiho, conflicts were resolved by following the everyday agricultural rituals as 
a guide for revising labour salaries at PT GAI.   Regional development plans 
should not only emphasize exploration for natural resources, but should also 
structure political, economic and legal systems consistent with the ritual practices 
of the local culture.    
 
Of course rituals of exchange are not a panacea.  They too can be manipulated to 
only serve the interests of a narrow kinship or religious group.  Nevertheless, 
rituals of exchange are often used to overcome the segregation created by religion.  
Rituals of exchange aim at building responsibility for mutual cooperation and 
extend the network of friendships in society. 374  The manipulation of rituals of 
exchange without responsibility can sharpen divisions in society according to 
ethnicity, religion or kin-networks.  If rituals strengthen a monopoly of power, 
centralized in one faction, then greed can seriously damage the tolerance in the 
society.   
 
In contrast, the exchange practices shown in the common people’s rituals, brought 
reconciliation in the North Moluccas by restraining the centralisation of power in 
the hands of only one ethnic, tribal or religious group.  In the Central Moluccas a 
similar principle is called pela.  The core of this practice is exchange. Exchange 
can be done with material or physical services.  I don’t agree with Rustam Kastor 
who says that the ritual of pela was created to manipulate the differences of the 
Moluccan people that are shaped through religion (Kastor: 2000b).  Pela is not 
specifically oriented to Muslims and Christians but unites all parties within a 
limited community regardless of their religion.  People who live as neighbours 
                                                 
373 Van der Veer distinguishes between ancestral rituals and pilgrim rituals.  The ancestral rituals 
concentrate on family whereas the pilgrim rituals relate to the community at large (see van der 
Veer: 1994, 119-120).  The difficulty of this dichotomy is illustrated by the religion of Numa, 
which were the family rituals of the Emperor and the religion of the Roman Empire. This ritual 
was used to expand empire while at the same time it appreciated the local practices of the 
community that it subjected ( See Henry, 1979, 4-9).   
374 cf. Russel: 1989, 35. 
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need exchange practices in their everyday life. The ritual of pela creates a safe 
context in which people can interact by exchanging what they have with what 
others need.  In Central Moluccas, ritual pela sirih (betel nut) and pinang (acreca 
nut) functions to extend relationships outside genealogical and ideological lines 
(see Chapter IV). This ritual was created out of the everyday practices of the 
people before they became Christians or Muslims. 
 
Ritual expresses a people’s humanity fulfilling the sacred message of their 
religions.  But ritual is ineffective if there is discrimination and injustice within 
the society. The practice of ritual exchange in the marriage process in Ngidiho 
includes a secret means of maintaining balance in the society. Modernization 
disconnects people from their origins if they don’t manage the process of cultural 
transformation carefully.  Ritual exchange is a fundamental resource that can 
break down the isolation and alienation experienced between members of a family 
as a result of social change. 
 
This dissertation shows that ritual is used to create conflict as well as 
reconciliation.  Ritual can stimulate conflict not only between those who are from 
different religions but also within the same religion.  Different traditions and 
symbols of legitimacy were already common among the people before they 
converted to the “new” religious teaching. The inheritance of traditions and 
symbols of legitimacy from before the arrival of world religions enriched the 
ritual practices of the different religions that displaced their predecessors.  
However rituals can also become issues of conflict within a religion, for example, 
as seen in the polemics about “syncretism” and “pure religion.” 
 
Perhaps there is truth in the common assertion in Western academic discourse that 
ritual become empty when used without commitment (Eckstein: 1992, 276).  
Ritual is related to social change, in which new values and practices replace the 
old ritual practices.  From the perspective of the new practices, the old ones are 
static and empty of meaning. However, new political movements don’t eliminate 
all rituals but rather replace the old with new rituals that distinguish the new 
regime from the former institutions of power.  As shown in my research in Galela, 
the changing meaning of the Cakalele dance, serves as an example of how rituals 
change.  First it was a dance to welcome the safe return of raiding pirates.  Then it 
became a wedding dance and part of the material negotiations between families.  
Most recently it regained a warlike meaning in the context of violence between 
religious groups. 
 
In the academic narration, the practices of exchange often are interpreted as 
elements within relationships between patrons and clients.  According to James 
Scott, the relationship of patron and client is a vertical relationship. The basic 
characteristics of this relationship is of an all powerful patron who can guarantee 
economic and political security, in a relationship with followers who pay gifts in 
order to gain benefits from their patron (Scott: 1977, 123-125). This appears to be 
an oversimplification if compared with the practices of common people in the 
North Moluccas.  Feudal relations between patrons and clients didn’t only appear 
in the old kingdoms of the North Moluccas but also in the new structures of the 
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Indonesian government since the Old Order up to now.  In the Colonial period, 
there are patron-client relations between the colonizers with the local kings.  Van 
Klaveren categories the model of paying a salary to a Sultan in Java as upeti 
(tribute) (van Klaveren: 1953, 115,116).  However, neither van Klaveren nor Scott 
pay attention to the patron-client relationships that are transformed by the 
common people who understand gift exchange as requiring reciprocal action from 
both sides.   
 
Ritual exchange among the common people shows an alternative model that is 
different from the politics of domination by the government that tends to create 
unequal patron-client relationships.  Actually in the current government of North 
Moluccas, which is dominated by Makian ethnic leadership, the principle of 
exchange works well among people who share ethnic bonds but tends to exclude 
other ethnic groups.  The principle of exchange is widely practiced among all 
ethnic groups in the North Moluccas.  However there is an urgent need to develop 
exchange rituals across ethnic lines.  This is underlined by the claim of trans-
ethnic Indonesian identity that applies to all citizens and gives everyone the right 
to stay openly anywhere in Indonesian teritory.  Widespread migration, both from 
outside and inside the North Moluccas, forces new settlers to develop an exchange 
relationship with the indigenous inhabitants so that they can build solidarity that 
transcends the relations of family, clan and tribe in the local place where they stay 
together as neighbours of the the same Indonesian people.  
 
8.2.  Contemporary Ritual in Indonesian Politics 
 
Muhammad Yamin made a famous statement about the borders of Indonesia as 
defined by eight genealogical territories defined by different ethnic groups.   The 
eight ethnic territories are Sumatra, Malaya, Borneo, Java, Celebes, Lesser 
Sundas, Moluccas and Papua (Yamin: 1945, 1-4).  Yamin also referred to the 
statement of Gadjah Mada about the territory of Islam.  Identities are tied to land.  
Each ethnic group developed political loyalties that were shaped by the ritual 
domains of religions like Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam or Christianity.  However 
the origins of the religions do not lie within the ethnic framework.  Anthony Reid 
says that the heterogeneous, pre-colonial territory of South East Asia was united 
by natural environments, trading and local diplomacy.  The creation of the 
archipelago as one region was not made by language, high religion, ancient 
culture or wisdom (quotation in Philpott: 2000, 96).  People are united or divided 
according to the borders that are available in nature as agreed together by various 
communities.  In Northern Halmahera, the principle of tolagumi becomes the 
criteria for territory claims of each tribe (see Chapters III, IV and VII). 
 
Yamin analyses the formation of Indonesia by combining the methods of 
precolonial territorial claims based on ethnicity and the territorial formulations 
after colonialism in which religious perspectives such as Hindu and Islam 
appeared.  Yamin’s territorial rhetoric should be understood in the context of the 
Dutch “Ethical Policy” at the end of the 19th Century in which Christianity was 
associated first with modernity and then, under Japanese occupation as a symbol 
of Western imperialism (see Chapter IV).  The territory of Hinduism symbolized 
 319 
the influence of Hindu kingdoms in the politics of trade before colonialism.  Islam 
was constructed as a symbol of resistance against the old orders of Hindu and 
Buddhist kingdoms and then against Colonialism.  During the conflict in the 
Moluccas, religiously defined territories again played an important role in 
mobilizing people to participate in violence.  Political, economic and cultural 
conflicts were subsumed by religious rhetoric. This phenomena shows that the 
more people emphasize global religious solidarity, the less commitment they 
show to common local practices and beliefs.  Translocal solidarity can lead to 
violence between groups that each claim a universal, absolute belief system. 
Therefore we may question the assumption of Yamin that religion can replace 
ethnic solidarity to bring forth a united Indonesia.  
 
The following sub-section explores how sacred symbols of territorial discourse 
were used by the New Order government to unite the diverse societies of 
Indonesia into one nation. 
 
8.2.1.  Pancasila as a Sacred Border 
 
The founding fathers created Pancasila as a collective ritual to unite the nation-
state of Indonesia.   After the fall of Suharto, Pancasila lost its sacred aura.  
Indonesians are disillusioned with Pancasila because Suharto used it to legitimate 
his powers (see Chapter V). However, in my opinion, Pancasila is a powerful 
symbol that still provides the most basic justification for the nation-state of 
Indonesia.  Pancasila is not just five principles of political morality or a state 
ideology that supports a common legal system.  Pancasila is the sacred border of 
Indonesia.  Without Indonesian territory, Pancasila would never have existed.  
Conversely, without Pancasila, the territory of Indonesia that contains many 
different ethnic, language and religious groups, would never have come into 
being.  The abuse of Pancasila by the New Order regime undermined the balance 
necessary for unity in Indonesia. One of the major tasks of the new leadership in 
the coming year will be to revitalize Pancasila (or some alternative ideology), in 
order to tie together a diverse nation.  As an ideology of politics, Pancasila is not a 
religion, as feared by some (see Ismail: 1985, 173 ff).  However it is part of a 
sacred ritual language to unite the nation. 375 
 
Reconciliation efforts after the conflict in the North Moluccas demonstrate that 
differences of religion can be accepted as a strength in Indonesian society.  
Religions can work with each other and with other social institutions to create 
collective rituals that maintain a dynamic balance in the society. The conversion 
of most Indonesians from their ancient local religions to one of the global, 
monotheist religions is a basic fact that underlies the state’s politics.  Indonesia is 
founded on belief in “The Great Unity of Deity” (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa).  
                                                 
375 Pancasila could be considered part of a “civil religion” for Indonesia.  However this term is 
misleading, since it seems to place “civil religion” as a competitor with other religions rather than 
a state ideology.  I prefer to see Pancasila as part of a sacralized national ritual, rather than a civil 
religion.  Robert N. Bellah, who is known for his discussion of “civil religion” in America, is now 
very cautious about using the phrase since it invites so much misunderstanding.  See, 
(Bellah:1970), and (Bellah and Hammond: 1980). 
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Thus far, most Indonesians have accepted this phrase as a fundamental assertion 
that they all hold in common, because they are self-defined as a religious 
people.376  According to my research among the Galela people, respect for 
ancestors was already the common practice before the people converted to the 
global religions.  
 
Perhaps the formulation, “The Great Unity of Deity” in Pancasila refers to the 
sacred value of honouring your ancestors, which is honoured by all religious 
people in Indonesia.377  This common belief and practice is shared and validated 
in Islamic as well as Christian teachings, which were contextualised within the 
local context (see Chapter IV).  The Abrahamic religions of Islam and Christianity 
believe that Adam and Eve were the common ancestors of all human beings.  
Shared memories of a united past, which recognises common ancestors, provides 
the people with a strong and logical sense of sacred relationships that must be 
passed on and honoured by future generations.  If all the people honour their 
common ancestors, each will feel protected and secure within their belief borders.  
 
However, the practices of global monotheism in Indonesia sharply differentiate 
the role of God from the role of the ancestors.  As a result, the rituals of local, 
tribal beliefs are not defined as religions and the Indonesian people have to choose 
one of the major religions: Muslim, Christian, Hindu or Buddhist.  The emphasis 
on the unity of the nation led Hindus to redefine their religion as fundamentally 
monotheistic (see Chapter II).  Beatty’s research on the creation of collective 
rituals in East Java, shows how collective rituals such as the slamatan, are 
polyvalent.  They are capable of multiple interpretations.  People from different 
religions or streams (aliran), can participate together in one ritua l that means 
different things to each of them.  Polyvalent rituals maintain a delicate balance 
between different groups and allow Hindus, Christians and mystics to resist state 
domination through Islamic rhetoric.  The experience of extreme violence in the  
area during 1965-66 lends urgency to the efforts to maintain religious balance 
(Beatty: 1999). 
 
In 2002, President Megawati announced a national holiday for the celebration of 
Imlek, or Chinese New Year, which is a religious holiday for the Confucian 
religion (Kong Hu Cu).378     The recognition of the Confucian holiday to honour 
the ancestors was welcomed, especially by the Chinese-Indonesia community.  
Even Amien Rais, a conservative Muslim leader suggested that the new holiday 
should not be a matter of debate since Indonesia is multiethnic and multireligious.  
Amin Rais’ comment about the Indonesian policy of respecting the celebrations of 
Confucianism should be read in light of the struggle in the Islamic world, 
especially in Indonesia, to find the right balance between the teachings of Islam 
                                                 
376 Up until now, all citizens of Indonesia are required to follow one of five religions:  Islam, 
Christianity (Catholic or Protestant), Hinduism, Buddhism or Confucianism.  There is no way to 
know how many citizens might define themselves differently if given the chance. 
377 See Kompas (February  18, 2002). 
378 In 2003 the government improved its status from being provisional to become definitive. The 
policy of recognizing Confucianism began under the government of Aburrahman Wahid in 2001.  
See Kompas (February  18, 2002). 
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and the political recognition of equal citizenship for all.  Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na’im writes that the teaching of the Qur’an can be reconciled with modern 
constitutionalism and human rights if the ummah is reinterpreted to include all 
citizens of a nation-state.  This reinterpretation provides a foundation to respect 
the equal rights of non-Muslims including those who do not believe in Allah 
(God), as in animism, atheism or agnosticism (An-Naim: 1994a, 72-74).  Since 
independence Indonesia has theoretically recognized the equal rights of all her 
citizens.   
 
National religious holidays are a good test of how far different religious 
communities can accept each other.  Religious holidays are national rituals that 
can unite or divide the religious communities.  Religious holidays have often 
served as the starting point for religious violence, for example “Bloody Idul Fitri” 
in Ambon, 1999, or the outbreak of violence in Halmahera following Christmas, 
2000.  However, the celebration of religious holidays also provides an opportunity 
for members of different religious communities to celebrate together. For 
example, in Java, the celebration of Idul Fitri and the Islamic New Year (1 
Muharam) are usually enjoyed by both Muslims and Christians together.  When I 
was working in Halmahera, the celebration of Muslim and Christian holidays was 
conducted together as family or kin-celebrations. The former Governor of the 
Moluccas, Latuconsina reminded the people of how Christmas and Idul Fitri were 
traditionally celebrated by both Christians and Muslims in Ambon, who visited 
each other (Tempo Detik: 2002).  Celebrations strengthen unity within a society.  
Celebration educates both the state and the people to get involved with giving and 
receiving gifts.379  Sekimoto writes that the state rituals of national holidays are 
carried out in villages all across Indonesia.  The people participate from all 
different backgrounds, giving and receiving gifts and services without regard to 
religious differences (Sekimoto: 1990, 57-73). 
 
In Indonesia, the state proclaims great ideals, but forgets its responsibility to carry 
out the principle of justice and democracy for the whole society.  Deliar Noer 
suggests several way to actualise Pancasila in concrete as an implementation of 
the state’s services to society (quotation in Ismail: 1995, 181-182). The 
actualisation of Pancasila requires good law enforcement that guarantees security 
and justice.  Pancasila requires strong social solidarity in which people work 
together to eliminate the deep divisions between the rich and the poor.  The lofty 
principles expounded in the Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, 
(known as P4, The Guide for Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila), 
must be expressed in real practices.  Unfortunately, the formalization of Pancasila 
as a New Order political mantra used to justify every dubious government 
development project became a boomerang for the government.  The people were 
not deceived. 
 
Exchange between two or more parties has to begin with recognition of equality.  
Offerings of services are just as important as negotiation of material things.  
Political promises during election campaigns cannot serve as rituals of exchange 
                                                 
379 cf. van der Linden:1996,18. 
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because they seem to carry no sacred weight (see Chapter V). The state needs to 
offer real things to the people, like the improvement of labours’ salaries, 
limitations on presidential periods in office and plans for regulation of 
development that protects the grass roots people from big investors who want to 
steal their land and resources. In reality, the Indonesian government has usually 
sided with the exploiters against the people.  The government produces huge 
amounts of regulations that become tools for corruption but seldom protect the 
people (see Thoolen: 1987). 
 
8.2.2.  Ethnic Territories within National Borders  
 
The ritual of reconciliation that was carried out to solve the conflict in the North 
Moluccas is a ritual of territory. Tona ma langi is the border where during the 
colonial period there was a treaty between the ancestors from the ethnic Tobelo 
and Galela.  In the process of reconciliation that began in October 2000, tona ma 
langi changed its function just marking the border of an ethnic territory and 
became the boundary for an ethnic religious territory (see Chapter VII). 
 
During the conflict, both sides constructed Tobelo as a symbol of Christianity and 
Galela as a symbol of Islam.  The meaning of territory that was constructed 
through collective tribal rituals took on a new religious meaning.  Historical 
memory shapes the symbolic meaning of the land, but new experiences and new 
material conditions change and renew the territorial means of uniting and 
distinguishing the different groups. The process led up to the violence.  The 
counterfeit letter had already raised the spectre of religiously defined territory.  
The land had been divided by ethnic borders but the letter suggested that one 
group (the Christians), wanted to make all of the land a Christian territory.   
 
In Kao the conflict started as an ethnic conflict over land, but the counterfeit letter 
shifted the discourse to the threat of religious imperialism.  An unknown author 
whose real identity is hidden behind the convenient term “provocateur” wrote the 
counterfeit letter.  The letter reduced the complex economic, political, social and 
cultural conflicts of Halmahera into black and white war between religions.  
People, who have developed complex rituals to negotiate political, economic, 
social and cultural differences, are willing to kill and die for their religion. 
 
Political formation through the manipulation of religion is as ancient as human 
history.  In the Middle Ages, various emperors extended their territory in the 
name of religion.   In the North Moluccas the conflict between the Catholic 
traders from Portugal and the Protestant Dutch East Indies Company is a history 
of violence in which the native peoples were the main victims.  The same history 
of violence was carried out by Spain in the Americas (Taussig: 1980) and the 
Ottoman Empire in Northern Africa (McCarthy: 1995).  
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When an ideology becomes the official religion of the state,380 a single, universal 
religion homogenized the people’s identity so that they were easier to control by 
what Ernest Renan calls the politics of amnesia.  They were made to forget other 
primary loci of identity (see Gellner: 1983, 168).  Freedom of religion did not lead 
to the loss of religion in the Western world.  European nationalism largely 
replaced religion as the locus of identity, at least for a time.  In my opinion, the 
true role of religion is to free human beings from violence and discrimination.  
Ironically, violence and discrimination are often conducted in the name of 
religion. 381  
 
Religion plays a dual role.  First, religion is located outside the structures of 
public power.  In the West, it is deliberately separated from political power.  
However secondly, religion is often reincarnated, explicitly or implicitly, inside 
the structures of power.  The “religion” of nationalism gives rise to a kind of civil 
religion where the state is sacralized and demands a higher allegiance from its 
citizens that transcends all other religions.  In both World War I and World War 
II, nationalism served in place of religion as the one value worth killing and dying 
for.  In this context we may interpret Suharto’s insistence that Pancasila be 
accepted as the only foundation for every recognized religion in Indonesia (Asas 
Tunggal), as an attempt to form a single, universal civil religion of Indonesian 
nationalism.   In secularised societies, a national civil religion may replace the 
religious impulse of the people, however in Indonesia, civil religion does not 
replace religion but provides a neutral space for a common identity that transcends 
the primordial identities of ethnicity and religion. 382  
  
On the other hand, the New Order regime did not hesitate to use violence to create 
a politics of homogenisation.  Suharto used violence to attack and control, not 
only militant religious groups, but any group that resisted homogenisation or 
opposed the policies of the “Father of Development.”  The New Order deceived 
various groups by creating factions according to religion and ideology that 
expended all their political energy in fighting with each other.  Hefner vividly 
names these practices as those of a “state without civilisation” (negara tidak 
beradab) (Hefner: 2000; see Chapter V).  The government was a political actor, 
not only within its own bureaucracies but also infiltrated civil organizations, 
militias, businesses and even groups of protestors.  The contradictions within the 
politics of the New Order created counter attacks and violent reactions with in 
society.  The violence in Halmahera may partly be attributed to a reaction from 
victims of New Order policies that stripped them of their land and manipulated 
their religious sentiments. 
                                                 
380 Christianity first became the official religion of the Roman Empire during the reign of 
Constantine who was Emperor of Byzantium.  Before this political moment, Christianity was only 
a religion of the people.  Jesus Christ was killed because he proclaimed a higher allegiance to the 
Kingdom of God, above that of  the Roman Empire.  His followers included many of the common 
people, the poor and the marginalized who suffered under Roman oppression. 
381 A similar view is held by Mitsua Nakamura who says that the Muhamadiyah movement was 
created to oppose the corruption of politics and the coalition between the colonial government and 
the local potentates. This movement for liberation was inspired by Islamic teachings (Nakamura: 
1977, 1-20). 
382 cf.  Bellah and Hammond:1980 and Haar:1948, 25. 
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Religious distinctions in society are sharpened by differences in economic 
ownership.  New social and economic classes appeared within or along side of the 
old structures of society.  PT GAI, the Banana Company introduced a new labour 
market and attracted educated labourers from North Sulawesi and Toraja who 
were Christian.  Some educated labourers who were Muslim also came from the 
North Moluccas and occupied middle level positions up to the level of Assistant 
Managers, however the top managers were Christians.  In contrast, the local 
people who sold their land for a cheap price to the company only worked as field 
labourers, taking care of the banana plants or working in the packing houses.  The 
transition of power after the fall of Suharto generated conflicts among the elite 
who exploited tensions among the common people for their own purpose.  For 
example, students led the demonstrations to demand better compensation from the 
Banana Company for the people’s land.  
 
After the violence subsided, the people re-evaluated the role of religion in society.  
To what extent was religion actually a tool for expansion of power by certain 
groups, and to what extent was religion a tool of peace?   The everyday religious 
practices of both Muslims and Christians supported the movement for 
reconciliation and the people became critical of those who used religion for their 
own self- interest.  For example, Muslims from Galela rejected the demands of 
outside members of the Laskar Jihad to take possession of the lands that belonged 
to Christians who had fled.  In Ngidiho, Islam was well integrated with the local 
culture and ensured the appreciation of women, who traditionally took leadership 
in running the family economy, even though their role in public leadership of 
religious rituals was restricted.  Similarly, the Halmaheran Church generally 
affirms the equal power of women, including their role as ministers and leaders of 
the community (see Chapters III and IV). 
 
Religion forms the identity of the Indonesian people.  Therefore it is not 
surprising that someone like Muhamad Yamin could refer to territories as marked 
by religion, for example, “the Hindu territory” or “the territory of Islam.”  
However Indonesia in the 20 century is spread over 17,000 islands that are 
marked by a rich diversity of religions, cultures and languages.  
 
Forces from outside have always dynamically influenced the identities of the 
peoples of Indonesia.  It is not always easy to distinguish outside influence from 
imperialism.  Yamin saw the struggle for Indonesian independence as a struggle 
against imperialism, which he saw as the spirit of expansion (see Yamin in Feith 
and Castle: 1970, 436).  Unfortunately, imperialism may not only come from 
outside, but may also occur within Indonesia.  People on the so-called “outer 
islands” sometimes viewed Sukarno and Suharto as foreign emperors.  According 
to Kahar Muzakar, various rebellions, such as DI/TII, RMS and PKI where 
reactions to the imperialism of Sukarno who tried to reinvent the feudalism of the 
Majapahit Empire within the system of a modern republic (Muzakar in Feith and 
Castle: 1979, 331, see also Chapters IV and V).  Feudalistic and imperialistic 
elements in the reign of Suharto are easy to find.  For example, Suharto’s Golkar 
mobilized the military, right down to the village level (babinsa), to ensure that 
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Suharto won every election.  Use of military violence to ensure political control is 
an age-old practice of imperialist powers over their conquered territories. 
 
In the case of the North Moluccas, we saw how the Kao people struggled to 
maintain their land and how the regional government confronted the problem by 
asserting the higher legitimacy of national law over local custom. The regional 
government attacked the claim of the Kao people over their land by saying that 
they were only bickering over fields of straw.  The government based their 
argument on the National Constitution (UUD1945) that states that the entire land, 
water and production of the earth is controlled by the state.383  In contrast, the 
claims of the Kao people are not written in recognized legal documents.  
 
Like most indigenous peoples the Kao rely on the oral traditions of their 
ancestors.  They describe the land where the Makian people live as the land of 
Kao through the work of their ancestor that is marked by the process of tolagumi 
(see Chapter V).  Their land ownership is also supported by stories, for example 
the myth about “Four Sangajis under one thatched roof” (Empat Sangaji dalam 
satu bengkawan).384    Formal treaties that are still the basis of ongoing practices 
also support their claim.  For example, the border between Kao and Jailolo was 
the result of an agreement between the ancestors of Kao and Jailolo.  Anyone 
from Jailolo who takes products from the land or sea while passing into Kao 
territory has to pay tribute to the adat leader of Kao.385  The same regulation also 
applies to someone from Kao who takes a harvest from the land or sea of Jailolo. 
 
The debate between the people of Kao and the government of the North Moluccas 
about whether land ownership should be regulated by state law or by adat law, 
portrays a contradiction in the thinking of the Indonesian people.  On the one hand 
there is a professed respect for Indonesian cultures, on the other hand there is a 
desire to be modern.  National leaders have tended to reject ritual, adat practices 
from the everyday life of the common people in favour of accepting state law.  
Adat law was considered primitive in comparison with state law that was 
considered rational and modern.  According to Daniel Lev, before independence 
most of the national elite tended to portray adat law as a sign of under 
development (Lev: 2000, 103-105).  State law is also easier to manipulate in 
favour of the interests of the elite.  Development projects, such as the Banana 
Company, PT GAI in Galela dismissed the agricultural practices of the local 
people as relatively worthless.  The Galelans had developed highly complex 
knowledge and ritual practices concerning the cultivation of bananas and the 
management of their plantation land.  Nevertheless the government viewed local 
knowledge as irrelevant for modern agro industry.  The agricultural system of the 
people was pushed aside and the people were forced to sell their land to the 
company.  The government ensured that the price of the land was kept cheap by 
                                                 
383 This statement is from UUD 1945 article 29.  
384 See Chapter VII. 
385 From an interview with a Kao leader on February  8, 2002. 
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using the same designation for uncultivated land as they used in the conflict with 
Kao, i.e. “fields of straw” (jerami).386 
 
Nevertheless, the government of the North Moluccas turned to adat law to 
empower the people to participate in the ritual practices of reconciliation (see 
Chapter II and VII).  At the same time, the local government still displays a 
double standard in rejecting the role of adat for solving the land dispute between 
the Kao people and the Makians.  Since the regional government is dominated by 
Makians, it is not surprising that they primarily refer to the Constitution (UUD 
1945) that doesn’t recognize the adat claims of the Kao people but regards all the 
land as under the control of the government of Indonesia. 
 
In my opinion, the purpose of the Constitution (UUD 1945) is to arrange 
Indonesian society according to the people’s own customs, traditions, religions 
and the ways of life.  Wherever possible, adat law should be encompassed in 
national law.  The transformation of adat law into national law correlates with the 
transformation of political governance from local systems into district, regional, 
provincial and national systems.  At the micro level the adat system needs to be 
transformed into a governmental system (Slamet - Velsink: 1986). These systems 
were created to ensure justice and democracy in the multicultural layers of 
Indonesian society. Local governments can only guarantee future stability for a 
region if they honour the principles of adat law and religion, within the boundaries 
of the Constitution.  Of course it is not easy to find the right balance between 
honouring local particularities and implementing more universal principles. 
 
8.3.  The Dialectic between Universalism and Particularism 
 
Ritual brings sacred legitimacy to particular material conditions.  Prior to the 
monotheistic religions, power was legitimised and centralized in the ancestral 
forces.  Power was fundamentally rooted in the community and in nature. In her 
research, Visser shows that the most important local figure in Awer, Sahu was 
considered the “Lord of the Domain”.  His authority stemmed from the dominion 
of the ancestors and he was responsible to provide a village Head for the welfare 
of the people.  The people refer to the village Head as the “younger brother” of 
the Lord of the Domain.  The Indonesian government modernized the local 
government bureaucracy and introduced alternative bureaucratic authority such as 
the Camat who is known in Sahu as the Dinas.  During the ritual of the ‘Great 
Cooking” in sabua when people come to contribute their food, there are two seats 
of honour provided, one for the “younger brother” (village Head), and the other 
for the Dinas.387    
' 
                                                 
386 See Chapter III.  Lev shows that the development of state law, like civil law, is based on adat 
law as it appears in the system of families in Indonesia (Lev: 2000, 107ff).  The individual rights 
of ownership relates to the division of families, for example, husbands, wives and children.  
According to Lev, the formulation of principles to govern economic relations between different 
individuals is influenced by both adat law and civil law in the European tradition (Lev: 2000, 124-
125; 130-133).  
387 (Visser: Unpublished paper, no year, page 11). 
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The monotheistic religions claimed God conferred power on his representative 
(Kalifah).  The very fact that a person became King, Sultan or “Resident” implied 
that they were appointed by God irrespective of the wishes of the people.  The 
doctrine of the divine right of kings/sultans has all but disappeared in the modern 
world, replaced by the almost universal democratic ideology that power resides in 
the people. However governments still use sacred rituals to acquire legitimacy, 
often appealing to transcendent, universal truths (such as Pancasila).  “Universal” 
conceptions, or particular interpretations of them that are determined by the 
dominant power of the time, often come into conflict with more particular, local 
versions of political truth.  In the political context of Islam and Christianity, the 
tension between universal principles and particular traditions is perennial.388  
 
Dominant groups extend their own civilization by universalising their own 
cultural and ritual practices.  For example, converts of English missionaries not 
only took on Western clothing and hairstyles, they also learned to drink English 
tea at 4 PM each day.  Before the West arrived in Southeast Asia, Islam spread 
with remarkable tolerance for local ritual practices (see Chapters III and IV).  
However during the period of Western colonialism, local rulers sharpened the 
distinctions between religions and cultures, often by introducing “original” Arabic 
Islamic rituals and suppressing local practices.  The ‘politics of ritual’ 
distinguished between the different ritual and political orientations of nobles, 
(priayi), peasants (abangan) and ‘orthodox Muslims’ (santri).  The priayi 
accommodated whoever was in power, including collaboration with the 
colonialists, but maintained their ideological detachment.  The abangan evolved 
their own distinct synthesis of local traditions with Islam, accommodating the 
ideology of the powerful with their ancestral practices, while the santri tried to 
recover a pure and rational understanding of universal Islamic practices while 
avoiding compromise with local beliefs.389   
 
In the context of modern Indonesia, the tension between universal ideologies and 
particular, cultural approaches can be found in both Islamic and Christian 
practices (cf. Siddique: 1997). Both Christians and Muslims have rationalized 
religion by maintaining a universal revelation that may be interpreted differently 
in particular contexts.  The challenge is to apply religious discourse as appears in 
the Qur’an and the Bible to particular cultural and political contexts of Indonesia 
(Meuleman: 2001, 1-12).  In my opinion, these are noble efforts as long as they do 
not sink into religious formalism or absolutism that denies the multicultural 
pluralism of Indonesia and impose a particular religious or cultural ideology on 
all.  Religious or cultural absolutism often leads to conflict over competing truth 
claims that may be masks to hide a struggle for power in the name of religion.  
Religion is used as a tool to attract the loyalty of new followers.  In the history of 
the North Moluccas, we can see the politics of ritual in the practices of various 
                                                 
388See Chapter II.  The differences between the two Islamic mainstreams, Sunni and Shi’a can be 
traced back to the political cultures of two main ethnicities before they embraced Islam. Youssef 
M. Choueiri argues that the conflict between Mu’awiya and Caliph Ali after the death of 
Muhammad were political conflicts between two ethnic groups with different political traditions, 
rather than theological or religious conflicts (Choueiri:1989, 45).   
389 See (Nakamura: 1977); cf. (Syamsudin: 1995a 47-98) and (Geertz: 1960). 
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Sultans as well as the Portuguese and Japanese colonizers.  The Sultans joined 
Islamic trade networks while the Portuguese urged their partners to join the 
universal (Catholic) Church.  Meanwhile the Japanese used the repertoire of “anti 
Christian, anti West as the political language to build loyalty with Indonesians.  
Only the Dutch seemed not to care what religion their subjects followed as long as 
there was a profit to be made.  Perhaps that is one secret of their long success! 
 
Din Syamsuddin distinguishes between three approaches to the contextualisation 
of Islam in Indonesia (Syamsudin: 1995b).  First, the approach of Islamic 
formalism, secondly, a substantialist approach and third fundamentalism.  
Formalism accepts the Islamic values of the original Arab cultural context as 
universal values that must be applied in all different particular settings. This 
approach emphasizes that both the substance and the form of Islamic rituals do 
not change and must be carried out legalistically. Formalism aims to create an 
Islamic state because political power is needed to control the homogenizing 
process of Islamic practices in society.  In contrast, the substantialist approach 
emphasizes that Islam stands for universal values and principles that may be 
applied differently in different contexts.  The content of Islamic universal 
principles, not their form, is what is important.  According to substantialists, it is 
not important for the state to adopt the symbols or attributes of Islam as long as 
adheres to the fundamental teachings of the Prophet concerning justice, law, 
morality, etc.  The goal is not for Islam to gain political power but rather for Islam 
to reshape the society, including the hearts and practices of the people.  Thirdly, 
the fundamentalist approach is similar to formalism in asserting a single, absolute 
truth, but is sceptical of the attempt to seize political power.  Fundamentalists 
challenge the status quo of Islam when it seizes control of the state.  Some 
fundamentalists believe that Muslims must cleanse themselves from within rather 
than seek power.  They are like formalists in insisting on a very literal 
interpretation of scriptures but more like substantialists in emphasizing inner 
change rather than using the power of the state.  According to Syamsuddin this 
approach is temporary as it serves as a critique of the other two approaches when 
they are unsuccessful.    
 
Reflecting on Syamsuddin’s typology, we can distinguish two different 
conceptions of universalism.  First, the substantialist approach suggests a 
universalism in which that which is universal may appear differently in different 
cultural contexts.  The quality that is universal will be recognized even if the 
actual practices, words and symbols used are different.  Something is called 
universal if its quality is recognised in an ever-widening area even though it is 
labelled with a different name.  For example, the word ‘sapi’ is an Indonesian 
word that corresponds to the English word “cow”.  The cow remains the same 
(universal), even though it is named and even conceptualised differently in 
different places.  Similarly, the truths of a particular religion may be named 
differently without losing their essential truth. 
 
Secondly, in contrast with substantialist universalism, the formalistic and 
fundamentalistic approaches understand a particular word, conception and 
practice from a particular time and place as universal, even if they are not yet 
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understood nor accepted in other contexts.   The truth was once and for all time 
displayed at Mecca and Medina during the 7th Century and we must return as 
literally as possible to the commandments of the prophet that are seen as the 
Words of God.  This conception of universalism is displayed in all kinds of 
messianic nationalism that proclaims a particular political agenda as the universal 
path to salvation for the people (cf. I. Aaron: 1967; Schulte Nordholt – Visser: 
1997). 
 
This latter kind of universalism has been a significant cause of conflict for all of 
human history.  Modern movements for democratic freedoms and protection of 
human rights have placed increasing pressures on states to emancipate their 
citizens without trying to shape their religious or political identity.  Instead, 
universal qualities that appear in all cultures suggest a global ethic that unites 
rather than divides different religions and ideologies.  The Islamic world is 
struggling to understand how the universal values of Islam can flourish in the 
modern world without loosing their unique particularity that is rooted in Arab 
culture.390  New methods of historical interpretation in Islam have led to an 
outpouring of new ideas, including new understandings of the emancipation of 
women in the Islamic theology (see Wahud: 1999; Abugideiri: 2001).   
 
Christianity also continues to struggle with the dialectic between universal and 
particular truths.  Historical critical methods of interpretation are commonplace in 
Christian theology, and have led to radical cultural relativism in some academic 
circles.  Contextualized theology refuses to recognize any particular cultural 
forms as universal.  There is no particular Christian culture and all cultures are in 
principle opened to the work of God.  Unfortunately not all Christians are tolerant.  
The fastest growing segments of the Christian church tend towards 
fundamentalism and/or Pentecostalism, often advocating one particular cultural 
style as the absolute, universal truth.  Since the United States is the only current 
world empire, it is not surprising that fundamentalists mistake American styles of 
Christianity as the universal truth.  Just as there is great diversity in Islamic views 
of universal truth, so there is great diversity in world wide Christianity.  Therefore 
generalizations are risky.  However it is safe to say that most mainline Protestant 
and Catholic theology favours dialogue between religions and work to promote 
justice rather than efforts to impose a particular form of religion as the universal 
truth (see Knitter: 1989, cf. Adeney: 1995). 
 
Formalism, whether Christian or Muslim, universalises the particular and uses 
ritual in service of a political movement.  The formalists use religion to disconnect 
society from local practices that actually have universal meaning as they tie the 
people together within the traditions of their families, clans, tribes and nation.  
Formal religious principles that are universalised as the will of God may increase 
solidarity within a limited group of fellow believers even as they break down the 
social ties that are available outside of the original religious tradition.  Imposition 
of absolute norms extends the power of a particular religious elite who claims 
                                                 
390 This struggle can be seen in Indonesia, for example, through the reflections of Nurcholid 
Madjid and Paramadina and in Malaysia through the Sisters of Islam community.  See (Othman: 
1994). 
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divine revelation as their legitimation for forcing their will on everyone else.  This 
form of universalism rationalized imperialist politics during the colonial period 
and continues wherever a government uses nationalist rhetoric to justify 
exploitation of the weak without regard for the will of the people (cf. Headley: 
1997). 
 
A shift in our understanding of universalism and particularism in relation to the 
politics of religion can give a new face to religion itself.  The universal 
significance of religion is located in a larger understanding of religious truth.  
Coercive political policies based on a single religious community’s understanding 
of universal truth cannot claim legitimacy in a pluralistic society that conceives of 
the people as sovereign.  It might appear that this shift in paradigm implies a 
complete separation between religion and politics, with a secular state, which 
disavows all particular religious values.  However this is not the case.  Religious 
values still inform the politics of the state, although collective action in the name 
of a particular religion is moved from common responsibility to personal 
responsibility.  Religions may still work to transform society, but not because they 
control the political resources of the state, but rather because they pressure the 
state to provide goods and services to its citizens.  Universal religions should 
honour the peculiar existence of human beings in their varied contexts.  The 
positive functions of religion become stronger when its universal meanings are 
reformulated in local, regional and national contexts. 
 
We need to locate the influence of formalism and fundamentalism as it occurred 
in the violence in the Moluccas, in a bigger picture of global change.  The revival 
of fundamentalism is part of a reaction against globalisation.  Secularism 
challenges the social values of religion in a community.  Secular liberal values 
threaten even the tolerant contextualized versions of universal truth espoused by 
religions.391  Islamic discourse strongly rejects secularism even as it seeks the 
empowerment of modern technology.  It is quite likely that the material changes 
brought by technology have a more profound affect on Islamic societies than 
Western liberal secularism.  Be that as it may, the pervasive impact of global 
capitalism on all aspects of life poses a profound threat to religiously committed 
ways of life.  One response is to absolutize local beliefs as a defence against the 
                                                 
391 According to Din Syamsudin, the fundamentalist movement has a temporal target because it 
reminds Islam of its critical function towards the state powers (Syamsudin : 1995b).  At the 
national level, the role of the fundamentalists is to struggle for justice for the Islamic community 
when they are oppressed by the politics of the state. In Indonesia, the politics of the state 
oppressed the Islamic community and that created resistence (Al-Chaidar: 2000).  Emad Eldin 
Shahin argues that Islamic resistance is inspired by a return to Islamic teachings in the Qur’an  
(Shahin: 1997).  In this context, many people see the politics of Islam as intolerant and physically 
violent.  However according to fundamentalist Muslims, mental violence through media and 
television is worse than violence to the body.  The militancy of fundamentalists creates a counter 
attack that is also fundamentalist and also uses violence as a means of struggle. In the North 
Moluccas, mass violence occurred when two parties took basically fundamentalist positions. The 
problem became more acute with the involvement of people from outside the communities. Local 
Laskar Jihad , the national Laskar Jihad and the military combined to overcome the Christian 
communities who were accused of being followers of the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS). 
However, there was no historical connection between the people of the North Moluccas and the 
RMS movement in the Central Moluccas (see Chapter VI).  
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overwhelming speed of social and technological change (cf. Aldridge: 2000, 
101).392  In my opinion, religions do hold universal values that clash with the 
values of international capitalism, however universal values cannot be frozen into 
one particular cultural form.  Nor can they be imposed from without on a 
multicultural, multireligious society. 
 
8.4.  Political Alternatives after the Violence:  Syari’ah or Civil Society? 
After the 1999-2000 violence, very few Christians remained in Ternate.  Some 
Muslims began a movement to impose Islamic law (Syari’ah) as the source of law 
for Ternate.  Actually the central government has responded positively to Syari’ah 
as law for governing religious practices.  The government does not apply Syari’ah 
but allows Muslims to use Syari’ah to govern their own communities.  The 
government ensures that Syari’ah religious regulations are not applied to all 
citizens, but only those who come under the jurisdiction of Islamic courts.  
Nevertheless many non-Muslims are quite concerned about this tendency towards 
“Islamisization” (Islamisasi), i.e. the spreading of Islamic influences throughout 
the society (Hefner: 1995a,21-46; Hefner: 2000).  Under the New Order, this 
policy was applied to the obligations of Islamic faith (Din). The New Order 
government built many mosques, Islamic educational institutions, etc.  However, 
at the same time, the New Order oppressed militant Islamic groups. 
 
Islamic law (Syari’ah) is a religious obligation for all Muslims, but not for non-
Muslims.  However Muslim discourse is by no means unified on how far 
governmental coercive power should be used to uphold Syari’ah, even for 
Muslims.  Surahman Hidayat explains that Syari’ah ensures the individual rights 
of non-Muslims, but is not clear about the political rights of non-Muslim as 
citizens.  In conservative readings of Syari’ah Jews and Christians (dzimmi) have 
the right to protection, as long as they pay a tax, but are not citizens of the 
commonwealth and have no political rights.  However neither the Qur’an nor the 
Hadith discuss the mechanisms of a modern state, such as the executive, 
judicative, and legislative functions of government (Hidayat: 2001, 6-23).  If the 
function of law is to protect and unite all the citizens of a society, then Islamic law 
seems curiously inappropriate for a multicultural society.  However some Muslim 
scholars argue that the universal teachings of Qur’an and Hadith can inspire the 
                                                 
392 Bruce Lawrence insists that the various distinctions within the Muslim community appear in 
their dress, business and politics (Lawrence: 1998, 170-172).  Sometimes the same distinctions can 
be seen among Christians, Hindus and Buddhists (Smith: 1974).  Sometimes a community is 
called fundamentalist because of their extreme rejection of secularism. The almost universal 
influence of secularism through communication and media technologies not only changes the way 
people think but also their ideologies and their beliefs.  Lawrence describes the revival of Islam in 
relation to the Western economy, politic hegemony and the influence of globalisation that already 
began in the period colonialism (Lawrence: 1998).  The politics of Islam creates a new bargaining 
position in the context of the politics of free market capitalism.  The politics of oil contributes to 
the tension between the Islamic world and Western countries.  Arab politicians acknowledges that 
the nation states of the Islamic world are rich, but they are not wealthy (Shahin: 1997, 10). This 
interesting statement shows an awareness of the weakness of Arab nation states for bargaining on 
the world market, as well as their inability to create the products they use. 
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principles of law and justice that are consistent with constitutionalism and the 
universal declaration of human rights (An-Na’im: 1994a). 
 
Muslims often argue for Syari’ah because they say Islam affects all of life and 
cannot be separated from politics.  Religion and the state are one.  This statement 
may be trued in theory but is hard to apply to a multicultural state.  A 
multicultural state like Indonesia needs a government that can create justice for 
the whole nation, including those who are non-Muslim. The separation of Church 
and State in Western politics did not occur because the people thought religions 
had nothing to say to politics.  The problem was that religions that universalised 
their particular forms and rituals often discriminated against citizens who did not 
use the same rituals and symbols.  A state that, like Indonesia, is founded on the 
sovereignty of the people, must guarantee the equal rights of all its citizenships.  
Indonesia may not follow the Western doctrine of a complete separation of 
religion from politics, but should at least encourage the proper role of religion in 
building the character of all its citizens as tolerant people who can live together in 
peace, i.e. a civil society. 
 
Aldridge distinguishes between the politics of religion and civil religion.  The 
politics of religion describes how the state uses religious symbols and sacred 
rituals to form the political identity of its citizenships for the political interests of 
the regime (Aldridge: 2000, 157).  The politics of religion uses a single religion as 
the foundation and official religion of the state. The symbols and ritual practices 
used in the politics of religion do not arise organically from the social 
relationships that are available in that particular society but are taken from a 
religion that transcends all particular societies.  The state uses religion as an 
ideology that determines the characteristics of an individual in relation to the 
state.  In contrast, Aldridge views civil religion as the sacralization of truths and 
commitments that transcend any particular religion.  The essence of civil religion 
is to provide an inspiration to society and to build common commitment to truths 
that undergird the political institutions.  Civil religion also provides for protesting 
against the state when it doesn’t fulfil its mandate to uphold tolerant values such 
as basic human rights and religious freedom (Aldridge: 2000, 157). 
 
Modern Indonesian law must find a delicate balance between local adat, religious 
law and rational, pragmatic laws that address the ever-changing needs and 
problems of society.  Laws that discriminate between groups, especially on the 
basis of categories like majority and minority (Muslim and Non-Muslim), display 
elements of religious absolutism that preclude healthy negotiation to find the 
common good for society.  Democratic government is based on negotiation and 
compromise, characteristic skills that are readily available in the everyday 
practices of the Indonesian people, not on imposition of an absolute ideology.  
Religions should shift their emphasis from imposing particular “vertical” rituals 
oriented to God, to encouraging “horizontal” values of justice and peaceful 
relations with others.  A shift of emphasis towards humanistic religious values 
does not imply the loss of the sacred but rather the inclusion of the sacred in 
everyday life.  All religions can inspire a deep respect for all human beings.  
However such universal religious values are easily subverted when religion 
 333 
becomes a tool of power for forcing one version of the “truth” on everyone else.  
A politics of religion that resorts to violence in order to defend “the truth” wounds 
the soul of religion that is committed to peace and justice.   
 
A commitment to democratic principles and the politics of negotiation and 
exchange, should not be equated with “Neoliberalism.”  Liberal democratic 
societies of the wealthy capitalistic nation-states are neither the models nor the 
examples that Indonesian law must follow.  The world economic system is deeply 
unjust and favours the rich nations and the capitalist elites within countries like 
Indonesia.  Neoliberalism breaks down all trade barriers and forces poor 
countries, and the poor within those countries, to compete on a “level playing 
field” with the rich and powerful.  The result is an increasing gap between the rich 
and the poor.  Even the freedom of speech is not an absolute value, especially in a 
context where the rich and powerful control all the media of communication.  
Market mechanisms do not result in justice but only in the suppression of all 
voices that do not support the dominant elites.  True negotiation requires a free 
press but a free press need not be defined as a press that is enslaved to the 
marketplace and unrestrained by a social conscience.  Neoliberalism sometimes 
leads to the suffering and exploitation of the poor, as seen in the agricultural 
transformation of the village of Ngidiho (see Chapters III, VI and VII). 
 
8.5.  Religion, Ideology and Politics 
 
The present system of nation-states is a product of colonialism, globalisation and 
modernisation.  The modern nation-state exists within a system that maintains the 
hegemony of Western capitalism.  It is not easy for a former colony to build a 
democratic society that is appropriate for the local context.  However, even 
though social structures that were shaped by colonialism influence the current 
shape of society, it is still the indigenous people who will determine their own 
future (see Chapter IV and V).  In Chapter II I describe the relationship between 
the Protestant Reformation and the appearance of the modern nation-state. The 
nation state arose in Western Europe before the American Revolution created a 
new model of democratic freedom.  The Protestant Reformation shaped a nation-
state that emphasized the interaction between religion and territory.  In contrast, 
the new nation-state in America, in principle (although not always in practice), 
denied the relevancy of ethnicity or religion in the formation of state territory (see 
Benjamin: 1988). 
 
According to Henry, the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States of 
America was based on the religious spirit of the Puritans (Henry: 1979).  This 
Preamble recognizes the role of religious belief in state politics.  However the 
state does not support any particular religion but rather encourages a generalized 
civil religion.  In Indonesia, both Pancasila and the Preamble to the Constitution 
(UUD 1945) recognize the power of God, not only in Islam but also in other 
religions. The recognition of “the Great Unity of Deity” (Ketuhanan yang Maha 
Esa) reflects the Indonesian people’s general commitment to monotheism. 393 
                                                 
393 In America, God is generally equated with the Go d of Israel and the Christian tradition (see 
Henry: 1979, ix). Robert Bellah states that the revelation of Qur’an to the prophet Muhammad 
 334 
In the history of the Indonesian Constitution, a single phrase requiring all 
Muslims to obey Islamic law (Syari’ah) was first proposed and then deleted.  The 
abolition of this phrase, known as the Jakarta Charter, as well as of other 
provisions, such as that the President must be a Muslim, is based on the 
understanding that the state should not legalise a single religion for its citizens 
(see Chapter V).  The Indonesian state does require that its citizens believe in One 
God.  The belief in the great Oneness of God unifies an Indonesian identity that 
transcends the great diversity of religions and beliefs.  Andrée Feillard describes 
the political compromises that led to the abolition of the Jakarta Charter on the 
22nd of June 1945.  These compromises were possible due to the role of the NU 
Party.  However, Feillard also shows that NU’s later doubts about Pancasila were 
related to Suharto’s use of Pancasila along with Javanese Ritual to maintain his 
power (Feillard: 1997, see Chapter V).  Thus Feillard argues that NU’s 
deemphasis on Pancasila was prompted by suspicion of Suharto’s political agenda 
regarding succession and did not indicate a rejection of Pancasila as the ideology 
of the state. 
 
After Suharto was pushed out of office, there was an urgent movement to 
delegitimize Pancasila.  This movement was part of the crisis atmosphere brought 
on by the economic collapse.  The economic crisis hit the middle classes like a ton 
of bricks and many slid below the poverty line.  According to Hefner, the middle 
class in Indonesia tends to be santri (pious Muslims).  In the pressure of the 
economic crisis, the pattern of rhetoric among the santri shifted from 
“substantialist” Islam to “formalism” and “fundamentalism”.  A similar shift in 
rhetoric also took place in other religions, such as Christianity.  Most Indonesians 
view religion as a vital element in determining public welfare (Hefner: 1995a, 38).  
Therefore, when things go badly there is a duel tendency to think that a stricter, 
more formalistic commitment to one’s own religion may bring safety, and to 
become suspicious of other religions as the cause of the calamity. 
 
Hefner shows how democratic principles are a vital part of “Civil Islam” in 
Indonesia.  Indonesia’s struggle to deal with secularisation, foreign ideologies and 
global economic competition are testing the development of civil Islam.  
Nevertheless, civil Islam has become the dominant discourse about the nation-
state of Indonesia (Hefner: 2000).  None of the political parties that compete in 
Indonesia are really secular parties because all acknowledge the Pancasila 
principle of the great unity of deity.  However there is a distinct division between 
parties that explicitly or implicitly use Islam as their primary political rhetoric and 
those who do not.  Prior to the 2004 elections, explicitly Islamic parties have not 
fared well with the electorate. 
 
Islam in Indonesia is different from Islam in other countries.  For example, 
Michael Hitchcock describes how Islam in Eastern Indonesia, in particular Bima, 
adjusted to the local context.  Islamic practices in Bima respect the kinship 
traditions and the material context prior to the arrival of Islam.  As a result, 
Muslim religion in Bima is unique and not simply a reflection of the Islamic 
                                                                                                                                     
does not use the term Allah as Father or King.  Rather Allah is similar to Yahweh, the God of the 
Jews (Bellah: 1970, 82-83, 95-96, 149). 
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religion that came from Arabia or India (Hichcock: 1988, 4). In the context of the 
North Moluccas, justice is at the core of religious teaching.  In the everyday life of 
the people, fair practices of exchange are a fundamental part of religion.  These 
values inspired the labourers to fight for their rights. For example, the traditional 
practice of providing food for all labourers, in addition to their salary, led the 
people to reject the Banana Company’s policy of denying rice to women labourers 
on the ground that they would get rice from their husbands.   
 
Bahtiar Effendi argues that the principles of universal Islam are tolerant and pay 
attention to humanitarian rights (Effendi: 1995, 1-19, cf. Price: 1999, 137-156).  
Nurcholish Madjid echoes this view. Madjid insists that Qur’an does not codify 
that a state has to apply Islamic Law. Both Effendi and Madjid suggest that in its 
political aspect, Islam should focus more on nation building and building a civil 
society in Indonesia rather than founding an explicitly Islamic state.  Madjid 
prefers to translate civil society as masyarakat madina, thereby underlining his 
conviction that the society that Muhammad built in the city of Medina was a truly 
civil society.  Madjid argues that the principles of tolerance, equality and justice 
applied to all peoples, tribes, ethnic groups and religions that lived together in 
Medina (Madjid, as discussed in Hidayat: 2000).394  However Madjid has been 
criticized for idealizing Medina and substituting a law-based, top-down concept of 
civil society in place of the idea of autonomous mediating institutions whose 
freedom is guaranteed by basic human rights.395 
 
Intellectual debates by moderate, liberal or “post- liberal” Muslims about the 
nature of civil society are a far cry from the political agenda of more radical 
Islamic parties who want to transform all of Indonesia into the Dar al Islam, the 
territory of the ummah.  According to Syamsuddin, the agenda of Muslim parties 
to create an Islamic state rests on an inadequate interpretation of the Qur’an 
(Syamsuddin: 1995b).  Unfortunately Syamsuddin does not show us how to carry 
out an historically critical interpretation of the holy book.  Kamali suggests that 
the conception of dawlat Islamiyyah assumes that the population of the state 
includes both Muslims and non-Muslims who need not be differentiated in 
carrying out the commandments of the Qur’an, namely doing good and attacking 
                                                 
394 Ann L. S. Lambton in her research about state and government in the Middle Ages of Islam 
concluded that the Constitution of Madinah framed the concept of ummah. The word Ummah 
means a community that is equal. There is no difference of existence but only different functions 
in the community. God is the head of the community and his orders are given directly.  Islam 
teaches that through the prophet Muhammad Muslims can achieve the essence of Ummah.  The 
purpose of the ummah is to teach how human beings have to live with respect and fear of God in 
preparation to face his judgment before entering heaven (Lambton: 1985 [1981]). The perspective 
of Madjid and Lambton are close to the opinion of Roberth Bellah.  Bellah use of Rousseau’s term 
“civil religion” shows that religion cannot be separated from politics because the people who 
govern are also those who believe (Bellah: 1970; Gehrig: 1979). However, the law that ties the 
religious people cannot be used as the law of state. Wilbur Zelinsky discusses how American 
nationalism interweaves different layers of cultural symbols and religion in the society and ties 
them together as a civil religion (Zelinsky: 1998). Allan Aldridge quotes Gellner who states that in 
the future, world politics will not be separated from the creation of collective rituals that can tie 
together different societies that have different ethnic groups, religions and social classes (Aldrige: 
2000, 64). 
395 See (Ahmad Baso:1999). 
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evil. The focus of this Qur’anic conception is known as hisbah and it is bigger 
than Syari’ah that emphasizes the territory Dar-al–Islam (Kamali: 1994, 50).   
 
Muslim discourse on Syari’ah in Indonesia is still confused and inconsistent.  On 
the one hand, some argue that non-Muslims need not worry since Syari’ah only 
applies to Muslims and not to non-Muslims.  On the other hand there are frequent 
assertions that Syari’ah is universal and should be applied to all.  In my opinion, 
neither of these two approaches answers the question of how an officially Muslim 
state will guarantee the political rights of non-Muslim citizens.  Frequent 
assertions that non-Muslims would enjoy complete freedom of worship according 
their religion are not reassuring, since freedom of religion does not guarantee 
equal political and civil rights for all citizens (see Chapter VII). 
 
Syari’ah was created in the dynasty of Umayyad when the ummah was already 
formed in Medina (Lambton: 1985, 2-3).  Syari’ah is not a single law book 
analogous to the tradition of Roman law in the West.  Rather Syari’ah is a 
discussion about the obligations of faith (Din). It addresses all aspects of personal 
and public life, such as family, health, social structure, conflict, business, and 
politics (Lambton: 1985, 2). Therefore the acceptance of Syari’ah aims at 
integrating all Muslims into the Ummah.  In Indonesia, many aspects of Syari’ah 
have already been incorporated into the law. 
 
However, most of Islamic political parties feel that using Islamic symbols in the 
political arena without gaining power in the structure of government is not 
consistent.  They see Islam as a political force that should politically benefit its 
followers.  Islamic politics should result in the public application of Syari’ah.  In 
my opinion, the politics of religious rhetoric in Indonesia is part of a political 
transition in Indonesia in which religious symbols are used to create a clear 
distinction from the former regime.  Some parts of the Muslim community feel the 
need for Syari’ah to be imposed as national law.  They need to become more 
aware of the need for openness in interpreting Syari’ah so that it can adjust to the 
complexity of the present society.  For example, in a recent survey, a large 
majority of Muslims favoured the implementation of Syari’ah in Indonesia.  
However an equally large majority stated that they do not agree with punishing 
theft by cutting off the guilty party’s hand.396  During the political transition in 
Indonesia, Islamic parties are still searching for forms in which their religious 
ideals can be recognized in the body of Indonesian politics.397 
 
In Chapter V I explained how different groups have used a politics of rhetoric in 
different stages of the transformation of national politics without replacing the 
ideology of Pancasila and UUD 1945.   In the 1950’s, Kahin argued that Pancasila 
was the best possible synthesis of different universal values such as Islam, 
Western democracy, village democracy, the communal ideals of Indonesia and 
even the basic principles of Marxism (Kahin: 1952, 123).  However we are now in 
a new situation in which the political rhetoric that aims to replace the old ideology 
                                                 
396 This survey from the Center for Population Studies of Gadjah Mada University, was cited at the 
Journal of Anthropology Conference held in Denpasar, Bali in July, 2002. 
397 cf. (An-Na’im: 1994a, 20). 
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of the state, has to be located in the bigger context of global Islam after end of the 
Cold War, the collapse of Communism and the hegemony of Western capitalism.  
The global Islamic movement can be seen as a means to bring down outmoded 
feudal leaderships within Muslim countries (see Kepel: 1993; Price: 1999). In the 
case of Indonesia, there is an effort to transform the nation-state after the collapse 
of Suharto (see Chapter V).  If  Pancasila is to survive, the government must 
separate the ideology of Pancasila from the politics of integralism that was 
promoted by Supomo.  The “integralist state” eliminated all opposition in the 
name of an indivisible national unity that was institutionalised under the Old 
Order and the New Order.  This book argues that principles of democracy that 
permit diversity are available in the practices of the common people in Galela.  
The model of ritual negotiation and exchange is more democratic and egalitarian 
than the outmoded politics of imperial domination that has been practiced by the 
Netherlands, Japan and Java (see Chapter VII). 
 
In Indonesia, Reformasi claimed to empower civil society and remove the military 
from politics.  Unfortunately the reality was quite different.  The military used 
fundamentalist forces to create instability that delegitimized the government and 
forced a continued dependence on the military to provide basic safety.  As a result 
of the economic crisis, money politics became the norm rather than the exception.  
Competing elites could easily mobilize factions in society by giving them money 
to vote for a particular candidate or to carry out demonstrations against their rivals 
(see Chapter V).  In the power vacuum following Suharto’s fall, competing groups 
ritualised economic and political conflicts by using ethnic or religious symbols 
and practices.  Rituals mobilized the people to engage in violence, but also 
became a tool to lead them to reconciliation. 
 
This dissertation does not argue for the elimination of religion from politics, 
which is impossible in any case in Indonesia.  In fact religion can be a critical 
voice in limiting the pretensions of the state, just as the state can be a critical 
factor in restraining religious groups that want to impose their own convictions on 
everyone else.  Religion and nationalism are at their best when they dialogue 
about how best to defend the weak and correct injustice.  Together they give hope 
in the struggle for political reform.  Indonesia needs to build political structures 
that create free and safe space for bargaining between different interest groups.  
Religious and ethnic rhetoric are dangerous weapons, especially if they are 
combined with nationalistic rhetoric that excludes certain groups from parts of the 
national territory.  The state, as a neutral arbitrator should professionally 
guarantee equality, justice and dignity for all groups within the nation state of the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
 
8.6.  Closing Remarks  
 
After the violence of 1999 – 2000, stability and safety is the most important 
political agenda in the North Moluccas.  Stability depends on both the society and 
the government in the region.  Government and society live in an ongoing 
dialectic: negotiating their respective tasks for maintaining security in the region.  
Negotiations are unlikely to succeed unless they are conducted in trust and 
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respect.  On the other hand, trust and respect are not enough.  They must be 
supplemented with realistic restraints on those who would extend their power by 
appealing to selective historical memories and powerful religious symbols.  The 
constellation of power in the North Moluccas has changed resulting in new 
temptations for those who came out on top.  However at least some of the 
common people of Halmahera are now wary of religious or ethnic rhetoric as a 
means of political mobilization. 
 
The history of society in the North Moluccas is usually related from the 
perspective of Kings, Sultans and imperial powers.  However, after the violence 
of 1999-2000 the people are more aware of their own power to engage in war or 
reconciliation. The common people are trying to reformulate the relationships 
between different ethnic and religious groups based on justice, using the 
principles of exchange as a starting point.  The government cannot create peace, 
but it can empower negotiation and exchange by at least guaranteeing a minimum 
level of safety for all groups.  The government failed to promote peace in the 
period leading up to the violence.  This dissertation does not suggest that a single 
“dalang” or provocateur, whether from inside or outside the government was the 
primary cause of the violence.  However it is clear that power struggles at a 
national level contributed to the violence and the government’s inability to limit 
the suffering of the people.   
 
Cultural factors, such as ritual, should not be separated from economic and 
political factors in both creating and resolving violent conflict.  Rituals of 
exchange include religious, cultural, economic and political elements that cannot 
be separated from each other.  This dissertation is neither “Weberian” in arguing 
for predominantly cultural influences on social change, nor “Marxist” in arguing 
for the dominance of material causes.  Rather I think cultural and material causes 
cannot and should not be separated from each other.  Material things, like land, 
have no meaning apart from culture and religion, while cultural and religious 
practices are always related to material conditions.  Efforts to prevent or resolve 
future conflicts should consider the rich cultural resources of the common people 
for resolving political, social and economic problems.   
 
This dissertation shows how ethnic territories are formed within the national 
borders.  The historical research in this book shows how the discourse about 
territory changes to reflect new power realities in the region and the nation at 
large.  The people’s connection with their land is a powerful force that stimulates 
extreme emotions when threatened.  The build up to the violence in Galela was 
not just the immediate causes related to competition between the Kao and the 
Makian or the Tobelo and the Galela.  It also included the mounting frustration of 
people who had lost their land to global agro business.  The economic crisis and 
the political power vacuum added to the people’s anxiety.  
 
People who faithfully practiced their particular religions while still remaining 
loyal to their ancestors as the primary owners of their land, continued to work for 
peace.  However when the people became convinced that one religion, or the 
other, was planning to take over, the whole area erupted in violence.  A 
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counterfeit letter provided “proof” that Christians were intent on taking over the 
region.  From the opposite side, the regional government’s support of the 
Makians’ bid to take over the area of the gold mine in the land of Kao seemed to 
substantiate the suspicion that the Muslims wanted to take total control of the new 
province.  Competing territorial claims combined with religious rhetoric to divide 
the society and convince the people that they had to kill or be killed.  This study 
provides insight into the processes leading up to violence in the hopes that the 
state may learn to play a more positive role in preventing violence by protecting 
the common people from attempts to take over their land or impose an alien 
religion.   
 
During the process of reconciliation, the people deemphasized religious 
exclusivism, which was prominent as an ideology for creating conflict.  The 
common practices related to historical claims of having common ancestors 
provided a united ritual to bring people together in peaceful negotiation.  Family 
or clan rituals provided a method of reconciliation, which was strengthened by 
religious legitimation as each party took oaths in the name of God to keep their 
commitments to their former enemies.  The common people are already a civil 
society that can imbue rituals with new meaning to support the common good.   
 
However, in the national level, the negotiations between religion and politics are 
not over in Indonesia.  Suharto used religion as a means of legitimacy.  Not much 
has changed.  During the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, the President was 
the former head of NU, the Head of the MPR (parliament) was the former head of 
Muhammadiyah while the head of DPR (legislature) was the former head of HMI.  
These are the three most influential religious institutions in Indonesia.  Religion is 
a powerful force for both good and evil, oppression and liberation.  Many people 
are now tired of religion as a tool of power.  Yet many others look to religion as 
an alternative to the cynical and corrupt developmentalism of the past.  Whether 
or not religion will play a positive role in leading Indonesia out of the crises of the 
past into a more just and peaceful society is still an open question.  The answer to 
this question may depend on how skilfully the common people re-enact the rituals 
of exchange in search of a new balance that is acceptable to all parties. 
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Chapter IX 
Conclusion 
 
The Moluccas today still experience the aftermath of the violence of 1999. It is 
like the history of Indonesia which cannot be separated from the 1965 tragedy 
when many were killed as part of the anti-communist movement by New Order 
forces. Violence began in Ambon in January 1999 and spread to the North 
Moluccas in December 1999. In this book I have analysed the dynamics of this 
conflict in a wider framework of the transformation that the district of Galela went 
through in a contemporary history. 
 
As these events unfolded, I was in the village of Ngidiho in North Halmahera 
doing my Ph.D. research on the impact of globalization in the region. I watched 
the growing violence in the region and observed how these tension were ritualized 
through political symbols and rhetoric. This caused a drastic change in the 
direction of my research. I focused on the roles of rituals as powerful mechanism 
both in creating solidarity and in aggravating conflict. I chose to use ritual as a 
point of entry and a tool of analysis to counter the popular view of the civil war as 
being primarily a religious conflict. 
 
As an analytical lens, ritual helps to understand the ways in which people cope 
with community life and with the politico-economic changes that their community 
underwent. It turned out that ritual can both intensify and reconciliate a conflict. 
As a solidarity mechanism, ritual unites and mobilizes people. Ritual can rally the 
the people against real or perceived outsiders and also can help them achieve 
agreement after confrontation. When used in conflict, ritual is a means to mobilize 
people to oppose existing power structures which are seen as a threat or to fight 
other groups seen as pursuing opposite interests. 
 
Rituals are practices which give meaning to solidarity, starting at the family level 
and moving up to associations, neighbourhoods, villages, districts, provinces and 
countries. In this book I define ritual as dynamic practices, that are guided and 
informed by ideology, memories and customs, that are reshaped as needed to meet 
the needs of the present. These practices are usually highly symbolic and embody 
sacred values to give weight and strength to the present actions. These values are 
expressed through words, actions, gestures, myths, symbols etc.. Ritual practices 
consolidate and restore a sense of belonging to a community, but if this 
community falls apart through conflict, the same practices can be used to create 
solidarity within opposing factions, just as they were used to create antagonism 
between the different parties. 
 
I was privileged to live with the Ngidiho people during their struggle before and 
after the violence.  This gave me a unique perspective on the events. I built my 
analysis from everyday practices of the Ngidiho people which provided material 
resources to reconstruct their social history.  My own ethnographic accounts are 
the main instruments for examining the present practices of the people.  I trace the 
oral history of the people by observing their present practices together with their 
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own interpretation. With this approach, I try to present village life as seen through 
the eyes of the people.  Then I carefully examined both primary and secondary 
sources in order to understand the interpretations and assumptions of other 
researchers in the region. 
  
In the everyday practices of the Ngidiho people, ritual plays an important role. 
People harmonize themselves with nature through ritual.  Ritual does not only 
structure the human life cylce but also mediates between people as they pass 
through crises in their families, clans and political relationships. Ritual functions 
as a mediating “language” that facilitates the negotiation of power. Ritual 
formulates ideology and material conditions into concrete actions and uses sacred 
meanings to legitimize the decisions they reach together. For the Ngidiho people, 
sacred meanings originate with their common ancestors. Their ancestors are 
transformed into good spirits who are expected to protect their clans and villages 
and may even be seen as a source of salvation. 
 
    However these traditional beliefs are transformed and partly obliterated by the 
impact of global change and the arrival of new religions which insist on replacing 
the ancestors with God as the source of the sacred. The dynamics between 
material changes and everyday practices of the community in Ngidiho led to 
ideological changes in the politics of ritual.  Modernization of agriculture created 
new structures within the kin-networks and changed living patterns. Sometimes 
within the same material context, several different concepts are used to explain 
the same meanings.  For example, the meaning of local religious practices are 
adapted to fit to Islamic and Christian doctrines, but without losing their old 
meanings as well. 
 
The transformation of the economic and ecological contexts in Galela led to a 
reformulation of social and cultural customs. The change in the material base of 
society forced the people to rewrite the basic concepts about what they do in their 
everyday lives. Still, the gap between the older generation and younger generation 
hinders the reformulation of ideology in the cultural practices of society. 
 
Sometimes there are policies that show inequality between different groups in 
society. The Galela marriage rituals illustrate a model of ritualized exchange in 
which different parties negotiatie their position in the community by exchanging 
labour, services and various kinds of wealth. The system is designed to maintain 
trust and equality in the society. The Galela practice gift exchange primarily in 
relations with people from outside their nuclear family. In Ngidiho, relationships 
between siblings should be unconditional. However relationships with other 
people are conditional.  Marriage is a major way to extend kin ties and community 
relations. The people of Ngidiho accept foreigners and strangers into their families 
through marriage because they believe that an exchange of blood via marriage 
also strengthens their existence as spirits after death. The goal of their spiritual 
transformation after death is to become one of the ancestral spirits (o diliki).  
 
Solidarity is a central ingredient of the Ngidiho people’s efforts to further expand 
their networks. The practice of generalized exchange in Galela, such as jojobo is 
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like a revolving fund system, to help each family meet the high costs of the 
primary rituals in the life cycle. Jojobo extends relations of mutual help and 
marriage bonds. Jojobo makes others to become part of one’s family. When 
people do not engage in the ritual practice of exchange, they are seen as enemies 
of the community; they disturb the mechanisms that include them in a process of 
giving and receiving. 
 
Life practices of the Galela should be seen in their totality. Exchange is a ritual 
practice that is found in all aspects of the Galela people’s life, including the 
economic, religious and political domains. Ideally the practices of exchange 
promote solidarity and acknowledge both the economic and spiritual needs that 
form the basic identity of the people in Ngidiho.  
 
Practices of exchange do not guarantee either justice or balance within a society if 
there is severe inequality. The Banana Company strengthened  the economic 
infrastructure by bringing new technology and skills to Galela. However at the 
same time, it took away people’s land causing major opposition from the farmers 
and others who demanded adequate compensation.  During the conflict, the 
politics of ritual mobilized the people of Galela, structurally linking their local 
problems with regional, national and international ideologies that tapped into their 
traditions and religion. Religious identity polarized people who were linked by 
ties of kinship, co-residence, and culture. Before these conflict came into the 
open, tensions within and between families were addressed through ritual which 
served as mechanisms to bring people together. The wedding party that I 
described in the early part of this book is a reflection on how ritual action 
functioned amidst local tensions. 
 
    Analysis of ritual action requires that we understand how rituals function within a 
larger context of the ongoing negotiations for power and position. A “thick 
description” narrates the conditions and reasons behind the event. The desciption 
doesn’t mean to separate ritual action as a political event from ritual as a cultural 
performance. The narraton is only a tool for understanding that the total meaning 
of a ritual action includes both the ideology it expresses and the material 
conditions which it negotiates. These two aspects cannot be separated.  
 
    In this study I examine the tensions between different groups’ material interests, 
which influenced the formation of particular political rituals.  Colonial 
competition for a trade monopoly employed competing ideologies, which aimed 
to formalise the identity of the society in order to control its population and 
exploit its resources. Two methods were employed in the politics of trade. First, 
the colonia lists appealed to material interests based on the rational subjectivity of 
the people. Secondly, they tried to mould the people’s spiritual subjectivity to 
enhance loyalty. Changes in the macro political economy transformed the villages 
in the District of Galela.  
 
Religion and ritual provide ways to build collective identity. Religion creates 
coalitions against the enemies of the community based on shared values. Often the 
people accepted and modified outside institutions of power as a means of 
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increasing their knowledge but without engaging in depth with its ideology.  
Sometimes feudal relations based on ancient ties, such as the authority of the 
Sultan of Ternate, were radically changed by the intrusion of a new power from 
outside through trade. Religious  loyalty tied the society together in the North 
Moluccas but was always influenced by competition for trade. In Halmahera the 
spread of Islam and Christianity occurred slowly at the end of the 19th century. 
Although the Sultan of Ternate was a Muslim who helped to form the political 
identity of Halmahera, this did not occcur smoothly because his policies were 
often oppressive to the local people. Indigenous groups that felt oppressed by the 
Sultan tended to retain their tribal religion or convert to Christianity. However, the 
most profound relationship between religion and politics began in Halmahera 
when religious identity was required as a part of political identity before the first 
parliamentary elections in 1955. The people in Ngidiho were forced to convert to 
Islam or Christianity before they could vote. 
 
During the post-colonial period in the Moluccas, the central government in Jakarta 
tried to control the political loyalty of the Moluccan people by creating coalitions 
based on old ties of political loyalty.  For example, Golkar employed the Sultan of 
Ternate to become an elite cadre. The last election before Suharto stepped down 
shows that the Golkar party opened the door for the Sultan of Ternate to return to 
regional power.  The Sultan revitalized the historical memories of the region. 
Political rituals enlivened national and regional power struggles and the power 
dynamics electrified political rituals. 
  
    National politics deeply affected the regional politics of the North Moluccas. The 
separation of the North Moluccas from the province of the Moluccas sharpened 
the old competition among the four kingdoms in the area. It reinvented the bitter 
political rivalry between Ternate and Tidore who used the Kao and Makians to 
stake out their differing claims to the ancient Kingdom of Maluku-Kie-Raha. The 
political transformation among the regional elites drove the people to divide into 
different groups that distinguished themselves from each other through their 
history of loyalties, religions and sub-ethnicities. When the interests became great 
and the conflict could not longer be managed wisely, the common people of 
Northen Halmahera had to pay the price in their own blood. 
 
 In Halmahera, it is clear that riots were not just the result of the local people’s 
will. National politics transformed regional power struggles over control of local 
natural resources. Political instability then provided an opportunity to attempt to 
defend territories or the borders of an area. The bureacractic elite used violence to 
enforce their will and made the people defend themselves. The only means of 
defence was through direct participation in the war. Political rituals swept people 
up in an overwhelming movement that forced them to go to war. In Ngidiho, it 
can be concluded that rituals mobilized the masses to commit themselves to 
violent action.  The local media, innuendos and rumours about black magic 
created the illusion of predestined violence.  A counterfeit letter created a 
discourse of fear, suggesting that there were plans for Christian domination of the 
whole territory.   
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Many people faithfully practiced their particular religions while still remaining 
loyal to their ancestors as the primary owners of the land. They continued to work 
for peace.  However when people became convinced that one religion or the other 
was planning to take over, the whole area erupted in violence.  The counterfeit 
letter provided “proof” that Christians were intent on taking over the region.  
Similar fears arose among the Christians, fed by rumours and the government 
supported bid for the Makians to take over the area of the gold mine in Kao.  
Religious rhetoric sharpened the conflict and convinced many people that they 
had to kill or be killed. The analysis of the subsequent violence in this book 
provides insight into the processes leading up to violence. 
 
The people defended themselves at two levels. First, among the common people, 
those who had formerly lived together in peace attacked and murdered each other. 
In doing so, people had to free themselves from family and kinship networks. To 
justify their actions the people employed a new synthesis combining universal 
religious identity with local, ancestral rituals that strengthened their structures of 
power and claims to the truth. This stimulated them to commit violent acts. Ritual 
gave sacred legitimacy to their actions, promised invulnerability to their bodies 
and clarity against the ambiguity of their identity and status (cf Douglas: 1988 
[1966], 103-104). 
     
 Secondly, at the level of the bureacratic elite in Ternate and in Tobelo, leaders of 
each group publised books and articles that aimed to give a rational explanation 
that would justify the warfare in which they were involved. These books and 
articles developed a political discourse that rewrote the history of their groups and 
religion, claiming a uniqueness over other group and religions that has been 
passed down from their ancestors. These interpretations of history lack internal 
consistency but reveal a social discourse that is gauged in new global terms. 
 
There can be no doubt that “memory” from before and after the riots is one of the 
important factors that influences conflict and its resolution. Memory also 
determines how we see division in a society. Bauman shows how memories 
formed social class in England at the end of the 18-century (Bauman: 1982). He 
says that memory functions to continue history. Memory makes history alive. 
Societies need a living history in their efforts to understand the meaning of change 
from an old environment to a new one (Bauman: 1982, 3). Memory is crusial in 
keeping people together, but at the same time people reconstruct their memories. 
Human beings forget a bitter history when it can no longer help them to survive 
the social changes they face.  After the violence, a new history was written to give 
legitimacy to a new reality. This revision of memories may serve a political 
purpose but at the grass roots level, people try to understand bitter events by 
relating their experience to their religious or tradit ional beliefs.   
 
For example, some people explained the violence as the result of Satan tempting 
human beings. The people objectified the violence by using the word “disaster” to 
efface the painful memories of their own participation and construct the vio lence 
as something similar to what happens in nature. Sometimes human beings can 
transcend disaster in this way, but sometimes they cannot. The history that lives in 
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the memory of communities is not a single, fixed conceptualisation.  Historical 
memories are open to adjustment as people have to face new and changing 
situations by reflecting on the ideas and practices that are available in their 
tradition. The people process the history of their ethnic groups and religions in 
order to recreate their memories of the society in North Moluccas as we have seen 
in the specific example of the Ngidiho people.   
  
 The physical borders of ethnic history that were not clear before in December 
1999 became clear after the conflict. Ethnic identity was equated with religious 
identity. Ethnic groups construct both secular and messianic national ideologies to 
sustain an imagined identity and inspire the political struggle of their people (cf 
Anderson: 1999).  Political labelling based on antagonistic religious loyalties 
resulted in sharp divisions in the society. People became divided by ethnicity, 
religion and descent. In the North Moluccas, boundaries between people are not 
only imaginary but also a physical reality. Religious rituals include taboos for one 
community that are not binding for outsiders of the belief.  Ideological taboos 
shaped the physical separation of the Christian’s houses from the Muslims in 
Ngidiho.  For example, the Christians raised pigs and allowed them to wander 
free.  This caused the Muslims to physically separate themselves from the 
Christians.  During the conflict, the refugees also created  geographical 
boundaries according to religion. Muslim refugees fled to Ternate and Tidore 
while Christian refugees escaped to Tobelo (Northern Halmahera) and Manado-
Bitung in North Sulawesi.  
 
 Imagined religious identities that are constructed by violence threaten the identity 
of  common people. However, when people are isolated from each other by 
physical threats their physical segregation may only continue as long as the 
physical danger persists. The people search for free space in social relationships 
with any party that does not threaten them. They free themselves from the 
limitations of imagined space that were created by their different political 
identities and negotiate renewed relationships through economic exchange based 
on assumptions of equality. 
 
 After the conflict the refugees reoriented themselves to their place of origin rather 
than to their religious identity. Christian refugees from North Moluccas 
emphasised their identity and solidarity with Halmahera. Muslim refugees 
identified themselves more specifically as from Ternate, Tidore, or another 
particular district. The process of reorientation illustrates the potential strength of 
original location that can be recognized in different groups. Affirmation of 
identity from their original location is a process that can assist the process of 
reconciliation in North Moluccas based on common socio-cultural practices, 
because as Juliet Peteet says: “location is only a beginning in the struggle of 
identity formation” (Peteet: 2000, 183). Identification  with a particular location is 
often related to political legitimacy. Generally, identity is expressed by referring 
to the centre of the region from which the person comes (cf Anderson: 1999). 
     
 However, in the case of the refugees from North Moluccas who stayed in both 
North Sulawesi and Ternate–Tidore, their identity is linked firstly with their 
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ownership of land rather than their political location.  Re fugees from North 
Moluccas, who fled to North Sulawesi, call themselves Halmaherans. Why don’t 
they identify themselves as people of Ternate where the centre of government is 
located?  One reason is that during the violence in 1999–2000 there was no 
political or security protection from the regional government in Ternate. On the 
other hand, they do not call themselves Minahasans (people of North Sulawesi).  
People who identify themselves as Minahasan tend to stay and to work in the 
region.  However most refugees cannot complete in the Minahasa labour market 
and do not identify themselves as Minahasans.  Their identity, is rooted in their 
material context and expressed in their political struggles. Three elements can be 
seen in this. First, their identity is related to their struggle to return to their 
original home.  Secondly, their rights as Halmaherans are linked to the land that 
they inherited from their ancestors on the island of Halmahera and not in Ternate 
or Tidore. Thirdly, their land is the place where they still hope to actualise their 
potential.  
  
The refugees who fled to Ternate also made claims of political identity. Muslim 
refugees in Ternate chose to identify themselves as people from Galela, Loloda, 
and Tobelo rather than more generally as Halmaherans. During the period of 
violence the jihad troops were organised at district levels. During the conflict the 
Muslims identified themselves by district. Among the Muslim refugees, the claim 
of identity according to ethnicity took a new meaning after the violence was over 
and they returned to their home villages. Identity based on ethnicity and being 
indigenous to a particular district gave them leverage to oppose efforts by 
newcomers to take over the land that was left behind by Christian refugees. 
Muslim Galelans protected their Christian neighbours’ lands against illegal claims 
made by people from other islands or districts. In Galela, the participants in the 
violence came from the regional and national Islamic Jihad. After the Christians 
were expelled from Galela, Islamic Jihad members from other islands attempted 
to seize the Christians’ lands. However, Muslim Galelans protected the land of 
their Christian neighbours from outsiders. 
     
Paying attention to the way the people identified themselves after the violence, it 
can be concluded that their identity is related to both ownership of the land and 
the new context in which they wish to remain. Some groups tried to manipulate 
land ownership by categorising someone’s identity by religion and appealing to 
the name of Allah. Both the Muslims who remained on their land and the 
Christian refugees called themselves Halmaherans as a sign of solidarity with the 
whole indigenous population, both Muslim and Christian. Both Christians who 
remained in their original homes and Muslim refugees, used more localized ethnic 
identity as a means of asserting their right to the land. This shows that members of 
both religious communities still have a strong identity based on land and rooted in 
local traditions.  
    
Material facts stimulated the people to find or restore ancient meanings that 
legitimise their right to the land. For example they acccepted the ancestral 
territory of tona ma langi as the place for beginning the process of reconciliation. 
Genealogical myths and rituals from their ancestral traditions provided orientation 
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for entering the process of negotiating reconciliation. In the process they 
recognised that their ethnic identities were strengthened by religious practices. 
The people combined elements from the traditions of their ancestors with 
religious practices to purify their broken relationships that occured during the 
violence. Common ethnic ancestors united people.  But they also appealed to their 
common kinship with all human beings as taught by their religions. People 
created a modified ritual to meet new material conditions within their 
relationships. As trust grows, Christians and Muslims continue to rebuild their 
relationships by visiting each other and engaging in basic economic negotiations 
of ritual exchange of their surplus products. Non-governmental organisations 
helped to facilitate the process of reconciliation through providing the primary 
needs of the refugees such as housing. Using family ties that transcend religious 
barriers, non-profit organisations empowered the refugees to give exchange 
services for building each other’s family houses. Muslims built Christians’ houses 
and vise versa. The local government, played an important role in providing a 
neutral position, which could support the process of reconciliaiton.   
 
Reconciliation allowed a return to open and fair economic activities but also 
required a collective ritual of forgetting and the creation of a new, regional 
solidarity (cf. Gulliver: 1979, 16). This collective ritual is a combination of 
religious and ethnic rituals, and both are important. The people reinterpreted their 
ethnic symbols to integrate them with their religious rituals. They located their 
religious rituals within the context of ethnic particularity. The people of Galela, 
Tobelo and the North Moluccas, succesfully interpreted their universal values 
within particular cultural contexts. This enabled them to creat a new 
understanding of themselves and their communities after the violence of 
December 1999. 
    
Collective rituals serve a means of negotiation that can empower modern society 
in the North Moluccas and Indonesia. The practice of ritual exchange is also used 
by the state. Indonesian is still struggling to build vital collective rituals for the 
common good. Cultural factors, such as ritual, should not be separated from 
economic and political factors in both creating and resolving violent conflict. 
Rituals of exchange include religious, cultural, economic and political elements 
that cannot be separated from each other. The historical research in this book 
shows how the discourse about territory changes to reflect new power realities in 
the region and the nation at large. The people’s connection with their land is a 
powerful force that stimulates extreme emotions when threatened. The build up to 
the violence in Galela was not just the immediate causes related to competition 
between the Kao and the Makian or the Tobelo and the Galela. It also included the 
mounting frustation of people who had lost their land to global agro business. The 
national economic crisis and the political power vacuum following Suharto’s fall, 
added to the people’s anxiety.  
 
During the process of reconciliation, the people deemphasized religious 
exclusivism, which was prominent as an idelogy for creating conflict. The people 
revitalised an ideology of reconciliation that combined religious teaching, ethnic 
rituals and the ongoing practices of economic exchange. There is an urgent need 
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to develop exchange rituals across ethnic lines. This is underlined by the claim of 
trans-ethnic Indonesian identity that applies to all citizens and gives everyone the 
right to stay openly anywhere in Indonesian territory. Widespread migration, both 
from outside and inside the North Moluccas is a fact of modern life.  New settlers 
are forced to develop exchange relationships with the indigenous inhabitants.  
Little by little they can build solidarity that transcends the relations of family, 
clan, and tribe in the local place where they stay together as neighbours of the 
same Indonesian people. 
 
Ritual mediates and negotiates power by uniting material concern with ideology.  
Rituals in the North Moluccas establish a link between the macrocosmic world of 
symbolic meanings and the microcosmic world of every day life, by drawing from 
a long historical memory. When the ritual negotiations do not work out, ritual can 
become the stimulus for violence.  Ritual mediates transition, not only in the 
human lifecycle but also in crisis transitions of a particular society. Ritual links 
the past with the present lives of the people.   
 
The attempt to create an integrated Indonesian state is confronted with the large 
gap between middle class-intelectuals and common people. Another kind of gap 
lies between different ethnic and religious groups. After colonialism, the 
Indonesian leadership created national rituals to bridge socio-cultural differences 
and serve the particular political agendas of local groups. Sukarno was a master at 
ritualizing his style of administration. Political parties competed by using 
symbols, myths and ideological discourse. Under the New Order and in the 
present reformation period Indonesian politics continues to be saturated with 
rituals.  The government reinforces its political projects by the use of symbols.  
When negotiation is blocked, violence becomes a means of determining political 
directions.  Following the collapse of Suharto, which ushered in the Reformation 
era,  North Moluccan society resurrected the bitter political rivalry between 
Ternate and Tidore, thus stimulating the increase of political tensions. The 
political transformation among the regional elites drove the people to divide into 
different groups that distinguished themselves from each other through their 
history of loyalities, religions and sub-ethnicities.   
 
 However, as we have seen, the sharp divisions that stimulated the violence could 
not be maintained indefinitely.  People needed to weave together different threads 
from their traditions, that would allow them to return to their homelands after their 
period of exile.  Now the people are more aware of their power to engage in war 
or reconciliation. The common people are reformulating the relationship between 
different ethnic and religious groups based on justice, using the principles of 
exchange as a starting points. Family or clan rituals were infused with religious 
legitimation as each party took oaths in the name of God to keep their 
commitments to their former enemies.  This dissertation has shown how ritual 
practices of exchange inform ethno-religious identity in the North Moluccas 
within the larger national identity of Indonesia.  The people successfully 
deemphasized religious exclusivism by asserting their common ancestry, that 
enabled them to participate in a united ritual of peaceful negotiation.  
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Ritual exchange among the common people provides an alternative model for 
political negotiation that is different from the politics of domination.  Government 
efforts often create unequal patron-client relationships whereas ritual exchange 
assumes reciprocity.  Of course ritual exchange can also be manipulated to only 
serve the interests of a narrow kinship, religious or ideological group.  However 
rituals of exchange are often used to overcome the segregation created by status 
social, religion and ethnic solidarities. Rituals of exchange build responsibility for 
mutual cooperation and extend the networks of friendships in society.  But rituals 
may be ineffective if there is discrimination and injustice within the society. The 
practice of ritual exchange in the marriage process in Ngidiho includes a secret 
means of maintaining balance in the society. Modernization disconnects people 
from their origins if they don’t manage the process of cultural transformation 
carefully. Ritual exchange is a fundamental resource that can break down the 
isolation and alienation experienced between members of a family and of a large 
community who are confronted with rapid social change. 
 
 Rituals of exchange include religious, cultural, economic and political elements, 
that cannot be separated from each other.  For Indonesia, in the context of 
multiculturalism, local rituals can contribute to nation building if political 
pressures from the dominant discourse are used in moderate way. The principles 
of exchange practiced in the North Moluccas discourage the tendency to take 
action that only benefits the stronger party. Rather than stimulating healthy 
exchange, state elites often use conflicts as an opportunity to build their own 
empires. The Indonesian elites use the symbol of the great national family to 
resolve local conflicts in a way that benefits the national leadership, without 
paying attention to the principles of exchange that are practiced in common 
society. Local rebellions are often a protest against the  stagnation of the exchange 
system and the growing gap between social classes.  
 
Some Indonesians believe we need a new ritual structure to break out of the 
decadent structures of the past. Included in the “ritual repertoire” of current 
Indonesian discourse is the rise of the interest in making Indonesia a religious 
state. This political desire is problematic for most Indonesian Muslims since the 
universal ideal of an Islamic state is also exclusive and threatens other universal 
values such as universal cit izenships, equal rights to civic participant, equal 
treatment under the law and religious freedom. My analysis has shown that 
positive, local, Islamic practices in Ngidiho, before the violence, demonstrate the 
capacity of Islam to adjust with the local culture. In contrast, imported “universal” 
ideologies stimulated the violence. 
 
 Religious values and local traditions are vital parts of both national and local 
Indonesian life.  Ritual exchange protects the dignity and equality of all parties 
and avoids excessive centralization of power or the domination of the majority.  
This dissertation shows the double-edged power of ritual in hopes that deeper 
understanding of local traditions in the context of conflict can strengthen our 
common struggle to create a just society. 
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Politiek, ritueel en identiteit in Indonesië: een 
Molukse geschiedenis van religie en sociaal conflict 
(Nederlandse samenvatting) 
 
De Molukken hebben vandaag nog steeds te kampen met de naweeën van het 
geweld van 1999. Dat geweld begon op Ambon in januari van dat jaar en breidde 
zich uit tot de Noord-Molukken in december 1999. In deze studie heb ik de 
dynamiek van dit conflict geanalyseerd in het bredere kader van de veranderingen 
die het district Galela in de recente geschiedenis heeft ondergaan. 
 
Tijdens deze gebeurtenissen was ik in het dorp Ngidiho in Noord-Halmahera 
bezig met een onderzoek naar de gevolgen van de globalisering op deze regio. Ik 
nam het groeiende geweld waar en zag hoe de spanningen geritualiseerd werden 
door middel van politieke symbolen en retoriek. Dat bracht een drastische 
verandering in mijn onderzoek, en ik richtte me op de rol van rituelen als 
machtige mechanismen zowel voor het creëren van solidariteit als voor het 
vergroten van het conflict. Ik nam ritueel als ingang en als analyse- instrument van 
mijn studie tegenover de gangbare visie op de burgeroorlog als primair een 
religieus conflict. 
 
Deze invalshoek maakt het mogelijk om te begrijpen hoe mensen omgaan met het 
leven in een gemeenschap en met de politiek-economische veranderingen die hun 
gemeenschap doormaakte. Als solidariteitsmechanisme verenigt en mobiliseert 
ritueel mensen in een confrontatie met echte of vermeende buitenstaanders maar 
het kan ze ook helpen om overeenstemming te realiseren na de confrontatie. 
 
Rituelen zijn praktijken die betekenis geven aan solidariteit, beginnend op het 
niveau van de familie tot de niveaus van verenigingen, buurtschappen, dorpen, 
districten, provincies en landen. In deze studie definieer ik rituelen als 
dynamische praktijken die geleid en geïnformeerd worden door ideologie, 
herinneringen en gewoonten die gevormd en hervormd worden in overeenstem-
ming met de behoeften van het moment. Deze praktijken zijn gewoonlijk bij 
uitstek symbolische handelingen die heilige waarden belichamen om handelingen 
te rechtvaardigen. Deze waarden worden uitgedrukt in woorden, handelingen, 
gebaren, mythen, symbolen etc. Rituele praktijken consolideren en herstellen een 
gevoel van verbondenheid met een gemeenschap, maar als deze gemeenschap 
uiteenvalt door conflicten, kunnen dezelfde praktijken gebruikt worden om soli-
dariteit tussen de strijdende partijen te creëren op eenzelfde wijze als ze gebruikt 
waren om antagonisme tussen deze partijen tot stand te brengen. 
 
Het feit dat ik temidden van de bevolking van Ngidiho woonde gedurende het 
conflict en na het massale geweld, gaf me een uniek perspectief op de 
gebeurtenissen. Ik ben uitgegaan van de alledaagse praktijken van de bewoners 
waarmee ik de sociale geschiedenis van hun dorp kon reconstrueren.  Mijn eigen 
etnografische verslag is het voornaamste instrument om de hedendaagse 
praktijken van de mensen te onderzoeken. Ik volg de mondelinge overlevering 
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van de mensen door hun handelingen te volgen en de interpretaties die zij er zelf 
aan verlenen. Daarmee laat ik het hedendaagse dorpsleven zien door de ogen van 
de bewoners. Vervolgens analyseer ik primaire en secundaire bronnen om de 
interpretaties en veronderstellingen van andere onderzoekers in de regio te 
begrijpen. 
 
In de alledaagse praktijken van de bevolking van Ngidiho speelt ritueel een 
belangrijke rol. Het brengt een harmonieuze relatie tot stand van de mensen met 
de natuur. Ritueel structureert niet alleen de menselijke levenscyclus maar 
bemiddelt ook tussen mensen wanneer zij crises doormaken in hun families, clans 
en politieke verhoudingen. Ritueel fungeert als een mediërende “taal” die 
onderhandelingen vergemakkelijkt. Ritueel formuleert de ideologische en 
materiële condities en zet die om in concrete handelingen en het gebruikt heilige 
betekenissen om de beslissingen die zij samen bereiken, te legitimeren. Deze 
heilige betekenissen vinden hun oorsprong in de gemeenschappelijke voorouders 
die gezien worden als de goede geesten die hun clans en dorpen beschermen en 
die uiteindelijk ook de bron van het heil kunnen zijn. 
 
Deze traditionele opvattingen veranderen en verdwijnen zelfs gedeeltelijk onder 
invloed van globalisering en de komst van nieuwe religies die de voorouders als 
bron van het heilige vervangen door God. Dit leidde tot ideologische 
veranderingen in de politiek van het ritueel. De modernisering van de landbouw 
bracht nieuwe structuren in de netwerken van verwanten en in leefpatronen. 
Binnen dezelfde materiële context kunnen verschillende concepten gebruikt 
worden om hetzelfde te verklaren. Zo kan de betekenis van locale religieuze 
praktijken aangepast worden aan de Islamitische en Christelijke doctrines zonder 
dat de oude betekenissen geheel verdwijnen. 
 
De economische en ecologische transformatie van Galela leidde tot een 
herformulering van sociale en culturele gebruiken. De veranderingen in de 
materiële bestaansbasis van de gemeenschap dwongen mensen om de 
fundamentele begrippen en de normen voor hun gedrag te herzien. Maar de kloof 
tussen de oude en de jonge generatie belemmert de herformulering van de ideo-
logie in de culturele praktijken. 
 
Op sommige momenten wordt de sociale ongelijkheid tussen bevolkingsgroepen 
ritueel benadrukt. Dat is het geval in de huwelijksrituelen waar de uitwisseling 
tussen de betrokken families het terrein is waarop zij onderhandelen over hun 
positie in de gemeenschap. Dit ritueel is gericht om de handhaving van onderling 
vertrouwen en gelijkheid. Het uitwisselen van geschenken vindt vooral plaats in 
relatie tot mensen buiten het kerngezin. In Ngidiho zijn de relaties tussen broers 
en zussen onvoorwaardelijk, maar zijn die tussen anderen aan bepaalde 
voorwaarden gebonden. Het huwelijk is de voornaamste manier om 
verwantschapsrelaties en gemeenschapsrelaties uit te breiden. Dat geldt ook voor 
vreemdelingen die door hun huwelijk nieuw bloed in de familie brengen waardoor 
zij na hun dood een grote rol als voorouderlijke geesten kunnen spelen. 
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Solidariteit is een de basis waarop de mensen in Ngidiho hun netwerken 
uitbreiden. Dat komt o.m. naar voren in jojobo, een vorm van ‘generalized 
exchange’ die functioneert als een roule rend spaarsysteem waarmee elke familie 
de hoge kosten van de levenscyclusrituelen kan opbrengen. Het systeem maakt het 
mogelijk om mensen van buiten de familie binnen het netwerk van uitwisseling en 
onderlinge steun te brengen. Daarmee wordt uitwisseling het centrale mechanisme 
waarmee solidariteit en identiteit tot stand worden gebracht en onderhouden. 
 
Dat wil niet zeggen dat uitwisseling zonder meer rechtvaardigheid of evenwicht 
creëren in de gemeenschap. In het conflict met de bananenplantage over de grond 
die deze onderneming onttrok aan Galela, namen de dorpelingen hun toevlucht tot 
een ritueel dat hen verenigde in hun strijd. Aan de andere kant leidde het 
toenemende bewustzijn van verschillende religieuze identiteiten tot een polarisatie 
van mensen die door banden van verwantschap, nabuurschap en cultuur met 
elkaar verbonden waren. Voordat dat echter tot een openlijk conflict leidde, 
probeerden families door rituelen de spanningen binnen en tussen families in de 
hand te houden. De bruiloft die ik in het begin van deze studie beschrijf is een 
voorbeeld van hoe ritueel handelen fungeerde temidden van locale spanningen. 
 
De analyse van ritueel handelen vereist dat we begrijpen hoe rituele functioneren 
in de bredere context van onderhandelingen over macht en sociale positie. Een 
‘thick description’ is nodig om de condities en motieven van de betrokken te 
begrijpen. Deze beschrijving beoogt niet om ritueel handelen in een politieke 
context los te maken van de culturele inbedding ervan. De beschrijving is slechts 
een hulpmiddel om te begrijpen dat de totale betekenis van een rituele handeling 
zowel de ideologie omvat die zij uitdrukt als de materiële condities waarover 
onderhandeld wordt. In deze studie onderzoek ik de spanningen tussen de 
materiële belangen van verschillende groepen die van invloed zijn op het ontstaan 
van bepaalde politieke rituelen. Het koloniale streven naar een handelsmonopolie 
maakte gebruik van tegenstrijdige ideologieën die erop gericht waren om de 
samenleving en de bevolking onder controle te brengen en de natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen te exploiteren. De koloniale overheid deden dat door in te spelen op 
de materiële behoeften van de bevolking maar ook door de mentaliteit van deze 
bevolking om te vormen tot grotere loyaliteit. Deze politiek-economische en 
culturele transformatie heeft het district Galela ingrijpen veranderd. 
 
Religie en ritueel bieden wegen om een collectieve identiteit op te bouwen. 
Religie creëert coalities tegen vijanden van de gemeenschap. De kracht van 
gedeelde waarden maakte het ook moge lijk om externe machtsinstanties te 
aanvaarden en ze tegelijkertijd om te vormen om hun kennis te vergroten zonder 
de ideologische inhoud ervan over te nemen. Zo werden de oude feodale relaties 
met de sultan van Ternate radicaal veranderd door de komst van een nieuwe 
macht van buitenaf die gebaseerd was op handel.  
 
Religieuze loyaliteit bond de samenleving in de Noord Molukken samen maar 
deze werd altijd beïnvloed door concurrentie om de handel. In Halmahera begon 
de verbreiding van de Islam en het Christendom langzaam op gang te komen aan 
het einde van de 19e eeuw. Hoewel de sultan van Ternate een Moslim was die de 
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politieke identiteit van Halmahera mede gestalte gaf, ging dit proces niet soepel 
omdat zijn beleid de locale bevolking vaak onder druk zette. Inheemse groepen 
die zich bedreigd voelden door de sultan hielden vast aan hun tribale religie of 
bekeerden zich tot het Christendom. Maar religie en politiek raakten pas echt met 
elkaar verbonden tijdens de verkiezingen van 1955 toen religieuze identiteit de 
basis werd van politieke partijen. In Ngidiho werden de mensen gedwongen zich 
tot de Islam of het Christendom te bekeren voordat zij aan de verkiezingen mee 
konden doen. Maar ook later probeerde de centrale regering in Jakarta politieke 
loyaliteit op de Molukken te creëren door gebruik te maken van oude loyaliteiten. 
Dit gebeurde bijvoorbeeld door de sultan van Ternate tot de regionale leider van 
de regeringspartij Golkar te maken en hem later een terugkeer tot zijn oude 
invloedrijke positie in het vooruitzicht te stellen. De strijd om de regionale macht 
werd dus ingepast in historische herinneringen: politieke rituelen en regionale 
machtsconflicten raakten zo onderling verweven. 
 
De nationale politiek had een groot effect op de regionale verhoudingen in de 
Noord Molukken, zeker toen deze regio de status kreeg van een aparte provincie: 
op dat moment werd de oude rivaliteit tussen de sultanaten van Ternate en Tidore 
nieuw leven ingeblazen waarbij de eerste gesteund werd door Jakarta en de 
voormalige sultan van Tidore de steun kreeg van de Kao en de Makian. Deze 
machtsstrijd was uiteindelijk een van de factoren die het grote conflict in de 
Noord Molukken wist aan te jagen. 
 
In Halmahera waren de rellen niet het resultaat van locale ontwikkelingen, maar 
van nationale politieke spelletjes om de regionale macht en de controle over de 
belangrijke natuurlijke hulpbronnen in het gebied. De politieke instabiliteit bood 
een gelegenheid om gebieden onder controle te krijgen. De bestuurlijke elite nam 
haar toevlucht tot geweld om haar wil op te leggen en de locale bevolking moest 
partij kiezen. Politieke rituelen droegen ertoe bij dat de mensen zich gingen 
voorbereiden op een oorlog. De locale media en de geruchtenmachine droegen 
ertoe bij dat de indruk werd gewekt dat een geweldsuitbarsting onvermijdelijk 
was: een vervalste brief waarin gesuggereerd werd dat de Christenen uit waren op 
een machtsovername in de regio, vormde de lont in het kruidvat. In een ander 
gerucht werd gezegd dat de islamitische Makian de goudmijn in Kao wilden 
overnemen met behulp van de overheid. 
 
Hoewel er in het algemeen een grote mate van religieuze tolerantie bestond (de 
meeste mensen beleden hun officiële religie maar hielden ook nog vast aan hun 
loyaliteit tegenover de voorouders), leidde de angst dat een van beide groepen uit 
was op een machtsgreep tot een uitbarsting van geweld. 
 
De mensen reageerden op verschillende manieren. Allereerst begonnen gewone 
mensen die voorheen vreedzaam samenleefden, elkaar aan te vallen en uit te 
moorden. Daarvoor moesten zij zich losmaken uit hun verwantschapsnetwerken. 
Ze rechtvaardigden hun acties zowel via hun universele religieuze identiteit als 
Moslims of Christenen als via locale voorouderrituelen die hun machtsstructuren 
en aanspraken op de waarheid versterkten. Het ritueel gaf een heilige legitimatie 
van hun handelen, beloofde onschendbaarheid van hun lichamen en helderheid 
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tegenover de ambiguïteit van hun identiteit en status (vgl. Douglas 1988 [1966]: 
103-104). 
 
Vervolgens publiceerden leiders van de bureaucratische elite in Ternate en Tidore 
een aantal boeken en artikelen die een rationele verklaring probeerden te geven 
voor de rechtvaardigheid van de oorlog waarin zij verwikkeld waren. Deze 
publicaties brachten een discours waarin de geschiedenis van de afzonderlijke 
groepen en religies herschreven werden met een claim op het unieke karakter ten 
opzichte van de andere groep en ten opzichte van de voorouderlijke religies. Deze 
historische interpretaties ontbrak het wel aan logische consistentie maar ze 
onthulden een discours dat in globale termen vervat was. 
 
Ongetwijfeld is de “herinnering” aan wat er voor en na de rellen gebeurde een van 
de belangrijke factoren die het conflict bepaalden, maar ook de oplossing daarvan. 
Herinnering bepaalt hoe we verdelingen in een samenleving zien. Zo heeft 
Bauman (1982) aangetoond hoe herinneringen de sociale klassen vormden aan het 
einde van de 18e eeuw. Herinnering maakt de geschiedenis levend en 
samenlevingen hebben behoefte aan een levende geschiedenis in hun pogingen 
om de betekenis te begrijpen van sociale veranderingen. Herinnering is cruciaal in 
het samenbinden van mensen maar tegelijkertijd reconstrueren mensen hun 
herinneringen: ze vergeten een pijnlijke geschiedenis als die niet meer van nut is 
om te overleven in een veranderingsproces. Ook in Halmahera werd een nieuwe 
geschiedenis geschreven na de geweldsuitbarstingen. Dat heeft zeker een politieke 
functie maar de mensen in de dorpen proberen deze pijnlijke gebeurtenissen door 
ze te relateren aan hun religieuze opvattingen. 
 
Zo verklaarden sommigen het geweld als het werk van Satan of ze objectiveerden 
het door het gebruik van het woord ‘ramp’ waarmee ze hun eigen deelname aan 
het geweld konden interpreteren als een natuurverschijnsel. Soms lukt het om 
rampen op die manier te overwinnen, maar soms ook niet. De geschiedenis die in 
de herinnering van gemeenschappen leeft is niet eenduidig en gefixeerd. 
Historische herinneringen kunnen met behulp van traditionele praktijken en 
ideeën aangepast worden als mensen met nieuwe en veranderende situaties 
geconfronteerd worden. 
 
De fysieke grenzen van de etnische geschiedenis die voor december 1999 nog 
onduidelijk waren, werden duidelijk na het conflict. Etnische identiteit werd 
gelijkgesteld met religieuze identiteit. Etnische groepen construeerden zowel 
seculiere als messianistische ideologieën om hun veronderstelde identiteit in stand 
te houden en hun strijd te inspireren (Anderson 1999). Politieke etikettering 
gebaseerd op antagonistische religieuze loyaliteiten leidde tot scherpe 
scheidslijnen in de samenleving. Mensen werden verdeeld naar etniciteit, religie 
en afstamming. In de Noord-Molukken zijn grenzen tussen mensen niet alleen 
maar imaginair maar wel degelijk een fysieke realiteit. Religieuze rituelen 
bevatten taboes die gelden voor de ene gemeenschap maar niet voor de andere. 
Ideologische taboes creëerden de fysieke scheiding tussen de huizen van de 
Moslims en de Christenen in Ngidiho (onder meer om te voorkomen dat de 
varkens die de Christenen hielden, op de erven en in de huizen van de Moslims 
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zouden komen). Tijdens het conflict maakten de vluchtelingen ook geografische 
grenzen gebaseerd op religie: de Moslims vluchtten naar Ternate en Tidore en de 
Christenen naar Tobelo (in de Noord Molukken) en naar Manado-Bitung op 
Noord Sulawesi. 
 
Verbeelde religieuze identiteiten die door geweld tot stand gekomen zijn, 
bedreigen de identiteit van gewone mensen. Maar wanneer mensen van elkaar 
gescheiden zijn door fysieke bedreigingen, dan zal hun fysieke segregatie slechts 
zo lang duren als het fysieke gevaar blijft bestaan. Mensen zoeken naar een vrije 
ruimte in sociale relaties met iedere partij die geen bedreiging vormt, en kunnen 
zich los maken van de imaginaire grenzen die door politieke middelen gecreëerd 
werden om opnieuw relaties aan te knopen via economische uitwisseling. 
 
Na het conflict heroriënteerden de vluchtelingen zich op hun plaats van herkomst 
en steeds minder op hun religieuze identiteit. Christenen uit de Noord Molukken 
identificeerden zich met Halmahera en Moslims met Ternate en Tidore. Deze 
heroriëntatie laat zien dat de plaats van herkomst een belangrijk bindmiddel kan 
zijn voor de verschillende groepen. De bevestiging van hun identiteit via hun 
plaats van herkomst is een proces dat de verzoening in de Noord Molukken op 
gang kan brengen omdat men dan kan aansluiten bij gemeenschappelijke sociaal-
culturele praktijken. 
 
Maar in het geval van de vluchtelingen die in Noord Sulawesi of op Ternate-
Tidore verbleven, was hun identiteit in de eerste plaats verbonden met hun 
landbezit en minder met hun politieke affiliatie. Vluchtelingen in Noord Sulawesi 
noemen zich ‘mensen van Halmahera’. Waarom beschouwden ze zichzelf niet als 
‘mensen van Ternate’ waar het bestuurlijke centrum is? Een reden hiervoor is dat 
tijdens het massale geweld van 1999-2000 de regionale overheid geen bescher-
ming bood. Maar ook noemen ze zichzelf niet ‘mensen van Minahasa’ (Noord 
Sulawesi) omdat ze voor zichzelf geen werk en toekomst zien in deze nieuwe 
regio. Zij zijn erop gericht terug te keren naar hun gebied van herkomst waar zij 
hun grond hebben geërfd van hun voorouders en waar zij een toekomst willen 
opbouwen. 
 
De vluchtelingen in Ternate aan de andere kant identificeren zich als ‘mensen van 
Galela, Loloda of Tobelo’ en niet als ‘mensen van Halmahera’. Gedurende het 
conflict waren de Moslim strijdgroepen op districtsniveau georganiseerd en zo 
werd het district het referentiepunt voor identificatie. Toen zij terugkeerden naar 
hun thuisdorpen konden zij zich beroepen op hun status als ‘autochtonen’ om 
nieuwkomers te weren die het voorzien hadden op het land dat de Christenen op 
hun vlucht hadden achtergelaten. Zo wisten zij de grond van de Christenen te 
beschermen. Een gemeenschappelijke identificatie van zowel de gevluchte 
Christenen als de achtergebleven Moslims die zich allen beschouwen als ‘mensen 
van Halmahera’ omdat zij voorouderlijke grond bezitten in de streek, is een sterke 
locale basis om tot verzoening te komen. 
 
Grondbezit werd zo het uitgangspunt voor een herstel van de verhoudingen. De 
mensen accepteerden het voorouderlijk territorium tona ma langi als plaats waar 
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het reconciliatieproces moest beginnen. Genealogische mythes en voorouderlijke 
rituelen gaven richting aan de onderhandelingen. Beide groepen gebruikten 
elementen uit hun gemeenschappelijke traditie om de verbroken relaties te 
herstellen. Maar ze beriepen zich ook om hun verwantschap met alle mensen 
zoals die door Moslims en Christenen wordt beleden. Naarmate het vertrouwen 
groeit kunnen zij hun relaties weer opbouwen, bij elkaar op bezoek te gaan en 
door weer ruilrelaties aan te gaan via een rituele uitwisseling van hun surplus. 
Non-gouvernementele organisaties droegen bij aan dit proces door in de primaire 
behoeften van de teruggekeerde vluchtelingen te voorzien. Bovendien 
stimuleerden zij dat Moslims meehielpen om de huizen van Christenen te bouwen, 
en omgekeerd. 
 
Reconciliatie opende de weg naar wederopbouw en een normaal economisch 
verkeer maar zij vereiste ook een collectief ritueel van ‘vergeten’ en de creatie 
van een nieuwe regionale solidariteit (vgl. Gulliver 1979: 16). Dit ritueel bevat 
elementen van religieuze en etnische rituelen met de nadruk op wat hun 
gemeenschappelijke afstamming voor hen betekent. 
 
Door hun religieuze exclusivisme af te zwakken en hun gemeenschappelijke 
afstamming te benadrukken konden mensen een gezamenlijk kader creëren voor 
vreedzame onderhandelingen over hoe de toekomst eruit moest zien. Dat geeft de 
kracht aan van een model dat gebaseerd is op rituele uitwisseling en dat krachtiger 
blijkt te zijn dan pogingen van de Indonesische overheid om tot voorziening te 
komen omdat die doorgaans gekanaliseerd worden via de hiërarchie van de 
bureaucratie of via patronage-banden tussen politieke leiders en hun volgelingen. 
Rituele uitwisseling is gebaseerd op reciprociteit en verschaffen daarmee een 
kader voor samenwerking en de uitbreiding van sociale netwerken. 
 
Uitwisselingsrituelen zijn ‘totale instituties’ en omvatten religieuze, culturele, 
economische en politieke elementen die onverbrekelijk met elkaar verbonden zijn. 
Als zodanig kunnen dit soort locale rituelen ook een bijdrage leveren aan het 
proces van staatsvorming in Indonesië omdat ze gebaseerd zijn op gelijkheid. 
Hoewel Indonesische elites sinds Sukarno altijd de metafoor gebruiken van het 
land als één grote familie, hebben ze slechts zelden gebruik gemaakt van de 
principes van uitwisseling bij de oplossing van conflicten. In dat opzicht kan de 
Indonesische overheid nog heel wat leren van de wijze waarop in Ngidiho 
verzoening gezocht wordt. 
 
Religieuze waarden en locale tradities zijn vitale waarden van het nationale en het 
locale leven in Indonesië. Rituele uitwisseling garandeert de gelijkheid van alle 
partijen en voorkomt een excessieve concentratie van macht of de overheersing 
door een meerderheid. In deze studie hoop ik te hebben aangetoond dat ritueel een 
tweesnijdend zwaard is en dat een beter begrip van locale manieren om met 
traumatische conflicten om te gaan kan leren hoe een rechtvaardige samenleving 
tot stand gebracht kan worden. 
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